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Abstract
 
A constant in the Social Panorama of Latin America is 
the chapter on poverty dynamics in Latin America. The 
2008 edition is no exception. Up-to-date estimates and 
analyses of the relevant figures, based on household 
surveys conducted in 18 countries, are provided for the 
year 2007. Three other chapters focus on the specific 
topics of the new employment-related target which has 
been incorporated into the Millennium Development 
Goals, the demographic dividend as an opportunity for 
expanding secondary education coverage, and the issue 
of youth violence and family violence as viewed from a 
perspective of social inclusion.
In the first chapter, the most recent estimates available 
for the countries of Latin America indicate that, in 2007, 
34.1% of the region’s population was living in poverty and 
12.6% in extreme poverty or indigence. The total number 
of poor people stood at 184 million, of whom 68 million 
were indigent. The downward trend observed since 2002 
has continued, with the number of poor persons falling by 
37 million and the number of indigent persons down by 
29 million. Rising food prices in 2007 (and part of 2008), 
however, are estimated to have prevented some 4 million 
persons from escaping from poverty and indigence, thus 
wiping out some of the gains made in terms of growth 
and income distribution. Nevertheless, in 2007, Latin 
America was well set to achieve the first target of the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
The factors associated with poverty reduction are 
also analysed in chapter 1. The region continues to bear 
the stigma of being the most unequal region in the world, 
and the disparity in its income distribution remains high, 
with the average per capita income of households in the 
tenth decile is approximately 17 times greater than that 
of the poorest 40% of households. Nevertheless, most of 
the progress made in 2002-2007 was due to an increase 
in the average incomes —mainly labour income— of the 
poorest households.
The discussion on social disparities looks at the 
perceptions of people in different socio-economic sectors 
and, in particular, seeks to determine whether they feel 
that they are part of society or are excluded from it. For 
most Latin Americans, social inclusion is associated with 
having a profession and an income of one’s own, owning 
property, and having obtained a higher education, speaking 
a foreign language and being computer-literate. On the 
other side of the coin, perceptions and feelings of solitude, 
powerlessness and disorientation are greater among 
persons who are living in households with fewer assets 
and who have a lower level of education. Perceptions and 
feelings of exclusion do not, however, make any substantial 
reduction in individuals’ expectations of social mobility, 
which tend to be more closely linked with perceptions 
relating to the future of the economy.
Between 1990 and 2002, some countries found it 
difficult to reduce poverty. The year 1990 was taken as a 
base year for measuring the advances made by countries 
towards the Millennium Development Goals, and 2002 
reflects the consequences of the worldwide economic 
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stagnation seen in the early years of the twenty-first 
century, as well as the economic crisis that overtook 
Argentina and Uruguay, in particular.
In the past five years (2003-2007), at over 3% per year, 
per capita GDP growth in Latin America has been at its 
highest since the 1970s. For 2008, as a result of the recent 
international financial crisis, slower, albeit still positive, 
growth is projected. Weaker demand for the region’s 
commodity exports, declining migrant remittances and 
scarce credit are just some of the factors that will have 
an adverse effect on aggregate demand in the region’s 
countries. International financial market constraints and 
particularly the tight liquidity situation will be further 
obstacles to the countries in their attempt to maintain the 
pace of growth achieved in the past five years.
In 2009, this economic slowdown will have an 
impact on poverty trends and may thus prolong the 
less favourable turn that poverty levels took in 2008 as 
compared to the trend in 2003-2007, when poverty in the 
region fell significantly. Notwithstanding the most recent 
forecasts, which suggest that the relative incidence of 
poverty continued to decline in 2008, albeit at a slower 
pace than in previous years, there is no denying that the 
absolute number of extremely poor or indigent persons 
has increased slightly. This is mainly attributable to the 
fact that escalating food and oil prices triggered a small 
upswing (0.43 of a percentage point) in indigence in mid-
2008. Clearly, food accounts for a major part of the basic 
basket of consumer items, especially in poor households. 
Although domestic prices for food and fuel have stopped 
rising, an even less favourable situation in 2009 in terms 
of poverty level is to be expected owing to the slower rate 
of growth that will be seen in the region in the wake of 
the current international financial crisis. 
Generally speaking, aggregate employment for the 
region as a whole will probably be flat or even lower in 
2009, and average real wages are expected to remain 
unchanged or to diminish somewhat. Moreover, the 
outlook in terms of how this deterioration in household 
income will be distributed is not encouraging: own-account 
workers and wage earners lacking in job security will be 
the hardest hit, since their jobs are usually most sensitive 
to movements in the business cycle. Poverty and indigence 
will probably increase, and even if the extent of this rise 
is limited, it will still prolong the negative trend that had 
already started in 2008.
The overall situation will differ from one group of 
countries to the next. Those that are most dependent on 
remittances or that have more direct links with the United 
States market are likely to be among the most seriously 
affected. The same applies to those which have a less 
diversified export structure and which rely on the commodity 
markets that have borne the brunt of the global crisis.
The chapter on employment shows that joblessness 
in Latin America remains high and that, as of 2006, 
the rate was still 2.4 percentage points higher than in 
1990. However, since 2002, unemployment rates have 
fallen in most urban areas in the countries of the region. 
Notwithstanding this reduction, sharp inequities persist 
and take the form of higher rates of unemployment 
among the poor, women and youth. This is due to the fact 
that female participation rates, especially among very 
young women, have continued to rise (54.2% around 
2006), while the male participation rate has remained 
stable (78.9%) and has even declined slightly among 
the youngest age groups.
The precarious situation in the region’s labour markets 
is associated with employment in low-productivity sectors, 
which is generally characterized by poor job quality, a 
lack of job security, low wages and a lack of access to 
social security coverage. This situation is often referred 
to as “labour informality”. In 2006, informal workers in 
urban areas of Latin America accounted for 44.9% of 
all workers. Of particular concern is the high percentage 
of urban women employed in low-productivity sectors 
(50.7%), compared with the figure for men (40.5%).
This chapter also looks at the new target (target 1B) of 
the first Millennium Development Goal: achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people. It notes that, for three out of 
the four indicators for monitoring progress towards this 
target, the trend in the region has been favourable: labour 
productivity and the rate of employment have increased 
and worker poverty has diminished. Nevertheless, worker 
vulnerability —measured as own-account and family 
workers over total employed— has remained unchanged.
Improving the quality of workforce integration in 
the labour market, in particular among the poorest, is 
identified as a crucial need. This would involve providing 
better wages, stable contracts, secure working conditions, 
and access to and membership in health-care schemes as 
well as paying into the social security system. Advances 
in these areas are of fundamental importance in order to 
reduce both poverty and income inequality. 
One of the dimensions that should be taken into account 
in evaluating future social development opportunities is 
the demographic transition. This edition of the Social 
Panorama of Latin America contains a chapter which 
assesses the advantages provided by what it known as 
the “demographic dividend”, which accrue to all Latin 
American countries. This dividend is associated with the 
more favourable ratio of the working-age population to 
the dependent-age population (children and older persons) 
that arises during one of the stages of the transition and 
will come to an end once the older population begins to 
increase substantially. Individual countries are at different 
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stages in the demographic transition, since, for some, this 
window of opportunity is closing, while for others it is 
just opening up.
The education sector in most countries is now benefiting 
from a clearly positive demographic dividend, since the 
demand for primary education will continue to decline 
in the coming decades (owing to a relative and absolute 
reduction in the child population) while the demand for 
secondary education will begin to decrease (as a result 
of the relative and subsequently absolute decline in the 
adolescent population). This is a period when governments 
are well placed to set ambitious targets for increasing levels 
of coverage and improving the quality of the secondary 
education cycle. 
However, as pointed out in this section of the 
report, the benefits to be derived from this period do 
not accrue automatically: they depend on the adoption 
of macroeconomic policies that stimulate investment in 
production, increase job opportunities and foster a stable 
social and economic environment that is conducive to 
sustainable development. They also depend on education 
policies and investment in this sector being oriented 
towards anticipating the virtuous effects of the demographic 
dividend, especially in order to expand enrolment in 
secondary schools, improve the quality of the supply of 
public services, and support sectors of the population that 
have less educational capital in order to improve their 
effective learning, their advancement within the school 
system and their graduation from the secondary cycle. 
The chapter on the social agenda focuses on the issue 
of youth and domestic violence in Latin America. Violence 
committed by and against young people is expressed in 
multiple forms, including self-inflicted violence, criminal 
violence, violence associated with international crime 
(drug trafficking), domestic violence and territorial 
violence. Such violence feeds on various forms of social 
and symbolic exclusion among youth, including a lack 
of equal opportunities, a lack of access to employment, 
alienation, discrepancies between symbolic consumption and 
material consumption, territorial segregation, the absence 
of public facilities for social and political participation, 
and an increasingly informal labour market. 
Government authorities consulted for the purposes 
of the preparation of this year’s edition of the Social 
Panorama have stated that the main problems they have to 
contend with in addressing the issue of youth violence are 
crime, gangs, street violence and the carrying of weapons. 
Indeed, the use of weapons is a serious concern in urban 
areas in several Latin American countries. A particularly 
alarming pattern is the involvement of youth gangs in drug 
use, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. 
Government authorities also drew attention to family 
violence, dating violence and intergenerational violence. 
While reporting of gender-based violence and violence 
against women has increased, abused children and youth 
remain largely without protection. Other serious problems 
are self-inflicted violence and violent behaviour related 
to alcohol and drug abuse. 
In Latin American, various approaches have been 
used for preventing youth violence, including approaches 
that focus on risk, citizen security, conflict resolution 
theory and human rights. However, a holistic approach 
by government institutions and the adoption of policies 
that support and coordinate initiatives coming from both 
government and non-governmental institutions are needed. 
Experts suggest that policies geared towards reducing 
violence should be specific, concerted, decentralized 
and participatory. In addition, they recommend primary 
preventive measures, together with appropriate social 
reintegration schemes for rehabilitated youth.
The chapter on the international agenda also reviews 
the agreements adopted in Santiago in November 2007 at 
the seventeenth meeting of the Ibero-American Summit of 
Heads of State and Government, whose central theme was 
social cohesion and social policy and how they can be used 
to create more inclusive societies in Ibero-America.
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Summary
Poverty, social exclusion and unequal income distribution
 Recent poverty trends
According to the latest estimates available for Latin American 
countries for 2007, the poor accounted for 34.1% of the 
total population. Of that percentage, those living in extreme 
poverty or indigence represented 12.6%. These figures 
signify that in 2007 there were 184 million poor persons, 
of whom 68 million were indigent (see figure 1).1
This means that, in 2007, poverty diminished by 
2.2 percentage points from its 2006 level, while indigence 
was down by 0.7 percentage points, thereby continuing 
the downward trend in poverty and indigence observed 
in the region since 2002, when the declines represented 
a remarkable advance: 9.9 and 6.8 percentage points, 
respectively (corresponding to 37 million fewer poor 
people and 29 million fewer indigent persons).
A comparison of the current figures with those of 1990 
shows that the situation in the region is decidedly different 
1
 According to the approach used by ECLAC in estimating poverty, 
a person is classified as “poor” when the per capita income of that 
person’s household is below the poverty line, i.e., the minimum 
income needed to meet a person’s basic needs. In the case of 
indigence, the line is based on the cost of satisfying a person’s 
food needs only.
from what it was 17 years ago. While the percentage of 
Latin Americans living in straitened circumstances remains 
very high, it has fallen by 14 percentage points since the 
beginning of the 1990s. In the case of extreme poverty, the 
reduction has been even more significant: while in 1990, 
one out of every two persons was indigent, the proportion 
is now down to one in three. Historically, however, 2002 is 
the year in which the absolute numbers of persons living 
in poverty and indigence were at their highest: 221 million 
and 97 million persons, respectively.
The latest figures available for 2007 for 11 Latin 
American countries confirm the downward trend that had 
been observed up to 2006, since practically all showed 
reductions in poverty. The most significant decreases (of 
over 3 percentage points per year) occurred in Bolivia and 
Brazil, followed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Honduras and Paraguay, where they exceeded 2 percentage 
points per year. Indigence levels also fell considerably. In 
absolute terms, the sharpest reductions were observed, all 
within the space of one year, in Honduras (3.7 percentage 
points), Panama (2.3 percentage points) and Costa Rica 
(1.9 percentage points) (see table 1).
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Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1980-2008 a
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a




LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERSONS LIVING IN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, AROUND 2002, 2006 AND 2007
(Percentages)
Country
Around 2002 Around 2006 2007
Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence
Argentina a 2002 45.4 20.9 2006 21.0 7.2 … … …
Bolivia 2002 62.4 37.1 2004 63.9 34.7 2007 54.0 31.2
Brazil 2001 37.5 13.2 2006 33.3 9.0 2007 30.0 8.5
Chile 2000 20.2 5.6 2006 13.7 3.2 … … …
Colombia 2002 51.5 24.8 2005 46.8 20.2 … … …
Costa Rica 2002 20.3 8.2 2006 19.0 7.2 2007 18.6 5.3
Dominican Republic 2002 47.1 20.7 2006 44.5 22.0 2007 44.5 21.0
Ecuador a 2002 49.0 19.4 2006 39.9 12.8 2007 38.8 12.4
El Salvador 2001 48.9 22.1 2004 47.5 19.0 … … …
Guatemala 2002 60.2 30.9 2006 54.8 29.1 … … …
Honduras 2002 77.3 54.4 2006 71.5 49.3 2007 68.9 45.6
Mexico 2002 39.4 12.6 2006 31.7 8.7 … … …
Nicaragua 2001 69.4 42.5 2005 61.9 31.9 … … …
Panama 2002 36.9 18.6 2006 29.9 14.3 2007 29.0 12.0
Paraguay 2001 61.0 33.2 2005 60.5 32.1 2007 60.5 31.6
Peru b 2001 54.7 24.4 2006 44.5 16.0 2007 39.3 13.7
Uruguay a 2002 15.4 2.5 2005 18.8 4.1 2007 18.1 3.1
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 2002 48.6 22.2 2006 30.2 9.9 2007 28.5 8.5




 Figures compiled by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. These values are not comparable with those of previous years owing to changes in the 
sample framework used in the household survey. In addition, the figures given for 2001 correspond to the fourth quarter, whereas those shown for 2006 and 2007 correspond to 
the entire year.
Judging from GDP growth projections and inflation 
forecasts in the various countries, it is to be expected that 
poverty will continue to diminish in 2008, albeit at a slower 
pace, to stand at 33.2% (almost one percentage point 
below the 2007 rate). Indigence is expected to increase 
slightly, however, by approximately 0.4 of a percentage 
point. These results reflect, to a great extent, the impact 
of the upswing in inflation recorded since the beginning 
of 2007 and, in particular, during the last part of that year 
and the first half of 2008. 
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Although food and fuel costs are no longer spiralling 
out of control and inflation has eased, the international 
financial crisis growth is likely to be reflected in a 
slowdown in the region. This, in turn, would suggest 
that the situation with regard to poverty rates will be less 
favourable in 2009. 
The repercussions of the crisis will be felt on several 
fronts. Some of its main manifestations may well be 
weaker demand for the region’s exports and a reduction 
in migrant remittances. These factors will dampen 
aggregate demand in the countries of the region, while 
international financial market constraints and the tight 
liquidity and credit situation will also restrain per capita 
GDP growth. In this context, total employment in the 
region will probably tend to stagnate, while real wages 
are not likely to increase and may even fall slightly. Own-
account workers and wage earners in unstable jobs are 
those that are most likely to suffer from this deterioration 
in household income, since they are the most vulnerable 
to cyclical downturns. Poverty and indigence levels will 
therefore probably rise, thus prolonging the negative trend 
that emerged in 2008 that put an end to a five-year period 
of declining poverty and indigence rates.
This slight increase in poverty overall, which may be 
steeper in some countries, could be moderated if governments 
implement policies that prevent the burden of the crisis from 
falling on the lowest-income sectors and that salvage some 
of the improvements achieved since 2002.
As indicated in two recent ECLAC publications, 
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
2007-2008 and Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
World Economy, 2007. Trends 2008, the region will not 
remain immune to the crisis, but is nonetheless better 
placed than it has been in the past to cope with such an 
event by, inter alia, implementing or stepping up measures 
to mitigate the impact that the slacker demand for labour 
will have on poor households and on those that might 
slip into poverty.
 Rising food prices and their impact on poverty rates
Like most other regions in the world, the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries were hit, especially in 2007 and 
the first half of 2008, by sharp rises in international food 
prices that were triggered by a series of entirely external 
factors. Moreover, many of the products whose prices 
climbed the most sharply were items in the basket of 
staple foods used by the poorest, such as rice, wheat and 
maize. Between January 2007 and June 2008, prices for 
these products shot up by between 80% and 90%. The 
situation started to ease towards the middle of 2008, when 
prices began to subside, although they have remained 
above the levels recorded in or prior to 2006.
Some Latin American and Caribbean countries are 
expected to be less vulnerable than others to higher food 
prices, in particular those that are net exporters of food 
products and those that have higher foreign exchange 
reserves or whose terms of trade allow them greater 
flexibility. This is not the case of Central America, for 
example, and the increase in food prices is thus expected to 
have a regressive impact in that subregion, although it will 
vary depending on the country and population in question. 
Generally speaking, the impact of rising international food 
prices on poverty rates will depend on the extent to which 
they are passed through to the local market, the level of 
poverty existing in the country, the ratio of households 
that are net food purchasers to those that are net food 
vendors, the percentage of the household budgets that are 
spent on food and the variation in the purchasing power 
of earnings from low-productivity jobs.
The poverty and indigence measurements presented 
at the beginning of the chapter take into account the 
impact of higher food prices, since these higher prices 
are reflected in the increase in the value of the respective 
poverty lines.2 Therefore, the very limited reduction in 
poverty and the increase in indigence projected for 2008, 
which, as mentioned earlier, represent a departure from 
the downward trend recorded since 2002, are indications 
of the influence that this trend is expected to have had 
on prices. In order to estimate the impact of this factor, a 
simulation exercise has been conducted which consisted 
of recalculating indigence and poverty rates based on the 
assumption that prices for food have risen at the same 
rate as those of other goods. 
2
 Since 2007, different price deflators have been used for indigence 
and poverty lines. This marks a departure from previous practice, 
where both lines were updated using a single deflator. The value 
of the indigence line is now updated on the basis of variations in 
the consumer price index (CPI) for food, while the portion of the 
poverty line that relates to expenditure on non-food items is updated 
on the basis of the variation in the corresponding CPI. 
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The simulations that were carried out suggest that the 
rise in food prices in 2007 prevented 4 million persons from 
escaping from poverty and indigence who would otherwise 
have done so. This effect was even more significant in 2008, 
since the cumulative increase in food costs since late 2006 has 
swelled the numbers of poor persons by 11 million compared 
with the numbers that would have been in this situation if food 
costs had risen at the same rate as those of other goods (see 
table 2). This means that, if the actual situation matched the 
simulation, the rate of indigence projected for 2008 would 
have been 1 percentage point lower, rather than 0.34 of a 
percentage point higher, than the 2007 level.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICA: SIMULATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE RISE IN FOOD PRICES ON THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AND 
INDIGENCE, 2007 AND 2008 a
(Percentages and millions of persons)
Percentages Millions of persons




Indigence 12.6 11.9 0.7 67.8 64.2 3.6
Poverty 34.1 33.4 0.7 183.9 180.0 3.9
2008 (projection)
Indigence 12.9 10.9 2.0 70.8 59.6 11.2
Poverty 33.2 31.2 2.0 181.6 170.7 10.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant 
countries
a
 The rise in food prices was equal to the rise in the CPI for all other goods as from December 2006.
In terms of the impact on different countries, the 
situation varies considerably. The simulation exercise 
indicates that cumulative price rises in 2007 and 2008 
had the greatest impact on indigence in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and 
Uruguay, where the number of persons living in indigence 
is approximately 50% higher than it would have been if 
food price rises had not been so much steeper than they 
were for other goods. In these countries, together with 
Costa Rica, the rise in food prices accounts for an increase 
of 15% or more in the number of poor persons.
In short, the rise in food prices has been a major factor 
in the deterioration in the living conditions of the poorest 
groups, wiping out a portion of the advances achieved in 
terms of growth and income distribution. Although this 
phenomenon subsided somewhat towards the end of 2008, 
mechanisms are needed to mitigate the impact of price 
rises on the budgets of the poorest households.
 Assessing progress towards the first target of the  
 Millennium Development Goals
Up to 2007, Latin America was well set to fulfil the 
first target of the Millennium Development Goals. The 
percentage of indigent persons in the region (12.6%) was 
just a bit more than one percentage point short of the target 
of 11.3%. This means that, in the 68% of the total time 
available for meeting the target that has elapsed so far, 
88% of the ground has already been covered.
The progress made at the regional level is the result 
of varying trends in the different countries. Four of 
them, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador (data for urban areas) and 
Mexico, have achieved the first target of the Millennium 
Development Goals, and Costa Rica may be regarded as 
being in the same category, since it is 95% of the way to 
the target. Five other countries (the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru) 
have advanced at a similar rate or at a faster pace than 
expected, with percentages ranging from 65% to 90%. 
The remaining countries have lagged behind. Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay are the countries that 
are the farthest from achieving the proposed target, in 
absolute terms, with shortfalls that are close to or exceed 
12 percentage points (see figure 2).
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Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): ADVANCES IN REDUCING 
EXTREME POVERTY BETWEEN 1990 AND 2007 a
(Percentages)




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 The amount of progress made (expressed as a percentage) is calculated by dividing 
the percentage-point reduction (or increase) in indigence registered during the period 
by one half of the indigence rate for 1990. The dotted line represents the amount of 
progress expected by 2007 (68%).
b
 Urban areas.
From the simulations based on the household surveys, 
it may be inferred that the average growth rate required 
by the region in order to achieve the first target of the 
Millennium Development Goals is 1.2%, a figure similar 
to the population growth forecast up to 2015. This rate 
is very low partly because of the “subsidy” represented 
by the fact that Brazil, Chile and Mexico, which account 
for approximately 60% of the region’s population, have 
already exceeded the target. 
The international financial crisis and the resulting world 
economic slowdown are expected to have repercussions 
on poverty levels that cast doubt on the feasibility of 
achieving the target set for 2015. As already indicated, a 
moderate increase in poverty and indigence is predicted for 
2009. In any event, bearing in mind the degree of progress 
achieved up to 2007, the target continues to be achievable 
for most countries, although the final result will ultimately 
depend on the duration of the period of low growth and the 
depth of the difficulties it entails. Since the region is in a 
sounder macroeconomic position to confront this episode 
than it was during previous crises, it will be better able to 
deploy measures to lessen the negative consequences of 
slower growth on the incomes of the poorest households. 
If the recession continues for an extended period of time, 
however, it may prevent the countries that are currently 
furthest from the mark (and that therefore need to attain 
and sustain high growth rates in order to achieve the 
required reduction) from reaching the target.
The aggregate analyses conducted at the national level 
should be complemented with others that describe the 
advances made in relation to specific population groups 
and categories. To this end, four dimensions have been 
selected: (i) the place of residence of the population, by 
urban and rural area; (ii) the educational background of 
the household, in other words, the average number of years 
of schooling of the head of household and the spouse, 
which captures the stock of human capital (a determining 
factor with respect to access to employment and household 
income); (iii) the sex of the head of household, which 
serves to highlight the greater vulnerability associated with 
having a female head of household and which normally 
is the case in households without a male partner; and 
(iv) the ethnic or racial origin of the population.
The breakdown by country yields varying results, since 
some countries have achieved inclusive progress, in which 
there are no significant differences between the groups 
considered, while in others the gap has widened. In any 
event, it is clear that an exercise of this type is necessary in 
order to arrive at a better understanding of the process of 
poverty reduction and in order to determine whether there 
are groups that are lagging behind the overall trend. 
 Factors associated with poverty reduction in the region 
The relationship between the variation in household income 
and its impact on the poverty rate may be analysed by 
examining, on the one hand, the increase in the average 
income of individuals, or the “growth effect”, and, on 
the other, changes in the way in which that income is 
distributed, or the “distribution effect”. 
On this basis, much of the progress made in alleviating 
poverty and indigence in Latin America in 2002-2007 is 
attributable to an increase in average household income. 
This is especially true in the countries that have achieved the 
highest percentage-point reductions in poverty. Nevertheless, 
the parts played by the growth and distribution effects 
in the various countries of the region have differed, and 
improvements in income distribution have been the main 
cause of the reductions in poverty and indigence achieved 
in a number of countries. 
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Higher average income has been the main factor in 
diminishing poverty and indigence in Argentina (urban 
areas), Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador (urban areas), Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico 
and Nicaragua, which are, moreover, among the countries 
that have achieved the most significant improvements 
in poverty and indigence rates during the period under 
consideration. In the case of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador and Panama, more than half of the 
decrease in poverty and indigence rates has been due to 
the distribution effect (see figure 3).
Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): GROWTH EFFECT AND 
DISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF CHANGES IN POVERTY  













































































Growth effect Distribution effect Total variation
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries. 
a
 The Dominican Republic has been omitted as well as Guatemala (under indigence) 
because the disaggregated results are not significant.
b
 Urban areas.
Nevertheless, even in the countries where the distribution 
effect was the predominant factor, the progress that was 
made would have been considerably less if it had not been 
supplemented by improvements in distribution. In fact, there 
are few countries where the increase in average income 
corresponds to more than three quarters of the reduction 
in poverty and indigence. This is the case in Colombia, 
Ecuador and Guatemala. In the other countries in which 
the growth effect has been predominant, the change in 
distribution accounts for between 30% and 40% of poverty 
reduction and for somewhat higher percentages in the case 
of the decline in indigence levels. 
The variation in total household income may also be 
analysed on the basis of the change in the main sources 
of income, namely: labour income, government transfers, 
private transfers, capital income and other income. This 
analysis indicates that between 2002 and 2007, labour 
income accounted for most of the variation observed in 
the average household income of lower-income groups. In 
particular, in the seven countries with the most significant 
poverty rate reductions, the increase in labour income 
accounts for approximately 77% of the growth in total 
income (69% in the case of indigent households). Labour 
income was also the most important factor in the variation 
in total per capita income of poor households in the other 
countries. In Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay, no less than 65% of the change in 
total income stemmed from the increase in labour income. 
Guatemala and Honduras were the only countries in which, 
this source played a smaller part and, in Guatemala, the 
pattern of variation was actually the opposite of what it was 
in the case of the other sources (see figure 4).
Figure 4
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL INCREASE IN  
TOTAL INCOME PER PERSON AND CONTRIBUTION OF  
EACH SOURCE TO INCOME OF INDIGENT AND  




















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Countries are grouped in three categories on the basis of poverty trends from 2002 
to 2007: significant reduction, no change or significant increase.
b
 Urban areas.
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The increase in wages was mainly attributable to an 
increase in labour income per employed person, in particular 
in the countries that reduced their poverty rates the most. In 
countries where there has not been any substantial decline in 
poverty levels, labour income per employed person has also 
had an impact, although in most cases it has been less of a 
factor than the net employment rate (number of employed 
persons over the number of economically active persons).
 Recent changes in income distribution
Income distribution is still more unequal in Latin America 
than anywhere else in the world. Improving the distribution 
of income and other assets will therefore continue to be 
one of the most important tasks facing the region in the 
years ahead. The huge gaps between rich and poor that 
exist in the Latin American countries can be seen by 
comparing the ratios between the highest-income decile 
and the four lowest-income deciles and between the 
fifth quintile (i.e., the 20% of households at the upper 
end of the spectrum) and the first quintile. According 
to the first of these two indicators, average per capita 
income in the tenth decile is about 17 times higher than 
among the poorest 40% of households. This ratio varies 
considerably from one country to another, from 9-to-1 in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay, to 25-
to-1 in Colombia. Per capita income in the richest quintile 
is on average 20 times higher than it is for the poorest 
quintile and ranges from 10 times higher in Uruguay to 
33 times higher in Honduras.
Changes in the structure of income distribution between 
2002 and 2007 reveal three clearly distinct situations. Nine 
countries (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Paraguay) have significantly narrowed the gap between 
the groups at the extreme ends of the spectrum, both by 
increasing the poorer groups’ share of total income and by 
lowering that of the highest-income households. The most 
notable reductions in the two aforementioned indicators 
(36% and 41%, respectively) were recorded in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. Significant improvements were 
also observed in Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua, where both 
indicators fell by about 30% (see figure 5). The second 
group consists of countries in which income distribution 
has remained relatively unchanged. These countries are 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. 
Although the income gap has tended to shrink in most 
of them, the variations have not been highly significant. 
Meanwhile, the income gap has widened between the 
richest and poorest segments of society in the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala and Honduras.
Most of the improvements in income distribution were 
generated by changes in labour income. Higher wage income 
was in fact the main factor of income growth in the lowest 
quintile. This also applied to some extent in the highest 
quintile, where a small increase in wage income was partially 
or totally counteracted by decreases in other sources.
Figure 5












































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a
 Countries ordered by percentage variation in the indicator.
b
 Urban areas.
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Inequality in income distribution can also be measured 
using synthetic indices that sum up the situation of income 
distribution for the whole population in a single indicator.3 
The inequality indicators for 2002-2007 corroborate the 
existence of an overall positive trend in income distribution. 
In the nine countries mentioned, each inequality indicator 
fell by at least 5%. Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
are the countries in which income distribution worsened 
notably in the period in question (see figure 6).
A longer-term comparison of Gini indices reveals 
that current inequality levels are at their lowest since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Around 1990, the simple average 
of the Gini indices for the region’s countries was 0.532. 
In 2007, this average, when calculated on a comparable 
basis in terms of countries and geographical areas, was 
0.515. Nevertheless, this represents a decline of barely 
3%, which can by no means be interpreted as a significant 
shift in income distribution patterns in the region.
3
 There are several synthetic indicators, such as the Gini, Theil and 
Atkinson indices, which differ in, among other things, the relative 
weight they assign to each aspect of income distribution. They are 
therefore useful in complementing one another. 
Figure 6




























Countries in which inequality
decreased
Countries in which inequality 
increased
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
 Poverty and perceptions of inclusion and exclusion 
The recent agreement between ECLAC and Corporación 
Latinobarómetro has made it possible to incorporate a 
long-overlooked element into the analysis, namely, people’s 
perception of social inclusion and exclusion and how that 
perception is related to the assets they have. 
In Latin America, how the very poor (and the rest of 
the population, for that matter) perceive social inclusion 
reflects their aspirations for economic autonomy and material 
well-being and their desire to possess the essential skills 
needed to get ahead in a knowledge- and information-
based society. In 18 countries in the region and across all 
socio-economic groups, the most frequently cited signs 
of inclusion are: having a trade or profession, having 
an income of one’s own, owning property and having a 
post-secondary education. Also, for a large percentage 
of Latin Americans, and again without answers varying 
substantially from one socio-economic group to another, 
speaking a foreign language and knowing how to use a 
computer are viewed as skills that are necessary in today’s 
society. A large proportion of people also maintain that 
not having a disability is essential for social inclusion 
(see figure 7).
Given that the poorest members of society lack 
most of the elements that contribute to social inclusion, 
it is not surprising that perceptions and sensations of 
exclusion are stronger among the poor than among 
the non-poor. Feelings of loneliness, impotence and 
disorientation are most common among Latin Americans 
who live in lower-income households and have lower 
levels of education. Feelings of exclusion are not linked 
solely to a lack of material assets, however. Belonging 
to an ethnic minority that is discriminated against, not 
participating in conventional institutions and suffering 
from social isolation are also associated with higher 
levels of perceived exclusion (see figure 8).
Feelings of exclusion do not substantially lower 
expectations of social mobility among the poor, however, 
because these are more closely linked to perceptions 
of the country’s economic prospects. Latin Americans 
from poorer households who are pessimistic about the 
country’s economic future have lower expectations (the 
standard of living they expect to attain) than aspirations 
(the standard of living they think they deserve), while 
poor people who are optimistic about the future of the 
economy have higher expectations than aspirations. 
This suggests that the poorer segments of the population 
would respond positively to social policies that create 
opportunities for them.
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Figure 7
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): WHAT IS NEEDED TO  






















Property, land or house
Not being disabled
Speaking a foreign language
Being a homeowner
Using a computer
Participating in volunteer work
Having something to say
Having a driver’s licence
Doing things that are important to others
Living in a large city
Participating in politics
Having close friends
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the 2007 Latinobarómetro survey.
a
 The question asked was: “People can feel included or excluded in society. Which of 
the following do you think are necessary in order for you to feel part of the society 
in which you live?”.
Figure 8
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTIONS AND FEELINGS 























0-1 asset 2-4 assets 5-6 assets 7-8 assets
High Moderate Low
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of the 2007 Latinobarómetro survey.
a
 The perceptions-of-exclusion index was constructed on the basis of people’s agreement 
or disagreement with the following statements: “sometimes I feel I am a failure,” “I 
have no influence over most problems,” “often I feel alone” “sometimes you have to 
do things that aren’t right in order to get on in life,” and “life is so complicated that I 
don’t think I will be able to get ahead.”
Employment, poverty and the new target of the  
first Millennium Development Goal
The labour market is the main link between economic 
growth and poverty reduction. Job creation, increases 
in real wages (associated with higher productivity) and 
the coverage and characteristics of the social protection 
afforded to workers are the mechanisms through which 
growth is translated into better incomes and well-being 
for households with economically active members. A 
lack of access to quality employment, on the other 
hand, is a determining factor in poverty and social 
inequalities that are reproduced over time, as reflected 
in the stark and persistent income concentration existing 
in the region. 
 Overview of regional employment: structural problems  
 and trends 
Unemployment in Latin America remains high 
and, according to data from household surveys, is 
2.4 percentage points higher than it was in 1990. 
However, during the period of sustained economic 
growth between 2002 and 2006, unemployment rates 
dropped in the vast majority of urban areas in the region’s 
countries, following a widespread rise in unemployment 
during the 1990s (see table 3 and figure 9). The most 
dramatic reductions were observed in Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama 
and Uruguay, which had all experienced extremely high 
unemployment up to 2002.
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Table 3
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT, PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGE LABOUR AND  
INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT (BOTH SEXES AND MEN AND WOMEN), AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006 a
(Urban areas)
Both sexes Women Men
1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006
Unemployment rate b 6.2 10.5 8.6 6.9 12.5 10.4 5.8 9.1 7.1
Participation rate 60.3 64.4 65.8 43.0 51.4 54.2 79.8 78.9 78.9
Employment rate 56.6 57.6 60.2 40.0 45.0 48.6 75.2 71.8 73.3
Wage labour rate 67.5 66.3 67.4 63.9 67.6 68.2 69.7 65.4 66.8
Informal employment rate c 48.5 47.2 44.9 54.5 52.6 50.7 45.0 43.5 40.5





 Unemployment rates derived from household surveys in Colombia, Dominican Republic and Panama include hidden unemployment.
c
 Percentage of people employed in low-productivity sectors. The weighted average does not include Colombia.
Figure 9
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG PEOPLE AGED 15 AND ABOVE, URBAN AREAS,  
2002-2006 AND 1990-2006 a
(Percentages)
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Countries in which 
unemployment fell
Countries in which 
unemployment fell
Countries in which 
unemployment rose
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a
 The regional total is a weighted average. The figures for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to the eight main cities plus El Alto, for Paraguay to Asunción and the 
Central Department, and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the national total. Unemployment rates derived from household surveys in Colombia, Dominican Republic 
and Panama include hidden unemployment. The regional figure does not include Nicaragua because no information on that country was available for 2006.
The region’s labour markets continue to exhibit 
structural problems in terms of equity, as is reflected 
in the fact that unemployment rates are higher among 
women, young people and the poor (see figure 10). 
Although unemployment rates in the poorest decile of 
households fell from 30.2% to 23.8% in 2002-2006, 
the gap between that and the wealthiest decile is still 
over 20 percentage points. The reduction in urban 
unemployment has not narrowed the gaps between 
men and women, as unemployment rates remain higher 
among women. Although youth unemployment declined 
significantly between 2002 and 2006, it is nonetheless 
higher than in other age groups and also exceeds the 
level recorded in 1990.
The labour participation rate is continuing to rise in 
the region, thanks to the growing incorporation of women 
into the labour market. The participation rate for women 
climbed from 51.4% to 54.2% between 2002 y 2006, while 
the rate for men remained stable at 78.9%. During the period 
1990-2006, the participation rate for women increased by 
11 percentage points, while the rate for men dropped by 
almost one percentage point. However, the male participation 
rate is 25 percentage points higher than the rate for women 
(see table 3). In this regard, cultural factors related to the 
division of labour in the household are still a determining 
factor, especially in the poorest strata: around 2005, the 
participation rate for women in the poorest decile of Latin 
American society was 37%, compared with 76% for men.
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Figure 10
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
AMONG PEOPLE AGED 15 AND ABOVE, URBAN AREAS,  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Weighted average. The data for 2006 do not include Nicaragua. Data on the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are nationwide figures. Unemployment rates 
derived from household surveys in Colombia, Dominican Republic and Panama 
include hidden unemployment.
Precarious employment in the region has a high correlation 
with low-productivity employment, which also tends to 
be of low quality with limited job security, low wages and 
lack of access to social security systems. The percentage 
of informal workers in urban areas dropped from 47.2% to 
44.9% between 2002 and 2006 (the trend has been fairly 
positive since the early 1990s, when the figure was 48.5%). 
In all the countries except Chile, 40% or more of those who 
work are own-account workers or domestic workers or are 
employed in low-productivity and low-income micro- or small 
enterprises. Of particular concern is the high proportion of 
women in urban areas who work in low-productivity sectors 
(50.7%) compared with men (40.5%).
Another indicator to be considered when analysing the 
quality of employment is the proportion of wage earners 
among the total number of workers, as shortfalls in this area 
encourage own-account work but also result in less competitive 
sectors becoming part of the informal sector (which has a 
particularly strong impact on contractual relations). In the 
period 2002-2006, wage labour in urban areas increased 
by one percentage point to 67.4%, which is higher than the 
level observed in the early 1990s (see table 3).
Income from employment is another aspect of job 
quality that is vital for poverty reduction. Variations in this 
category of income are linked to the behaviour of human 
capital and patterns of productivity, the competitiveness 
of the sectors providing employment, and the level of 
protection and the negotiating power of workers (which in 
turn is related to factors such as the degree of unionization 
and the possibility of collective bargaining). According to 
household surveys, the labour income of workers in urban 
areas increased slightly in real terms in 2002-2006, with 
the regional average rising from US$ 377 to US$ 397 per 
month at 2000 prices (an annual increase of 1.3%). Monthly 
wages increased at a faster rate (annual growth of 2.0%), 
climbing from US$ 350 to US$ 378 at 2000 prices.4 These 
increases are not in line with the growth of per capita GDP 
in the region for the same period, which was around 3.3% 
per year. This is partly because the monthly labour income 
of urban workers in low-productivity sectors fell from 
US$ 345 to US$ 283 at 2000 prices between 1990 and 
2006, widening the gap with formal-sector workers, whose 
incomes averaged US$ 493 in 2006 (see figure 11).
Figure 11
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN REAL WAGES, 

































Total workersWorkers in low-productivity sectors
Workers in medium- and high-productivity sectors
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Some of the years falling between the periods considered above, wage levels have 
fallen as a result of various crises.
Around 2006, 37% of workers nationwide and 44% 
of those in urban areas reported that they were paying 
contributions to social security systems, and these figures 
have been fairly stable since 2002. These averages 
nonetheless conceal major differences among countries. 
In Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Peru, a third or less of urban workers were 
contributing to social security systems, while in Chile and 
Costa Rica, coverage was above two thirds of all workers. 
These data clearly show that the region’s labour markets 
4
 A recent report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) states 
that, between 1995 and 2006, trends in real wages in 11 of the region’s 
countries had been fairly unsatisfactory, increasing in some cases and 
falling in others: in Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay 
wages declined to varying degrees, while in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru there were slight 
increases. Honduras was the only country to post significant wage 
increases in the period of the study (see ILO, Evolución de los salarios 
en América Latina 1995-2006, Santiago, Chile, October 2008).
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have not fulfilled their role of providing universal access 
to social protection systems. The situation is particularly 
difficult in rural areas and for informal workers, although 
this is not to say that urban workers in formal employment 
automatically enjoy protection. Furthermore, although rates 
of contributing workers are similar among men and women, 
a significant gender gap is revealed when the total working-
age population is included (rather than just the employed): 
only 15% of women are members of social security systems, 
compared with 25% of men (see figure 12).
The low coverage rate of social protection systems in 
the region’s countries is a factor that is largely determined 
by the level of formality of their labour markets. It is 
therefore vital to implement policies that create formal 
jobs for workers who are supporting dependents but 
have no access to social protection systems. In Latin 
American countries, the nature of the challenges inherent in 
introducing such policies depends on the stage of maturity 
of the labour market (which determines the number of 
workers funding contributory social protection) and the 
country’s stage of demographic transition (which dictates 
the level and structure of dependency).
Figure 12
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): WORKERS a COVERED BY THE 
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Workers with social security 
coverage as a percentage
of the working-age
population:
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Employed workers aged 15 and above who declared labour income. The figure 
corresponds to wage earners in general in Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. Simple average.
 The new employment target of the first  
 Millennium Development Goal
Employment is a human right that plays a fundamental 
role in social integration, in having a meaningful 
personal life and in opportunities to participate actively 
in society. At the same time, employment is also the 
engine driving material progress in Latin American 
households, as labour earnings are the main source of 
monetary income.5 The importance of employment 
and the close link between the labour market and 
improvements in people’s levels of well-being have 
recently been recognized by the United Nations as 
a new target of the Millennium Development Goals 
(target 1.B): “to achieve full and productive employment 
and decent work for all, including women and young 
people”. The target was adopted in 2008 and has been 
included in the first Millennium Development Goal: “to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”. Although this 
is not a quantitative target with levels to be reached by 
a certain date, the message for the region’s countries 
is clear: efforts should be focused on improving the 
5
 Around 2006, 79% of total household income in urban areas of 
Latin America came from the participation of members of the 
household in the labour market.
functioning of the labour market in order to generate 
quality employment, as this represents the main means 
of reducing poverty and inequality. 
Measuring complex concepts such as full and productive 
employment and decent work as part of the new target 
is a major challenge. There are four official indicators to 
be used to monitor the new employment target, with two 
focusing on income as a part of decent work:
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio
1.6 Proportion of employed people living on less 
than US$ 1 (PPP) per day
1.7 Own-account and contributing family workers 
as a proportion of total employment
Between 1990 and 2006, the regional trends for three 
of the four indicators were positive: labour productivity 
and the employment rate increased, while poverty among 
the employed fell. However, the vulnerability of workers 
(measured as the proportion of the employed who are own-
account workers and unpaid family workers) remained 
stable (see figure 13).
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Figure 13
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS IN INDICATORS USED FOR MONITORING THE NEW EMPLOYMENT TARGET OF THE FIRST  
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL, 1992-2006, 1990 and 2006
(Percentages)



















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant 
countries, and United Nations, Millennium Goals Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/. 
a
 Simple average. 
b
 Weighted average.
Productive employment is one of the elements that 
make up the concept of decent work, and it is a fundamental 
factor in poverty reduction. The first indicator for monitoring 
the new employment target of the first Millennium 
Development Goal is therefore the growth rate of GDP 
per person employed, which can be used to assess whether 
the country’s economic conditions are able to generate and 
sustain opportunities for decent work with fair and equitable 
wages. Countries that successfully increase productivity are 
expected to see lower poverty, and this correlation will be 
even more apparent in countries with more equitable income 
distribution, where the impact of increased production 
should reach low-income groups more quickly. In Latin 
America, however, the slow growth of labour productivity 
since the beginning of the 1990s has failed to contribute 
to the reduction of extreme poverty. Between 1992 and 
2006, value added per job grew at an annual average rate 
of 0.6% for the 18 countries of Latin America. 
The link between increased productivity and poverty 
reduction is even stronger when the productivity gain goes 
hand in hand with job creation. The second indicator for 
monitoring target 1.B is therefore the employment rate, 
defined as the proportion of the working-age population 
that is employed. This measures both labour-market 
participation and the economy’s capacity to absorb 
the workforce. 
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The employment rate in Latin America rose between 
1990 and 2006, mainly because of women entering the 
labour market. During this period, employment rates fell 
among men and edged up slightly among young people. 
The latter was the net effect of two contrasting phenomena: 
fewer employed people among the male population and 
higher employment rates among young women.
The proportion of employed people living on less than 
US$ 1 (PPP) per day reflects a key element of the lack of 
decent work worldwide: if workers do not generate enough 
income to pull themselves and their families out of extreme 
poverty, their jobs can hardly be called “decent”. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the percentage of employed 
people living on less than US$ 1 per day fell by just over three 
percentage points, from 11.6% in 1997 to 8.0% in 2007.
Based on the method traditionally utilized by ECLAC, 
indigence and poverty rates for employed persons were 
calculated using individual poverty lines for each country. 
These calculations show that large groups of workers are 
still poor: in Chile and in Honduras, between 7% and 63% 
of workers live in poverty, and between 1% and 40%, 
respectively, are indigent. The regional trend was positive 
between 1990 and 2006, with the percentage of poor workers 
falling from 39.7% to 29.5% and the percentage of indigent 
workers dropping from 17.5% to 11.4%. In most countries 
the percentage of poor workers fell throughout the period: 
there was a reduction of 18 percentage points in Chile and 
a drop of 14 percentage points in Brazil and Mexico. The 
exceptions were Argentina and Uruguay, where poverty 
among the employed increased slightly, and Bolivia and 
Paraguay, where the poverty rate for workers rose by around 
four percentage points (see figure 14).
Figure 14
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): POVERTY RATE AMONG  
THE EMPLOYED, NATIONWIDE TOTALS,  





















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
b
 Urban areas. 
c
 Asunción and the Central Department. 
d
 Eight major cities plus El Alto.
The proportion of own-account and family workers 
within the total employed population can be a useful means 
of identifying persons in a vulnerable employment situation, 
as workers in these categories are less likely to have access 
to social protection. Vulnerable workers have no social 
protection system or safety net to protect them when labour 
demand is slack, and they are often unable to save enough 
money to see themselves through such situations so that they 
can avoid slipping below the poverty line. The percentage 
of vulnerable workers in Latin America rose from 33.0% in 
1990 to 33.7% in 2006 (the rate increased to 35.0% between 
1990 and 2002 but subsequently fell). Vulnerable forms of 
employment increased among both men and women. In 
most Latin American countries (the exceptions are Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Panama and Uruguay), the percentage of 
own-account and unpaid family workers is higher among 
women than among men. As with other indicators, national 
averages conceal sharp geographical differences: in rural 
areas (where own-account and unpaid family workers 
tend to account for over 50% of the employed), vulnerable 
workers are much more common than in urban areas (where 
around 30% of workers are vulnerable).
To monitor the employment target at the regional level, 
it may also be useful to quantify the relative significance 
of the three main factors associated with increases in per 
capita household income (the first two of which are directly 
related to target 1.B): the number of employed people in 
relation to the total number of household members (or 
“overall employment rate”), labour income per employed 
person (representing labour productivity) and income 
from non-labour sources. This methodology shows that 
the way in which growth leads to changes in the monetary 
resources of members of poor households depends on the 
quantity and quality of jobs created, increases in wage 
and non-wage income, and transfers of resources from 
the State through social programmes.
The results are summarized in table 4, which shows 
that between 1990 and 2006 the main factors behind 
increases in per capita income in indigent households were 
the proportion of total household members who are employed 
and non-labour income.6 Since 1990, labour income 
per employed person (which is related to productivity) 
increased in indigent households only in Brazil, Chile 
and the urban areas of Ecuador, while it fell or remained 
unchanged in the other countries. This is due to the poor 
performance of the labour market in 1990-2002, when 
the average pay levels of wage earners and independent 
(own-account) workers in indigent households either fell 
or remained constant in all countries except Brazil.
6
 Changes in these two factors, as well as in labour income per 
worker, refer to deciles that were below the indigence line at the 
beginning of the period.
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Table 4
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN THE OVERALL EMPLOYMENT RATE, LABOUR INCOME PER WORKER  
(PRODUCTIVITY) AND NON-LABOUR INCOME IN DECILES THAT INCLUDE INDIGENT  
HOUSEHOLDS, AROUND 1990-2006





per worker d Non-labour income
 e Indigence in 
around 2006 b
Chile 12.9 + + + 3.2
Brazil 23.3 + ++ ++ 9.0
Ecuador f 26.0 + ++ + 12.8
Mexico 18.6 ++ - + 8.7
Panama 19.2 + =/+- + 11.7
Guatemala 43.4 ++ - ++ 31.5
Costa Rica 9.8 =/+- =/+- + 7.2
Colombia 25.8 =/+- =/+- + 20.2
El Salvador 21.6 + -- ++ 19.0
Bolivia f 22.8 ++ - =/+- 18.5
Honduras 60.6 ++ -- ++ 49.2
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 14.6 ++ =/+- - 9.9
Paraguay g 12.7 =/+- - + 15.2
Uruguay f 3.4 =/+- - + 4.2
Argentina g 5.2 + -- + 6.7
Dominican Republic 14.8 + -- - 22.0













 Countries are shown in order of the annual reduction in indigence, estimated on the basis of the following formula: ARI = ((FP-IP) / IP) *100)/y, where ARI = annual reduction in 
indigence, FP = final percentage of indigence, IP = initial percentage of indigence and y = number of years in the period.
b
 These percentages may not correspond to those appearing in the Social Panorama of Latin America, 2007 owing to a different treatment of domestic service. For Guatemala, 
adjustments were made in the way the data were processed in order to adjust for the lack of measurements that included the population under the age of 10 in 1989 and the age 
of 7 in 2002. Due to issues related to the years in which surveys were carried out, 1990 and 2006 are not included in the poverty figures of all countries.
c
 Number of employed persons relative to total household members.
d
 Labour income per employed person (productivity).
e





With few exceptions, overall employment rates helped 
to raise the per capita incomes of indigent households. 
Rising employment cannot, however, be interpreted as being 
entirely attributable to a growing capacity for job creation 
in the region’s economies. The increase is also partly a 
result of falling total fertility rates and the tendency to form 
smaller families, which have both reduced the number of 
members (the denominator of the overall employment rate) 
in households with low per capita incomes. Furthermore, 
changes in the age structure of the population have increased 
the proportion of working-age people in households, while 
the growing incorporation of women into the labour market 
has raised the average number of workers per household 
(the numerator of the rate).
 Employment situation of young people and women 
The recommendation made at the World Summit in 
2005 to explicitly include an employment target in 
the first Millennium Development Goal is based on a 
recognition of the fact that employment is one of the 
main mechanisms for accessing well-being and for 
overcoming poverty and the associated deprivation. The 
fact that the recommendation emphasizes the importance 
of monitoring employment indicators, especially among 
young people and women, is an acknowledgement of 
the valuable economic and productive contribution that 
both groups make to society and of their disadvantageous 
position in this regard. Young people and women have 
particular difficulty in obtaining employment and are 
vulnerable to various forms of discrimination which may 
make it more likely that they will end up in low-quality 
and low-paid jobs.
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Labour participation of young people and women 
Between 1990 and 2006, labour-market participation 
among people between 15 and 29 years of age rose slowly 
but steadily from 59.4% to 62.8%. This was the result of 
two major trends: a slight reduction in the participation of 
young men and a strong increase in that of young women 
(mainly those aged 20 and above). The first was mainly 
attributable to the expansion of education systems and higher 
retention rates among younger students. The second trend 
reflects the gradually increasing participation of women in 
the labour market, which in the period under consideration 
rose from 40.7% to 53.2% in the region as a whole.
Furthermore, unemployment rates among young 
people are usually high and often increase dramatically 
in times of crisis as they move into the labour market to 
supplement household income (see figure 15.A). In 2006, 
the youth employment rate was around 12.9%. 
Unemployment rates are highest among the poorest 
young people. Around 2005, the average unemployment 
rate among young people in the lowest per capita income 
quintile was just over 24%, while the rate dropped to 6.6% 
for young people in the top quintile.
Another of the most striking disparities in terms of 
unemployment among young people is the difference 
between the rates for males and females. Gender is clearly 
still a criterion that influences which people are selected for 
jobs, and this is a factor that affects women throughout their 
productive life cycle: in 2006, the overall unemployment 
rate for women (9.4%) was 56% higher than it was for men. 
High rates of youth unemployment are largely attributable 
to the higher jobless rates for young women.
The position of young people and women in the  
labour market
Young people tend to have lower-quality jobs than 
adults, and women’s jobs tend to be of lower quality than 
those of men. A larger proportion of the members of both 
groups work in low-productivity sectors, in low-paying 
jobs in which working conditions are poor and which often 
do not provide health-care or social security benefits.
The proportion of own-account workers among young 
people has remained stable at around one in four. Among 
women, the proportion increased slightly from 34.1% to 
35.9%, even during the post-2002 recovery.
Despite these trends, employment in low-productivity 
sectors dipped somewhat between 1990 and 2006 among 
both men and women and both young people and adults. 
Around 2006, half of Latin American workers (51%), 
or almost 67 million people, were employed in low-
productivity sectors. A higher proportion of women are 
employed in low-productivity sectors throughout their 
lifetimes (see figure 15.B).
Figure 15
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, BY AGE GROUP AND SEX; LABOUR 
INCOME, BY AGE GROUP, SEX AND LABOUR CATEGORY; AND GENDER PARITY INDEX, NATIONAL TOTAL, AROUND 2006 a
(Percentages, dollars at 2000 prices and ratio of women’s to men’s incomes)
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Figure 15 (concluded)
 C. Monthly wages D. Non-wage labour income
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a
 Weighted average of countries at the national level. The figures for Argentina correspond to Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to eight major cities plus El Alto, for Ecuador and 
Uruguay to urban areas and for Paraguay to Asunción and the Central Department. Does not include Colombia.
There has been a significant deterioration in the 
situation with regard to social protection. Informal hiring 
and the use of atypical contracting procedures that do not 
include social security and health benefits have become 
more widespread in the region’s countries. Young people 
are particularly subject to such practices: between 1990 
and 2006, the proportion of wage earners between the 
ages of 15 and 29 who had social security coverage fell 
from 61% to 53%. Women’s situation has deteriorated the 
most, as the percentage of social security coverage among 
female wage earners dropped from 74% to 62%.
There have, however, been some regional improvements 
in terms of labour income. These improvements have 
benefited young people to a certain degree, as their labour 
incomes rose by 21.4% (compared with 19.4% among 
adults). Women’s incomes have increased by more than 
men’s, especially among non-wage workers (the increase 
in this group’s labour income was 38%). This has slightly 
narrowed the wide wage and income gaps between young 
people and adults and also (to a somewhat greater extent) 
between men and women. This having been said, the 
gaps are still substantial: among wage earners, the gender 
difference in employment rates is as much as 21%, and 
this increases with age, as does the income gap (see figure 
15.C); among non-wage workers, the differences are even 
larger (44%) and become even greater among older age 
groups (see figure 15.D).
In conclusion, an improvement in the quality of the 
jobs held by a large portion of the workforce, especially 
its poorest members, is imperative. This will entail 
providing sufficient wages, stable contracts, safe working 
conditions, access to health care and social security 
coverage. Achieving full and productive employment and 
decent work in the countries of Latin America is key to 
reducing poverty and income inequality, whose roots lie 
in the way in which the labour market operates.
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The demographic dividend: an opportunity to improve 
coverage and progression rates in secondary education
Demographic transitions represent important turning 
points in terms of development opportunities. While 
they do not create such opportunities, they clearly do 
influence them and pose challenges for their realization. 
It is therefore important to consider the timing of 
demographic transitions in the region and the ways in 
which they can be taken advantage of in order to maximize 
the impact of investment and social expenditure. All 
the countries of Latin America are now going through 
a favourable stage known as the “demographic bonus” 
or “demographic dividend”, in which the proportion 
of people in the potentially productive age bracket 
grows steadily relative to the number of people of 
potentially inactive ages (children and older persons). 
Owing to the unevenness of demographic change, 
however, this window of opportunity is beginning to 
close for some countries whereas in others it has just 
begun to open up. 
The benefits associated with this period do not 
accrue automatically. They are subject to the adoption of 
macroeconomic policies that will encourage productive 
investment, increase employment opportunities and 
promote a stable social and economic environment 
conducive to sustained development. In particular, they 
require major investments in human capital, especially 
in the education of young people, to increase their 
productivity and thereby strengthen the positive effects 
of the demographic dividend.
A positive demographic impact on the education 
sector is already apparent in most of the countries. In 
the coming decades, not only will demand for primary 
education continue to decline, but so will demand for 
secondary education, relatively at first, but subsequently in 
absolute terms. During this period, governments will have 
the opportunity to pursue ambitious goals for increasing 
coverage and quality in secondary education.
Generating more opportunities for young people, 
as well as investing in their education and health and 
in the creation of productive jobs, during the period 
corresponding to the demographic dividend will constitutes 
a unique opportunity to prepare for the future. This is 
because the fruits of such investments are essential for 
achieving the savings and productive leaps forward 
needed for dealing with the exponential increase in 
costs which will accompany society’s inexorable 
ageing. In particular, the demographic bonus opens up 
an opportunity for moving towards universal coverage 
for secondary education in conjunction with on-time 
progression. While this achievement depends mostly on 
countries’ efforts as regards investments and the quality 
of policies, the demographic dividend undeniably boosts 
the impact of those efforts, as will be discussed in the 
present section.
The countries of Latin America are at differing stages 
in the demographic transition, given their varying fertility 
rates and life expectancy. Despite those differences, Latin 
America in general is experiencing demographic transition 
dynamics at higher rates than those experienced in the past 
by the industrialized countries. In other words, changes 
in the age structure of the population, especially ageing, 
are occurring more quickly in Latin America than they 
did in the industrialized countries.
During the initial stage of demographic transition 
—during which mortality, especially among children, has 
fallen but fertility remains high— the region’s population 
remained very young and even became somewhat younger 
as a result of the growing proportion of children. Beginning 
in the mid-1960s, the continuing fall in fertility and 
a sustained rise in life expectancy led to the start of a 
gradual ageing of the population as the more numerous 
generations progressed through the life cycle.
Since people’s economic behaviour depends on 
the stage they have reached in the life cycle, changes 
in the age structure tend to have a major impact on 
economic development. This is reflected in trends in the 
dependency ratio, which relates the numbers of people 
in potentially inactive age groups (under 15 years and 
over 60 years) to the population in potentially active 
age groups (15-59 years).
The average dependency ratio in Latin America is 
estimated to have risen in the period between 1950 and 
the mid-1960s owing to the relative increase in the child 
population; subsequently, it began to decline steadily 
as fertility rates fell. This marked the beginning of the 
demographic dividend. The dependency ratio (i.e., the 
ratio of members of potentially inactive age groups relative 
to members of potentially active ones) is projected to 
continue falling until about 2020, when it will begin to 
rise slowly as a result of the relative increase in the older 
population (see figure 16).
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Figure 16
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Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
While the Latin American countries generally match 
this model in formal terms, the rates of change that they 
are experiencing vary considerably. The dependency ratio 
shows a downward trend in the countries which are the 
farthest back in the transition process, but a clear uptrend 
in those which are farthest ahead. A comparison of the 
extreme cases of Cuba and Guatemala clearly reflects 
the diversity of demographic situations in the region. As 
figure 17 shows, Cuba’s dependency ratio is expected 
to practically double by 2050 (from 53 to 100 inactive 
persons per 100 active persons), but in Guatemala the 
ratio is expected to be nearly halved.
Figure 17
LATIN AMERICA, CUBA AND GUATEMALA: DEPENDENCY  
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Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
On average, the Latin American population is 
currently in the second —the most favourable— stage of 
the demographic transition, in which the dependency ratio 
tends to be relatively low and continues to fall.7 While the 
countries of the region show little difference as regards 
the onset of the demographic dividend, the extent and 
duration of its different phases vary significantly.
Generally speaking, the countries which are most 
advanced in the demographic transition have a shorter 
dividend period left than countries that are further behind in 
the process. In Cuba and Chile, for example, the dividend 
is expected to end some time in the first quarter of this 
century, but it should last until 2062 in Bolivia and 2069 
in Guatemala.
Although the duration and magnitude of the 
demographic dividend vary greatly among the Latin 
American countries, trends for the secondary-school 
age group through the various stages of the demographic 
dividend tend to follow a similar pattern in all of the 
countries. This population generally increases considerably 
during the initial stage of the dividend, as large groups of 
children move into adolescence. This leads to a series of 
demands on public policy, especially in terms of providing 
quality secondary education and creating enough jobs to 
make good use of a growing supply of increasingly well 
educated and trained labour.
As countries move through the period of the dividend, 
the secondary-school age group stabilizes and then begins 
to decrease, first in relative and later in absolute terms, 
which provides a unique opportunity to extend coverage 
and improve the quality of schooling provided at the 
secondary level. This increases the amount of possible 
investment per secondary-school pupil, as pressure on 
public spending from the older population is still relatively 
low because this group has yet to reach its highest rate 
of expansion.
Although the downward trend in the secondary-
school-age population will tend to continue beyond 
the period of the dividend in all countries, by this point 
the situation will be less propitious for investment in 
education because the process of population ageing will 
have increased demand for public spending in other areas, 
such as health care and pensions.
7
 There is no exact measurement of the beginning and ending points 
of the demographic dividend, and its definition in terms of the 
dependency ratio may vary.  In this study, the period corresponding 
to the demographic dividend has been subdivided into three phases. 
In the first of these phases, the dependency ratio declines but is still 
fairly high (above 2:3, i.e., two dependents for every three persons 
in economically active age groups). In the second, the dependency 
ratio falls below 2:3 and continues to decrease. In the third and 
final phase, the dependency ratio begins to rise as the proportion 
of older persons increases, but is still below 2:3.
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Given the current economic, social and demographic 
conditions in Latin America, the countries of the region 
should focus their efforts on achieving significant 
advances in secondary education, since the demographic 
dividend offers an opportunity for governments to 
adopt increasingly ambitious targets for that level of 
education.
Such efforts are essential for development in a 
number of ways. First, because completion of secondary 
education marks a crucial threshold as regards rates of 
return on education and future working careers, it will 
enable large groups of people to escape from poverty or 
to avoid lapsing into it. Second, widespread completion 
of secondary education may be expected to have a 
positive impact on equality of opportunities. Third, 
this achievement entails a qualitative leap forward in 
terms of society’s human capital and can therefore be 
expected to pave the way for future growth on the basis 
of greater competitiveness. Lastly, a higher level of 
education is an important resource for full citizenship 
in a knowledge society.
Although access to primary education in the Latin 
American countries is almost universal, many of them 
will need to make additional efforts to achieve that 
goal, especially because of their high repetition and 
dropout rates. Under these circumstances, considerable 
numbers of children will not reach secondary school at 
the appropriate age, which, in turn, undermines efforts 
to improve the coverage of secondary education.
While there are targets that remain to be attained 
at the primary level, the countries should seek to 
achieve those relating to the secondary level as soon as 
possible. On the one hand, the fact that the secondary-
school age group has greatly increased in numbers 
means that its many needs, among which education 
is of vital importance, must be analysed and attended 
to. On the other hand, quality secondary education 
is needed to ensure that young people have access to 
higher-productivity jobs and thus to incomes which will 
enable them to remain above the poverty line.
To attain the net coverage target of 75% for 
secondary education by 2010, as agreed at the Summit 
of the Americas in 1998, calculations based on the 
demographic situation as of 2005 indicate that the 
region will need to commit additional expenditure of 
between US$ 1.5 billion and US$ 3.1 billion at current 
prices, equivalent to a further 0.1% of its total GDP. 
This is, therefore, an achievable goal. Five of the 
countries of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba 
and Uruguay) have already attained it. Starting from 
today’s demographic situation, most of the remaining 
countries are close to achieving it.
A higher cost would be involved in reaching the 
goal of universal secondary-school coverage8 in the 
region; this would entail added spending of between 
US$ 8.8 billion and US$ 17.3 billion. For most of the 
countries, this target could be reached with spending 
increases of 0.5% of GDP or less. In some cases, the 
necessary increase would be greater, but with reductions 
in out-of-age enrolment,9 the cost would fall to about 
1% of GDP (see figure 18).
Figure 18
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE TARGET 


































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre 2008 [online] http://stats.
uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143.
To move towards an even more ambitious target, the 
region would need to make an effort not only in the area 
of coverage but also in terms of increasing its spending 
per student. Thus, a more logical target for Latin America 
would be to achieve the average figure for the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
that is, 93% coverage and spending per secondary-school 
student equivalent to 17% of GDP per working-age 
adult.10 This would mean that the region’s total spending 
level would have to be far more than doubled, with added 
expenditure of from US$ 56 billion to US$ 66 billion at 
8
 This target is used for purposes of the simulation, although there 
is still some doubt as to whether or not it is actually achievable or 
even desirable.
9
 Percentage of out-of-age enrolments in secondary school owing 
to repetition or other reasons.
10
 This does not mean that the average level of expenditure on secondary 
education in the countries of the region should be raised to equal that 
of the OECD countries, but rather that the percentage of GDP per 
working-age adult should be placed on a par with the percentage for 
the OECD. Clearly, given the existing differences in GDP, the available 
monetary resources vary considerably, both between the Latin American 
and the OECD countries and within Latin America itself.
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current prices (4% of GDP).11 It may seem surprising that 
Latin America would have to spend 4% of its GDP on 
secondary education to achieve OECD levels of coverage 
and of spending per student (as a percentage of GDP), 
since those countries currently spend about 2.6% of their 
GDP on education. The explanation lies in the favourable 
demographic structure existing in the OECD countries. 
As demographic changes move forward in Latin America, 
the required expenditure will decline as a consequence 
of the demographic dividend.
Thus, although the cost of achieving the targets 
relating to secondary education is high within the current 
demographic context, it may be mitigated by a decrease 
in the dependency ratio in Latin America in the coming 
years. A sizeable dividend will result from reductions 
in the primary-school and secondary-school age groups 
throughout the demographic dividend period. This 
currently represents as much as 1.7% of the present value 
of the countries’ GDP, with an average of 0.8% of the 
present value of the region’s GDP. In fact, this dividend 
is sufficient to cover the cost of attaining the target of 
universal secondary education in all the countries and 
would make a significant contribution towards achieving 
more ambitious goals, such as reaching OECD levels 
(again, in relative GDP terms).
In the cases of both primary and secondary education, 
the countries which lag behind the most are also the least 
advanced in the demographic transition process. These 
are countries with younger populations which face greater 
potential demands at the levels of primary and secondary 
education and which have had to cope with serious 
constraints associated with their geographical locations. 
They have only recently begun to reap the demographic 
dividend. Accordingly, from this point on until the end 
of the dividend cycle, they will have the opportunity to 
improve their educational systems through the timely 
implementation of appropriate policies.
Although the demographic dividend will generate 
savings in the future, the countries should not wait for 
it to take effect, but should instead take early action in 
order to obtain the maximum advantage. Actually, the 
countries are not going to benefit immediately from the 
resources freed up by the “educational bonus” since these
11
 The top end of this estimate (US$ 66 billion at current prices) 
includes current out-of-age enrolment rates, whereas the low-end 
figure (US$ 56 billion at current prices) was calculated on the basis 
of the average out-of-age enrolment rate of the OECD countries.
resources will be generated with the passage of the entire 
demographic dividend period in each country. There are, 
however, a number of reasons why the countries should 
make efforts to realize the expected future dividend in the 
present, particularly by investing in secondary education. 
If future generations are insufficiently educated, this 
will compromise each country’s ability to compete 
successfully in the globalized economy. Furthermore, the 
countries would then be less prepared to respond to the 
pension and the other demands of an ageing population.
In other words, to achieve greater advances in 
secondary education, the countries of the region could 
reinvest the entire secondary-education demographic 
dividend in that system. They could also invest part of the 
positive balance of the primary-education bonus in the 
secondary education system, since a smaller population of 
children with a higher rate of primary-school completion 
will also make it possible to devote more resources to 
secondary education. Since these dividends are realized 
not in the present but in the course of the demographic 
transition and up to the end of each country’s demographic 
dividend period, each one will need to find a way to make 
use now of the resources it will save in the future. One 
possibility would be to redistribute resources over time 
by borrowing to finance today’s investments and then 
using the proceeds of the demographic dividend to repay 
that loan later on.
To sum up, the savings associated with the 
demographic dividend provide the opportunity to adopt 
more ambitious targets in terms of secondary education. 
However, demographic changes do not always produce 
the same results in every case. The experiences of some 
countries which have already gone through a large part 
of their demographic dividend periods attest to the 
fact that achievements are not always proportional to 
improvements in demographic conditions. Optimizing 
the potential benefits of this phenomenon calls for 
special efforts in education policy, and in investment 
in education, to increase secondary-school enrolment, 
improve the quality of public-sector service provision, 
and help areas with lower levels of educational capital to 
improve effective teaching, progression and completion 
of the secondary cycle. 
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Youth and family violence in Latin America: the social 
agenda and inclusive approaches 
Violence committed upon and by young people takes the 
shape of self-inflicted violence, individual violent crimes 
such as robbery, violence in organized crime, domestic 
violence, territorial violence, violence motivated by gender 
and other forms of discrimination, and various types of 
group violence. This section will primarily discuss the 
problem of violence, of which young people are among 
the main victims and perpetrators, from the viewpoint 
of the material and symbolic social exclusion which, to 
a great extent, underlies the phenomenon. This form of 
exclusion is reflected in inequality of opportunities, a 
lack of access to employment, alienation among young 
people who are neither studying nor working, and the gaps 
between symbolic consumption (images, symbols and 
information) and reduced material consumption (due to 
people’s lack of incomes of their own), with the consequent 
frustration of their expectations. Other considerations 
include territorial segregation, which creates pockets of 
exclusion and violence, and the lack of public spaces for 
social and political participation.
 Diagnostic analysis
In recent decades the issue of youth violence in Latin 
America has become increasingly prominent in public debate, 
government agendas and in forums and conferences held 
within the international system. Not only has violence grown 
in most of Latin America in recent years, but young people 
are also clearly over-represented in terms of the incidence 
and gravity of violence, as both victims and perpetrators. In 
many countries in the region, young people are committing 
violent crimes at increasingly early ages and are dying at 
increasingly early ages as a result of such crimes. It is therefore 
a matter of urgency to adopt policies to deal with the causes 
of this escalating violence among the young.
It is very difficult to measure all forms of violence, but 
violent deaths among young people constitute one available 
indicator. The figures show that the incidence of violence 
among the causes of young people’s deaths in Latin America 
is rising and has a strong gender bias: the rates for young men 
are more than double those for young women in deaths by 
homicide, traffic accidents and suicides (see figure 19).
While there is an obvious gender-based difference 
in the figures on violence among young people, the 
statistics underrepresent violence against young women 
in Latin America because such violence is not visible in 
vital statistics, and society is reluctant to discuss the issue 
openly. Gender-based violence places a heavy burden on 
public health systems and is associated with risks related to 
sexually transmitted diseases. About one in three women in 
Latin America has been the victim of physical, psychological 
or sexual violence at the hands of family members. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) calculates that, as of 
2002, between 10% and 36% of Latin American women 
had been subjected to physical or sexual violence and that 
between 70% and 80% of the victims of sexual violence 
were girl children. In almost half of these cases, the abuser 
lives with the victim and, in three quarters of them, the 
abuser is a close relative of the victim.
Figure 19
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): RATE OF MORTALITY DUE TO 
EXTERNAL CAUSES a AMONG PERSONS FROM 15 TO  




















































































































































Death due to external causes, men Homicide, men
Death due to external causes, women Homicide, women
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from World Health Organization (WHO), Health 
Statistics from the Americas, 2007, Washington, D.C., 2007; Latin American 
and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of 
ECLAC and the United Nations.
a
 Vehicular accidents, homicides, suicides, drownings, suffocation and other violent 
causes of death.
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In 2008, ECLAC conducted a survey of the interior 
ministries of Latin American governments on the subject 
of policies and programmes for tackling youth violence. 
The respondents stated that the main problem in relation 
to violence among young people had to do with organized 
youth crime, whether in the form of ordinary offences, 
gang activities, street violence or possession of weapons 
in particular urban areas in a number of countries in Latin 
America. Gangs (commonly referred to as pandillas, but 
known as maras in Central America and quadrilhas in 
Brazil), rising crime in the countries of the Southern Cone 
and violence in the Andean countries clearly shows that 
special-purpose measures for young people are needed. 
Of particular concern is gang involvement in drug abuse, 
drug trafficking and human trafficking.
Second, the authorities reported that domestic, 
intergenerational and partner violence were a major 
problem. Although the reporting of gender violence has 
increased, protection for abused children and young people 
still fall far short of the mark. The respondents’ main 
concerns included self-inflicted violence and violence 
committed against others in connection with alcohol and 
drug abuse. The authorities also stated that the greatest 
problem affecting young people of both sexes was poverty; 
young males saw unemployment as their worst problem, 
whereas for young women, the most serious problem was 
domestic violence. The two sexes are equally affected 
by addiction to drugs and other substances, the lack of 
access to education, the absence of social networks and 
a lack of participation.
 Policies and programmes to prevent and control youth violence
The Latin American countries have adopted a variety of 
approaches in seeking to address the problem of youth 
violence. These approaches have focused on exposure 
levels, citizen security, dispute settlement and rights-based 
perspectives. Based on these various courses of action 
for reducing youth violence, all of the above-mentioned 
prevention models are designed to build protective 
mechanisms for adolescents and young people and to 
develop their strengths.
The large variety of initiatives in place reflect 
considerable differences among countries. National 
programmes are based on multi-layered paradigms for 
addressing the issues of concern for young people, policies 
are founded upon varying legislative bases (legal and 
regulatory structures), the levels of public administration 
responsible for activities to help young people vary as 
to their institutional ties, and there are divergences in 
relation to the type of actions to be conducted by official 
bodies in each country. Two areas appear to be central to 
youth policies: a comprehensive approach by government 
institutions, and policies to support and coordinate initiatives 
by both official and non-governmental bodies.
The authorities’ responses to the ECLAC survey reflect 
four major areas of reform in national legal provisions: 
general laws on youth; reforms to codes for the protection 
of children and adolescents; new legislation on domestic 
violence and gender equality; and measures relating to 
the legal responsibility of adolescents and young people. 
These legislative advances should be carried forward 
by means of the monitoring and assessment of their 
implementation and results.
The Latin American countries have a wide variety 
of policies and programmes for the prevention and 
reduction of youth violence. These include measures 
oriented towards civil coexistence and security, the 
elimination of violence against women and of domestic 
and intra-family violence; recreation; interventions in 
schools and educational reintegration for offenders; 
job training; and health care for adolescents and young 
adults. The ECLAC study indicates that only a few of 
the countries have incorporated programmes against 
youth violence into their national youth systems; in other 
countries, such programmes come under specialized 
and sectoral areas.
 Problems of youth violence as perceived by the authorities
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 Assessment of experience
The economic and social costs of violence tend to be greater 
than the effective cost of programmes for prevention or for 
the reintegration of young victims and offenders. The earlier 
society invests in an individual, the greater the chances of 
preventing violent conduct in adulthood. Preventive and 
comprehensive investment in young people at social risk 
has complementary effects in terms of poverty reduction, 
the build-up of social capital and the prevention of negative 
externalities. Such investment therefore helps to reinforce 
the right to social justice and human rights in general.
Assessments of a number of programmes and of the 
experiences gained in the course of those programmes 
point to some achievements in the area of inter-ministerial 
coordination and private- and public-sector networking, but 
the weakness of the institutions and departments executing 
the programmes has a negative impact on the dissemination 
and replication of positive experiences. An analysis of these 
programmes reveals at least two omissions which make it 
harder to deal with the problem of youth violence. One of 
these omissions relates to the implementation of a diverse 
range of actions without targeting specific sectors among 
young people. The other has to do with the fact that little 
or no action is being taken which is focused expressly on 
children, women and young males living in the streets. 
Experts recommend that policies to reduce violence should 
be specific, coordinated, decentralized, participatory 
and selective. They suggest essential primary preventive 
measures, together with secondary and tertiary measures 
and appropriate support for the social reintegration of young 
people who have been rehabilitated.
In order to address the problem of youth violence, 
young people need to be recognized as actors and subjects 
of rights, should be provided with access to assets that will 
allow them to attain independence, and should be given 
opportunities for public and political self-affirmation.
The more young people are brought into society 
and the more they are allowed to exercise their rights as 
citizens, the more the causes of violence can be mitigated. 
Within this framework, innovative strategies should take a 
preventive approach, should be based on community assets 
and should include a participatory dimension. Programmes 
of this kind already exist which incorporate national, 
subnational and local levels of implementation and that are 
expressly directed towards creating institutional networks 
for prevention, building awareness, generating knowledge 
and encouraging participation by young people.
Policies for dealing with the problem of youth violence 
should maintain high levels of flexibility and adapt to the 
characteristics of young people and their environment. 
There is a great deal of evidence which shows that the 
most effective means of preventing violence is at the local 
level, where proximity to the young people concerned 
and the feasibility of working with them is greater and 
where actions in different sectors aimed at dealing with 
specific types of violence and their associated risk factors 
can be coordinated. 
Attempts to increase the criminalization of youth 
violence have failed to show positive results or bring 
about a reduction in the violence. As a result, there is 
a growing consensus as to the need to move towards 
prevention- and rehabilitation-based models. This will 
entail concrete actions at the time of the first or second 
offence; separate sections for minors in prisons in order to 
prevent contact with adult offenders from turning young 
persons who have had occasional run-ins with the law into 
repeat offenders; modernizing judicial systems and the 
administration of justice; and the creation of legislative 
committees specifically focused on young people’s issues 
in order to modernize the current legislation through 
broadly-based political agreements.
 International agenda
In the international social agenda, emphasis is placed 
on the seventeenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of 
State and Government, whose main theme was ”Social 
cohesion and social policy for the creation of more inclusive 
societies in Ibero-America”. This conference was held 
in Chile in 2007 and saw the adoption of the Santiago 
Declaration, which includes important agreements by the 
Ibero-American governments on social cohesion, universal 
access to basic services, gender equity, and protection for 
young people and vulnerable groups.
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The countries of the region are currently faced with the 
need to mitigate the impact of the recent international 
financial crisis and its worldwide recessionary effects 
and to minimize its repercussions in terms of jobs and 
poverty levels. 
One of the main challenges is how to use fiscal 
resource management as an economic reactivation and 
containment mechanism and as a means of halting the 
expected deterioration in the social situation. Public 
expenditure plays a key role in redistributing wealth and 
in ameliorating substandard living conditions, as well as 
in boosting some sectors of the domestic economy (such 
as construction, school supplies, and medical equipment 
and supplies).
Social security is still the largest public spending item 
in the region, followed by education and, in third place, 
health. Most countries’ social protection schemes offer 
limited coverage, provide low-quality benefits and are 
largely financed by contributions. There are few examples 
of effective countercyclical social expenditure policies for 
financing compensatory mechanisms that mitigate social 
risks when the economy starts to contract.
Social expenditure has become more progressive 
as the coverage of public services has been expanded 
to take in more economically depressed or remote 
geographical areas.. Various kinds of social welfare 
programmes have also been developed to attend to the 
needs of traditionally excluded population groups. The 
redistributive impact of social spending (as an income 
supplement) is highly significant among lower-income 
segments, which absorb up to half of the available 
resources. These segments benefit mainly from public 
education and social welfare programmes and to a lesser 
extent from access to public health care. Social security 
expenditure, on the other hand, is highly regressive due 
to its eminently contributory nature.
As a consequence of the financial crisis and economic 
slowdown, it is likely that, in the short term, social spending 
in the region may not increase (as a percentage of GDP) 
and may lose ground as a macroeconomic priority, although 
it will probably continue to rise in absolute terms. This 
will depend, of course, on each country’s fiscal revenue 
projections, the size of its present surplus or deficit, how 
long it calculates that the crisis and the worldwide recession 
will last and how the national budget is drawn up (i.e., 
on the basis of past income or according to projected 
future revenue).
Public social expenditure may become less of a 
fiscal priority if some of the public resources allocated 
to social projects are re-channelled into investments in 
infrastructure to prop up the construction sector. The 
social areas that are historically more sensitive to changes 
in the business cycle, such as health and, to a lesser 
extent, education, will probably be negatively affected 
as a result. When economies contract, it is investment in 
these sectors (as well as in housing and basic services) 
that usually suffers first. 
The following courses of action are recommended 
under these circumstances:
Implement a countercyclical public expenditure • 
policy, especially in the case of social spending.
Maintain the principles of universality, solidarity and • 
efficiency as a normative horizon. When resources 
are in short supply, establish transparent and effective 
mechanisms for targeting expenditure.
Strengthen the institutional framework for • 
programmes designed to combat poverty and provide 
resources for social assistance programmes; lengthen 
the duration of unemployment benefits, where they 
exist, and, if possible, broaden coverage to include 
other potential beneficiaries (non-contributory 
unemployment insurance).
Boost public investment in housing and basic • 
services.
Maintain, as far as possible, the level of public • 
investment in education and health, especially in 
the case of investment related to the creation and 
renovation of infrastructure in order to buoy the 
construction sector.
Maintain a fiscal reserve for emergency social • 
assistance (employment programmes, the expansion 
of anti-poverty schemes, food programmes) and 
for financing public transfers to the redistributive 
components of pension systems. 
Reinforce the State’s revenue-collection capacity • 
(take steps to combat tax avoidance and evasion) 
and develop new fiscal pacts and social contracts 
that make it possible to increase receipts (raise 
taxes) and increase the efficiency and transparency 
of public resources management. 
Public social spending in the context of the financial 
crisis and its role as a redistributive mechanism
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Chapter I
Poverty, social exclusion and  
distributive inequality 
A. Recent poverty trends
Regional rates of poverty and extreme poverty fell again in 2007, to 34.1% and 12.6% of the 
population, respectively. Although projections see general poverty continuing to decline in 
2008, the same is not expected in the case of extreme poverty, mainly owing to the rise in 
food prices. Moreover, the international financial crisis that broke out recently could cause a 
moderate increase in both extreme and general poverty in 2009.
1. The economic situation
The Latin American and Caribbean economy reported 
positive results in 2007, including 5.7% growth of gross 
domestic product (GDP), equivalent to per capita output 
growth of 4.3%. These figures represent a fifth year of 
continuous expansion, in which per capita GDP has risen 
from US$ 3,960 in 2002 to US$  4,712 in 2007 (measured 
in constant 2000 prices). 
All of the region’s countries recorded a net increase 
in per capita GDP in 2007, albeit of differing amounts. 
Some countries grew faster than 7% per year, such as 
Argentina (7.6%), Cuba (7.3%), Panama (9.4%), Peru 
(7.6%) and Uruguay (7.2%), while elsewhere growth 
was weaker: e.g., Ecuador (1.2%), Haiti (1.5%) and 
Mexico (2.0%). As many as 12 of the 18 countries in 
the region posted growth rates at least as high as in 2006 
(see table I.1).
As noted in Economic Survey of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 2007-2008, the regional economy 
grew in a favourable international setting between 
2003 and 2007. In addition to the expansion of the 
world economy and abundant liquidity on international 
markets, the rapid industrialization process unfolding in 
several Asian developing countries, particularly China 
and India, generated greater demand which boosted the 
region’s export volumes and improved its terms of trade 
(ECLAC, 2008b).
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Table I.1








































 2000-2005 0.5 15.8 0.0 10.2  2000-2005 -1.9 … … 19.7
 2006 7.4 10.2 8.7 9.8  2006 0.7 … … 10.2
 2007 7.6 8.5 12.1 8.5  2007 1.5 … … 9.3
Bolivia Honduras
 2000-2005 0.7 8.0 1.8 3.4  2000-2005 g 2.7 6.8 … 8.5
 2006 2.6 8.0 -8.0 4.9  2006 4.2 4.9 … 5.3
 2007 2.4 7.7 -2.8 11.7  2007 4.2 4.1 … 8.9
Brazil Mexico
 2000-2005 1.5 9.8 -2.8 8.1  2000-2005 1.7 4.3 2.6 5.3
 2006 2.3 10.0 3.5 3.1  2006 3.7 4.6 0.5 4.1
 2007 4.0 9.3 1.5 4.5  2007 2.0 4.8 0.9 3.8
Chile d Nicaragua
 2000-2005 3.1 9.7 1.6 2.9  2000-2005 1.9 9.5 0.7 7.3
 2006 3.3 7.7 1.9 2.6  2006 2.5 7.0 1.3 10.2
 2007 4.0 7.1 2.8 7.8  2007 2.4 6.9 -1.8 16.2
Colombia Panama
 2000-2005 2.2 16.5 1.5 6.7  2000-2005 2.2 15.1 -2.0 1.5
 2006 5.5 13.0 3.8 4.5  2006 6.8 10.4 2.0 2.2
 2007 6.8 11.4 -0.5 5.7  2007 9.4 7.8 0.9 6.4
Costa Rica Paraguay
 2000-2005 1.7 6.4 0.3 11.3  2000-2005 -0.4 10.7 -0.1 8.9
 2006 6.9 6.0 1.6 9.4  2006 2.4 8.9 0.6 12.5
 2007 5.5 4.8 1.4 10.8  2007 4.9 7.2 2.3 6.0
Cuba Peru h
 2000-2005 e 4.9 3.2 5.9 …  2000-2005 2.7 9.3 0.8 2.1
 2006 12.0 2.0 11.6 …  2006 6.3 8.5 1.2 1.1
 2007 7.3 1.9 -0.9 …  2007 7.6 8.4 -1.8 3.9
Dominican Rep. d Uruguay
 2000-2005 2.2 16.5 … 17.1  2000-2005 0.4 14.7 -3.6 9.6
 2006 9.0 16.2 … 5.0  2006 6.8 11.4 4.3 6.4
 2007 6.9 15.6 … 8.9  2007 7.2 9.6 4.7 8.5
Ecuador Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) d
 2000-2005 3.5 10.2 … 22.3  2000-2005 0.9 14.8 -2.9 19.6
 2006 2.4 8.1 ... 2.9  2006 8.5 10.0 5.1 17.0
 2007 1.2 7.4 … 3.3  2007 6.6 8.4 1.2 22.5
El Salvador
 2000-2005 0.4 6.6 … 3.5
 2006 2.4 5.7 … 4.9
 2007 2.9 … … 4.9
Guatemala Latin America
 2000-2005 f 0.6 5.0 -0.4 7.3  2000-2005 1.5 10.3 0.3 8.2
 2006 2.7 … -1.1 5.8  2006 4.3 8.6 2.5 5.0
 2007 3.1 … -4.6 8.7  2007 4.3 8.0 1.1 6.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a 
 Based on per capita GDP in dollars at constant 2000 prices. The 2007 figure is a preliminary estimate.
b 
 In general, the coverage of this index is very incomplete. In most countries it refers only to formal-sector workers in the manufacturing sector. The 2007 figure is a preliminary 
estimate. Figures for Latin America represent the simple average variation of the indices in the different countries.
c 
 Represents a simple average of December-December variations each year.
d 
 Average urban unemployment corresponds to total national unemployment. 
e 
 The variation in the minimum real wage corresponds to the period 2001-2005.
f 
 Average urban unemployment corresponds to the period 2002-2004.
g 
 Average urban unemployment corresponds to the period 2001-2005.
h 
 Average urban unemployment corresponds to the city of Lima.
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Nonetheless, the international economic scenario has 
changed since 2007, with growth faltering and inflation 
accelerating worldwide. The rise in international food 
and energy prices that gathered pace in that year fuelled 
inflationary forces and, although the process weakened as 
from the second half of 2008, it was partly counteracted 
by the devaluation of a number of local currencies. The 
financial crisis in the United States is affecting —and 
will continue to affect— the growth of exports and the 
remittance flows the region has benefited from in recent 
years. Some current features of the Latin American 
economies, such as their lesser external vulnerability, 
greater fiscal solvency and high levels of reserve, should 
make it possible to implement countercyclical policies 
to mitigate the effect of external developments on the 
region’s performance. Nonetheless, although it is better 
prepared to cope with this international situation than in 
the past, one should not assume that Latin America and the 
Caribbean is immune to the changes that are taking place, 
and trends in the second half of 2008 and in 2009 will 
reflect developments in the current setting. Accordingly, 
ECLAC forecasts GDP growth of 4.6% for Latin America 
and the Caribbean in 2008, a figure which, although lower 
than in 2007, “shows continuity insofar as this would be the 
sixth consecutive year in which growth would be exceed 
3%, an unprecedented achievement, at least in the past 40 
years” (ECLAC, 2008b). Nonetheless, recent events can 
be expected to have a greater effect in 2009, with regional 
GDP expected to grow by around 3%.
The economic expansion created new jobs and 
resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point rise in employment. The 
average rate of urban unemployment in Latin America 
continued its downward trend in 2007, falling to a level 
0.6 percentage points below the 2006 figure and 2.3 points 
below the average for the period 2000-2005. Unemployment 
retreated across the board in all countries, with reductions 
of more than 1.5 percentage points from the 2006 levels in 
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mexico was the only 
country to report a slight rise in the urban unemployment 
rate during this period, although it is still one of the lowest 
in the region (see table I.1).1
The average unemployment rate for the region in 2008 
is forecast at 7.5% —a 0.5 percentage-point improvement 
on the previous year’s figure as a result of the continuing 
upswing. Nonetheless, the growth slowdown expected 
in 2009 could cause employment to stall and halt the 
downward trend of unemployment, which may actually 
rise slightly.
Regionwide, inflation settled around 6.4%, 1.4 
percentage points higher than in 2006, thus interrupting 
the previous downward trend. These figures mainly 
reflect higher food prices, the poverty-impact of which 
is reviewed later in this chapter, compounded by high 
energy costs. These trends intensified in mid-2007 
and continued into the first half of 2008. The rest of 
2008 saw a slowdown in inflation as international 
commodity prices fell back; and this pattern is likely 
to last throughout 2009, given the possible slowdown 
in the pace of economic activity.
Lastly, average earnings grew slowly in 2007 (1.1% 
on average compared to the previous year’s 2.5%), despite 
rising in Argentina by over 12%. Real earnings declined 
by at least 1% in Bolivia, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
Peru. Progress in 2008 was eroded by higher inflation, and, 
while the latter is expected to ease next year, weaker job 
creation associated with slower economic growth means 
earnings growth is likely to be zero in real terms.
1
 Chapter II makes a detailed analysis of the employment situation 
in the region since 1990. 
2. Poverty and indigence in the region
The most recent estimates for Latin American countries, 
relating to 2007, show that 34.1% of the region’s population 
are living in poverty. Of this proportion, 12.6 percentage 
points represent those living in conditions of extreme 
poverty or indigence, which means that in 2007 a total 
of 184 million people were poor, of whom 68 million 
were living in extreme poverty (see figure I.1 and tables 
I.2 and I.3).2
2
 The approach used to estimate poverty in this report consists of 
classifying a person as “poor”, when the per capita income of his or 
her household is below the “poverty line” i.e., the minimum amount 
needed to satisfy basic needs. In the case of extreme poverty, the 
line used reflects the cost of satisfying food needs only. For further 
details, see box I.1.
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Figure I.1
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE RATES, 1990-2008 a
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Indigent Non-indigent poor
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a 
 Estimate for 18 countries of the region, plus Haiti. The figures shown in the orange 





LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE RATES, 1980-2007 a
(Percentage of population)
Poor b Indigent c
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
1980 40.5 29.8 59.9 18.6 10.6 32.7
1990 48.3 41.4 65.4 22.5 15.3 40.4
1997 43.5 36.5 63.0 19.0 12.3 37.6
1999 43.8 37.1 63.7 18.5 11.9 38.3
2002 44.0 38.4 61.8 19.4 13.5 37.9
2005 39.8 34.1 58.8 15.4 10.3 32.5
2006 36.3 31.0 54.0 13.3 8.5 29.2
2007 34.1 28.9 52.1 12.6 80.1 28.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Estimate for 18 countries of the region, plus Haiti.
b
 Percentage of the population living below the poverty line. Includes people living in 
situations of indigence.
c 
 Percentage of the population living below the indigence line.
Table I.3
LATIN AMERICA: POOR AND INDIGENT POPULATION, 1980-2007 a
(Million people)
Poor b Indigent c
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
1980 135.9 62.9 73.0 62.4 22.5 39.9
1990 200.2 121.7 78.5 93.4 45.0 48.4
1997 203.8 125.7 78.2 88.8 42.2 46.6
1999 211.4 134.2 77.2 89.4 43.0 46.4
2002 221.4 146.7 74.8 97.4 51.6 45.8
2005 209.0 137.9 71.1 81.1 41.8 39.3
2006 193.5 1 270.2 66.3 70.6 34.7 35.9
2007 183.9 121.0 62.9 67.8 33.9 33.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Estimate for 18 countries of the region, plus Haiti.
b
 Number of people living below the poverty line. Includes people living in situations 
of indigence.
c
 Number of people living below the indigence line.
The data for 2007 reveal an ongoing trend-reduction 
in poverty and indigence across the region since 2004. 
Compared to 2006, poverty declined by 2.2 percentage 
points, while extreme poverty decreased by 0.7 points. 
These variations, following those achieved in earlier 
years, place the poverty and extreme poverty rates 9.9 
and 6.8 percentage points below the 2002 figures, which 
is significant progress.
The retreat of poverty and indigence has also meant 
a reduction in the number of people living below the 
poverty and indigence lines, which decreased in net terms 
by 9 million and 3 million people, respectively, between 
2006 and 2007.3 Accordingly, the number of poor people 
has decreased by roughly 37 million compared to 2002, 
including 29 million fewer indigent.
If current figures are compared to those for 1990, 
the situation in the region today is visibly different from 
17 years ago. Although much of the Latin American 
population still lives in conditions of deprivation, the 
proportion has decreased by 14 percentage points since 
the start of the 1990s. In the case of extreme poverty, the 
reduction has been even sharper: whereas one in every 
two poor people was indigent in 1990, today the ratio is 
one in three. 
The composition of poverty and indigence differs 
markedly between geographic areas. Of the population 
living in conditions of general poverty, 34% are in rural 
zones, compared to half of all extremely poor people. 
Although this composition has changed very little since 
3
 As these figures are calculated from cross-section surveys that 
reflect the situation at a given moment but do not track the same 
group of interviewees through time, it is possible to ascertain the 
difference in the number of poor people from one year to the next, 
but not the dynamic of entering and escaping from poverty that 
gives rise to that difference. 
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the late 1990s, it is possible to discern a growing trend 
towards the urbanization of both poverty and indigence 
(see table I.3). 
The contribution made to regional poverty by the 
various subregions is similar to their share in total 
population, although the same is not necessarily true 
in the case of indigence. Of the total number of poor 
people living in Latin America, 31% are in Brazil, 28% 
are in Andean Community countries, 19% in Mexico, 
8% in the MERCOSUR countries plus Chile, and 14% 
in Central America (including the Dominican Republic). 
These figures closely match total population share, with 
the largest differences occurring in Central America and 
the Andean Community, which have a larger proportion 
of people living in poverty than their total population 
share, and in MERCOSUR where the opposite is the 
case. The situation is substantially different in the case 
of indigence, since Brazil, Mexico and MERCOSUR see 
their proportionate shares drop to 26%, 14% and 9%, 
respectively, while those of the Andean Community and 
Central America grow to 31% and 20%, respectively 
(see figure I.2). 
Based on GDP growth projections and inflation 
forecasts for the different countries, poverty can be 
expected to continue fall further to a level of 33.2% in 
2008, or nearly 1 percentage point below the 2007 figure. 
In contrast, extreme poverty is set to grow by roughly 0.3 
percentage points. Although this is only a slight increase, 
it would represent a change in the behaviour of this 
indicator compared to the last five years (see figure I.1). 
The rise in the percentage of people living in extreme 
poverty in 2008 and, to some extent, the small drop in 
the percentage of non-indigent poor, is mainly explained 
by the steep rise in food prices, which is analysed in 
greater detail in section B of this chapter. Expectations 
are also highly influenced by the potential effects of the 
economic crisis that broke out in industrialized countries, 
as summarized in box I.2.
Figure I.2
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POOR AND INDIGENT 
POPULATION BY SUBREGIONS, AROUND 2007
(Percentages)
35 31 26 












Total population Poor Indigent
Brazil Andean Community Mexico
MERCOSUR Central America a
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Includes Panama and, exceptionally, the Dominican Republic.
Box I.1
METHOD USED TO MEASURE POVERTY
The method used to estimate poverty in this 
report classifies a person as “poor” when 
the per capita income of the household in 
which he or she lives is below the “poverty 
line” or minimum income required to meet 
their basic needs. Poverty lines expressed 
in national currency are calculated as the 
cost of a basket of goods and services, 
using the “cost of basic needs” method.
Where the relevant information was 
available, the cost of a basic food basket 
covering the population’s nutritional needs 
was estimated for each country and 
geographical area, taking into account 
consumption habits, the effective availability 
of foodstuffs and their relative prices, as well 
as the differences between metropolitan 
areas, other urban areas and rural areas. To 
this value, which constituted the “indigence 
line”, was then added an estimate of the 
resources households need to satisfy their 
basic non-nutritional needs, to make up 
the total value of the poverty line. For this 
purpose, the indigence line was multiplied 
by a constant factor of 2 for urban areas 
and 1.75 for rural areas.a
The monthly equivalent in dollars 
of the most recent poverty lines varies 
between US$ 57 and US$ 175 in urban 
areas, and between US$ 39 and US$ 101 
in rural areas. The figure for indigence 
lines ranges from US$ 29 to US$ 93 urban 
areas, and from US$ 22 to US$ 58 in 
rural areas (in all cases, the lower values 
relate to Bolivia and the higher ones to 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Mexico (see table A-5 of the statistical 
appendix).b
In most cases, data concerning the 
structure of household consumption, of 
both foodstuffs and other goods and 
services came from surveys on household 
budgets conducted in the respective 
countries.c As these surveys were carried 
out before the poverty estimates were 
prepared, the value of the poverty lines 
was updated according to the cumulative 
variation in the consumer price index 
(CPI). Up to December 2006, the same 
variation was applied to both lines; from 
2007 onwards, however, the indigence 
line has been adjusted by the variation 
in the CPI for foodstuffs, whereas the 
part of the poverty line that corresponds 
to expenditure on non-food products 
is updated using the variation in the 
corresponding CPI. From 2007 onwards, 
therefore, the difference between the 
indigence and poverty lines is no longer 
constant.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)46
Box I.1 (concluded)
Data on family income were taken 
from household surveys conducted in 
the respective countries, in the years 
that correspond to the poverty estimates 
contained in this publication. In line with 
the usual practice at ECLAC, both partial 
non-response to income questions —in 
the case of wage-earners, independent 
workers and retirees— and probable 
biases arising from underreporting were 
corrected. This was done by comparing 
the survey entries for income with figures 
from an estimate of the household income 
and expenditure account of each country’s 
System of National Accounts (SNA), 
prepared for this purpose using official 
information. The concept of income 
corresponds to total current income; i.e., 
income from wage labour (monetary and 
in kind), independent labour (including 
self-supply and the consumption value of 
homemade products), property, retirement 
and other pensions and other transfers 
received by households. In most of the 
countries, household income included the 
imputed rental value of owner-occupied 
dwellings.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a 
 The sole exceptions to this general rule were Brazil and Peru. For Brazil, the study used new indigence lines estimated for different geographical areas within the country, 
in the framework of a joint project conducted by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute, the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research and ECLAC in 
the late 1990s. For Peru, the indigence and poverty lines used were estimates prepared by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics under the Programme for 
the Improvement of Surveys and the Measurement of Living Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean implemented in that country.
b 
 The exchange rate used is the average rate from the reference month used to compile information on income through household surveys. 
c 
 When data from the processing of a recent survey of this type were not available, other information on household consumption was used.
Box I.2
THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON POVERTY
The most recent projections see the 
incidence of poverty continuing to decline 
in 2008, but more slowly than in the 
immediately preceding years, while the 
number of extremely poor or indigent 
people is expected to have risen slightly. 
These figures largely reflect the impact of 
the upsurge in inflation since early 2007 
and, in particular, the steep rise in food 
prices. The international financial crisis 
which began in the United States has 
started to affect the real economy, causing 
a slowdown and even a fall in the level 
of economic activity in the industrialized 
world. One of the repercussions has been 
a slump in the demand for commodities 
and their prices. Domestic food and fuel 
prices have thus stopped rising in the 
region, and some are even falling, thereby 
alleviating inflation. This trend is positive 
in terms of its effect on expected poverty 
trends, since the factor that is thought to 
have worsened the poverty and indigence 
situation in 2008 is no longer in play. 
The international crisis will also affect 
the global economic dynamic of Latin 
American and Caribbean economies, 
however. Weaker demand for the goods 
exported by the region and a reduction in 
migrant remittances are factors which, to 
a greater or lesser extent, will undermine 
aggregate demand in the region’s countries. 
Similarly, constraints on the international 
financial market will pose another obstacle 
to maintaining the pace of growth recorded 
over the last year. The resultant slowdown is 
likely to affect the behaviour of the poverty 
line next year, potentially prolonging the 
less favourable trend forecast for 2008.
Aggregate employment for the 
region as a whole is expected to remain 
broadly constant in 2009, in line with much 
weaker output growth than in 2008, when 
employment rose slightly. In this setting, 
it will also be difficult for real wages to 
improve significantly, and on average 
they are expected to remain unchanged. 
Accordingly, average real household income 
from employment —the main financial 
source for most of the population— could 
fall in per capita terms.
The outlook is not very promising 
either for the distribution of the small 
change expected in total household 
income, since unskilled workers, who 
account for most of the people with jobs 
among lower-income groups, will be the 
first and most intensively affected by the 
production slowdown. This group consists 
predominantly of own-account workers 
and wage earners in precarious jobs, 
which are usually more sensitive to the 
business cycle. This would also make 
their incomes more vulnerable. 
In economies in which employment 
and the earnings of lower-income 
households are set to decline, poverty 
and indigence could also increase. While 
any such increase is not expected to be 
large, it would prolong a negative trend 
that began in 2008, ending a five-year 
period of declining poverty and indigence 
rates.
This general panorama conceals 
differences between country groups. 
Those most affected by the reduction 
in remittances, or by their more direct 
link with United States market, could be 
among the worst hit, along with countries 
whose exports are less diversified and 
concentrated in the markets that have 
suffered most.
This backdrop of slightly rising 
poverty, which could gain intensity in 
some countries, could be alleviated if 
Governments deploy policies to prevent 
lower-income sectors having to bear the 
burden of the crisis and thus lose the gains 
achieved since 2002. While the region will 
not be immune to the effect of this crisis, 
it is better placed to cope with it than on 
other occasions. Policies should include 
the implementation or intensification of 
measures to alleviate the impact of weaker 
labour demand on poor households and 
on those likely to slip into poverty.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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3. Poverty and indigence in the countries of the region
Poverty and indigence levels have fallen in most of the 
region’s countries during the current decade. An analysis 
of what happened between 2002 and 2006 (roughly, 
depending on the availability of data in each country) 
shows that poverty levels have retreated by at least 1.5 
percentage points per year in Argentina, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador (urban area), 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. The 
indices have also fallen sharply by around one percentage 
point per year in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala;4 and only 
Bolivia and Uruguay have seen an increase in poverty 
(see figure I.3).
Indigence rates also generally trended downwards 
between 2002 and 2006, with the largest reductions, in 
terms of percentage points per year, recorded in Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Peru, with significant progress also in 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Panama. The 
Dominican Republic and Uruguay were the exceptions 
as in the case of non-indigent poverty.
New figures available for 2007 in 11 of the region’s 
countries confirm the downward trend recorded until 2006, 
with nearly all of them reporting a reduction in poverty. 
The steepest falls occurred in Bolivia Brazil —over three 
percentage points per year— followed by the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Honduras and Paraguay with annual 
reductions of more than two percentage points. 
Indigence also receded sharply, with the largest 
reductions in absolute terms occurring in Honduras (3.7 
percentage points), Panama (2.3 points) and Costa Rica 
(1.9 points) in a year in all three cases. 
The reductions achieved over the last five years can be 
seen not only in terms of the percentage of the population 
living in poverty and indigence, but also when the poverty-
gap and poverty-gap-squared indices are used (also known 
as the index of the severity of poverty). These indicators 
provide a more complete view of poverty conditions by 
taking account not only of the percentage of people who 
are poor, but also measuring the shortfall between the 
average income of the poor and the poverty line, and 
how those incomes are distributed among the poor (in 
the case of the second index). In fact, in most countries, 
the percentage reduction in these indicators was at least
4
 As the comparison periods vary between countries, the total 
percentage-point variation in the poverty rate is divided by the 
number of years covered in the period. The years considered in 
each country coincide with those reported in table I.4.
as large as in the poverty and indigence rates. In other 
words, in addition to having reduced the proportion of the 
population with incomes below the poverty line, the average 
income of the poor also increased and the dispersion of 
their incomes narrowed. The few countries that do not 
fit this pattern include Guatemala and Honduras, where 
the percentage reduction in the poverty rate was not very 
significant, unlike the absolute reduction in percentage-
point terms (see figure I.4).
Figure I.3
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ANNUALIZED VARIATION IN 








































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a 
 The survey year used differs from country to country. The data for 2002 are based 
on the most recent available estimates for 2000-2002, and those for 2006 are based 
on surveys available between 2004 and 2006. 
b 
 Urban areas.
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Figure I.4
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ANNUALIZED VARIATION IN 





































































































































































































































































































































































































Indigence rate Indigence gap Gap squared
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a  The survey year used differs from country to country. The period 2002 corresponds 
to the most recent survey available between 2000 and 2002, and the period 2006 
represents surveys available between 2004 and 2006.
b  Urban areas.
Although the gaps between countries in terms of 
poverty and indigence levels have narrowed, the region 
remains highly heterogeneous. The most recent figures 
available for each country report the lowest poverty levels 
in Argentina (figures covering the urban area only), Chile, 
Uruguay and Costa Rica, which have poverty rates below 
22% and indigent rates between 3% and 7%. The medium-
low poverty group consists of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Panama, where poverty 
rates are below 32%. Countries with medium-high poverty 
levels include Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador and Peru, with poverty rates between 38% and 
48%. Those with the highest poverty and indigence rates, 
above 50% and 30% respectively, are Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay (see table I.A-1 in the 
annex at the end of this chapter).
The heterogeneity of poverty in the region can also 
be seen in the wide variety of ways it affects individual 
subgroups of the population. The incidence of poverty is 
always greater in rural areas than in urban zones (except 
in Chile and Uruguay). Moreover, a lack of income to 
satisfy basic needs is largely correlated with educational 
achievement. The incidence of poverty is greater among 
individuals whose head of household and partner have 
not completed primary school education than among 
individuals living in families with a higher education level. 
There are also life-cycle differences in poverty rates, with 
the highest levels being reported among children, and 
also differences according to activity status (employed, 
unemployed, or not economically active) (see figure I.5). 
Other relevant dimensions include the sex of the head 
of household, ethnic origin (poverty affects indigenous 
and Afro-descendent people more) and disability status 
(which is also highly correlated with poverty), among 
others. Several of these factors are reviewed in greater 
detail in section C of this chapter, which analyses progress 
made towards meeting the first target of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).
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Figure I.5
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POVERTY INCIDENCE ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUAL OR 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS, AROUND 2007
(Percentage of the population)
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Total Head employed Head unemployed Head inactive
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Corresponds to the average number of years of schooling of the head of household and partner.
b Urban areas.
Box I.3
WORLD BANK POVERTY FIGURES: RECENT UPDATES
To work with an absolute poverty measure 
that is comparable between the different 
regions and developing countries, over 
the last few decades the World Bank has 
been using an international standard based 
on the national poverty lines adopted by 
countries with the lowest per capita income 
levels of in the world.
This approach assumes that two 
people with the same purchasing power 
are treated the same, even through they 
live in different countries. An alternative 
is to use the exchange rate, but this can 
produce an underestimate of the incomes 
of people living in the poorest countries 
and thus overstate poverty. As the lower 
wage level in developing economies is 
reflected in lower prices of goods that 
are not traded internationally, one unit 
of the local currency will have greater 
purchasing power domestically than 
worldwide. For that reason, the World 
Bank has used purchasing power parity 
(PPP), which is calculated by converting 
a local currency into a reference currency 
(US$) in terms of purchasing power 
equivalent. Following this logic, in 
1991, an international poverty line was 
estimated equivalent to one PPP dollar 
per day at 1985 prices. In 2000 the line 
was recalculated at 1993 prices and set 
at 1.08 PPP dollars. 
In 2005, the World Bank coordinated 
an exercise to update PPP values, which 
aimed to correct a number of problems 
encountered in the previous measurements. 
These include biases in the price surveys 
used and a lack of clear standards in 
selecting and valuing the goods subject 
international comparison. The changes 
made resulted in a significant increase 
in PPP values for 2005 compared to 
those estimated for 1993. For example, 
a PPP rate of 1.42 yuans per dollar was 
estimated for China in 1993, whereas in 
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the 2005 exercise this value rose to 3.46 
yuans per dollar. This means that in China 
the price level index (i.e., the PPP rate 
divided by the exchange rate) rose from 
25% in 1983 to 52% in 2005. A similar 
situation has been observed in India: the 
price index in 1993 was 23% and it had 
risen to 40% by 2005. One reason for 
this growth is differences in the quality 
of products covered in 1993 and 2005. It 
is thus plausible that goods considered 
in 1993 were of lower quality in poorer 
countries than in the United States market. 
According to the International Comparison 
Programme (ICP) the 1993 PPP values 
underestimated the cost of living in the 
poorest countries.
The new PPP values for 2005 
were used as basic inputs to update the 
international poverty line used by the 
World Bank. The new threshold proposed 
is 1.25 PPP dollars per day, representing 
the average of the national poverty lines 
used in the 15 countries (with surveys 
available) that have the lowest per capita 
income or consumption levels in the world 
(Malawi, Mali, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Níger, 
Uganda, Gambia, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Tajikistan, 
Mozambique, Chad, Nepal and Ghana). 
Based on this new international line, the 
incidence of poverty was estimated for 
developing countries in 2005, and the 
estimates for previous years were amended 
retroactively to 1981.
The review conducted by the World 
Bank has two effects that work in opposite 
directions. Firstly, the higher PPP rates 
in poor countries mean that one unit of 
the local currency yields less in parity 
terms, thereby increasing the value of 
the international line in local currency 
terms. Secondly, the review lowered the 
international poverty line, because if the 
poverty line of 1.08 DPP dollars of 1993 
had been updated in terms of inflation, the 
value of the line for 2005 would have been 
1.45 DPP dollars per day. As, according to 
the World Bank, the first effect dominates 
the second, there was an increasing 
incidence of poverty overall. 
Shortcomings in the review performed 
by the World Bank in 2005 include the fact 
that PPP rates are national averages, which 
means that the weights specified for the 
various goods might not be appropriate for 
the poorest segments of the population. 
Moreover, the use of a national measure 
ignores potential cost of living differences 
between urban and rural zones, a situation 
that could be aggravated by problems of 
representativeness of rural areas in certain 
price surveys used in the International 
Comparison Programme in 2005. Lastly, 
data comparability issues need to be kept 
in mind when reviewing the 2005 World 
Bank estimates; for instance the PPP 
values for the various reference years 
do not necessarily coincide with national 
sources, as the conversion to PPP values is 
only done once for each country. Moreover, 
in countries where only one survey was 
available between 1981 and 2005, national 
accounts were used for interpolation, 
assuming a constant Lorenz curve.
The methodology described differs 
from that used by ECLAC to estimate 
poverty and indigence for Latin American 
countries. In particular, ECLAC measures 
are based on poverty standards that 
are specific to the region and higher 
than those used for the world’s poorest 
countries. Consequently, the World Bank 
figures tend to be lower. It should be noted 
that the methodological differences also 
produce different country rankings by 
poverty levels. 
Box I.3 (concluded)
POVERTY ESTIMATED BY THE WORLD BANK IN DIFFERENT



































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of World Bank, “PovcalNet” [online] http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/
povDuplic.html.
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF EXTREME POVERTY,



































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and 
World Bank.
a
 The World Bank figures correspond to 2002 in the case of Guatemala, 2003 for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela Chile, Colombia and El Salvador, and 2004 in the cases of Mexico 
and Nicaragua. The figures for Argentina and Uruguay are urban totals. ECLAC figures 
show the percentage of the population living below the indigence line. The data correspond 
to 2002 in the case of Guatemala, 2003 in the cases of Chile and Honduras, and 2004 for 
Bolivia and El Salvador. The figures for Argentina and Uruguay are urban totals.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Shaohua Shen and Martin Ravallion, “The developing world is poorer than 
we thought, but not less successful in the fight against poverty”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 47032008; World Bank, “Global purchasing power parities 
and real expenditures. 2005 international comparison programme”, Working Paper, No. 45196, Washington, D.C., 2008 and “PovcalNet” [online] http://iresearch.
worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povDuplic.html.
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Box I.4
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING POVERTY
The poverty measurements used in this 
document belong to the family of parametric 
indices proposed by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984), which are obtained 



















Where n represents the size of the 
population, q denotes the number of 
people with income below the poverty 
line (z), and the parameter α > 0 assigns 
varying weights to the difference between 
the income (y) of each poor or indigent 
individual and the poverty or indigence 
line.
When α = 0 equation (1) corresponds 
to what is known as the headcount index 
(H), which represents the proportion of 
the population with income lower than 




When α = 1, however, the equation 
yields an indicator that measures the 
relative income shortfall of poor people 
with respect to the value of the poverty 
line. This indicator is known as the poverty 
















Lastly, when α = 2 the indicator gives 
greater relative weight in the final result to 
those who fall furthest below the poverty 





















Source: James Foster, Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke, “A class of decomposable poverty measures”, Econometrica, vol. 52, 1984.
B. The rise in food prices and its impact on poverty
Convergence among a set of domestic and, in particular, external factors has caused a sharp 
increase in food prices that has undermined living standards among the poorest in Latin 
America. The cumulative rise in food prices in 2007 and 2008 is thought to have prevented 
roughly 11 million people from moving out of poverty and a similar number from escaping 
indigence. Accordingly, the countries of the region need to implement policies to protect the 
poorest sectors from the rise in these prices and strengthen the productive capacity of the food 
system to sustainably satisfy the population’s needs over the medium and long terms.
1. Factors related to the rise in food prices
The convergence of a number of factors has meant that in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, as in the rest of 
the world, food prices have risen steadily throughout the 
decade, with the process intensifying from 2006 onwards. 
Although in the latter months of 2008, prices trended 
downwards as a result of the global financial crisis, they 
are likely to take time to return to their previous levels.
International food prices rose on average by 138% 
between 2000 and 2008. The largest increases occurred 
between 2006 and 2007, with prices rising by 23.8% in 
that biennium, and between 2007 and June 2008 when they 
rose by 40%.5 Furthermore, several of the commodities 
whose prices have risen by most, such as rice, wheat and 
maize, are essential items in the basic shopping basket of 
the poorest people. Between June 2007 and June 2008, the 
5
 Average of a set of price indices covering 55 food products, 
weighted by the share of these products in total world exports 
between 1998 and 2000, as estimated by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of United Nations (FAO) [online]. http://www.fao.
org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/es/.
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prices of these products rose between 80% and 90% (see 
figure I.6). The trend altered in the middle of this year, 
when prices began to fall, although they have remained 
higher than in 2006 and earlier. On this point, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
(2008) has argued that although the downward trend could 
gather pace, it seems unlikely that prices will return to 
their levels of earlier periods.
Figure I.6
TREND OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF SELECTED ESSENTIAL FOOD PRODUCTS, JANUARY 2000-NOVEMBER 2008


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Strictly speaking, the rise in food prices reflected 
a combination of structural and other more temporary 
factors (ECLAC, 2008b; Rodríguez, 2008). Among the 
structural factors, according to FAO (2008) the low level 
of exportable food products has been the main factor 
explaining the rise in prices. This problem stems from 
the fact that consumption has outstripped production in 
many exporting countries, resulting in drastic rundown 
of inventories. For example, the rise in grain prices 
coincided with an surge in consumption and a reduction 
in inventories that has been visible since early in this 
decade (see figure I.7).
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Figure I.7
TREND OF GLOBAL GRAIN INVENTORIES (WHEAT, MAIZE



































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), “Grain: world 
markets and trade archives” [online] http://www.fas.usda.gov/grain_arc.asp, 
April 2008.
a
 The value for the commercial year is equal to the sum of worldwide wheat, maize 
and rice inventories in that year. It should be noted that commercial years vary by 
country and product. In the case of wheat, the most frequent commercial year runs 
from July to June, that for maize extends from October to September, whereas rice 
follows the calendar year.
Another factor that has had an impact on food price 
inflation has been the growth in demand from emerging 
countries, particularly those in developing Asia, such as 
China and India (ECLAC, 2008b, 2008c), and a number 
of African countries. In these countries, population has 
grown, urbanization rates have increased and incomes 
have risen in the wake of economic growth. For example, 
in Asia economic growth raised the average income of the 
population by 9% between 2005 and 2007, while in Africa 
average incomes grew by 6% (Von Braun, 2008). 
The rise in energy prices has also had a major effect 
in pushing up food prices, not only by increasing food 
production and marketing costs (fertilizers, transport), but 
also by stimulating a search for alternative energy forms. 
In United States and Europe, the subsidies offered for 
biofuels have boosted the demand for agricultural products. 
According to Jiménez, Jiménez and Kacef (2008), between 
50% and 75% of the increase in demand for certain grain 
products reflects the greater demand for biofuels, while 
the World Bank estimates that ethanol production will 
consume 30% of the maize crop in the United States 
in 2010.6 Recent empirical research has concluded that 
the expansion in the production of biofuels has been the 
key factor explaining the reduction in maize and wheat 
inventories and has encouraged export restrictions and 
fuelled a speculative boom (Mitchell, 2008).
ECLAC (2008b) has argued that the factors influencing 
the trend of commodity prices reflect dynamics on both 
the financial and goods markets. Since 2006, the demand 
for instruments indexed to commodity prices has increased 
(Jiménez, Jiménez and Kacef, 2008), and between January 
and September 2008, grain and oilseed futures contracts 
expanded by 15.2% compared to the same period in 2007 
(Chicago Chamber of Commerce, 2008). Nonetheless, the 
data also show a reduction in the volume of contracts for 
grains, oilseeds and other food commodity products in 
the latter months of 2008, so the impact of commodity 
price speculation could be limited to a specific period 
(ECLAC, 2008b).
6




2. The impact of higher food prices on regional poverty
Latin America and the Caribbean is likely to be less 
vulnerable to rising food prices than other regions, since 
it is a net food exporter and has greater foreign currency 
liquidity and flexibility in the terms of trade (Von Braun, 
2008). Nonetheless, there are several reasons to expect 
the rise in food prices to have a regressive impact varying 
from country to country and the population concerned. 
Generally speaking, the poverty impact of world food 
prices will depend on the degree to which international 
prices are passed through to local markets, the initial scale 
of poverty, the balance between households that are net 
buyers and net sellers of food products, the percentage 
of the budget that poor households spend on food, and 
the trend of the ratio between incomes earned from low 
productivity jobs and food inflation.
The countries of the region that are most vulnerable 
to the pass-through of international food prices are net 
food and energy importers. These include several Central 
American and Caribbean countries, which also face high 
logistics and transport costs, access difficulties to food 
products and productive bottlenecks (such as a shortage 
of seeds and fertilizers). In contrast, countries that are 
net food exporters and net energy importers face positive 
agricultural shocks but negative energy ones, while net 
food and energy exporters would, theoretically, be the 
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least vulnerable to the rise in prices (ECLAC, 2008b). 
Nonetheless, the behaviour of inflation in individual 
countries also will depend on the fiscal and monetary 
policies being implemented and private expenditure 
trends, among other factors.
In fact, the available evidence shows that Latin 
America and the Caribbean is by no means shielded 
from the rise international prices. Up to September 2008, 
total inflation in the previous 22 months had risen in all 
countries, and, with one exception, the food price index 
had outpaced the overall index (see figure I.8). In line 
with the drop in international prices since the middle of 
2008, domestic inflation eased in the second part of the 
year in most countries. Despite the inflationary effect 
that could be generated by local currency devaluations 
in some countries, domestic prices look likely to rise by 
less in 2009.
Figure I.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): 





























































Food CPI General CPI
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information from the respective countries.
One factor that could cause a difference in the 
magnitude of the impact of higher food prices on poverty 
is the balance between the number of poor households 
that are net food producers and consumers in the different 
countries. If poor people consume more than they produce, 
the impact will be negative, but if the opposite is the case 
the impact will be positive. Nonetheless, even in countries 
that are net exporters of food products, most households 
are net food consumers, since most food is not produced by 
family businesses. These differences can also be extended 
to the degree to which international prices will be passed 
through to the local market; in urban zones that are more 
integrated into the international economy, pass-through 
is more likely, and they will have a larger proportion of 
net food-consuming households.
The poorest groups are likely to be the worst hit by the 
rise in food prices because, the lower a family’s income, 
the larger the proportion of its income that will be spent 
on food to satisfy its members’ nutritional needs. If food 
prices rise by more than other prices, then expenditure by 
the poorest population groups will be subject to greater 
relative inflation. In fact, data show that the rise in food 
prices seriously erodes the purchasing power of the poorest 
households: for example, in rural areas of El Salvador, 
households in 2008 were buying 58% of what they bought 
18 months earlier for the same money. This erosion of 
purchasing power will not only worsen the food situation 
among the poorest people, but it may also result in the loss 
of other essential goods, such as heating, water, sanitation, 
education and health (Von Braun, 2008).
There are thus several factors affecting the potential 
impact of food price inflation on the incidence of poverty 
in the region’s countries. The poverty and indigence 
measures discussed in the first section include the effect 
of higher food prices, since this is reflected in the higher 
level of the respective thresholds.7 Accordingly, the 
rise in indigence projected 2008, which breaks with the 
downward trend seen since 2002, is an indication of the 
impact of the behaviour of prices. To estimate the impact 
of this factor, a simulation was performed to recalculate 
indigence and poverty rates assuming food prices rose 
by the same amount as other goods. 
The simulations suggest that the rise in food prices 
in 2007 prevented roughly 4 million people moving out 
of poverty and indigence in that year. The effect was even 
greater in 2008, because the cumulative increase in food 
costs since late 2006 would have increased the number of 
poor and extremely poor people by 11 million, compared 
to the figures that would have obtained if food prices had 
risen at the same pace as other goods (see table I.4). This 
means that, if the simulated situation had actually occurred, 
the indigence rate projected for 2008 would have been 
nearly one percentage point lower than in 2007, instead 
of 0.3 percentage points higher.
7
 From 2007 onwards, the value of the indigence line has been adjusted 
according to the consumer price index for food products, whereas 
the segment of the poverty line that corresponds to expenditure on 
non-food products is updated using the corresponding CPI (see 
table I.1).
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Table I.4
LATIN AMERICA: SIMULATED IMPACT OF THE RISE IN FOOD 
PRICES ON POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 2007 AND 2008 a










 Indigence 12.6 11.9 0.7 67.8 64.2 3.6
 Poverty 34.1 33.4 0.7 183.9 180.0 3.9
2008
 (projection)  
 Indigence 12.9 10.9 20.0 700.8 59.6 11.2
 Poverty 33.2 31.2 20.0 181.6 170.7 100.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 The rise in food prices is assumed equal to the increase in the CPI for other goods 
as from December 2006.
The impact of the price increase varies from country to 
country. The simulation exercise shows that the cumulative 
rise in prices in 2007 and 2008 is likely to have the 
largest impact on indigence in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay, where 
the number of people living in extreme poverty is roughly 
50% higher than what would have been the case if food 
prices had not risen by more than other products. In these 
countries, along with Costa Rica, the rise in food prices 
is likely to have increased the number of poor people by 
15% or more (see figure I.9).
In brief, the rise in food prices has been a key factor 
eroding living standards among the poorest segments of the 
population, partly offsetting the progress achieved earlier 
in terms of income growth and distribution. Although this 
phenomenon weakened towards the end of 2008, mechanisms 
are still needed to alleviate the impact of rising prices on the 
budgets of the poorest families. Some of the policies applied 
in the region for this purpose are outlined in box I.5.
Figure I.9
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): POOR AND INDIGENT PEOPLE, 

























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),on 
the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
Box I.5
POLICIES TO OFFSET THE IMPACT OF HIGHER FOOD PRICES ON THE POOREST SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION
Although much the inflationary upsurge 
stems from external factors, which reduces 
room for manoeuvre among the region’s 
countries (ECLAC, 2008c), a wide variety 
of instruments have been and can be used 
to protect the poorest from the effects 
of food price inflation and strengthen 
food production systems. Each of these 
policy alternatives has advantages and 
disadvantages, and they need to be chosen 
in the light of local realities.
Macroeconomic policies to protect 
food purchasing power have been widely 
implemented by countries in the region. For 
example, import duties on food products 
were lowered in Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Peru; and a number of tariff barriers were 
eliminated in Mexico. Some countries 
have imposed export restrictions (such as 
setting quotas for rice exports in Brazil, 
and for wheat and grains in Argentina; 
and price controls have been applied to 
specific food products (ECLAC, 2008b). 
Measures such as these may reduce food 
shortages in the short run, but they distort 
the price system and can discourage 
food production and foster the formation 
of local cartels, among other problems 
(Von Braun, 2008).
Some Governments have purchased 
food on the international and domestic 
markets for sale at controlled prices in 
the poorest zones. Such initiatives include 
the Food Mission (Misión Alimentación) 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
set up in 2003. According to figures from 
the statistics unit of the Food Markets 
Mission (MERCAL), in September 
2008, food was distributed to over 
13 million people at prices representing 
a 71.7% saving on market prices.a 
Nonetheless, the impact of this initiative 
has not been rigorously evaluated to its 
identify its effects on poverty and food 
security, or the progressive nature of the 
expenditure and repercussions on private 
food supply. 
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Box I.5 (concluded)
Possible measures to increase the 
production and availability of food products, 
and thus lower prices, include the supply 
of inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers), 
financing and technical cooperation 
for small-scale producers. In this area, 
some countries have provided support 
to small-scale farmers and have given 
incentives for the production of food for 
self-consumption (ECLAC, 2008b). An 
example is the Brazilian Government’s Zero 
Hunger Programme, introduced in 2003, 
under which the Government has provided 
credits, training and technical assistance to 
small-scale farmers through the National 
Programme for the Improvement of 
Family Agriculture (PRONAF); and it has 
recovered and distributed food products 
wasted by commercial production, through 
the Food Bank Programme. By 2006, an 
estimated 2 million small-scale Brazilian 
producers had received PRONAF credits 
(FAO, 2006). 
Various types of programme to increase 
human capital and reduce poverty could be 
adapted to alleviate the effects of higher food 
prices on the most vulnerable population 
groups. Examples include school food 
programmes and mother-child programmes, 
which have broad coverage and a long 
tradition in several of the region’s countries. 
There are also conditional income transfers, 
which have improved the quality and diversity 
of family diets and the proportion of family 
incomes spent on food products, although 
their nutritional impacts are not entirely 
clear. Other types of transfer are specifically 
designed to sustain consumption among 
the poorest families during economic crises, 
such as food vouchers or food supply 
schemes that are conditional on work or 
school attendance.
Lastly, a recent trend is the 
implementation of programmes to serve 
population groups subject to nutritional 
risk, who are given complementary food 
enriched with multivitamin supplements. 
Initiatives of this type include the MÁS 
VIDA (More life) plan implemented in 
Buenos Aires province, which targets 
expectant and breast-feeding mothers 
and children from birth to five years old 
in extremely poor families, by providing 
food supplements, health checkups, 
nutritional surveillance and training. 
Another programme is the Micro-Nutrient 
Initiative in Nicaragua, which provides 
food products (sugar, salt, flour) fortified 
with vitamin A and iron —covering over 
80% of the micronutrient needs of the 
beneficiary population— together with 
preventive health care services (Cohen 
and Franco, 2005).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 See the website of the Ministry of Popular Power for Food [online]http://www.minpal.gob.ve/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9&Itemid=27.
C. Progress towards meeting the first target of 
 the Millennium Development Goals
In late 2007, the Latin American region was well on the way to fulfilling the first MDG target; 
The region as a whole was already 90% of the way towards achieving this, and nine countries 
had made progress that was at least on track. Although future prospects are still positive, the 
scenario of uncertainty and volatility prevailing in the latter months of 2008 could reduce the 
chances of meeting this target. Moreover, the chances of halving total poverty seem more 
remote, since only 59% of this target had been achieved by 2007. An evaluation based on 
national averages needs to be complemented with a specific review of specific population 
groups, leading to practical policy formulations. Factors such as area of residence, the 
educational climate in the family, the sex of the head of the household, or the ethnic group to 
which it belongs, display wide disparities in terms of the incidence of extreme poverty and 
progress towards meeting the target.
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1. Prospects for meeting the target at the aggregate level
An essential benchmark for a country’s’ social development 
is provided by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
for which the evaluation framework has recently been 
revised (see box I.6). As part of the periodic review made 
by ECLAC on the progress made by countries towards 
meeting the various targets, this section draws on the new 
poverty estimates that are available to monitor the first 
MDG target to halve the proportion of people living on 
less than one dollar a day, between 1990 and 2015.8 
According to the 2007 poverty estimates, the Latin 
American region as a whole is fully on track to meet its 
commitment. The proportion of the region’s people who 
are indigent (12.6% in 2007) is just over one percentage 
point away from the target (11.3%), which means that in 
60% of the total time available to meet the target, 88% of 
the path has been travelled (see figure I.10). 
With regard to the somewhat more demanding target 
of halving total poverty between 1990 and 2015, which 
in previous editions of the Social Panorama of Latin 
America was considered more appropriate to the region’s 
economic development level, only 59% has been achieved, 
so progress is behind schedule. Although the total poverty 
rate in Latin America has declined significantly, from 
48.3% in 1990 to 34.1% in 2007, the target (24.2%) is 
still a long way off.
Progress at the regional level is the outcome of 
heterogeneous trends in the individual countries. Four 
of them, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador (data from urban areas) 
and Mexico have already met the first MDG target, while 
Costa Rica is 95% of the way there. Five other countries, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru show progress that is similar 
to or better than expected (between 65% and 90%); while 
the remainder are behind schedule. Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Paraguay display the largest absolute gaps 
between the current situation and the target, in all cases 
wider than 12 percentage points.
In the case of total poverty, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador and Mexico have made progress that is at least 
as good as expected, although only Chile has already 
succeeded in halving total poverty from its 1990 level. At 
the other extreme, several countries have made progress 
of less than 30%, i.e., under half of what was expected 
at this stage.
8
 See chapter II for an up-to-date analysis of the new MDG targets 
and indicators on employment.
Figure I.10
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE PROGRESS IN 
REDUCING EXTREME POVERTY AND TOTAL POVERTY
BETWEEN 1990 AND 2007 a
Extreme poverty

















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a The amount of progress made (expressed as a percentage) is calculated by dividing 
the percentage–point reduction (or increase) in indigence registered during the period 
by one half of the indigence rate for 1990. The dotted line represents the amount of 
progress expected by 2007 (68%).
b Urban areas.
Simulations based on household surveys suggest the 
region needs an average growth rate of 1.2% to meet the 
first MDG target, which is similar to forecast population 
growth up to 2015. This low rate partly reflects the 
“subsidy” that assumes Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, 
representing about 60% of the region’s population, have 
already met the target ( see figures I.10 and I.11). 
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Figure I.11
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES 
































































































Growth with no change in distribution Growth with a change in distribution
Average growth 1990-2007 Growth forecast for 2009
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries.
The growth needed regionally involves very different 
efforts by the individual countries. Whereas per capita 
GDP in some cases would need to grow by over 4% per 
year, the rates needed in other countries are below 2%, 
while those that have already met the target have a margin 
enabling them to remain in the same category despite 
possible reductions in per capita income.
Broadly speaking, three groups of countries can be 
defined in terms of their prospects of meeting the target. 
The first group, consisting of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Mexico, has the best chances of reaching 
2015 with an extreme poverty rate below half of that 
recorded in 1990. Although several of these countries 
could be vulnerable in the current scenario, the progress 
achieved thus far provides a cushion that other countries 
do not enjoy. The second group consists of countries that, 
while not having met the target yet, require a growth rate 
that is consistent with their historical performance and 
with growth expectations for the near future. These include 
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Lastly, in a third 
group of countries the growth rate needed is above their 
average growth since 1990, and also above projections 
for 2009. These include Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay.
It should be noted that small distributive improvements 
have a major effect on the chances of meeting the first 
MDG target. Even small growth that largely benefits the 
poor can significantly lower the necessary growth rate to 
more feasible levels. Even in countries that face the greatest 
growth challenges, a distributive change equivalent to a 
10% reduction in the Gini index would enable nearly all 
of them to reduce poverty in line with the proposed target 
(see figure I.11). This topic is analysed in section D of 
this chapter, which shows how the “distribution effect” 
has generated significant progress in poverty reduction, 
beyond what would have been achieved exclusively from 
a uniform rise in average household incomes.
Evaluating the feasibility of meeting the target set for 
2015 is an exercise that is highly sensitive to the setting 
of economic uncertainty that started to prevail in the latter 
months of 2008 in the wake of the international financial 
crisis and resultant slowdown in the world economy. As 
noted above, slower economic growth is forecast for Latin 
America and the Caribbean in 2009, together with some 
distributive deterioration (see box I.2) —factors that could 
lead to an increase in poverty and indigence. Nonetheless, 
given the progress already made, the target still seems to 
be attainable in most countries, although this will clearly 
depend on the duration of the low-growth period and the 
depth of the difficulties it entails. The fact that the region is 
confronting this episode in a more robust economic setting 
than on previous occasions makes it easier to implement 
measures to mitigate the negative effects of slower growth 
on the incomes of the most poor. Nonetheless, a lengthy 
recession could prevent some countries from meeting the 
target, particularly those that still have furthest to go and 
require high and sustained growth rates.
Box I.6
REVISED MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS MONITORING FRAMEWORK a
The development goals and targets 
were announced in the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, which was 
signed in September 2000 by 189 
United Nations Member States. The 
first monitoring framework consisted 
of a list of 18 targets and 48 indicators 
responding to the following eight specific 
goals: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger (2) Achieve universal primary 
education; (3) Promote gender equality 
and empower women; (4) Reduce child 
mortality; (5) Improve maternal health; 
(6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases; (7) Ensure environmental 
sustainability; and (8) Develop a global 
partnership for development.
The 2005 World Summit added four 
new targets to the monitoring framework 
in force at that time, to allow for more 
quantitative supervision of the established 
goals. The new targets highlighted issues 
of productive employment and decent 
work, access to reproductive health 
services, access to HIV/AIDS treatment 
and biodiversity. The technical work to 
select suitable indicators for the new 
targets was done by the Inter-Agency and 
Expert Group on Millennium Development 
Goal Indicators.
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Box I.6 (concluded)
The Expert Group presented the 
official revised Millennium Development 
Goals Monitoring Framework at the 
62nd Session of the General Assembly 
in 2007. The framework will be used to 
report annually to the General Assembly 
and is expected to serve to monitor the 
MDGs in all official matters. It contains 
21 targets and 60 indicators that have 
been renumbered sequentially according 
to the respective goals and targets.b In 
addition, several targets and indicators 
were eliminated and others reformulated. 
The most significant changes include the 
following:
•	 Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger. A new target was 
introduced, relating to “Achieve 
full and productive employment 
and decent work for all, including 
women and young people.” Four 
official indicators were defined for 
that purpose, involving measurement 
of the rate of productivity growth 
per worker, the percentage of the 
population employed, the percentage 
of extremely poor workers and 
the proportion of workers that 
have unstable and insecure jobs 
(“vulnerable workers”). In addition, 
the recommendation to monitor 
poverty trends by using national 
poverty lines was made explicit. 
Although the “dollar-a-day” poverty 
line makes it possible to compare 
the various realities of countries 
around the world in absolute terms, 
national poverty lines also allow for 
measurements that are more relevant 
to each country and thus more useful 
for designing public policies.
•	 Goal 2: Achieve universal primary 
education. The previous indicator 
was replaced by one measuring 
survival to the last grade of primary 
education (Proportion of pupils 
starting grade 1 who reach last grade 
of primary). Although calculation of 
the new indicator is methodologically 
more difficult, it is a more direct 
measurement of target 2.A, which 
seeks to ensure that by 2015 children 
throughout the world can complete 
a full cycle of primary education.
•	 Goal 5: Improve maternal health. A 
new target to be attained by 2015 
was introduced, namely universal 
access to reproductive health, which 
is recognized as a fundamental right 
for women. To quantify progress, 
three new official indicators are 
added, relating to the birth rate 
among adolescents, the coverage 
of antenatal care, and unmet needs 
in terms of family planning. 
•	 Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases. A new target 
was incorporated for achievement 
by 2010, namely universal access 
to HIV/AIDS treatment for all people 
requiring it. The indicator for this is 
the proportion of population with 
advanced HIV infection that have 
access to antiretroviral drugs. In 
addition, most of the indicators 
were reformulated: measurement of 
HIV/AIDS prevalence was targeted 
on the youth population; greater 
relevance was given to the incidence 
of malaria than to its prevalence; 
malaria prevention mechanisms were 
distinguished from medication-based 
treatment for the same purpose; and 
tuberculosis incidence was included in 
addition to measuring its prevalence 
and associated mortality rates.
•	 Goal 7: Ensure environmental 
sustainability. To measure progress in 
incorporating sustainable development 
principles in national policies and 
programmes and to reduce the loss 
of environmental resources, three 
indicators have been added of various 
types: consumption of substances 
that deplete the ozone layer, the 
proportion of fish populations that are 
within safe biological limits, and the 
proportion of water resources used. A 
new target has also been introduced 
relating to reducing biodiversity loss, 
with a new indicator that calculates 
the proportion of species in danger 
of extinction. These changes pose a 
major challenge for countries’ statistics 
systems, because some of the new 
environmental indicators suffer from 
significant limitations in terms of 
obtaining data and monitoring.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of “Official MDG`s targets and indicator list” [online] http://www.eclac.org/mdg/
official_indicators_en.html.
a Approved at the General Assembly at its sixty-second session in 2007 and in force since 15 January 2008. 
b
 The new indicator numbering system consists of a figure composed by the goal number followed by the corresponding indicator (e.g., the fourth indicator for goal 1 is 
indicator 1.4).
2. Evaluation of progress towards the first MDG target by 
 population subgroups9
9
 This section adopts the structure and main arguments of the 
analysis developed in León (2008); progress percentages have 
been recalculated on the basis of the new information available.
It is useful to augment aggregate nationwide analyses with 
others that take account of different dimensions making it 
possible to measure progress in terms of specific population 
groups and strata, particularly in Latin America with its 
characteristically high level of inequality. 
Based on information provided regularly by household 
surveys across the region, four dimensions were chosen 
for studying the progress made by individual countries 
towards meeting the poverty target, namely: (a) place 
of residence of the population, distinguishing between 
urban and rural areas; (b) educational climate in the home, 
measured by the average number of years’ education 
of the head of household and spouse, which captures 
the availability of human capital —a decisive factor for 
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access to employment and household incomes; (c) the 
sex of the head of household, which seeks to capture the 
greater vulnerability associated with families headed by 
women— usually households in which the male partner is 
absent; and (d) ethnic or racial origin of the population. 
These dimensions are relevant in two ways: firstly, 
they refer to population subgroups which in all countries 
differ significantly in terms of the scale of poverty 
affecting them. The focus is on progress made by the 
most backward population strata, i.e., those displaying 
the highest poverty indices. 
Secondly —and largely as a consequence of the 
above— these dimensions are often considered in the 
design of policies and programmes to combat poverty, 
either directly, by identifying specific policy target groups 
(such as poor rural populations), or indirectly as a basis 
for the design and evaluation of social programmes (e.g., 
the significance of female-head-of-household status 
in conditional monetary transfer programmes and the 
presence of school-age children to establish the usual 
requisites of those programmes). 
(a) Progress in urban and rural zones
Poverty measurements based on income and those 
based on indicators of unmet basic needs show that people 
living in rural areas in Latin American countries tend 
to suffer greater deprivation than those living in urban 
zones. Average incomes are higher in urban households 
than in rural ones, although the differences between 
the two vary greatly from one country to another. In 
Bolivia, urban income is more than double the level in 
rural areas; in Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, 
urban income exceeds rural income by between 50% and 
60%; in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico, 
average urban income is between 25% and 40% higher 
than in rural areas. The differences are smallest in Chile 
and Costa Rica were urban income is 12% higher than 
in rural zones, and especially in Paraguay, were average 
incomes in both areas are similar (see figure I.12).10
Rural-urban disparities have narrowed in most of the 
countries analysed since the 1990s. The largest reduction 
occurred in Brazil, where the gap narrowed from 2.2 to 
1.5 thanks to a much larger increase in rural incomes 
than urban ones, which also grew substantially. Mexico, 
Panama and Paraguay also report significant reductions 
in income disparities between areas, although partly 
reflecting a deterioration in real incomes in urban areas. 
10
 It should be remembered that the average income in each area 
has been divided by the value of the poverty line as a way of 
approximating cost of living differences between areas. As urban 
poverty lines are higher than rural ones, the nominal disparity of 
average incomes is greater than reported here.
In contrast, the gap between the different geographic 
settings has widened in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia.
Figure I.12
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 
















































































Around 1990 Around 2007
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Corresponds to the average income of urban households and the average income of 
rural households, both expressed as multiples of the poverty line for each geographic 
setting. The base years are 1997 in Bolivia, 1995 in El Salvador, 2002 in Panama 
and 1999 in Paraguay, since nationally representative household surveys are not 
available for earlier years.
At the regional level, the rate of progress in rural 
areas is significantly less than in urban ones. Whereas the 
former are about 61% along the way towards achieving 
the target, the latter have already virtually attained it. This 
unfavourable pattern for rural areas is repeated in several 
countries, particularly those with low rates of progress 
nationally, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, but also in Colombia and Mexico, which have 
made more substantial progress. In contrast, several of 
the countries that have made most progress in reducing 
extreme poverty nationwide are also those that have made 
this a priority in rural areas. For example, Brazil, Chile and 
Costa Rica, which have already met the first MDG target 
or are very close to doing so, display progress rates in rural 
areas that are a similar or superior to those in urban zones. 
This result suggests that prioritizing progress among the 
country’s most backward groups can be a viable strategy 
when combined with pursuit of a general improvement 
in living standards (see figure I.13).
The results described also illustrate the importance 
of performing a disaggregated analysis. For example, 
both Chile and Mexico report significant reductions in 
poverty and have already met the target for extreme 
poverty. Nonetheless, while both rural and urban areas in 
Chile have benefited from similar progress, in Mexico, 
rural areas have fallen even further behind urban zones 
than at the start of the past decade. Although it is perfectly 
feasible for a country as a whole to attain the stipulated 
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target while a large part of its population does not move 
forward at the same pace, it is important not to lose sight 
of the situation of more deprived groups.11
Figure I.13
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): PROGRESS TOWARDS 





































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
(b) Progress in households with different educational 
climates
A particularly important dimension for a disaggregated 
analysis of progress towards meeting the first MDG 
target involves household human capital. The educational 
achievement of family members is not only a reliable 
indicator of the socioeconomic group they belong to, but 
also decisive for the opportunities available to children 
that have not yet joined the labour market. The high rate 
of transmission of educational capital between parents and 
children and, hence, job opportunities, is one of the greatest 
influences on the glaring socioeconomic inequality and 
high levels of absolute poverty prevailing in most Latin 
American countries. This means that family educational 
capital is possibly the most appropriate criterion for 
classifying progress on poverty reduction in the various 
socioeconomic strata.12
In order to describe the household in terms of its 
educational climate, it is best to look at the members 
that are the main breadwinners and who, as a result of 
11
 Something similar is happening at the regional level, since Latin 
America as a region has made considerable progress towards the 
target, yet several individual countries are still a long way from 
doing so.
12
 From the operational standpoint too, using this variable has the 
advantage that all household surveys provide information on the 
education of family members and strata can be constructed on 
comparable bases.
this capital, influence the opportunities for well-being 
of the household members as a whole. For this purpose, 
the variable used is that of the educational climate of 
the household; this is defined as the average number of 
years of schooling completed by the head of household 
and his or her spouse.13
On the basis of the educational climate, three groups 
of households may be identified: (i) a low level, which 
corresponds to incomplete primary schooling (less than six 
years in most countries); (ii) an average level, equivalent 
to complete primary schooling to incomplete secondary 
schooling; and (iii) a high level, which corresponds to an 
educational level equivalent to or higher than complete 
secondary schooling.14
To point to note is that in all of the lower per capita 
income countries, 25% or more of the low-education 
household population was living in extreme poverty, 
and indigence affected over 40% in three cases (Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua and Paraguay). In high-education 
households, on the other hand, both in higher and in lower 
per capita income countries, the incidence of extreme 
poverty is no greater than 10%. This shows that household 
educational capital is an appropriate dimension for 
identifying population strata with different probabilities 
of being extremely poor. 
Although all countries have achieved very high net 
primary school enrolment rates (above 90% in the vast 
majority of cases) (United Nations, 2005), people living 
in homes with very low levels of educational capital 
account for roughly a third of the regional population. 
Even in some of the relatively more developed countries, 
this group accounts for about 20% of the population, and 
the proportion rises as high as 50% in several lower-
income countries.
Progress made between 1990 and 2007 towards 
achieving the first MDG target varies according to 
household educational capital. In 10 countries, indigence 
among lower-education households has decreased less 
than in other households (see figure I.14). This warrants 
special attention, because it shows that households that 
fail to overcome extreme poverty are precisely those 
most likely to reproduce conditions of structural poverty 
from one generation to the next and, therefore, need to 
be specially targeted by public policy. Nonetheless, it 
should also be remembered that many of these countries 
have seen a substantial increase in families’ educational 
13
 In single-parent households (where there is no spouse), the educational 
background corresponds to the number of years of schooling of 
the man or woman who happens to be the head of household.
14
 The criterion used for these groups is the duration of school cycles 
defined in the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED), developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
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levels, which has substantially reduced the proportion of 
people living in low-education homes. Thus, while the 
proportion of people living in low-education households 
may not have decreased as much as in other countries, 
the absolute number of people in this category may 
nonetheless have dropped. That is why this category 
includes countries with highly diverse indigence rates 
and degrees of fulfilment of the target nationwide. 
Whereas in countries such as the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile and Mexico, the proportion of all 
households in which the education climate is poor 
has decreased by more than 15 percentage points, in 
Nicaragua and Panama it has fallen by less than five 
points. Lastly, it is worth noting that in six countries 
more progress has been made towards meeting the 
first MDG target in low-education households than 
in others.
Figure I.14
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): PROGRESS TOWARDS THE 























































































Incomplete primary Complete primary Complete secondary
not completed primary education
households whose members have
Progress in countries with more
not completed primary education
households whose members have
Progress in countries with fewer
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Excludes progress percentages in categories where the indigence rate is below 
1%, in either the initial or the final year. The base year is 1997 in Bolivia, 1995 in El 
Salvador, 2002 in Panama and 1000 in Paraguay, since nationally representative 
household surveys are not available for earlier years.
b
 Urban areas.
(c)  Progress in households headed by women
The multiple changes that have occurred in family 
types over the last two decades in the region include 
a reduction in the number of two-parent nuclear 
families with children, and an increase in the number 
of single-parent families (with or without children), 
where in most cases the woman plays the role of head 
of household —a situation that has been accompanied 
by an increase in women’s participation in economic 
activity (ECLAC, 2007a). The concept of female head of 
household is useful since it makes it possible to identify 
households where the absence of the male partner 
forces women to bear the entire burden of maintaining 
the household, which is particularly complex when 
there are small children. Another factor that increases 
the relevance of this dimension is the important role 
played by female household heads in the main poverty 
reduction programmes in Latin America, especially 
in terms of administering the resources of conditional 
transfer programmes.
In this setting, the key issue is an increase in the 
proportion of households declaring female heads in the 
region, and the rise in the proportion of people living in 
them. At the present time, one in every four Latin Americans 
lives in a household headed by a woman, compared to 
one in every seven in the early 1990s. 
Secondly, the evidence shows that households 
headed by women are more vulnerable, although this is 
more of an urban phenomenon than a rural one. Thus, 
while there is a correlation between female-headed 
households and indigence, this is not equally strong 
in all countries nor in urban and rural zones. In many 
cases, rural households headed by women do not display 
higher indigence rates than those headed by men, e.g., 
in urban zones in all countries, except for Guatemala, 
Honduras and Peru (see figure I.15). This could, at least 
partly, be because in rural zones, the male partner often 
migrates or works away from home for lengthy periods 
(e.g., seasonal agricultural work).
Progress towards meeting the first MDG target 
according to the sex of the head of the household 
varies from one country to another. Seven countries 
have achieved a faster reduction in incidence among 
male headed households, specifically Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama Paraguay. 
In these countries, the gap between the two groups 
of households ranges from 10 percentage points in 
Mexico to 50 in Argentina and also in Paraguay, a 
country where female headed households have recorded 
the only increase in extreme poverty in the region. In 
contrast, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay 
display progress among female-headed households 
ranging between 11 and 47 percentage points higher 
than those headed by men. Brazil is the only country 
without a significant difference between male and 
female headed households (see figure I.16).
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Figure I.15
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF EXTREME 
POVERTY, BY SEX OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, URBAN



























































































































































































































































































Male-headed households Female-headed households
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
Figure I.16
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PROGRESS TOWARDS 
MEETING THE FIRST MDG TARGET, BY SEX OF HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD,1990-2007
(Percentages)



















Male-headed household Female-headed household
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 




(d)  Progress according to ethnic origin  
of the population
Despite the renewed interest in the situation of the 
indigenous peoples of Latin America, there is a significant 
backlog in the quality of information needed to make them 
“statistical visible”. The 2000 round of censuses contained 
questions on the ethnic identification of the population in 
nearly all countries, usually based on self-identification, in 
line with international recommendations.15 Nonetheless, 
censuses are not a suitable data source for monitoring 
progress towards meeting the first MDG target, because 
they do not provide information on household incomes. 
Household s rveys, on the other hand, which do satisfy 
this requirement, are limited sources for reflecting the 
ethnic dimension, either because they do not ask questions 
on this subject; or they do so in different ways, which 
reduces the chance of making comparative analyses; 
or else they use samples that are too small to obtain 
representative estimates.
In view of these limitations, it is impossible to obtain 
a satisfactory breakdown of information for monitoring 
the first MDG target by ethnic groups. Nonetheless, the 
data available from population censuses and household 
surveys in seven countries clearly reveal the differences 
in living standards according to this dimension. 
In general terms, the indigenous population is currently 
estimated at over 30 million people, representing about 
6% of the total population of Latin America. Moreover, 
slightly over 80% of the indigenous population was 
living in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru, and 
about 70% was concentrated in low per capita income 
countries. Although a large proportion of the indigenous 
population lives in rural areas, a current trend is the 
marked ethnic diversity visible in the cities. Data 
from 10 countries show that, around 2000, over 80% 
of the indigenous population of Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Panama and Paraguay were living in rural 
areas. In contrast, in Guatemala and Mexico, roughly 
one in every three indigenous people lives in urban 
zones, and in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile, over half live 
in cities (ECLAC, 2007a). 
The indigenous population usually lives in less 
favourable conditions than the rest of the population, 
irrespective of their zone of residence. For example, 
infant mortality (among children under one year of 
age) and mortality among the under-fives is much 
higher among the indigenous population. Estimates of 
the regional average show that infant mortality among 
15
 Differences in methods used in the most recent censuses to capture 
people’s ethnic or racial membership or origin do not ensure 
adequate recording of people belonging to the groups analysed, 
or comparability among the data collected. 
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indigenous populations is 60% higher than among their 
non-indigenous counterparts. Although the migration 
of indigenous populations to urban areas reduces infant 
mortality (compared to rates in rural zones), it does not 
close the gap on their non-indigenous counterparts. In 
fact, in some countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Brazil and Costa Rica) the gap is wider in urban zones 
than in rural ones (see table III.9 in ECLAC, 2007a). 
The situation is similar with respect to the incidence 
of extreme poverty among indigenous and Afro-descendent 
groups, which is higher than the in rest of the population 
in urban and rural areas alike. This shows that there are 
lower living standards which are not an effect of a rural 
or urban setting, but stem from inequities based on the 
ethnic and racial origin of the people in question (see 
table I.5).
Although the population belonging to an ethnic group 
has lower indigence rate in urban than in rural zones, it 
remains higher than among the rest of the population. In 
Bolivia and Brazil, this disadvantage is even accentuated 
in urban areas, as shown by the larger relative gaps between 
the corresponding indigence rates, whereas the opposite 
is true in Chile and Ecuador.
In rural areas, extreme poverty has retreated more 
slowly among indigenous and Afro-descendent groups 
than in the rest of the population, as can be seen in the 
trends reported in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and 
Panama.16 The pattern has been uneven between urban 
and rural areas: in Bolivia and Brazil, the incidence rate 
among groupshas fallen faster in urban than in rural 
areas, whereas the opposite has happened in Chile and 
Paraguay.
To conclude, the disaggregated analysis of progress 
towards meeting the first MDG target shows, that an exercise 
of this type is needed to more accurately characterize 
poverty reduction processes and identify any groups 
that are lagging behind the general trends. Thus, while 
some countries have achieved inclusive process without 
significant differences between the groups studied, in 
other cases the gaps have widened.
16
 It should be noted that the base years for the comparison are well 
after 1990, except in Brazil. 
Table I.5
LATIN AMERICA (6 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF EXTREME POVERTY AMONG THE INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-DESCENDENT POPULATION 
AND THE REST OF THE POPULATION, URBAN AND RURAL AREAS a
(Percentages)
Urban area Rural area












Bolivia 1999 12.9 25.4 2.0 56.7 66.3 1.2
2007 11.3 21.4 1.9 46.8 63.8 1.4
Percentage variation -12.3 -15.8 -17.4 -3.8
Brazil 1990 16.1 26.8 1.7 45.7 52.2 1.1
2007 60.3 90.5 1.5 17.8 21.4 1.2
Percentage variation -60.9 -64.6 -61.1 -59.0
Chile 1996 5.1 7.0 1.4 8.8 13.3 1.5
2006 3.1 4.2 1.3 3.0 6.2 2.1
Percentage variation -38.2 -40.3 -65.8 -53.3
Ecuador 2002 19.3 20.6 1.1 … … …
2007 11.6 20.0 1.8 20.7 320.3 1,6
Percentage variation -40.0 -30.2 … …
Panama 2002 9.0 … … 27.0 68.7 2.5
2007 5.0 … … 17.5 49.1 2.8
Percentage variation -44.5 … -35.4 -28.5
Paraguay 1999 10.0 31.7 3.2 23.3 60.6 2.6
2007 18.1 31.7 1.8 26.0 47.0 1.8
Percentage variation 81.5 0.2 11.3 -22.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a 
 Identified on the basis of information obtained from household surveys, according to the following categories: Bolivia, “Quechua, Aimara, Guaraní, Chiquitano, Mojeño and others”; 
Brazil, “Indigenous or black skin”; Chile, “Aimara, Rapa Nui, Quechua, Mapuche, Atacameño, Coya, Kawaskar, Yagán, Diaguita”; Ecuador, “ indigenous, and negroes and mixed 
race (mulatos)”; Panama, “Indigenous ”, and Paraguay: Guaraní is only language spoken.
b 
 Ratio between indigence rates for indigenous and Afro-descendent populations and others.
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D. Factors associated with poverty reduction in 
 the region 
The reductions in indigence and poverty achieved in many countries between 2002 and 
2007 stemmed both from increase in average household incomes and an improvement in its 
distribution. Although the predominance of one or other of these factors varies significantly 
between countries, distributive changes are recognized as a key element for empowering 
the effect of growth on poverty reduction. Moreover, in this period, income growth in poor 
households has mainly come from an increase in labour income per employed person, unlike 
what happens when the longer-term variation is analysed.
sustained economic expansion spanning that period. This 
setting provides an ideal scenario for exploring the role 
played by a number of factors that are usually associated 
with poverty, in determining its trend.
Following several years of meagre growth and, in some 
countries, deteriorating living standards, from 2002 onwards 
poverty indicators trended clearly downwards in most of 
the region’s countries, consistent with the continuous and 
1. Growth and distribution effects
A simple way to evaluate the relation between economic 
growth and the variation in poverty is to measure the 
elasticity of poverty in relation to income, i.e., the 
percentage change in the poverty rate for every percentage 
point change in per capita GDP. Evidence from 15 of 
the region’s countries with information available for 
the period 2002-2007 shows that in the vast majority of 
cases the increase in per capita GDP was accompanied 
by a reduction in poverty, as one would normally expect. 
Uruguay is an exception, however, since it displays positive 
income elasticities, such that poverty increased despite 
per capita output growth (see table I.6). 
In countries where economic growth has generated 
poverty reduction, the impact has been less than proportional 
(i.e., an income elasticity that is negative but greater 
than -1) in six cases (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay). In contrast, 
the percentage increase in income has reduced poverty 
more than proportionately (i.e., an income elasticity of less 
than -1) in 10 countries (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua). 
The percentage reduction in indigence in response to 
each percentage point of economic growth is usually more 
pronounced than in the case of non-indigent poverty. The 
simple average income elasticity of indigence between 
2002 and 2007 in the region’s countries is -2.0, compared 
to -1.2 in the case of non-indigent poverty.17 In some 
countries, e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay, 
the elasticity of indigence is more than double that of 
non-indigent poverty, while in other cases, it is three or 
more times higher, such as in Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
The Dominican Republic and Guatemala are the only 
exceptions, where the income elasticity of indigence is 
less than the income elasticity of general poverty.
17
 El Salvador is excluded from the average because the income 
elasticity of indigence in this country is very high by regional 
standards.
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Table I.6
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): INCOME ELASTICITY OF POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 2002-2007
Country Initial year Final year
Annual percentage variation
(Percentages) Income elasticity
Poverty rate Indigence rate Per capita GDP Poverty Indigence
Argentina 2002 2006 -18 -23 7.8 -2.2 -3.0
Bolivia 2002 2007 -3 -3 1.9 -1.5 -1.8
Brazil 2001 2007 -4 -7 2.1 -1.7 -3.3
Chile 2000 2006 -6 -9 3.1 -2.0 -2.8
Colombia 2002 2005 -3 -7 3.5 -0.9 -1.9
Costa Rica 2002 2007 -2 -8 4.6 -0.4 -1.8
Dominican Rep. 2002 2007 -1 0 5.2 -0.2 0.1
Ecuador 2002 2007 -5 -9 3.3 -1.4 -2.6
El Salvador 2001 2004 -1 -5 0.3 -3.0 -15.6
Guatemala 2002 2006 -2 -2 1.0 -2.3 -1.5
Honduras 2002 2007 -2 -3 3.8 -0.6 -0.9
Mexico 2002 2006 -5 -9 2.4 -2.1 -3.6
Nicaragua 2001 2005 -3 -7 1.9 -1.5 -3.7
Panama 2002 2007 -5 -8 5.9 -0.8 -1.4
Paraguay 2001 2007 0 -1 1.7 -0.1 -0.5
Uruguay 2002 2007 3 4 6.9 0.4 0.6
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2002 2007 -10 -17 5.7 -1.8 -3.0
Simple average -1.2 -2.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
Elasticity analysis reveals that similar growth rates 
can be compatible with very different outcomes in terms 
of poverty and indigence reduction. In the period analysed, 
Chile, Colombia and Honduras grew at rates averaging 
between 3% and 4%, yet the income elasticity of poverty 
in Chile is double that in Colombia and four times that 
in Honduras. A better understanding of these differences 
requires analysing the different modalities of growth in 
the countries concerned, or, more specifically, the way 
in which economic growth translates into changes in the 
level and distribution of household incomes.
Variations in the income received by households can 
differ from GDP growth. Between 2002 and 2007, growth 
rates of per capita household income were at least one 
percentage point below per capita GDP growth rates in 
eight of the region’s countries, while the opposite was 
true in five others. The first group includes Costa Rica 
and Uruguay, where average household income did not 
grow but actually fell back despite substantial growth in 
per capita GDP. In Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Guatemala, countries that reported some of the highest 
rates of growth of average household income, the latter 
substantially outpaced GDP growth (see figure I.17).18
18
 It should be noted that the deflator used to express the two variables 
in real terms is different. Whereas for per capita GDP, the implicit 
national accounts deflator was used, the variation in the general
Figure I.17
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 































































































Per capita income of households Per capita GDP
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
The relation between the variation in household incomes 
and its impact on the poverty rate can be analysed using 
a breakdown that considers, firstly, the growth of average 
 CPI was used for the incomes measured in the survey. Although this 
might affect the strict comparability of the two variables, it is not a 
significant factor in explaining differences in their growth rates.
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personal income or the “growth effect”, and, secondly, 
changes in the way this income is distributed, or the 
“distribution effect”. These two components represent the
total variation in the poverty rate for a given period and 
can be estimated through simulations based on household 
survey data (see box I.7).19
19
 It should be noted that, as the “growth effect” represents the variation 
in average incomes in the survey and not per capita GDP, the 
“distribution effect” cannot be directly assimilated to the trend of 
commonly used inequality indicators. The Gini coefficient and other 
indicators, which are used to describe income distribution in the next 
chapter, summarize the average dispersion of household income as 
a whole, whereas the “distribution effect” refers to the segment of 
the distribution that is relevant for the subset of poor households.
Box I.7
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN POVERTY
According to the traditional scheme for 
measuring poverty based on lack of 
income, a country’s poverty rate at a 
given point in time is wholly determined by 
three elements: the poverty line, average 
income and the structure of the income 
distribution. Accordingly, if the poverty line 
is held constant in real terms, any change 
in the poverty indicator can be analysed 
in terms of changes in average income 
and the income distribution. 
Following Datt and Ravallion (1992), 
a poverty indicator can be calculated using 
the income distribution for the initial period 
and the level of average income in the 
final period. The difference between this 
indicator and the poverty rate observed 
in the initial period can be interpreted 
as a “growth effect”. It is also possible to 
calculate the poverty rate corresponding 
to average income in the initial period, but 
with an income distribution similar to that 
prevailing in the final period. The difference 
between this indicator at the initial poverty 
rate is the “distribution effect”. The two 
effects can also be calculated with the 
initial and final periods interchanged.
In formal terms, if H(yt,dt) is the poverty 
indicator for period t, determined by average 
income (yt) and the shape of the distribution (dt), the decomposition into the growth and 
inequality effects can be expressed as:
The decomposition as specified 
here has three disadvantages. Firstly it 
is not exact, because there is a residual 
that has no analytical interpretation. The 
second shortcoming is the fact that the 
size of each effect depends on the base 
year used in the comparison (initial or 
final year). Both disadvantages can be 
overcome by averaging the calculated 
effects using the two base years (Kakwani, 
1997), a procedure that was used to 
make the calculations presented in 
the chapter.
“Growth” effect “Distribution” effect
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] RdyHdyHdyHdyHdyHdyH +−+−=− 112111121122 ,,,,,,
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, “Growth and redistribution components 
of changes in poverty measures”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 38, 1992 and Nanak Kakwani, “On measuring growth and inequality components of 
changes in poverty with application to Thailand”, Discussion Paper, University of New South Wales, 1997.
Most of the progress made on poverty and indigence 
in Latin American countries in the period 2002-2007 has 
been the result of growth in average household incomes. 
This is particularly true of countries reporting the largest 
poverty reductions, in percentage-point terms. Nonetheless, 
the share of the growth and distribution (i.e., inequality) 
effects in the region’s countries has not been uniform, 
and in several cases reductions in poverty and indigence 
are mainly explained by a better distribution of income.
Average-income growth has been the predominant 
factor in reducing poverty and indigence in Argentina 
(urban area), Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador (urban area), Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and 
Nicaragua, which are also among the countries achieving 
the largest reductions in poverty and indigence rates in 
the period analysed (see figure I.18). 
Nonetheless, considerably less progress would have 
been made if it had not been supported by distributive 
improvements. In fact, there are few countries where 
the increase in average incomes accounts for more than 
three quarters of the reduction in poverty and indigence. 
Examples are Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala. In the 
other countries where the “growth effect” predominated, 
between 30% and 40% of the reduction in poverty and 
slightly higher percentages of the reduction in indigence 
are due to the change in distribution. 
Over half of the reduction in poverty and indigence 
rates in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Panama, along with Paraguay in the case of indigence, 
stems from the “distribution effect”. This has predominated 
in several of the countries that have made significant 
relative progress in terms of poverty reduction (albeit 
less so in percentage point terms), particularly in Brazil, 
Chile and Panama.
The growth and distribution effects complement each 
other in most countries, such that their interaction has 
made it possible to achieve better results than would have 
been the case if only one of these factors had been in play. 
In other words, the reductions in poverty and indigence 
recorded between 2002 and 2007 have been the outcome 
of growth in average incomes and a better distribution of 
them. There are a few exceptions to this pattern, such as 
Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala, where the income 
distribution tended to aggravate poverty and indigence, 
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and in El Salvador and Paraguay where the “distribution 
effect” alone would explain a larger reduction in indigence 
than actually occurred.
Figure I.18
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): EFFECT OF ECONOMIC 














































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Guatemala is excluded in the indigence graph and the Dominican Republic in both 
graphs because the results of the breakdown are not significant.
b Urban areas.
The results described above simply and directly verify 
that income distribution is a highly relevant factor in 
poverty reduction which should therefore not be relegated 
or excluded because it complements economic growth. 
Reducing the concentration of income has clearly been a key 
factor in reducing in the poverty rate in several countries, 
but a lack of distributional progress also undermines the 
chances of achieving larger poverty reductions.
The breakdown of changes in the poverty rate into 
the growth and distribution effects can also be applied 
to other poverty indicators, particularly indices of the 
poverty gap (PG) and the severity of poverty or FGT2. As 
indicated in section A, these indicators are useful because 
they provide a more complete view of poverty conditions, 
by measuring, in addition to the percentage of poor people, 
the gap between the average income of the poor and the 
poverty line (in the case of the PG index) and the way in 
which those incomes are distributed among the poor (in 
the case of the FGT2 index).
The “distribution effect” plays more of a role in 
changes in the poverty gap and severity indices, because 
these are more sensitive than the headcount index to 
distributive issues in relation to those living below the 
poverty line. In fact, the percentage variation in the PG 
and FGT2 indices resulting from average income growth 
is always less than the figure obtained for the poverty 
rate, with the sole exception of El Salvador. Moreover, 
differences in the weight of each effect are generally 
small, with few exceptions (Colombia, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua) (see figure I.19).
Figure I.19
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): GROWTH EFFECT ON 
CHANGES IN POVERTY INDICATORS: H (HEADCOUNT
INDEX), PG (POVERTY GAP) AND FGT2 (FOSTER,






















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Figures for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and Uruguay are 
excluded because the results of the breakdown of not significant for any of the 
three indicators.
b Urban areas.
When the geographic dimension is brought into the 
analysis to distinguish between urban and rural areas, it 
can be shown that the growth and distribution effects have 
played different roles in each country. Whereas in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua and Panama the “distribution 
effect” predominated in urban areas, the opposite is the case 
in rural zones. In contrast, the “growth effect” prevailed 
in urban areas of Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, but 
not in rural areas (see figure I.20).
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Figure I.20
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): “GROWTH EFFECT” ON POVERTY IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 2002-2007 a
(Variation in percentage points)



























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Figures for the Dominican Republic and Paraguay are excluded because the results of the breakdown are insignificant in terms of geographic areas.
2. Factors underlying changes in incomes
Broadly speaking, total household income consists of 
labour income received by workers (both employees and 
the self-employed), public transfers (including from social 
security and poverty reduction programmes), private transfers 
(such as remittances and gifts from other households), 
capital income and other income (including imputation 
of rent in the case of owner-occupied housing).
In both indigent and poor households alike, most 
income is obtained from the labour market. Labour 
income, including salaries and wages, tends to account 
for a larger proportion of total income in non-indigent 
poor households than in indigent ones. The lack of labour 
incomes in the latter is mainly compensated for by transfers, 
which are proportionately larger than in non-indigent poor 
households. Capital income is usually a less significant 
income source for the poor and indigent, although data 
suggest that Brazil is an exception (see figure I.21). 
Consequently, it is no surprise that most of the variations 
recorded in average income among low-income groups over 
the last five years come from employment.20 In particular, 
in the seven countries where poverty retreated the most,21
20
 The analytical group is the percentage of people below the poverty 
line in 2002. 
21
 In relative terms (i.e., the percentage variation in the rate), although 
not necessarily in absolute terms (i.e., percentage points).
the growth of labour income accounts for roughly 77% of 
total income growth (69% in the case of indigent families). 
This source was particularly decisive in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Panama, where it represents 
at least 85% of the change in total income, followed by 
Argentina and Chile (about 80%), and Brazil, Ecuador 
and Mexico (at least 66%) (see figure I.22).
Labour income was also the key to explaining the 
variation in total per capita income among poor households 
in the other countries. In Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Paraguay, at least 65% of the change 
in total income stems from an increase in labour incomes. 
Only in Guatemala and Honduras did this source make a 
minor contribution, and in the first case it actually changed 
in the opposite direction to the other income sources.
Transfers were not a key factor for income growth 
among the poor in those countries, but they were particularly 
important in countries such as Guatemala and Honduras, 
accounting for 50% or more of the income growth among 
the poor. In these countries, most of the increase in transfers 
stems from remittances received from abroad.
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Figure I.21



























































































































































































Wages and salaries Own-account earnings
Transfers Capital income
Other
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas.
Figure I.22
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL GROWTH OF TOTAL INCOME PER PERSON AND CONTRIBUTION OF EACH SOURCE,























































































































































































































Labour income Transfers Other income Total income
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Countries grouped in three categories according to the poverty trend between 2002 and 2007: Significant reduction, stagnation, or significant increase.
b
 Urban areas.
Labour incomes, the most important source of changes 
in income among the poor and indigent, can be analysed 
using the breakdown scheme applied in Social Panorama of 
Latin America 2007, whereby labour income per person can 
be seen as the product of the following three components: 
labour income per employed person, the net employment 
rate (number of people employed divided by the number 
of economically active people), and the percentage of the 
population who are economically active.22
Between 2002 and 2007, the growth of labour income 
per employed person was the key factor driving total 
income growth, particularly in countries reporting the 
22
 The latter factor can be further broken down into the product of 
the participation rate and (the inverse of) the dependency rate. 
Nonetheless, as these demographic variables hardly vary over 
short periods they are not analysed on a disaggregated basis.
largest poverty reductions. This variable grew at more than 
10% per year in Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, and between 2.1% and 3.4% in Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Panama. In countries where poverty 
did not retreat by much, labour income per employed person 
also played a major role, especially in Costa Rica and El 
Salvador, although in most cases it was less decisive than 
other factors, and in some cases moved in the opposite 
direction, as in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala 
(see figure I.23).
The net employment rate has been another key factor 
in the growth of average income per person. In some of 
the countries achieving the largest poverty reductions, 
such as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chile, Ecuador and Panama, this was the second most 
important variable in explaining the growth of labour 
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income. In Colombia and Nicaragua, the employment 
rate was at least as important as average income per 
person employed. In Uruguay, the rise in the employment 
rate prevented labour income from falling further, partly 
offsetting the reduction in income per employed person 
and the percentage of household members who are 
economically active. The employment rate among the 
poor fell in Bolivia and Mexico only.23
The proportion of household members who are 
economically active has behaved unevenly. Among 
countries where poverty decreased substantially, this 
variable increased significantly only in Brazil and 
Mexico, whereas it ended to decline in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. There were also movements in 
both directions in other countries, although less than 1% 
per year in most cases.
In conclusion, the reductions in poverty and indigence 
reported over the last five years are mainly explained by 
an increase in labour income. Particularly in countries 
where poverty declined by most, this has been the result 
of an increase in average income per employed person, 
rather than a rise in the employment rate or household 
activity rate.
23
 These figures differ from those obtained in Social Panorama of 
Latin America 2007 for the period 1990-2005. In that period, the 
employment rate was the main factor drivingincome growth in
Figure I.23
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Labour income per employed person Employment rate
Percentage of active population
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a 
 Countries arranged according to the change in labour income per person employed 
and grouped together in three categories according to the poverty trend between 2002 
and 2007, classified as: significant reduction, no change or significant increase.
b
 Urban areas.
 poor households in most countries, whereas labour income per 
employed person tended to recede.
E. Recent trend of distributive inequality
Over the last five years, the income distribution has shown signs of moving towards greater 
equity in several of the region’s countries, with a substantial narrowing of the gap between 
the richest and poorest groups. Significant distributive improvements were observed in nine 
countries between 2002 and 2007, which has reduced the average level of inequality in the 
region. Although income remains highly concentrated, these figures set an important precedent 
regarding the feasibility of improving the distribution of resources in Latin America.
1. Structure of income distribution
An initial understanding of the scale of distributional 
inequality in the region can be gained by measuring the 
share of total income received by the different income 
groups: the poorest 40% of the region’s households 
receive an average of 15% of total income. This 
indicator is lowest in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic 
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and Honduras, never exceeding 11%. Only in Uruguay 
does the share of this group surpass 20%; in the other 
countries with a high share in the first quintile, such 
as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Mexico, it is between 17% and 18% (see figure I.24 
and table I.A-2 in the appendix). 
Figure I.24
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): STRUCTURE OF INCOME 






























































































































Poorest 40% Next 30% 20% below the richest 10%
Richest 10% Decile X / deciles I to IV Quintile V / quintile I
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Households arranged in order of per capita income.
b Urban area.
In contrast, the wealthiest 10% of the region’s 
households receive on average 35% of total income, 
although the income share of this group varies widely 
from country to country. While the highest levels are 
above 40%, such as in Brazil and Colombia, the lowest 
are below 28%, in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Uruguay.
The clear distributive disparity that characterizes 
Latin American countries can also be seen by comparing 
the ratio of incomes between the wealthiest and the four 
poorest deciles, and between the fifth quintile (i.e., the 
20% of households in the highest part of the distribution) 
and the first. The first of these indices shows that average 
income per person in households located in the 10th decile 
is roughly 17 times higher than that of the poorest 40% of 
households. The ratio varies widely from one country to 
another, from about nine times in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Uruguay, to 25 times in Colombia. 
Meanwhile, per capita income in the wealthiest quintile 
is 20 times higher on average than that of the poorest 
quintile, ranging from 10 times in Uruguay to 33 times 
in Honduras.
The pattern of income distribution between 2002 and 
2007 reveals three distinct trends. Nine countries (Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay) report a 
significant narrowing of the gap between groups at the two 
ends of distribution, reflecting both an increase in the share 
of income received by the poorest groups and a reduction 
in the share received by households in the top part of the 
distribution. In these countries, the 40% of households 
with lowest per capita incomes have increased their share 
of total income by at least one percentage point, and by 
up to four percentage points in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. The proportion of total income received by 
the wealthiest decile has also shrunk by between four and 
five percentage points in all cases, except in Paraguay, 
where the reduction was less than one percentage point. 
Consequently, in these countries, the average-income 
gap between the wealthiest quintile and the four poorest 
deciles has narrowed by at least 17%, and the difference 
between the extreme quintiles has decreased by at least 
20%. The largest reductions in the two indicators occurred 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, of 36% and 41%, 
respectively. Significant improvements were also achieved 
in Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua, of around 30% in both 
indicators (see figure I.25).
In a second group of countries, consisting of Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, the 
structure of income distribution remained broadly unchanged. 
Although in most cases, the gaps have tended to narrow, 
the variations have not been very significant. 
The Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras 
form a separate group in terms of the structural trend of 
the income distribution, because the gaps between the 
two extremes of the distribution widened in all three 
cases. In Guatemala, the deterioration stemmed from a 
loss of income share in the lowest-income groups and an 
increase in the share of the wealthiest groups, whereas in 
the Dominican Republic and Honduras the deterioration 
was mostly due to the first of these factors.
In several countries reporting a significant narrowing 
of the gaps between the groups at the two ends of the 
distribution, this result stemmed from the stagnation 
of real income in the wealthiest quintile, in contrast to 
a substantial increase in the first quintile. This did not 
happen in Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
or Nicaragua, however, where the income of the highest 
quintile grew significantly, nor in El Salvador where the 
average real income of that group fell (see figure I.26).
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Figure I.25
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN THE INCOME GAP BETWEEN THE WEALTHIEST AND
POOREST GROUPS, 2002-2007





























































































































































































































































2002 2007 Variation 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban areas
Figure I.26
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): GROWTH OF AVERAGE INCOME AND ITS MAIN SOURCES, QUINTILES I AND V, 2002-2007 a
(Percentages of annualized real growth rates) 
 Countries where the gap between quintiles decreased Countries where the gap between 
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Rep.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 To calculate the real income growth, income was expressed as multiples of the poverty line in each year. Possible differences in the trend of this variable between urban and rural 
areas mean that the results are not fully compatible with the trend of the gaps between the extreme quintiles shown in figure I.25. 
Most of the distributive improvements reported by 
certain countries resulted from the trend of labour incomes. 
Higher earnings from work were the main factor driving 
income growth in the lowest quintile. A similar thing 
happened with incomes in the highest quintile, where 
labour income grew slightly, and this was partly or fully 
offset by reductions in incomes from other sources. The 
clearest exception in this regard is Nicaragua, where 
income growth in the top quintile is entirely due to an 
increase in transfers.
In countries where the gap remained broadly 
unchanged, labour incomes were also the main factor 
explaining the change in total incomes. In Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Mexico, differences in income growth in the 
first and fifth quintiles broadly reproduced the trends in 
labour income for those same groups. A similar pattern 
can be seen in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and 
Honduras, where the income gap between the wealthiest 
and poorest quintiles widened. There are some exceptions, 
however, such as the highest quintile in Colombia and 
Guatemala, where the increase in transfers and other 
incomes easily outpaced labour-income growth, or the 
widespread fall in income in Uruguay, in which all sources 
participated to the same extent. 
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2. Synthetic inequality indicators
From a different perspective, distributive inequality can be 
analysed through synthetic indices that summarize information 
on the income distribution for the entire population in a 
single value. There are several synthetic indicators, such 
as the Gini, Theil or Atkinson indices, which differ, among 
other ways, in the relative weight they assign to each segment 
of the income distribution. For that reason, it is best to use 
them in a complementary way (see box I.8).
Box I.8
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING DISTRIBUTIVE INEQUALITY
The degree of concentration displayed by a 
given income distribution can be measured 
through a wide range of indicators. This 
chapter uses four of the best-known, which 





where n = population size, yi = per 
capita income of the i-th individual, µ = 
mean income, and log denotes natural 
logarithm.
The Gini index is the best-known 
index for analysing income distributions. 
It corresponds to the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the equi-distribution line. 
The greater the income concentration, the 
larger will this area be, which increases 
the value of the indicator. 
Despite its popularity, the Gini index 
does not satisfy the “transfer principle” —a 
desirable property for inequality indicators 
whereby inequality should decrease in 
response to a progressive transfer of 
income (i.e., from a “rich” household to 
a “poor” one). This makes it advisable 
to complement the analysis with other 
indicators that do satisfy this property, 
such as the Theil, Atkinson and logarithmic 
variance indicators. 
In all four cases, the higher the value 
of the indicator, the greater the inequality. 
Nonetheless, while the Gini and Atkinson 
indicators take values in the range [0,1] 
(where the 0 corresponds to absolute 
equality and 1 represents absolute 
inequality), the other two indicators have 
maximum values greater than 1.
It should also be noted that the 
formulation of the Atkinson indicator 
uses an additional parameter known 
as “inequality aversion” (ε). The greater 
the value used, the higher the weighting 
given to observations in the lower part of 
the distribution, most frequently between 
0.5 and 2.0.
All inequality indicators are ordinal, 
so their values are not comparable. 
Furthermore, as each of them measures 
partial aspects of inequality, it is possible for 
them to generate different rankings for the 
same distribution. The ranking of a group 
of distributions can only be considered 
definitive if it does not vary depending 
on the index used. The best procedure, 
therefore, is to use inequality indices in 






















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Frank Cowell, “Measuring Inequality”, LSE Handbooks in Economics, 
Prentice Hall, 2000.
Owing to their specific properties, the ranking of 
the countries by inequality levels will depend on which 
indicator is being used. Nonetheless, certain regularities 
can be identified. Based on the most recently available 
figures, the least unequal countries in the region are 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay. It is also possible to identify Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras as those with the 
highest levels of income concentration in the region. 
Classifying the other countries by their inequality levels 
is somewhat more arbitrary, because the rankings vary 
widely according to the indicator used. Nonetheless, 
one possible grouping would consider Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru as countries with 
medium-low inequality in the regional context, while the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama and Paraguay 
would be medium-high inequality countries (see figure 
I.27 and table I.A-3 of the appendix).24
24
 To classify countries by inequality levels, the k-means statistical 
clustering algorithm was used, which seeks to generate strata that 
are internally homogeneous but also have the maximum possible 
variability between them. 
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Figure I.27






































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a Urban areas.
The trend of inequality indicators between 2002 
and 2007 corroborates a majority trend towards a better 
income distribution. In all of the nine countries mentioned 
above (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama 
and Paraguay) inequality indicators fell by at least 5%. 
Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras can also be identified 
as countries in which the distribution tended to deteriorate 
in the period under study (see figure I.28). 
Reflecting the reduction in inequality that predominated 
in several of the region’s countries, the simple average of each 
of the four indicators analysed fell between 2002 and 2007 
—by 4%, 8%, 5% and 10% for the Gini, Theil, Atkinson 
and Variance of logarithms indices, respectively. Although 
the region remains exceedingly unequal, these figures set a 
significant precedent regarding the feasibility of improving 
the distribution of resources in Latin America.
A longer term comparison, using the Gini index 
exclusively, shows that current inequality levels are the 
lowest recorded since the early 1990s. Around 1990, the 
simple average of Gini indices in the region’s countries 
amounted to 0.532, whereas the average of around 2007, 
calculated on a comparable basis in terms of countries 
and geographic areas analysed, was 0.515. Nonetheless, 
these figures represent a reduction of just 3%, which by 
no means can be interpreted as a significant change in the 
distribution patterns prevailing in the region.
Figure I.28
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INEQUALITY INDICATORS, 2002-2007
















































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
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Box I.9
INEQUALITY TRENDS IN COUNTRIES OF THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
Distributive inequality is an important 
issue in all regions of the world, especially 
when it is tending to deteriorate. Such is 
the case in most member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), according to a 
study recently published by that institution, 
which analyses inequality trends over the 
last two decades. 
Inequality patterns in OECD countries 
vary widely. For example, the Gini index 
varies from less than 0.25 in countries 
such as Denmark and Sweden, to almost 
0.40 in the United States and Portugal, 
with Mexico and Turkey reporting even 
higher values. 
Regardless of these differences, the 
study in question concludes that the income 
distribution has deteriorated on average 
with respect to the situation prevailing 
in the mid-1980s. The breakdown of the 
total variation in two subperiods shows 
that between 1980 and 1990 deterioration 
predominated, particularly in Mexico, 
New Zealand and Turkey, with very few 
countries reporting improvements. In the 
subsequent decade, there was a wider 
variety of trends, with the distribution 
worsening in some countries, such as 
Canada and Finland, while improving in 
others, including Mexico and Turkey. The 
cumulative result over the two decades is 
that nearly all OECD countries suffered 
a slight but significant increase in their 
inequality levels, particularly in Finland, 
New Zealand and Portugal.
VARIATION OF THE GINI COEFFICIENT BY SUB-PERIODS 
(Hundredths of the Gini Coefficient)
 Decades 1980-1990 Decades 1990-2000 Decades 1980-2000
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, Paris, 2008.
3. Inequality in different population groups
A useful property of some inequality indicators is the 
possibly of estimating the contribution made to the final 
outcome by mutually exclusive population groups. In 
particular, the Theil index can be broken down into the 
sum of two factors: intra-group inequality, or the extent of 
dispersion of incomes within each group; and inter-group 
inequality which is the dispersion of average income 
between groups. Intra-group inequality also corresponds 
to the sum of the Theil indices for each group weighted 
by their share in the total income of that group.
One way to explore the characteristics of inequality 
in the region’s countries is to analyse the contribution 
made to inequality by some of the dimensions used above 
to evaluate the region’s progress in reducing poverty 
—particularly geographic area, the sex of the head of 
household and the average education level. 
Inequality in the income distribution affects urban 
and rural areas in the region’s countries in very different 
ways. While rural areas in Bolivia, Honduras, Panama and 
Paraguay report indicators that are substantially higher than 
in urban areas, the opposite is true of Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the contribution made 
by rural areas to total inequality is always less than that of 
urban areas, because, while they may have high levels of 
inequality, their share of total income is considerably less 
than that of the urban area. Paraguay is the only country 
where the rural area accounts for almost 50% of intra-
group inequality, and it joins Guatemala and Honduras 
as the only countries where this proportion is above 25% 
(see figure I.29).
In the breakdown of inequality by urban and rural 
areas, the intra-group factor dominates; i.e., income 
concentration is mostly explained by the dispersion of 
incomes within urban and rural areas, rather than the 
average-income gap between them.25 Countries in which 
the inter-group factor is more important are Bolivia, El 
25
 The small share of the inter-group factor is partly due to the small number 
of groups used in the breakdown —in this case just two. The weight 
of this factor tends to increase as the number of groups grows, as is 
shown below in the breakdown by “household educational climate”.
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Salvador, Honduras and Peru, with this factor accounting 
for between 15% and 20% of total inequality. In countries 
such as Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, income differences between geographic 
areas explain less than 5% of total inequality.
A breakdown of the Theil index by the sex of the 
head of household shows an even greater predominance of 
the intra-group component, which accounts for virtually 
100% of total inequality. In other words, there are no 
major differences in average income between households 
headed by men and women, at least compared to the 
wide income disparity among households headed by 
a person of the same sex. Here it can be shown that 
inequality in households headed by men is clearly 
greater than in families headed by women, except in a 
few countries where the differences are negligible. In 
keeping with this, male-headed households contribute 
most to total inequality.
The stratification of households by education level, 
measured by the “educational climate” variable used in 
previous sections of this chapter, shows that intra-group 
inequality stems mainly from the highest educational strata.26 
This happens not only because the dispersion of incomes 
received by members of that group is generally larger than 
in the other two groups, but also because of its large share 
of total income, which magnifies its contribution to overall 
inter-group inequality. This is particularly clear in Chile, where 
70% of inter-group inequality comes from households in the 
highest education level. Moreover, this pattern is not present 
in countries where the average education level is relatively 
low by regional standards. In El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras for example, the largest contribution to intra-
group inequality stems from low-education households. 
The intra-group component accounts for roughly 30% of 
total inequality in countries such as Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay.
26
 “Educational climate” is measured by the average number of years 
study by the head of household and his or her partner. This variable is 
stratified in three levels: Incomplete primary education; Incomplete 
secondary education; and Complete secondary education.
Figure I.29
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): THEIL INDEX AND ITS DECOMPOSITION BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS,
AROUND 2007
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Figure I.29 (concluded)






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Corresponds to the average number of years’ study completed by the head of household and spouse. “Low” represents incomplete primary education; “Medium”, represents 
complete primary but incomplete secondary education; and “High”, represents complete secondary education and beyond.
F. Poverty and perceptions of inclusion and exclusion
The poorest sectors in Latin America, like the rest of the population, see social inclusion as 
reflecting their aspirations for economic autonomy and material well-being, and also their desire 
to possess the skills needed to participate in information- and knowledge-based societies that are 
permanently in flux. As the poorest groups are short on all social constituents of inclusion, it is 
hardly surprising that they express perceptions and sentiments of exclusion, such as loneliness, 
impotence and disorientation, more intensively than the non-poor. Nonetheless, feelings of 
exclusion do not significantly reduce expectations of social mobility among the most poor, which 
tend to reflect perceptions of the future of the economy, thereby suggesting that the poorest people 
will react positively to new opportunities. Social policies should therefore reduce poverty and 
at the same time promote social inclusion and strengthen the sense of belonging.
Although Latin America has achieved a significant reduction 
in poverty and a slight improvement in the income distribution 
in recent years, there are still a substantial number of 
households that lack the resources to satisfy their basic 
needs, and the region is still the most unequal in the world. 
Moreover, the increasing integration of countries in the 
global economy has made the labour market more precarious 
and eroded traditional social security mechanisms (on this 
point see chapter II). These trends have also contributed to 
higher levels of vulnerability and exclusion among broad 
swathes of the Latin American population, including newly 
impoverished sectors of former middle classes that are 
living just above the threshold for satisfying their basic 
needs. There are also extremely deprived groups that are 
not covered by social support networks, whether family, 
community or institutional based.
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The persistence of absolute poverty and particularly 
high levels of inequality, compounded by the emergence 
of new forms of vulnerability and exclusion, call for more 
comprehensive public policy that complements actions 
to raise incomes with initiatives aimed at promoting 
participation by individuals and families in the social 
activities needed for them to have an acceptable life in 
terms of social inclusion. Governments also need to take 
account of the perceptions of the most excluded members 
of their population, regarding their sense of belonging in 
society, since these groups would be most prone to feelings 
of disorientation and uncertainty generated by globalization 
processes, which would compound the potential adverse 
psycho-social repercussions of opportunity structures that 
are traditionally highly asymmetric. At the same time, a 
widening of the gap between expectations and effective 
material achievement among the poorest members of 
society could threaten inclusion and cohesion policies, 
owing to their potential effects in terms of frustration and 
destabilization of democracy.
Despite the greater visibility of the concept of inclusion 
on country agendas in the region, there is currently no 
consensus as to which inclusion standards are most 
relevant to the Latin American reality, for use as a frame 
of reference for designing public policies and constructing 
social exclusion and inclusion indicators. Nor have any 
regional quantitative studies analysed the perceptions and 
feelings of exclusion and gaps between aspirations and 
expectations of mobility prevailing among the poorest and 
most excluded sectors, against a backdrop in which major 
inequities converge with changes in economic, social, and 
cultural structures. This section makes: (i) a characterization 
of the Latin American population’s perceptions based on 
the main pillars of inclusion, for the purpose of producing 
inputs for applying the inclusion-exclusion approach in 
public policies; (ii) a comparative analysis of perceptions of 
exclusion among different socioeconomic strata to provide 
an initial overview of the psycho-social impact of a highly 
unequal opportunities structure and growing exposure to 
changes in the different domains of life; and (iii) a review 
of factors that could be associated with the gap between 
aspirations and expectations of well-being, bearing in mind 
people’s socioeconomic position, their feelings of exclusion 
and perceptions for the future of the economy.
1. Perceptions of inclusion
The inclusion-exclusion approach began to be seen as 
a useful analytical tool for public and social policies, 
both in Latin America and in other parts of the world, 
in a context where the categories traditionally used to 
understand deprivation processes were becoming limited. 
In particular, repercussions on the social structure of the 
transformations associated with globalization (Hopenhayn, 
2001), greater precariousness in the labour market and a 
weakening of the social protection system, revealed the 
need to take a broader view of problems of deprivation. 
New forms of poverty began to be mentioned, such as 
that affecting recently impoverished households that are 
slightly above the thresholds for satisfying basic needs, 
or extreme deprivation which afflicts people that have 
no access to social safety nets.27 In the last few years, 
ECLAC (2007b) has argued that the persistence of high 
levels of inequality is an obstacle to social inclusion and 
weakens the basic social links needed to maintain a sense 
of integration and belonging.
27
 The concept of “new poverty” refers to the impoverishment of urban 
middle classes in some middle-income Latin American countries, in 
particular reflecting wage and labour impoverishment, rather than 
job loss. For further details see Kessler and Di Virgilio (2008).
One of the issues to bear in mind when applying 
the inclusion —exclusion approach is the wide variety 
of meanings that have been attributed to these concepts 
in social policy discourses. The pillars on which 
these distinctions have been established have usually 
considered participation in activities that are essential 
for society (e.g., daily activities in which most members 
of the country take part); the quality of links and social 
ties that exist between people, groups and institutions 
(where exclusion is a disconnecting process that results 
in cumulative disadvantages and persistent deprivation); 
and the degree to which basic citizenry entitlements are 
guaranteed. Inclusion and exclusion processes have also 
been defined on the basis of structural factors that result 
in unequal access to resources and opportunities and, 
mainly, their reproduction through time.
In the European tradition, the concept of exclusion has 
been used as part of a political strategy aimed at redefining 
poverty as a condition of relative deprivation, in which 
individuals or households lack resources to participate in 
normal society activities (Townsend, 1979). This approach 
has given rise to relative poverty measures based on 
the cross-section of the income distribution at specific 
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standard thresholds (e.g., 60% of the median income of 
the population), below which people are poor (Atkinson 
and others, 2005). In Europe, social exclusion has also 
been used to refer to a lack of wage-earning employment. 
In this case, its opposite would not be social participation, 
but participation in the labour market (although having a 
job might serve as a proxy indicator for participation in 
other spheres of life). The third distinction stems from the 
idea that social exclusion is an extreme form of poverty; 
those who are excluded would be in the worst situation, 
the poorest of the poor (Gordon, 1998).
The three approaches used in the European tradition 
are hard to apply in Latin America. In the approach 
that relates to activities in which the average citizen 
participates, the high levels of absolute poverty existing 
in the region (seven countries have absolute poverty rates 
close to or well above 50% of the population), suggest 
that median income would hardly guarantee adequate 
participation in social life. Moreover, using different 
relative poverty thresholds in the region does not produce 
differences larger than 10% between countries, without 
discriminating by development level (ECLAC, 2007a; 
ECLAC/EUROSocial, 2007). With regard to the notion 
of inclusion through labour-market participation, it has 
long been clear that merely being employed does not 
ensure permanent escape from poverty in the region, 
owing to the high prevalence of the informal sector 
(ECLAC, 2007b; ECLAC/EUROSocial, 2007). Nor 
does the concept of exclusion as confined to a minority 
of “hardcore” poverty does seem appropriate for the 
region, where deprivation in terms of basic needs 
remains widespread. 
At the same time, while social exclusion has often 
been used as a synonym for poverty, it is important to 
maintain the distinction between the two terms. It has been 
argued that poverty means a lack of economic resources, 
whereas social exclusion refers to the broader issue of 
social integration. One way of visualizing the relations 
that exist between poverty and exclusion is that the first 
impedes social participation and the exercise of citizenship. 
Thus, if poverty entails a lack of resources to participate in 
society, social exclusion refers to the dynamic processes 
that end up disconnecting individuals from the social, 
economic, political, cultural systems that determine 
their social integration (Levitas, 1998). The difference 
between poverty and exclusion can also be illustrated 
through situations in which a poor resource endowment 
does not cause social isolation, or through exclusions 
that stem from more than just a lack of resources, such 
as disability (Gordon, 1998).
Thus, while the inclusion-exclusion approach provides 
opportunities for designing multidimensional policies that 
go beyond the issues traditionally addressed in poverty 
reduction schemes, lack of consensus over the meaning of 
the terms “inclusion” and “exclusion” makes them hard 
to apply. As Levitas (1998) points out, it is complicated 
to specify the types of participation that are considered 
necessary for inclusion in different contexts and dimensions 
of well-being, and to determine the level and quality of 
material resources that would make it possible to establish 
a minimum level of inclusion. Moreover, both categories 
can be seen as a continuum with an intermediate zone 
of vulnerability, which further complicates the issue, 
since there would be no threshold or borderline between 
inclusion and exclusion in this case.
Furthermore, what constitutes social exclusion or 
inclusion will depend on the prevailing representations in a 
given society regarding the activities-participation standards 
that need to be satisfied for people to be included. One way 
to approach how people define social inclusion in Latin 
America is to question them about the things individuals 
need to possess to feel part of the society they live in. 
This exercise can provide information on individuals’ 
aspirations and the importance citizens attach to the different 
dimensions of inclusion, and analyse the distribution of 
these perceptions in terms of the different socioeconomic 
indicators. Not only is this of interest for policy design, but 
it can also provide inputs for constructing exclusion and 
inclusion indicators based on citizens’ perceptions.
The data shown in figure I.30 show that the ideas Latin 
American people hold regarding the things that people 
need to feel included contain more dimensions than the 
concepts usually proposed by experts or decision-makers. 
Although interviewees prioritize the things needed for 
autonomy28 (trade or profession and own income) and 
economic well-being (property ownership), which usually 
predominate in the public policy discourse, they also 
mention skills relating to participation in information- and 
knowledge-based societies (speaking a foreign language, 
having higher education, using a computer), activities 
related to the exercise of social and political citizenship, 
and basic social ties for belonging (having close friends 
and one’s own home).29 A large proportion of people 
also cite not suffering from a disability as a condition for 
belonging to society, so it is important to bear this aspect 
in mind when designing inclusion policies. 
28
 The items prioritized by the interviewees mainly correspond to 
things achieved by adults (having a trade, own income, having a 
home, having obtained higher education qualifications).
29
 The proposed grouping of the things people consider necessary for 
social inclusion, mainly reflects conceptual criteria. Nonetheless, an 
exploratory analysis of the factors underlying individuals’ replies 
shows that these are grouped more or less consistently in terms 
of two main factors: the dimensions of autonomy and economic 
well-being and the skills needed to participate in globalized 
information- and knowledge-based societies. For further details 
see table I.A-2 of the appendix.
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Figure I.30
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): THINGS THAT PEOPLE NEED 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey.
a
 The question asked was: “People can feel included or excluded in society. Which of 
the following do you think are necessary in order for you to feel part of the society 
in which you live?”. The percentages were estimated using as the denominator 
respondents who mentioned at least one of the things people should have. Those 
who did not choose any category were treated as missing cases.
The replies given by interviewees to the question 
on the things people should have to feel included can 
be interpreted as reflecting the aspirations and values of 
the Latin American population. The frequent reference 
to categories relating to autonomy and material well-
being could be an expression of a desire for economic 
and social mobility and values associated with a degree 
of economic success. This would not correspond to the 
standard of living prevailing among the wealthier strata of 
society, nor to the predominant standard of living of the 
average citizen (given the extent of deprivation in terms 
of basic needs in several countries of the region); instead 
it would serve more as a reference group to the wealthier 
segments of the middle-class.30 At the same time, mention 
of the skills needed to participate in information- and 
knowledge-based societies shows that socially perceived 
inclusion criteria reflect changes in contemporary life, 
particularly those relating to the new requirements for 
adequate participation in labour markets.
Differences between the various socioeconomic groups 
in terms of the importance attached to each constituent 
of inclusion are very small, particularly in the inclusion 
categories that are most important for the whole population 
(having a trade or profession, own income and higher 
30
 When people are asked to indicate the level of well-being they believe 
corresponds to them, on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 corresponding to worst 
conditions and 10 to the best), the replies have a median of 7. This 
cannot not be interpreted as indicating that the Latin American 
population aspires to living in the style of the wealthiest people.
education).31 The differences between socioeconomic groups 
are larger in the more peripheral categories (those obtaining 
smaller percentages of referrals), such as “living in a large 
city” and “having something to say”. The importance of 
the first category decreases as household goods increase, 
and the weight of the second category is greater among 
interviewees from households with more goods. In the 
case of differences by educational level, people with less 
schooling give less importance to inclusion criteria based 
on social and political citizenship (participating in political 
and voluntary activities, doing things that are important 
for others, and having something to say).
The high degree of continuity between the different 
socioeconomic groups in terms of socially perceived 
inclusion criteria suggests very similar underlying aspirations 
and values between the different social segments. This 
means that a setting of unequal distribution of opportunities 
is likely to produce perceptions and feelings of exclusion 
among those who are disadvantaged.32 Thus poverty-
reduction policies should go beyond merely handing out 
compensatory monetary transfers and aim to promote 
social inclusion, which entails addressing aspirations 
for entering the labour market, gaining economic self-
sufficiency (having a profession, having own income) 
and possessing assets (property, house, land) that ensure 
sustainable livelihoods. The acquisition of human capital 
to participate in information- and knowledge-based 
societies is also important to the most poor (e.g., having 
higher education qualifications).
Lastly, the similarities observed show that it is feasible 
to construct inclusion and exclusion indicators based 
on majority social perceptions, which could be used to 
complement traditional poverty measures. One alternative is 
to prepare an exclusion index that considers the dimensions 
that are most relevant for the population (having a trade or 
profession, own income, higher education and property/
house/land) and use the importance that people attach 
to each of these dimensions as a weighting criterion.33 
Another possibility is to construct a subjective exclusion 
indicator based on perceptions of the activities people need 
to engage in to avoid being excluded. This could result 
31
 Preference has been given to comparing the positions obtained by 
each of the inclusion categories within each of the groups, because 
the comparison of raw values between groups could be affected 
by interviewees with more education and goods systematically 
selecting more inclusion criteria. 
32
 Homogeneity is also maintained when comparing by zone of 
residence, ethnic belonging and country. For further details see 
tables I.A-5 and I.A-6 in the appendix.
33
 This would mean in inverting the categories (excluded people 
would be those that did not have a trade or profession, or did not 
have their own income, among other situations). Nonetheless, this 
requires better definition of the categories, particularly since people 
do not necessarily see inclusion or exclusion as dichotomous.
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in a threshold consisting of the minimum income needed 
for social inclusion. Nonetheless, as this replicates the 
subjective poverty method, it could be prone to problems 
such as producing a very high threshold, which would 
make it hard to argue that all people below the inclusion 
line are excluded (Gordon and others, 2000).34
34
 For further details see Gordon and others (2000) and Feres and 
Mancero (2001).
Table I.7
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): THINGS THAT PEOPLE NEED TO HAVE TO FEEL PART OF SOCIETY, ACCORDING TO
POSSESSION OF GOODS IN THE HOME AND SCHOOLING a
(Percentages and position of the category within each group) 
Possession of goods in the home Schooling



































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey.
a
 The percentages were estimated using as the denominator respondents who mentioned at least one of the things people should have. Those who did not choose any category 
were treated as missing cases. The indicator of possession of durable goods and basic household services includes possession of the following: (1) refrigerator/freezer; (2) washing 
machine; (3) fixed-line telephone; (4) computer; (5) piped hot water; (6) automobile; (7) sewerage; and (8) mobile phone. Location within each group is obtained by ranking the 
percentage of referrals to each of the categories in descending order. The figures are shown in parentheses.
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2. Perceptions of exclusion
While concern for the psycho-social aspects associated 
with material deprivation is nothing new in Latin America, 
virtually no quantitative empirical research has been done 
on the subject. The first more or less systematic approach to 
this component of the problem in the region can be found 
in modernization theory (Germani, 1980), which viewed 
marginal zones as areas that have not been permeated 
by modern values and attitudes, and their inhabitants are 
incapable of overcoming marginalization on their own 
(Cortés, 2002). This view coincides with the belief that 
there is a group of poor people who are so radically different 
from the rest of society that they form a distinct culture 
that reproduces itself through time. From the psycho-social 
standpoint, people in the poverty culture generally display 
feelings of impotence, despair, neglect and marginalization, 
among other sentiments (Lewis, 1969). A factor that would 
determine whether or not people are in the poverty culture 
is social participation, since ignorance of the forms of 
organization and functioning of groups outside the family 
would cause integration attempts to fail and thus generate 
despair (Miller, 1976; Lewis, 1969). 
“Cultural” explanations of deprivation were so 
influential that, in the late 1970s, ECLAC enhanced 
its definition of poverty by including attitudes of 
discouragement and anomie (see box I.10), lack of 
participation and, possibly, adherence to a scale of values 
that were different from those of the rest of society 
(Altimir, 1979). Nonetheless, criticisms also began to 
be made of some of the implications of hypotheses such 
as the culture of poverty, and the need to “culturally 
rehabilitate” the poorest people to overcome deprivation. 
Doubts also emerged about the causal role of cultural 
and psycho-social factors. In the historical-structural 
perspective, it was argued that marginality was not the 
outcome of a lack of integration, but represented a way 
of participating in dependent capitalism; the survival 
strategies of the poor were thus forms of adaptation and 
not expressions of a subculture. United States sociology 
also put forward hypotheses that were very close to those 
of the historical-structural perspective; for Wilson (1991) 
the persistence of urban poverty was explained by the 
concentration of poverty and social isolation, which cuts 
access to paths of mobility and affects perceptions of 
opportunities, thereby encouraging adaptive strategies 
that would end up reproducing the causes of poverty 
(Gould, 1999).35
35
 Gould (1999) argues that for Wilson, the situations into which the 
poorest people are born produce forms of adaptation and create 
subcultural patterns that become a self-replicating pathology, 
which would be contradictory to the critique made by Wilson on 
“cultural” approaches to poverty.
Box I.10
ANOMIE AND ALIENATION: “CLASSIC VISIONS” AND SOME CURRENT ONES
Alienation and anomie are concepts that 
seek to explain mental states arising from 
regulation failures in differentiated social 
systems. Social regulation is defined as the 
moral demands imposed on the individual 
as a result of group membership, whereas 
social integration is the extent to which 
social relations expose people to the moral 
demands of the group (Bearman, 1991). 
The sociological concept of anomie stems 
from the work of Durkheim (influenced 
by Jean-Marie Guyeau), and the idea of 
alienation discussed here was developed 
by Marx and is compatible with several of 
Durkheim’s residual arguments. Anomie in 
the Durkheim sense is expressed in terms 
of a lack of validity for socially imposed limits 
and a loss of trust in normative guidelines. In 
situations of change or crisis, norms are not 
fulfilled, either because society is incapable of 
monitoring them, and/or because people do 
not accept them (Girola, 2005). In contrast, 
Marx characterized alienation as a cognitive 
state of impotence resulting from inequitable 
interactions that undermine freedom and the 
development of human capacities, causing 
individuals to feel neglected and governed 
by external forces that put them in social 
positions that they have not themselves 
chosen. For Durkheim, however, fatalism 
occurs when individuals experience such 
persistent coercion that it drives them to total 
despair. Thus, if anomie is the dissonance 
generated by a position on the border 
between the old and new world, fatalism 
relates to the fact that expectations are so 
limited that life itself becomes a matter of 
indifference. Alienation is thus a consequence 
of excessive regulation, whereas anomie 
results from deregulation (Bearman, 1991; 
Acevedo, 2005). Anomie in the Durkheim 
sense is not synonymous with a lack of 
belonging and group integration. Although 
it has been associated with the absence of 
solidarity groups and associated links, the 
lack of a satisfactory moral life and a need for 
social networks are distinguishable. In fact, 
the cognitive dissonance experienced by 
anomic individuals stems from participation 
in different social groups that impose different 
normative requirements (e.g., adolescents 
that have to respond simultaneously to 
the demands of their parents and those 
of their peer group) and, for that reason, 
they try to balance their networks and 
reduce dissonance, casting off old relations 
and creating new ones. This is different 
from egotistical suicide, which involves a 
simultaneous lack of regulation and networks 
(Bearman, 1991; Girola, 2005).
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Box I.10 (concluded)
Since these classical formulations, 
both concepts have been used to analyse 
a wide variety of problems, such as the 
inability of the poorest people to overcome 
deprivation, or the failure of third world 
countries to achieve development (Girola, 
2005). For example, Merton (1987) 
considers the characteristics of relative 
deprivation that cause anomie, particularly 
the disjunction between the opportunities 
structure and cultural goals. The pressure 
that stems from anomie operates unevenly 
between the different strata, having 
greatest effect on the most deprived. 
Other authors have viewed anomie from 
an individual perspective; Srole (1956, 
cited in McClosky and Schaar, 1965) 
defined it as a continuum that includes 
the widespread sense of belonging at 
one extreme and the sense distance or 
alienation at the other. Srole and Middleton 
(1963, cited in Huschka and Mau, 2005) 
made the psychological concepts of anomie 
and alienation operational, thereby giving 
rise to many empirical studies, especially 
in the United States. More contemporary 
versions have argued that inequities and 
social polarization produce anomie at times 
of social change. From this perspective, 
anomie consists of difficulties of individual 
adaptation, which are expressed in a loss 
of a sense of orientation; the development 
of feelings of insecurity, relative deprivation; 
and a questioning of the core values of 
social life (Huschka and Mau, 2005).
Although the concept of anomie has 
been used extensively, it has not been 
possible to reach a unanimous definition 
of the term, which at the present time 
seems somewhat exhausted (Girola, 
2005). Criticisms have also been made of 
the “psychologizing” emphasis which has 
overshadowed the fact that alienation and 
anomie are properties of social systems; 
and synthetic indices have been called into 
question, as the sentiments of deprivation 
included in measures of alienation/anomie 
would be different phenomena (Seeman, 
1975). Recently it has been argued that 
Durkheim’s theories on anomie have no 
empirical support given the lack of control 
over psychological variables. A study 
on suicide in eight European countries 
between 1973 and 1997, which used proxy 
indicators for depression and alcoholism 
as controls, found moderate support for 
Durkheim’s theories (Fernquist, 2007).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
During the 1990s in some of the region’s countries, the 
theoretical approaches that came to the fore emphasized 
the potentials, assets and networks of the poorest people 
(resilience theory, the social capital approach, or discourses on 
empowerment, among others) as key elements for overcoming 
poverty. According to these approaches, characterizations of 
the subculture type contributed more to forming a concept 
of poverty dominated by negativity and lack, while giving 
secondary importance to economic, social and political 
mechanisms that reproduce deprivation through time 
(Raczinsky and Serrano, 2002; Consejo Nacional para la 
Superación de la Pobreza, 1996). In a retrospective view, 
Hopenhayn (2007) pointed out that the ideas of the poverty 
culture and anomie had historically served to identify the 
poor and make them responsible for their situation (see box 
I.10). Clearly, one of the possible functions of the symbolic 
representation of the poorest groups as “spiritually lacking” 
in the discourses of elite groups is to legitimize inequality 
by blaming those affected for their own problems. 
In the current decade, however, psycho-social expressions 
of deprivation have gained renewed currency, but this time 
under the social-exclusion approach and bearing in mind the 
transformations caused by globalization that are undermining 
the pillars of biographical experiences (family stability, lifetime 
employment, social protection and traditional gender roles) 
and increasing sentiments of uncertainty and vulnerability 
(Esping Andersen, 1999; Giddens, 2001; Beck, 2002).36 
Apart from adapting this approach to the regional context, 
the process of biographical construction could become 
36
 A qualitative study of the lynching of criminals in Guatemala found 
that they were probably fuelled by “globalization anxiety”. Exposed 
to rapid social and economic changes, residents in the affected
more problematic, especially for the poorest in society, who 
would have fewer means available to adapt to the changes 
caused by globalization.37 These trends could be accentuated 
in settings where the State is precarious; for, in situations 
of State institutional failure and when local networks are 
unable to regulate community life, the individual is cast 
adrift (Hernández de Padrón, 2006). 
Simultaneously, exposure to stress began spreading in 
the social epidemiology, as a result of people’s position in 
the social structure and as a determinant of psychological 
problems. People who are disadvantaged, whether as a 
result of poverty or discrimination, display higher rates 
of mental disorder because they face harsher conditions 
of life, are more exposed to risks, and have less access 
to resources to cope with crisis situations (Aneshensel, 
1992; Payne, 1998; House, 2001).38 The notion of stress 
in the social psychology of mental health is close to the 
idea of pressure in the theory of relative deprivation; 
thus, pressure will stem from a mismatch between 
people’s living standards and their aspirations (which, 
as noted above, seem to be similar among the various 
socioeconomic groups), and from a mismatch between 
individual competencies and requirements for integration 
into permanently changing societies.
 zones felt a diffuse sense of control and high levels of insecurity. 
Public punishment thus sought to repair links and restore solidarity 
among community members (Snodgrass, 2004).
37
 In the region, social security and lifelong employment were never 
dominant biographical pillars for broad segments of the population.
38
 Social causation models in the context of mental health have been 
criticized because of the possibility that psychological disorder 
generates downward social mobility. Nonetheless, according to 
Aneshensel (1992), the empirical evidence supports the thesis of 
social causation except for the most complex disturbances.
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2008 85
Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence on the 
psycho-social expressions of deprivation in Latin America, 
and virtually none in terms of quantitative studies using 
samples from different countries. This section sets out 
the main results of a review of selected perceptions and 
sentiments of exclusion, such as loneliness, impotence, 
disorientation and normative dissonance, among people 
from different socioeconomic strata in 18 of the region’s 
countries.39 Although these perceptions express different 
social regulation problems (which stem from highly coercive 
social structures and those generated by process of change), 
it was decided to consider them in grouped form, firstly 
because the use of two indices —one for sentiments of 
loneliness and impotence and the other for perceptions 
of disorientation and normative dissonance— does not 
produce significant differences in comparisons based on 
socioeconomic situation, education or ethnic origin; and 
secondly because the aggregate index generates more reliable 
results than those obtained using separate instruments.40
The data in figure I.31 show that perceptions and 
feelings of exclusion are inversely related to the possession 
of goods in the home and the educational levels of those 
interviewed. Feelings and perceptions of exclusion are
39
 This chapter does not include perceptions of being discriminated 
against, which were treated in previous editions of the Social 
Panorama. For further details see ECLAC (2008a). 
40
 The internal consistency of the index of perceptions of exclusion 
is acceptable (alpha = 0,75), whereas that of indices measuring
stronger among people living in households with fewer 
goods and among interviewees of lower education levels. 
This is most clearly evident among individuals without any 
formal education living in households that have at most 
one of the goods and services included in this research. 
Moreover, the tendency for perceptions of exclusion to 
increase as the quantity of goods and services available 
in households declines, is confirmed in 17 of 18 countries 
in the region (see table I.A-7 in the appendix). Lack of 
a school or employment activity and membership of an 
ethnic minority are associated with a higher incidence of 
perceptions of exclusion (see figure I.32). The indicator 
of a lack of school or employment activity proxies for a 
lack of links with conventional institutions, so the high 
perceptions of exclusion expressed by the group that does 
not have links with school and employment institutions at the 
time of the interview could be interpreted as indicating the 
psycho-social effects of institutional disconnect. Moreover 
the high incidence of perceptions of exclusion among the 
poorest Afro-descendants supports the findings of research 
undertaken in other parts of the world (Huschka and Mau, 
2005) and could express the effects of the dual exclusion 
associated with their economic and ethnic situation.41
 sentiments of loneliness and impotence and perceptions of cultural 
dissonance and disorientation reach levels of 0.65 and 0.64 
respectively, which can be considered modest.
41
 Verifying this hypothesis would require interaction analysis, which 
is beyond the scope of this study.
Figure I.31
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTIONS AND FEELINGS OF EXCLUSION, ACCORDING TO POSSESSION OF GOODS
IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE INTERVIEWEES a
(Percentages)
























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey.
a
 The index of exclusion perceptions was calculated from people’s agreement or disagreement with the following statements: “I sometimes think I’m a failure”; “I can’t influence most 
of the problems”; “I often feel alone”; “Sometimes you are forced to do things that are not good for getting ahead”; and “Life is so complicated that I don’t think I’ll be able to find 
a way forward”. The replies were coded with values ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree. The total individual score was obtained by adding 
together the values for each question and dividing by the number of questions. Three levels of sentiment/perceptions of exclusion were generated from the coding of total scores; 
(a) low = 1 - 2.2 points; (b) moderate = 2.4 - 2.6 points; and (c) high = 2.8 - 4 points. 2.8 -4 points.
b 
 The indicator of possession of durable goods and basic services in the home includes possession of the following: (1) refrigerator/freezer; (2) washing machine; (3) fixed line 
telephone; (4) computer; (5) piped hot water; (6) automobile; (7) sewerage; and (8) mobile phone.
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Figure I.32
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTIONS AND FEELINGS OF EXCLUSION, ACCORDING TO PERSONAL OR HOUSEHOLD 
CHARACTERISTICS, BY NUMBER OF GOODS IN THE HOUSEHOLD a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007.
a  The index of exclusion perceptions was calculated from people’s agreement or disagreement with the following statements: “I sometimes think I’m a failure”; “I can’t influence most 
of the problems”; “I often feel alone”; “Sometimes you are forced to do things that are not good for getting ahead”; and “Life is so complicated that I don’t think I’ll be able to find 
a way forward”. The replies were coded with values ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree. The total individual score was obtained by adding 
together the values for each question and dividing by the number of questions. Three levels of sentiment/perceptions of exclusion were generated from the coding of total scores; 
(a) low = 1 - 2.2 points; (b) moderate = 2.4 - 2.6 points; and (c) high = 2.8 - 4 points. 2.8 -4 points. The indicator of possession of durable goods and basic services in the home 
includes possession of the following: (1) refrigerator/freezer; (2) washing machine; (3) fixed line telephone; (4) computer; (5) piped hot water; (6) automobile; (7) sewerage; and 
(8) mobile phone.
b 
 Ethnic identity was established through a self-identification question.
At the same time, sentiments of exclusion weigh 
more heavily on people who have never or hardly 
ever used e-mail or Internet. This information should 
be taken into account, given the fact that at least 1/5 
of all people claimed that computer use was one of 
the things that people should know how to do to be 
included in today’s society. On this point, it has been 
argued that technological change, without a knowledge 
base and adequate skills, could entail the suppression 
of traditional knowledge and cause disorientation and 
isolation among individuals who are unable to adapt; 
but, at the same time, the new technologies would 
establish a new base of knowledge and opportunities that 
would increase people’s prospects and inspire a greater 
sense of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility 
(Foley, 2004).
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Perceptions of exclusion are also stronger among 
people who report the lowest levels of social activities 
with family members, friends and colleagues — a situation 
that is repeated in all socioeconomic conditions (see 
figure I.32). The group with the strongest perceptions of 
exclusion consists of people living in families with the 
fewest goods and do not participate in visits or meetings 
outside the home with other family members, friends or 
colleagues. Nonetheless, it the most isolated people and 
those belonging to most wealthy socioeconomic group also 
have a disproportionately high perceptions of exclusion. 
Thus, objective situations of social isolation that have 
been mentioned in the literature as factors that diminish 
capacities to deal with the crisis among the poorest 
population groups and influence the reproduction of poverty, 
would strengthen the effect of relative deprivation. This 
is expressed in psychologically negative sentiments, but, 
at the same time there seems to be an isolation effect that 
goes beyond people’s socioeconomic situation.
In short, the analyses made suggest that it is not 
only material deprivation that leads to perceptions and 
sentiments of exclusion. More specifically, membership 
of ethnic minorities that are discriminated against, lower 
educational achievement, lack of skills to participate 
in information- and knowledge-based societies, lack 
of integration in conventional institutions and social 
isolation are all correlated with higher levels of perceived 
exclusion. Thus, the challenge for social policies is 
to reduce poverty, while stressing social inclusion 
and belonging. As noted by Márquez (2003), while 
traditional policies aimed overcome given income 
threshold, they have neglected the links that allow 
people to achieve stronger citizenship and a greater 
sense of belonging.
3. The mismatch between aspirations and expectations
Aspirations and expectations of social mobility form the 
foundations of a society based on equal opportunities 
and meritocracy. One of the threats facing social 
cohesion in highly exclusive societies is the potential 
for creating a widening gap between expectations 
and actual achievements, or for large discrepancies 
to develop between symbolic integration mechanisms 
(which increasingly operate through communications 
media) and the systemic means of material integration, 
which could turn into sentiments and conduits of 
frustration and aggression (ECLAC, 2007a; Hopenhayn, 
2000, 2001). For approaches that highlight the role of 
cultural factors in the persistence of deprivation, low 
expectations of mobility and despair would be crucial 
expressions of social exclusion and poverty transmitted 
between generations (Atkinson, 1998; Narayan and 
others, 2000).
Generally speaking, the literature has not clearly 
defined the differences between normative expectations, 
which are stable in the face of situational changes, and 
cognitive expectations which respond to discrepancies 
caused by changes in the environment (Gould, 1999). 
For example, people might want quality education 
for their children (a normative expectation); but, at 
the same time, they might see this as unachievable 
(cognitive expectation) —either because of the multiple 
constraints they face in the opportunities structure, 
or else because of feelings of exclusion and despair 
generated by failed attempts at social integration in the 
past. It is plausible that a mismatch could exist between 
aspirations, understood as the level of well-being that 
people desire, and expectations of well-being in terms of 
the socioeconomic position that individuals actually hope 
to achieve. This would be the result of an evaluation of 
their personal capacities and the opportunities provided 
to them by the social structure.
Figure I.33 shows that individuals living in poorer 
households have lower aspirations and expectations 
of well-being. In the case of expectations, the data 
are consistent with information that shows that these 
vary according to the individual’s position in the social 
structure (ECLAC, 2008a). Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that the association between welfare expectations 
and the household’s economic situation has the properties 
of a direct relation. For example, the characteristics 
of schools (such as the capacity and social status of 
teachers and students) could affect self-image and the 
setting of targets by students, through processes of 
social comparison with significant others (Buchman 
and Dalton, 2002). This mediation of the education 
system could be even more pronounced in societies 
such as Latin American ones, which are characterized 
by major educational segmentation and segregation 
(ECLAC, 2008a).
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Figure I.33
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ASPIRATIONS a AND 
EXPECTATIONS OF WELL-BEING ACCORDING TO
PERCEPTIONS AND FEELINGS OF EXCLUSION
AND POSSESSION OF GOODS IN THE HOME
(Averages based on a scale of 1 to 10, where 




















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007. 
a
 With respect to aspirations, the question people were asked was: “Imagine a ladder 
with 10 rungs in which the top represents the best living standards you can imagine 
and the bottom the worst. Where would you place the living standards that correspond 
to you? With respect to expectations, the question people were asked was: “Imagine 
a ladder with 10 rungs in which the top represents the best living standards you can 
imagine and the bottom the worst. Where would you see yourself in five years time?
At the same time, perceptions and sentiments 
of exclusion are associated with aspirations and 
expectations of well-being. Strictly speaking, in all 
economic conditions, individuals with the greatest 
perception of exclusion display the lowest aspirations 
and expectations of welfare. Nonetheless, the data 
shown in figure I.33 reveal a close correlation between 
aspirations and expectations, and there is only a small 
gap between individuals living in households with more 
goods that feel moderately or highly excluded. In the 
poorest group, the differences between aspirations of 
expectations claimed by individuals with different 
levels of perceived exclusion are small. An alternative 
explanation is that the gap between aspirations of 
expectations could be revealed by using a circumstantial 
indicator, which is consistent with the distinction 
proposed earlier between the normative and cognitive 
components of expectations.
The data illustrated in figure I.34 show that the 
mismatch between aspirations of expectations is closely 
associated with the people’s perceptions about the future 
of the economy. Strictly speaking, in all economic 
conditions, individuals who are pessimistic about the 
economic future of the country display a significant 
negative gap between their aspirations of expectations, 
whereas in the case people who are optimistic about the 
future of the economy, expectations are located almost at 
the same level or slightly above their aspirations.42 Among 
the poorest groups, the data show that their expectations 
of well-being are elastic with respect to changes in 
economic and social circumstances and changes in the 
opportunities structure; so they should not be treated as 
more or less stable individual characteristics stemming 
from socialization in a specific subculture. Thus, given 
suitable opportunities, the most underprivileged should 
change their expectations and act accordingly.
42
 If peoples’ perceptions of the economy were a reliable reflection 
of the behaviour of the business cycle, it could be argued that the 
gap between aspirations of expectations behaves procyclically, i.e., 
widening in situations of crisis and narrowing in boom periods. 
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Figure I.34
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF MATERIAL WELL-BEING, ACCORDING TO PERCEPTIONS
OF THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMY AND POSSESSION OF GOODS, 2007 a
(Averages based on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = worst standards and 10 = best standards)










































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007.
a  With respect to aspirations, the question people were asked was: “Imagine a ladder with 10 rungs in which the top represents the best living standards you can imagine and the 
bottom the worst. Where would you place the living standards that correspond to you? With respect to expectations, the question people were asked was: “Imagine a ladder with 
10 rungs in which the top represents the best living standards you can imagine and the bottom the worst. Where would you see yourself in five years time?
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Table I.A-1




Households Population Households Population
Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG) Gap squared (FGT2) Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG)
Gap squared 
(FGT2)
Argentina c 1990 d 16.2 21.2 7.2 3.4 3.5 5.2 1.6 0.8
1999 16.3 23.7 8.6 4.3 4.3 6.6 2.1 1.1
2002 34.9 45.4 21.1 12.8 13.9 20.9 8.4 4.6
2005 18.7 26.0 10.4 5.8 6.0 9.1 3.4 1.8
2006 14.7 21.0 8.3 4.6 4.9 7.2 2.8 1.5
Bolivia 1989 e 48.9 52.6 24.5 15.0 21.9 23.0 9.7 6.1
1999 54.7 60.6 33.9 24.1 32.5 36.4 20.3 14.7
2002 55.5 62.4 34.4 23.8 31.7 37.1 19.5 13.5
2004 56.4 63.9 32.1 20.1 29.9 34.7 15.0 8.9
2007 47.2 54.0 27.8 18.2 27.2 31.2 14.5 9.7
Brazil 1990 41.4 48.0 23.5 14.7 18.3 23.4 9.7 5.5
1999 29.9 37.5 17.0 10.2 9.6 12.9 5.3 3.3
2001 29.9 37.5 17.3 10.7 10.0 13.2 5.8 3.8
2006 26.1 33.3 14.3 8.4 6.7 9.0 3.7 2.3
2007 23,4 300.0 13.0 7,8 6,7 80.5 3,9 20.7
Chile 1990 33.3 38.6 14.9 8.0 10.6 13.0 4.4 2.3
1998 17.8 21.7 7.5 3.8 4.6 5.6 2.0 1.1
2000 16.3 20.2 7.0 3.7 4.5 5.6 2.1 1.2
2003 15.3 18.7 6.3 3.2 3.9 4.7 1.7 1.0
2006 11.3 13.7 4.4 2.2 2.7 3.2 1.1 0.7
Colombia 1994 47.3 52.5 26.6 17.5 25.0 28.5 13.8 9.1
1999 48.7 54.9 25.6 15.7 23.2 26.8 11.2 6.9
2002 45.6 51.5 24.3 15.1 21.8 24.8 10.5 6.6
2004 45.2 51.1 23.8 14.6 21.4 24.2 10.2 6.3
2005 40.6 46.8 20.7 12.3 17.4 20.2 8.3 5.0
Costa Rica 1990 23.6 26.3 10.7 6.5 10.0 10.1 4.8 3.4
1999 18.2 20.3 8.1 4.8 7.5 7.8 3.5 2.3
2002 18.6 20.3 8.4 5.2 7.7 8.2 3.9 2.7
2006 18.0 19.0 7.6 4.5 7.3 7.2 3.1 2.0
2007 17.1 18.6 6.2 3.3 5.1 5.3 2.0 1.2
Dominican 
Republic
2002 42.2 47.1 20.9 12.6 18.2 20.7 8.8 5.3
2006 41.1 44.5 21.1 12.9 20.2 22.0 9.1 5.4
2007 41.2 44.5 20.6 12.6 19.6 21.0 8.9 5.5
Ecuador 1990 c 55.8 62.1 27.6 15.8 22.6 26.2 9.2 4.9
1999 c 58.0 63.5 30.1 18.2 27.2 31.3 11.5 6.3
2002 c 42.6 49.0 20.8 11.8 16.3 19.4 6.9 3.7
2006 36.8 43.0 17.2 9.2 13.6 16.1 5.4 2.7
2007 36.0 42.6 16.7 9.0 12.9 16.0 5.6 3.0
El Salvador 1995 47.6 54.2 24.0 14.3 18.2 21.7 9.1 5.6
1999 43.5 49.8 22.9 14.0 18.3 21.9 9.4 5.8
2001 42.9 48.9 22.7 14.0 18.3 22.1 9.5 5.7
2004 40.4 47.5 21.1 12.6 15.6 19.0 8.1 5.0
Guatemala 1989 63.0 69.4 35.9 23.1 36.7 42.0 18.5 11.2
1998 53.5 61.1 27.3 15.4 26.1 31.6 10.7 5.1
2002 52.8 60.2 27.0 15.4 26.9 30.9 10.7 5.5
2006 46.7 54.8 25.5 15.2 22.7 29.1 11.3 5.8
Honduras 1990 75.2 80.8 50.2 35.9 53.9 60.9 31.5 20.2
1999 74.3 79.7 47.4 32.9 50.6 56.8 27.9 17.5
2002 70.9 77.3 45.3 31.2 47.1 54.4 26.6 16.2
2006 65.7 71.5 43.1 31.3 43.4 49.3 27.4 19.0
2007 63.1 68.9 39.5 27.6 39.9 45.6 23.9 15.7




Households Population Households Population
Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG) Gap squared (FGT2) Incidence (H) Incidence (H) Gap (PG)
Gap squared 
(FGT2)
Mexico 1989 39.0 47.7 18.7 9.9 14.0 18.7 5.9 2.7
1998 38.0 46.9 18.4 9.4 13.2 18.5 5.3 2.2
2002 31.8 39.4 13.9 6.7 9.1 12.6 3.5 1.4
2004 29.8 37.0 13.2 6.5 8.7 11.7 3.5 1.6
2006 24.6 31.7 10.5 4.9 6.0 8.7 2.4 1.0
Nicaragua 1993 68.1 73.6 41.9 29.3 43.2 48.4 24.3 16.2
 1998 65.1 69.9 39.4 27.3 40.1 44.6 22.6 15.1
 2001 63.0 69.4 37.1 24.5 36.5 42.5 19.2 12.0
 2005 54.4 61.9 29.1 17.3 26.8 31.9 12.3 6.5
Panama 1991 c 27.4 32.7 13.7 8.1 10.1 11.5 5.2 3.4
1999 c 17.0 20.8 7.6 4.1 4.9 5.9 2.3 1.4
2002 30.0 36.9 16.8 10.2 14.4 18.6 7.6 4.3
2006 23.2 29.9 13.4 8.0 10.5 14.3 6.0 3.4
2007 22.2 29.0 11.7 6.4 8.6 12.0 4.3 2.2
Paraguay 1990 f 36.8 43.2 16.1 8.0 10.4 13.1 3.6 1.5
 1999 51.7 60.6 30.2 19.0 26.0 33.8 14.5 8.5
 2001 52.0 61.0 30.3 19.5 26.5 33.2 15.4 9.6
 2005 51.9 60.5 29.5 18.0 25.4 32.1 13.1 7.4
 2007 53.2 60.5 28.4 17.4 26.0 31.6 13.5 8.0
Peru 1997 40.5 47.6 20.8 12.0 20.4 25.1 10.1 5.7
1999 42.3 48.6 20.6 11.7 18.7 22.4 9.2 5.1
2001 g 48.7 54.7 24.7 14.5 20.4 24.4 9.6 5.2
2006 g 38.4 44.5 17.7 9.3 13.0 16.0 5.2 2.4
2007 g 33.9 39.3 15.3 8.1 11.4 13.7 4.3 1.9
Uruguay c 1990 11.8 17.9 5.3 2.4 2.0 3.4 0.9 0.4
1999 5.6 9.4 2.7 1.2 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.2
2002 9.3 15.4 4.5 1.9 1.3 2.5 0.6 0.2
2005 11.8 18.8 6.0 2.7 2.2 4.1 1.0 0.4
2007 11.3 18.1 5.2 2.1 1.7 3,1 0,7 0.2
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)
1990 34.2 39.8 15.7 8.5 11.8 14.4 5.0 2.4
1999 44.0 49.4 22.6 13.7 19.4 21.7 9.0 5.5
2002 43.3 48.6 22.1 13.4 19.7 22.2 9.2 5.7
 2006 26.2 30.2 11.5 6.3 9.0 9.9 3.8 2.4
 2007 24.5 28.5 10.2 5.4 7.5 8.5 3.2 1.9
Latin 
America h
1990 41.0 48.3 ... ... 17.7 22.5 ... ...
1999 35.4 43.9 ... ... 14.1 18.7 ... ...
2002 36.1 44.0 ... ... 14.6 19.4 ... ...
2006 29.0 36.3 ... ... 10.1 13.3 ... ...
2007 27.1 34.1 … … 9.7 12.6 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 H = Headcount index; PG = Poverty gap; FGT2 = Foster, Greer and Thorbecke index.
b




 Greater Buenos Aires.
e 
 Eight major cities and El Alto.
f 
 Asunción metropolitan area.
g 
 Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology (INEI) of Peru. These figures are not comparable with those of previous years because of a change 
in the sample framework used in the household survey. Similarly, figures for 2001 refer to the fourth quarter, whereas those the 2005 to 2007 relate to the entire year.
h 
 Estimation for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti.
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Table I.A-2
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1990-2007 a
(Percentages)
Country Year Averageincome b
Share in total income of: Ratio of average per capita income c





 / D(1 a 4) Q5 / Q1
Argentina d 1990 e 10.6 15.0 23.7 26.7 34.6 13.5 13.5
1999 11.3 15.8 22.1 25.3 36.8 16.2 16.6
2002 7.3 14.4 20.5 24.6 40.5 19.0 20.7
2005 9.6 16.4 22.7 25.4 35.5 14.9 16.1
2006 10.8 16.9 22.9 25.2 35.0 14.4 15.5
Bolivia 1989 f 7.7 12.1 21.9 27.9 38.1 17.1 21.4
1999 5.6 9.3 24.1 29.6 37.0 26.7 48.1
2002 6.1 9.5 21.4 28.3 40.8 30.3 44.2
2004 5.3 12.2 22.7 27.3 37.8 20.6 24.8
2007 6.1 11.2 25.2 28.2 35.4 22.2 31.5
Brazil 1990 9.4 9.6 18.5 28.0 43.9 31.2 35.0
1999 11.3 10.0 17.4 25.4 47.2 32.0 35.6
2001 11.0 10.3 17.4 25.6 46.7 32.2 36.9
2006 10.5 12.2 18.8 25.1 43.9 24.9 27.2
2007 10.8 12.7 19.5 25.7 42.1 22.7 25.9
Chile 1990 9.5 13.2 20.8 25.3 40.7 18.2 18.4
1998 13.7 13.0 20.4 26.6 40.0 19.1 19.7
2000 14.0 13.5 20.5 25.3 40.7 19.2 19.5
2003 13.6 13.8 20.8 25.6 39.8 18.8 18.4
2006 14.4 14.6 21.6 26.7 37.1 15.9 15.7
Colombia 1994 7.7 9.9 21.3 27 41.8 26.8 35.2
1999 6.7 12.4 21.6 26.0 40.0 22.3 25.6
2002 6.9 12.3 22.4 26.5 38.8 24.1 28.5
2004 6.9 12.1 21.9 26.0 40.0 25.1 29.1
2005 7.8 12.2 21.3 25.4 41.1 25.2 27.8
Costa Rica 1990 9.5 16.7 27.4 30.2 25.7 10.1 13.1
1999 11.4 15.3 25.7 29.7 29.3 12.6 15.3
2002 11.7 14.4 25.6 29.7 30.3 13.7 16.9
2006 11.2 14.5 25.7 29.3 30.5 13.4 16.1
2007 11.0 15.0 24.9 28.1 32.0 13.9 14.8
Dominican 
Republic 
2002 6.9 12.7 22.7 26.9 37.7 17.8 20.7
2006 8.1 9.8 20.1 29.0 41.1 24.5 29.1
2007 7.5 11.0 22.0 29.2 37.8 21.3 26.4
Ecuador d 1990 5.5 17.1 25.4 26.9 30.6 11.4 12.3
1999 5.6 14.1 22.7 26.5 36.7 17.2 18.4
2002 6.7 15.5 24.3 26.1 34.1 15.7 16.8
2006 8.1 15.7 24.1 26.1 34.1 14.8 15.6
2007 8.3 15.4 23.1 26.1 35.4 15.4 15.8
El Salvador 1995 6.2 15.5 24.8 27.0 32.7 14.1 16.9
1999 6.6 13.8 25.0 29.1 32.1 15.2 19.6
2001 6.7 13.5 24.7 28.7 33.1 16.2 20.3
2004 6.2 15.9 26.0 28.8 29.3 13.3 16.3
Guatemala 1989 6.0 11.8 20.9 26.9 40.4 23.6 27.4
1998 7.1 14.3 21.6 25.0 39.1 20.4 19.8
2002 6.8 14.1 22.4 27.3 36.2 18.6 19.3
2006 7.6 12.8 21.8 25.7 39.7 22.0 23.9
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Table I.A-2 (concluded)
Country Year Averageincome b
Share in total income of: Ratio of average per capita income c





 / D(1 a 4) Q5 / Q1
Honduras 1990 4.3 10.2 19.7 27.1 43.0 27.4 30.7
1999 3.9 11.8 22.9 29.0 36.3 22.3 26.5
2002 4.3 11.4 21.7 27.6 39.3 23.6 26.3
2006 4.5 8.8 22.5 29.3 39.4 27.8 40.9
2007 4.7 10.1 23.5 29.5 36.9 23.6 32.5
Mexico 1989 8.6 15.8 22.5 25.1 36.6 17.2 16.9
1998 7.7 15.0 22.7 25.6 36.7 18.4 18.5
2002 8.2 15.7 23.8 27.2 33.3 15.1 15.5
2004 8.3 15.8 23.3 26.3 34.6 15.9 16.0
2006 8.7 16.9 24.1 26.1 32.9 14.7 14.8
Nicaragua 1993 5.2 10.4 22.8 28.4 38.4 26.1 37.7
1998 5.6 10.4 22.1 27.0 40.5 25.3 35.1
2001 5.8 12.0 21.7 25.6 40.7 23.6 27.5
2005 6.5 14.3 24.0 26.2 35.5 17.2 18.6
Panama 1991 d 10.8 14.1 23.9 29.3 32.7 16.8 20.1
1999 d 12.6 15.6 25.2 27.8 31.4 14.0 15.9
2002 9.8 12.2 23.6 28.0 36.2 20.1 25.7
2006 10.3 13.5 25.2 29.1 32.2 16.8 21.8
2007 10.1 14.7 25.4 28.2 31.7 15.6 18.9
Paraguay 1990 g 7.7 18.7 25.7 26.8 28.8 10.2 10.6
1999 6.2 13.2 23.0 27.8 36.0 19.3 22.6
2001 6.2 12.9 23.5 26.3 37.3 20.9 25.6
2005 5.5 14.9 23.9 26.4 34.8 16.0 18.2
2007 5.7 14.3 23.9 25.2 36.6 17.0 19.1
Peru 1997 7.5 13.3 24.6 28.7 33.4 17.9 20.9
1999 7.5 13.3 23.1 27.1 36.5 19.5 21.7
2001 6.4 13.4 24.6 28.5 33.5 17.4 19.3
2006 7.1 14.8 25.2 28.1 31.9 15.3 16.3
2007 7.8 14.1 24.6 28.1 33.2 15.4 17.2
Uruguay d 1990 9.9 18.9 23.3 22.5 35.3 11.0 10.5
1999 11.9 21.6 25.5 25.8 27.1 8.8 9.5
2002 9.4 21.7 25.4 25.6 27.3 9.5 10.2
2005 8.1 21.6 25.0 25.7 27.7 9.3 10.0
2007 8.4 21.1 25.1 26.3 27.5 9.6 10.3
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)
1990 8.9 16.7 25.7 28.9 28.7 12.1 13.4
1999 7.2 14.5 25.0 29.0 31.5 15.0 18.0
2002 7.1 14.3 25.0 29.5 31.2 14.5 18.1
2006 9.0 17.4 27.0 28.3 27.3 10.5 12.3
2007 8.9 18.4 27.5 28.5 25.6 9.3 10.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Households arranged in order of per capita income.
b
 Average monthly household income, in multiples of the per capita poverty line.
c
 D(1 to 4) means the 40% of households with the lowest income, while D10 means the 10% of households with the highest income. Similar notation is used for quintiles (Q), where 
each group represents 20% of total households.
d Urban total.
e
 Greater Buenos Aires.
f
 Eight major cities and El Alto.
g
 Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table I.A-3
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF INCOME CONCENTRATION, 1990-2007 a
Country Year
Percentage of people with 
per capita income below 
50% of the median
Indices of concentration
Gini b Variance Log Theil Atkinson(ε=1.5)
Argentina c 1990 d 20.5 0.501 0.982 0.555 0.473
1999 22.2 0.539 1.194 0.667 0.530
2002 24.3 0.578 1.510 0.724 0.593
2005 22.1 0.526 1.190 0.602 0.525
2006 21.7 0.519 1.173 0.626 0.522
Bolivia 1989 e 20.6 0.537 1.528 0.574 0.600
1999 29.5 0.586 2.548 0.658 0.738
2002 28.6 0.614 2.510 0.776 0.738
2004 23.8 0.561 1.559 0.636 0.600
2007 27.2 0.565 2.159 0.611 0.709
Brazil 1990 26.6 0.627 1.938 0.816 0.664
1999 25.9 0.640 1.913 0.914 0.663
2001 26.1 0.639 1.925 0.914 0.665
2006 24.4 0.604 1.646 0.807 0.621
2007 24.7 0.590 1.559 0.744 0.605
Chile 1990 20.4 0.554 1.261 0.644 0.546
1998 21.0 0.560 1.302 0.654 0.553
2000 20.3 0.564 1.308 0.676 0.556
2003 19.5 0.552 1.203 0.674 0.535
2006 18.5 0.522 1.065 0.568 0.497
Colombia 1994 26.0 0.601 2.042 0.794 0.684
1999 21.8 0.572 1.456 0.734 0.603
2002 22.4 0.569 1.396 0.705 0.580
2004 22.0 0.577 1.410 0.727 0.580
2005 21.2 0.584 1.460 0.752 0.591
Costa Rica 1990 19.4 0.438 0.833 0.328 0.412
1999 20.7 0.473 0.974 0.395 0.457
2002 21.2 0.488 1.080 0.440 0.491
2006 20.7 0.482 1.031 0.427 0.475
2007 18.9 0.484 0.918 0.466 0.449
Dominican Republic 2002 22.1 0.537 1.247 0.569 0.536
2006 25.3 0.583 1.597 0.692 0.614
2007 24.2 0.556 1.466 0.599 0.587
Ecuador c 1990 17.4 0.461 0.823 0.403 0.422
1999 18.8 0.526 1.075 0.567 0.498
2002 19.6 0.513 1.031 0.563 0.487
2006 19.3 0.507 0.978 0.609 0.474
2007 19.0 0.520 1.043 0.550 0.488
El Salvador 1995 22.0 0.507 1.192 0.502 0.525
1999 24.2 0.518 1.548 0.496 0.601
2001 24.4 0.525 1.559 0.528 0.602
2004 21.3 0.493 1.325 0.449 0.552
Guatemala 1989 22.7 0.582 1.476 0.736 0.590
1998 20.0 0.560 1.182 0.760 0.534
2002 17.9 0.542 1.157 0.583 0.515
2006 24.7 0.585 1.475 0.773 0.590
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Table I.A-3 (concluded)
Country Year
Percentage of people with 
per capita income below 
50% of the median
Indices of concentration
Gini b Variance Log Theil Atkinson(ε=1.5)
Honduras 1990 26.1 0.615 1.842 0.817 0.649
1999 25.7 0.564 1.560 0.636 0.603
2002 26.5 0.588 1.607 0.719 0.608
2006 31.9 0.605 2.332 0.736 0.713
2007 30.5 0.580 1.963 0.650 0.661
Mexico 1989 19.7 0.536 1.096 0.680 0.509
1998 22.9 0.539 1.142 0.634 0.515
2002 21.2 0.514 1.045 0.521 0.485
2004 19.9 0.516 1.045 0.588 0.490
2006 19.5 0.506 0.992 0.527 0.481
Nicaragua 1993 27.4 0.582 1.598 0.671 0.619
1998 26.8 0.583 1.800 0.731 0.654
2001 23.8 0.579 1.599 0.783 0.620
2005 22.6 0.532 1.187 0.614 0.526
Panama 1991 c 22.0 0.530 1.254 0.543 0.534
1999 c 21.7 0.499 1.088 0.459 0.490
2002 26.6 0.567 1.691 0.616 0.618
2006 26.6 0.540 1.580 0.548 0.597
2007 25.9 0.524 1.334 0.520 0.547
Paraguay 1990 f 16.4 0.447 0.737 0.365 0.386
1999 25.7 0.565 1.555 0.668 0.599
2001 26.4 0.570 1.705 0.702 0.631
2005 22.8 0.536 1.318 0.614 0.553
2007 21.9 0.539 1.309 0.701 0.557
Peru 1997 25.6 0.533 1.351 0.567 0.554
1999 23.6 0.545 1.357 0.599 0.560
2001 23.9 0.525 1.219 0.556 0.527
2006 22.8 0.501 1.036 0.496 0.480
2007 24.2 0.509 1.112 0.513 0.499
Uruguay c 1990 17.4 0.492 0.812 0.699 0.441
1999 19.0 0.440 0.764 0.354 0.393
2002 19.6 0.455 0.802 0.385 0.412
2005 19.9 0.451 0.798 0.383 0.414
2007 19.5 0.457 0.787 0.389 0.403
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 1990 20.1 0.471 0.930 0.416 0.446
1999 21.6 0.498 1.134 0.464 0.507
2002 22.4 0.500 1.122 0.456 0.507
2006 19.3 0.447 0.811 0.359 0.409
2007 18.1 0.427 0.734 0.321 0.381
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a 
 Calculated on the basis of per capita income distribution throughout the country. 
b 




 Greater Buenos Aires.
e 
 Eight major cities and El Alto.
f
 Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table I.A-4
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCEPTIONS OF INCLUSION, LATENT STRUCTURE a
(Coefficients of correlation between the replies to questions with each of the components)
Questions Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Holding a driving licence 0.61 -0.23 -0.16
Being able to use a computer 0.58 -0.16 -0.40
Speaking a foreign language 0.53 -0.21 -0.44
Having close friends 0.49 -0.30 0.13
Having something to say 0.48 0.04 0.38
Doing things that matter to others 0.47 -0.04 0.41
Having a home with a father and mother 0.46 0.18 0.25
Participating in voluntary activities 0.46 -0.10 0.47
Living in a large city 0.45 -0.28 -0.03
Having one’s own income 0.45 0.52 0.03
Owning property, land or a house 0.44 0.47 -0.03
Having higher education 0.44 0.27 -0.32
Political participation 0.44 -0.24 0.19
Having a trade or profession 0.38 0.53 -0.16
Not suffering from a disability 0.33 -0.26 -0.24
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007.
a Principal components analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) was used, with a three-dimension or component solution, where component 1 corresponded to 22% of the variance, 
component 2 accounted for 8.7% and component 3 corresponded to 8%.
Table I.A-5
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): THINGS THAT PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE TO FEEL PART OF SOCIETY,
BY A ZONE OF RESIDENCE AND IDENTITY ETHNIC
(Percentages)









or mixed race 
(mulato)
Indigenous Mestizo or white
Having a trade or profession 53.5 54.8 57.7 55.2 48.9 57.1
Having one’s own income 41.2 37.8 40.5 36.5 34.0 40.3
Having higher education 40.8 35.8 38.7 33.9 35.4 38.7
Owning property, land or a house 36.4 32.7 32.8 28.3 30.2 33.7
Not suffering from a disability 30.8 33.8 32.4 32.0 31.1 33.6
Speaking a foreign language 25.8 19.9 22.5 24.9 19.3 22.4
Having a home with a father
 and mother 23.9 21.9 22.2 18.4 20.5 22
Being able to use a computer 21.6 20.5 21.7 23.6 20.2 20.9
Participating in voluntary activities 19.5 17.5 18.8 17.7 14.7 18.7
Having something to say 19.3 15.1 13.9 18.4 11.9 15.8
Holding a driving licence 17 13.5 17.8 15.6 14.7 15.1
Doing things that matter to others 16.7 13.1 12.5 13.3 12.3 14.7
Living in a large city 16.4 13.0 13.8 13.1 14.3 13.9
Participating in politics 15.3 12.6 11.6 13.0 13.5 13.2
Having close friends 15.2 12.1 16.2 13.2 11.4 12.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007.
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Table I.A-7
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SENTIMENTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF EXCLUSION,
BY POSSESSION OF GOODS IN THE HOME AND BY COUNTRY
(Percentages)
Country Possession of goods Low Moderate or high
Argentina 0-4 goods 50.0 50.0
5-8 goods 64.3 35.7
Bolivia 0-4 goods 47.6 52.4
5-8 goods 66.7 33.3
Brazil 0-4 goods 52.8 47.2
5-8 goods 67.1 32.9
Colombia 0-4 goods 41.4 58.6
5-8 goods 61.3 38.7
Costa Rica 0-4 goods 58.1 41.9
5-8 goods 69.2 30.8
Chile 0-4 goods 39.5 60.5
5-8 goods 56.6 43.4
Dominican Republic 0-4 goods 43.1 56.9
5-8 goods 61.0 39.0
Ecuador 0-4 goods 59.8 40.2
5-8 goods 71.3 28.7
El Salvador 0-4 goods 54.9 45.1
5-8 goods 65.1 34.9
Guatemala 0-4 goods 56.0 440.0
5-8 goods 58.7 41.3
Honduras 0-4 goods 46.6 53.4
5-8 goods 55.9 44.1
Mexico 0-4 goods 48.5 51.5
5-8 goods 65.9 34.1
Nicaragua 0-4 goods 41.8 58.2
5-8 goods 70.0 30.0
Panama 0-4 goods 63.0 37.0
5-8 goods 64.7 35.3
Paraguay 0-4 goods 43.5 56.5
5-8 goods 60.6 39.4
Peru 0-4 goods 55.8 44.2
5-8 goods 72.5 27.5
Uruguay 0-4 goods 43.6 56.4
5-8 goods 68.1 31.9
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0-4 goods 71.0 290.0
5-8 goods 66.4 33.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the Latinobarómetro 2007 survey, 2007.
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Chapter II
Employment, poverty and the new 
target of the first Millennium 
Development Goal
A. Overview of employment in the region: trends 
 and structural problems
On average, 79% of household income in Latin America is derived from labour, with job 
creation and higher productivity being the main mechanisms through which economic 
growth translates into poverty reduction. The trend in Latin America has been positive since 
2003, with continuous improvements in real wages in the formal sector and a steady decline 
in unemployment. The picture looks less encouraging for the longer term, however, with 
persistent structural problems such as the large size of the informal sector and the limited 
coverage of social welfare systems. The labour market remains a determining factor in the 
region’s high levels of social inequality: labour income is responsible for between 71% and 
92% of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
1.  The labour market: the link between economic growth 
 and poverty reduction
Employment is a human right that plays a fundamental 
role in social integration, a meaningful life and active 
participation in society (ECLAC, 2007b). It is also the 
driving force behind material progress for Latin American 
households, as labour earnings, particularly wages, are 
the main source of monetary income.
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The labour market is the main link between economic 
growth and poverty reduction, as has been emphasized 
in a number of studies (ECLAC, 2000a, 2000b; United 
Nations, 2005). Job creation, increases in real wages 
(associated with higher productivity) and the coverage 
and characteristics of workers’ social protection are the 
mechanisms through which growth is translated into 
higher incomes and greater well-being for households 
with economically active members. However, limited 
access to quality employment is a determining factor in 
poverty and social inequalities that are perpetuated over 
time and reflected in the persistently high levels of income 
concentration in the region (see chapter I) (ECLAC, 
2007a and 2007b). Around 2005, with the exception of 
Uruguay, wage differentials accounted for between 70.5% 
(Panama) and 92% (Nicaragua) of overall inequality in 
the Latin American countries, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient (Medina and Galván, 2008). 
Surveys taken around 2006 showed that 79% of total 
household income in urban areas in Latin America came 
from household members’ participation in the labour 
market. Wages represent approximately two thirds of that 
amount, equivalent to 52% of total income.1 In rural areas, 
wages are a much lower proportion of household income, 
representing approximately 38% of the total, although 
the proportion of total income corresponding to labour 
income (77%) is similar to that for urban areas.
Figure II.1 shows that in Uruguay, where labour 
income makes up the lowest proportion of overall income, 
only 63% of total urban household income is derived 
from labour income. In other countries with low levels of 
labour income as a proportion of total household income, 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, the figure is no 
less than 70%. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Paraguay, labour income provides 
around 85% or more of total household income. Other 
sources of household income include property rent, 
transfers from social security systems and universal or 
targeted government social assistance programmes, and 
transfers from other households.
Transfers from other households include remittances 
sent by Latin American migrants working outside their 
home countries. After being a destination for immigrants 
for many years, the region is now a net exporter of labour 
owing to problems at home and the attractiveness of labour 
markets in developed countries. The migrant population 
from Latin America and the Caribbean in other regions 
is estimated at 4% of the region’s total population.2 
1
 Non-wage labour income is that of own-account workers and 
employers, in the case of the latter excluding profits.
2
 For 2005, this estimated percentage represents around 26 million 
people, most of whom (19.3 million) were living in the United 
States (CELADE, 2006).
Consequently, remittances play a considerable role in some 
countries, at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. 
The Social Panorama of Latin America, 2005 showed 
that remittances were equal to about a third of the current 
total income of households receiving such transfers.3 At 
the macroeconomic level, remittances make up a large 
proportion of GDP in several countries, particularly in 
Central America: close to 25% in Honduras, over 15% in 
El Salvador and Nicaragua, and 10% in Guatemala. Mexico 
receives the largest amount of remittances in absolute 
terms, with close to US$ 24 billion in 2007, equivalent to 
2.4% of the country’s GDP (ECLAC, 2008b). The weight 
of remittances as a proportion of GDP is expected to 
decrease in 2008 as a result of the international financial 
crisis that began in the United States.
Figure II.1
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): LABOUR INCOME AND WAGES 





























































































































Wages Other labour income
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 




Social security transfers include pensions and 
retirement benefits, unemployment insurance, family 
allowances, and sickness or accident insurance payments 
(Beccaria, 2007). Unsurprisingly, the two countries 
where wages represent the lowest proportion of total 
household income (Brazil and Uruguay) also have the 
highest levels of public social spending on social security 
and welfare (over 12% of GDP).4 Conversely, countries 
3
 Calculation for an average of 11 countries around 2002 (ECLAC, 
2006a).
4
 In 2004-2005, social spending in this sector was 12.3% of GDP in 
Uruguay and 12% in Brazil. The country with the third-highest level 
of public social spending on social security and welfare (9.2% of 
GDP) was Argentina (ECLAC, 2008a). Medina and Galván (2008) 
found that in 2005, public and private transfers made up a quarter 
of household income in Uruguay and 20% in Brazil. 
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such as Ecuador or Paraguay, where non-labour income 
represents a low proportion of total household income, 
allocate just 2.4% and 2.2% of GDP, respectively, to 
social security spending.5
5
 Figures for Paraguay correspond to the central government budget, 
which may have underestimated social security expenditure. No 
data are available for spending on social security and welfare in 
Nicaragua, the country with the lowest proportion of non-labour 
income in total household income.
2.  Unemployment and labour participation
As indicated in chapter I, the past six years have been 
favourable in terms of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The positive growth trend since 2003 has been 
accompanied by job creation, a situation reflected in the 
regional unemployment rate based on official figures 
from the countries, which dropped from 11.0% to 8.0% 
between 2002 and 2007.
The present period of growth not only shows higher 
and more stable growth rates over a number of years, but 
also reflects responsible macroeconomic management 
and better-quality growth compared with the recent past 
(ECLAC, 2008e). However, the longer period analysed 
in this chapter (1990-2006) was not free from problems, 
as it included a number of economic crises affecting all 
or part of Latin America; among these were the Mexican 
crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the Russian 
crisis in 1998, the major crisis that hit Argentina and 
Uruguay in 2001 and 2002, and a number of natural 
disasters, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean. 
Even though the region continued to grow in 2008, in 
2009 the countries will feel the negative effects of the 
international financial crisis.
Table II.1
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT, PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGE LABOUR AND INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS (BOTH SEXES, MALES, AND FEMALES), AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006 a
Both sexes Females Males
1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006
Unemployment b 6.2 10.5 8.6 6.9 12.5 10.4 5.8 9.1 7.1
Participation rate 60.3 64.4 65.8 43.0 51.4 54.2 79.8 78.9 78.9
Employment rate 56.6 57.6 60.2 40.0 45.0 48.6 75.2 71.8 73.3
Wage labour rate 67.5 66.3 67.4 63.9 67.6 68.2 69.7 65.4 66.8
Informal employment c 48.5 47.2 44.9 54.5 52.6 50.7 45.0 43.5 40.5




 Unemployment rates based on household surveys in Colombia, Dominican Republic and Panama include hidden unemployment.
c
 Percentage of employed persons working in low-productivity sectors. The weighted average does not include Colombia.
Data from household surveys show that, during the 
period of sustained economic growth between 2002 and 
2006, unemployment rates dropped in the great majority 
of urban areas in the countries, following a widespread 
rise in unemployment during the 1990s (see figure II.2 (a)
and (b)).6 The most dramatic falls were seen in Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and 
Uruguay, which had all experienced very high unemployment 
up to 2002. Unemployment in the Dominican Republic 
continued to rise steadily up to 2004, and the economic
6
 Employment figures in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, based on official data from the countries, 
may differ from figures published in the Social Panorama. The latter 
are calculated by ECLAC on the basis of multipurpose household 
surveys in order so that data can be broken down in various ways.
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recovery of the following two years was not enough to 
bring down the high unemployment rate (16.8%).
In spite of the recovery in recent years, unemployment 
in Latin America remains high, partly because of the 
growth of labour participation, and according to data from 
household surveys it now stands 2.4 percentage points 
higher than in 1990. Present unemployment rates compared 
with those for 1990 show that the situation has worsened in 
nine countries, with significant rises in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Uruguay (see figure II.2 (c)).
Figure II.2
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
AMONG PEOPLE AGED 15 AND ABOVE, URBAN AREAS,
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 The regional total is a weighted average. Figures for Argentina refer to Greater 
Buenos Aires, for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the national total, for 
Bolivia to the eight main cities plus El Alto and for Paraguay to Asunción and the 
Central Department. Unemployment rates based on household surveys in Colombia, 
Dominican Republic and Panama include hidden unemployment.
b
 The regional figure does not include Nicaragua because no information on that 
country was available for 2006.
The region’s labour markets continue to exhibit 
structural problems in terms of equity, reflected in higher 
unemployment rates among women, young people, the poor 
and other specific social groups. Although unemployment 
rates in the poorest decile of households fell from 30.2% to 
23.8% in 2002-2006, the gap in relation to the wealthiest 
decile is still over 20 percentage points. The reduction in 
urban unemployment has not reduced the discrepancies 
between males and females, with unemployment rates 
remaining higher among women. The two-point drop in 
unemployment for both sexes in 2002-2006 was more 
favourable to men, who had already enjoyed lower rates 
than those for women in 2002 (see figure II.3 (b)). Although 
youth unemployment declined significantly between 
2002 and 2006, it is nonetheless higher than in other age 
groups and exceeds the level recorded in 1990 (see figure 
II.12).7 Unemployment rates among Afro-descendents 
and indigenous peoples are higher than those for the rest 
of the population in a number of countries, including 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay (ILO, 2007b).8 A 
recent study on employment (ECLAC/UNDP/ILO, 2008) 
identified high levels of racial inequality in the Brazilian 
labour market: in 2006, the unemployment rate among 
Brazilian men of European origin was 5.6%, compared 
with 7.1% among male Afro-descendants and 12.5% 
among female Afro-descendants. 
Figure II.3
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG 
PEOPLE AGED 15 AND OVER, URBAN AREAS, BY GENDER
AND INCOME DECILE, 1990, 2002 AND 2006 a
(Percentages) 
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7
 Section C of this chapter provides more detailed analysis of the 
problems faced by women and young people seeking to enter the 
labour market.
8
 In Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru, however, the unemployment rate 
among indigenous people is lower than that of non-indigenous 
people (ILO, 2007b).
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a
 Weighted average. Data for 2006 do not include Nicaragua. Data on the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela are nationwide figures. Unemployment rates based on 
household surveys in Colombia, Dominican Republic and Panama include hidden 
unemployment.
Labour participation is continuing to rise in the region 
owing to the growing numbers of women entering the 
labour market. The participation rate for women climbed 
from 51.4% to 54.2% between 2002 and 2006, while the 
rate for men was unchanged at 78.9%. During the period 
1990-2006, the participation rate for women increased by 
11 percentage points, while the rate for men dropped by 
almost one percentage point. Although the gap between 
men and women is diminishing, the male participation 
rate is still 25 percentage points higher than that for 
females (see table II.1).
The growth of labour participation has played a key 
role in improving the incomes of poor households, many 
of which have succeeded in escaping from poverty since 
2002 (see chapter I). Cultural factors related to the division 
of household labour, however, still play an important part 
in the persistent gap between the participation rates of 
men and women, especially in the poorest strata of the 
population. Around 2005, the participation rate for women 
in the poorest decile in Latin America was 37%, compared 
with 76% for men. This is why there is an urgent need to 
deal with the limitations that hinder women’s participation 
in the labour market and their contribution to household 
incomes (ECLAC, 2008a).
3.  Characteristics of job creation
(a) Low-productivity sectors
Apart from the trends related to unemployment and 
labour participation, the degree of quality and stability 
of jobs created in the region over the last five years 
should be considered. Precarious employment is closely 
correlated with labour informality and employment in 
low-productivity sectors. Such jobs also tend to be of low 
quality, offer limited job security and low wages, and lack 
access to social security systems (see box II.1).
Box II.1
RECENT APPROACHES TO INFORMALITY
The concept of informality as first used 
by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in a report on poor workers in Kenya 
(Employment, incomes and equity: a strategy 
for increasing productive employment in 
Kenya, Geneva, 1972) has been modified 
a number of times over the last 35 years, 
leading to a range of analyses and policy 
proposals for the labour market. At the 
time, the concept of the informal sector was 
used to identify the large number of poor 
workers who survived, produced goods and 
conducted subsistence activities outside the 
legal framework. Over the years, various 
experts and international bodies have 
recognized that informality is a significant 
phenomenon in Latin America, where 
the labour market has failed to provide 
productive, quality employment for the 
whole workforce without the implementation 
of targeted social and economic policies. 
There is general agreement regarding 
the problems faced by informal workers in 
developing countries, not only concerning 
low labour income, but also the lack of job 
security, labour rights and social protection 
and limited access to pensions, because 
Latin American workers must have formal 
work contracts in order to benefit from 
social welfare systems.
The measurement of informality, an 
issue of international concern, is closely 
linked to the conceptual debate. In 1993, the 
fifteenth International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians established that the enterprise 
was the appropriate unit of analysis. From 
this viewpoint, the main factor in levels of 
informality is not compliance with the law, 
employment characteristics or the work 
relationship, but the productivity level of 
the unit. Informality is considered to result 
from the heterogeneity of the productive 
structure, which can be seen schematically 
as two sectors: one which is formal, has a 
medium to high production level, greater 
levels of investment, relatively high growth 
potential and effective social protection; 
and the other informal, with low levels of 
productivity, growth potential and social 
protection. Consequently, unskilled own-
account workers, unpaid family workers 
or apprentices, owners and employees of 
micro-enterprises and domestic workers 
are all considered informal.
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Box II.1 (concluded)
ILO has recently begun to consider 
that the “informal” category also includes 
workers subcontracted by formal 
companies, that is, firms with higher 
productivity levels. This is related to the 
introduction of the concept of decent 
work. In order to focus the discussion 
on the job rather than the company, 
the new conceptual framework of the 
“informal economy” has been proposed in 
order to complement that of the informal 
sector, given that informal activities are 
found in both low- and high-productivity 
sectors. This new approach includes 
waged workers in the formal sector 
whose working conditions are not covered 
by employment legislation, meaning 
that they have no access to the social 
protection or other benefits provided 
for by the labour laws in force in the 
country concerned. Accordingly, taking 
into account the recommendations of 
the Delhi Group (experts from different 
countries who study informal-sector 
statistics), the seventeenth International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians, held 
in 2003, approved a statistical definition 
of informal employment, defined by the 
total number of informal jobs regardless 
of whether they are in formal- or informal-
sector companies.
ILO believes that the increasingly 
informal nature of the Latin American 
labour market is due to falling numbers 
of public-sector jobs as well as large 
corporations’ job-cutting measures in 
the context of changes in the division of 
labour between countries. In response to 
this situation, priority should be placed on 
three areas: in the short term, working 
conditions should be improved by providing 
all workers with the right to protection and 
representation; in the medium-term, labour 
institutions should be improved in order 
to promote formalization of employment; 
and in the long term, greater numbers 
of decent and protected jobs should be 
provided for all.
The World Bank considers that the 
existence of the informal economy is largely 
due to high labour costs and excessively 
complex bureaucracy, which make it difficult 
to conduct economic activity formally and 
in accordance with labour law. Faced by 
this situation, economic agents use cost-
benefit analysis to decide whether they 
will conduct their activities wholly or partly 
in the informal sector. This supposes that 
self-employment is voluntary, since some 
workers who decide to transfer from the 
waged to the own-account labour market 
do so for financial reasons. Using the same 
analytical approach, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) believes that 
many own-account workers, if not all, 
have voluntarily chosen to work informally. 
Accordingly, informality is characteristic 
of a labour-market dynamic: the decision 
to leave the waged market and prefer 
self-employment. Whether this concept 
of informality is appropriate for the 
study of employment situations in Latin 
America is questioned by IDB, given that 
the status of “informal worker” would not 
allow the quality of such employment to 
be assessed.
Lastly, ECLAC links the term 
“informality” to that of low-productivity 
sectors, but does not yet take into account 
aspects such as social protection and 
subcontracting. Given that low productivity 
implies low incomes and limited investment 
capacity, ECLAC proposes that the 
informal sector should also be defined by 
its characteristic insecurity. It also argues 
that the heterogeneity of production 
mechanisms generates and maintains 
the informal sector. Priority must therefore 
be given to production convergence, 
together with measures to improve labour 
institutions and social policies. From this 
structuralist viewpoint, labour informality 
is a serious problem that should be dealt 
with by governments, owing to its negative 
influence on both economic development 
and social cohesion in the countries 
concerned.
In shor t ,  the def in i t ion and 
measurement of informality, along with 
identification of its main causes, strongly 
influences public policy and labour 
legislation, even though the lack of social 
protection and labour rights for workers 
is a common denominator in the different 
analyses. This, then, is an issue that 
governments should not overlook when 
attempting to improve the workings of the 
labour market.
Source: Alejandro Portes and William Haller, “La economía informal”, Políticas sociales series, No. 100 (LC/L.2218-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2004. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.04.II.G.138; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic and Social 
Progress in Latin America, 2004 Report. Good Jobs Wanted: Labor Markets in Latin America, Washington, D.C., 2004; Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2006 (LC/G.2326–P), Santiago, Chile, 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.G.133; 
Ricardo Infante, “América Latina: informalidad y heterogeneidad estructural: los desafíos de la convergencia productiva”, unpublished, 2008; International Labour 
Organization (ILO), 2006 Labour Overview. Latin America and the Caribbean, Lima, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006; International 
Labour Organization (ILO), 2007 Labour Overview. Latin America and the Caribbean, Lima, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007; International 
Labour Office, Report VI: Decent work and the informal economy, International Labour Conference, 90th Session, Geneva, 2002; Guillermo Perry and others, 
Informality: Exit and Exclusion, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2007; Victor Tokman, “Informalidad, inseguridad y cohesión social en América Latina”, Políticas 
sociales series, No. 130, Santiago, Chile, 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.45 and De la informalidad a la modernidad, International Labour 
Organization (ILO), Santiago, Chile, 2001.
In urban areas of Latin America, almost half of all 
workers are employed in low-productivity sectors. Between 
2002 and 2006, the percentage of informal workers 
dropped from 47.2% to 44.9%, and this situation has 
been improving gradually since the early 1990s, when the 
figure stood at 48.5%. In all countries except Chile, 40% 
or more of employed people are own-account workers or 
domestic workers or are employed in low-productivity 
and low-income micro- or small enterprises, with little or 
no social security coverage.9 Of particular concern is the 
9
 In eight countries in the region (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
high proportion of women living in urban areas who work 
in low-productivity sectors (50.7%) compared with men 
(40.5%) (see tables II.1 and II.10); this reflects how the 
labour force is strongly divided, with women occupying the 
most precarious and worst-paid jobs (ECLAC, 2004a). 
(b) Wage labour 
Another indicator to be considered when analysing 
employment quality is the proportion of wage earners among 
 Paraguay and Peru) fewer than 5% of those employed in low-productivity 
sectors contribute to social security systems (see table II.14).
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the total number of employed persons. The generation 
of wage employment may be considered a reflection 
of an economy’s buoyancy, while shortfalls in this area 
encourage own-account work and small-business start-
ups, and also result in less competitive sectors moving 
into the informal sector, particularly as regards workers’ 
contractual status.
In 2002-2006, wage labour in urban areas increased by 
one percentage point to 67.4%, recovering its level of the 
early 1990s (see table II.1). Differences in the proportion 
of urban wage labour by country highlight the diverse 
conditions found in the Latin American labour market. 
While more than 70% of the urban employed are wage 
earners in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Panama and Uruguay, the figure stands at around 50% 
in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. 
(c) Formal hiring in wage employment
An additional element of employment quality is the 
presence of a formal contract, generally involving a set 
of legal obligations on the part of the employer such as 
payment for overtime, assistance in case of job loss, and 
annual-leave entitlement. In the urban areas of those 
countries for which information is available on hiring 
with formal or written contracts, formal employment 
increased by 1.4 percentage points between 2002 and 
2006. In 2006, around 59% of the wage workers in 12 
Latin American countries had formal contracts and more 
than half had long-term contracts. Informal employment 
is not exclusive to low-productivity sectors, where 70.5% 
of wage workers have no formal contract, for 30.8% of 
wage workers in medium- and high-productivity sectors 
are also in that position. Moreover, 63.7% of male wage 
workers have formal contracts compared with 61.8% of 
women, although a slightly lower proportion of men have 
long-term contracts (see table II.11). 
(d) Wage trends
Employment income is a key indicator of job quality 
and plays a fundamental role in poverty reduction. Its 
variations are linked to the behaviour of human capital 
and patterns of productivity, the competitiveness of 
the sectors providing the employment, and the level of 
protection and negotiating power of workers, which in 
turn is related to factors such as the degree of unionization 
and the possibility of collective bargaining. Trends in real 
wages can be negatively affected by inflationary surges, 
such as those observed in the subregion since 2007.
Household surveys show that the labour income of 
workers in urban areas increased slightly in real terms in 
2002-2006, with the regional average rising from US$ 377 
to US$ 397 per month at 2000 prices (an annual increase 
of 1.3%). Average monthly salaries increased more (annual 
growth of 2%), rising from US$ 350 to US$ 378 at 2000 
prices.10 These increases did not match the expansion of 
per capita GDP in the region for the same period, which 
was around 3.3% per annum. These trends are the result 
of highly divergent levels and rates of variation among 
the region’s countries, although they all showed labour-
income and wage gaps between men and women, between 
the formal and informal sectors, and between the working 
population with and without social security coverage. 
Between 1990 and 2006 in particular, the labour income 
of urban workers in low-productivity sectors fell from 
US$ 345 to US$ 283 at 2000 prices, widening the gap 
with formal-sector workers, whose incomes averaged 
US$ 493 in 2006 (see table II.12 and figure II.4).
Figure II.4
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN REAL WAGES, 


































Total employed Employed in low-productivity sectors
Employed in medium- and high- productivity sectors
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries.
a
 In the years falling between the periods considered above, some wage levels dropped 
as a result of various crises.
(e) Social security coverage
To have social protection —access to health-care 
systems, health insurance and social security coverage— is 
a fundamental right of workers. According to recent 
household surveys, around 37% of workers nationwide 
and 44% of those in urban areas reported that they were 
enrolled in and contributing to social security systems; 
10
 A recent report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) states 
that, between 1995 and 2006, trends in real wages in 11 of the region’s 
countries were fairly unsatisfactory, increasing in some cases and 
falling in others: in Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay 
wages declined to varying degrees, while in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru there were slight 
increases. Honduras was the only country to post significant wage 
increases during the period of the study (ILO, 2008).
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these figures have been fairly stable since 2002. These 
averages conceal major differences among the region’s 
countries: around 2006 in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, a third or less of 
urban workers were contributing to social security systems, 
while in Chile and Costa Rica, coverage was above two 
thirds of employed persons. In practically all the countries, 
increases in coverage were slight (see table II.13).
These data clearly show that the region’s labour markets 
have not fulfilled their role of providing universal access 
to social protection systems. The situation is particularly 
difficult in rural areas and for informal workers, although 
this is not to say that urban workers in formal employment 
automatically enjoy protection. Furthermore, although 
percentages of contributing workers are similar among 
men and women, a significant gender gap is revealed when 
the total working-age population is included rather than 
only the employed: only 15% of women are affiliated 
to social security systems, compared with 25% of men. 
There are clear gender differences when both active and 
inactive population groups are taken into account, owing 
to women’s long contribution gaps during periods spent 
caring for children, the elderly and the disabled. There is 
also a strong correlation in all the countries between levels 
of household income and social security coverage: workers 
belonging to the richest quintile of income distribution 
recorded systematically higher rates of contributions and 
coverage than those belonging to the poorest quintile (see 
figure II.5) (ECLAC, 2006b). Also, the lower the income 
level the higher the percentage of own-account workers; 
this partly explains the lower affiliation to social security 
systems among the lower income groups.
Figure II.5
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): WORKERS COVERED BY 













Quintile V Quintile I Men Women
Workers with social
security coverage as 
a percentage of the 
working-age population: 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries.
a
 Employed workers aged 15 and above who declared labour income. In the case of 
Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the figure corresponds to wage 
earners. Simple average.
4.  Formal workers and their dependants
The strong economic growth witnessed in recent years has 
been accompanied by persistent structural problems of 
informality and limited social protection. It is important to 
understand how difficult it is for social security systems which 
are financed by contributions from formal workers to cover 
the needs of population groups that have no direct access to 
the social services linked to such funding mechanisms.
This can be achieved by using the indicator for the 
number of dependants per formal worker presented in the 
Social Panorama of Latin America, 2007.11 This indicator 
refers to the ratio between workers actively employed in the 
formal sector of the economy and the rest of the population, 
which has considerable difficulties in obtaining access to 
the social protection system.12 The indicator identifies the 
degree of labour market segmentation in each country, 
which directly affects the capacity to respond to social 
protection needs and demands; it also allows countries 
11
 See chapter II, section C, pages 115-118. See also Uthoff, Vera and 
Ruedi (2006).
12
 The indicator corresponds to the number of dependents (children 
under 15, non-workers between 15 and 59 years, adults aged over 60,
to be grouped together according to the maturity of their 
labour markets and their stage of demographic transition.
Figure II.6 shows that countries with high levels of formal 
dependency also show lower levels of per capita income, 
and government tax revenues available for meeting social 
protection needs are also lower. The first group of countries, 
with more than five dependants per formal worker, consists 
of Bolivia (which has the highest level in the region, with 
around 10 dependants per formal worker), followed by the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. The second group, 
with four to five dependants per formal worker, includes the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Mexico and Panama. In 
the third group, consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay, there are three to four dependants per 
formal worker. A decline in the average number of those 
dependent on formal workers was recorded in 2006 compared 
 along with the unemployed and workers in low-productivity sectors 
aged 15 to 59) for each medium- or high-productivity sector worker 
aged 15 to 59.
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with 2002 (from 6.1 to 5.6 dependants); Honduras registered 
the best improvement in this indicator, with a decrease from 
10.7 to 8.1 dependants per formal worker.
Figure II.6
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS 
PER FORMAL WORKER AND PER CAPITA GDP,
AROUND 2002 AND 2006
(In dollars at 2000 prices)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries.
Countries in group I show the highest levels of 
informality, linked to both lower wages and social security 
contributions and higher rates of poverty among wage earners 
(see table II.16). The percentages of wage earners among 
the employed for groups I, II and III are 49%, 63% and 
72%, respectively; the percentages of wage earners in each 
group making welfare contributions are 38%, 61% and 71%, 
respectively; and the percentages of wage earners classified 
as poor stand at 38%, 18% and 12%, respectively.
In all countries, particularly in groups I and II, the weight 
of employment problems (measured by unemployment 
and informal work) in the indicator for dependence on 
formal workers is the second largest after that of children 
under the age of 15.13 Nonetheless, although informality 
levels are higher in the region’s poorest countries (reaching 
65%, 53% and 41% of the total employed population in 
groups I, II and III), unemployment among people aged 
15 to 59 shows a positive correlation with per capita GDP 
(6%, 7% and 9%, respectively).14
These stylized facts demonstrate that low social 
security coverage in the region’s countries is strongly 
influenced by the level of formality in labour markets. 
Policies should therefore be implemented to create formal 
jobs for workers who are responsible for dependants with 
no access to social protection.
Social policies should counterbalance constraints imposed 
by inequalities and budgetary restrictions. The different 
levels of maturity of the Latin American countries’ labour 
markets, which determine the numbers of workers affiliated 
to contributory social protection systems, and their stages of 
demographic transition, which affect the numbers and categories 
of dependants, will determine the nature of the challenges 
involved in fulfilling this task (ECLAC, 2008a).
13
 The unemployed and informal workers make up 30.1% of total formal 
dependents in group I, 27.6% in group II and 25.2% in group III.
14
 This is because the main labour market adjustment mechanisms in the 
poorest countries are voluntary underemployment (few hours worked 
in the reference period) and self-employment in informal activities.
Box II.2
EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS: BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
Unemployed: people aged 15 and over 
who are, during the reference period: 
(1) without work; (2) available for work in 
waged or own-account employment; and 
(3) actively searching for a job, having 
taken specific measures to find work 
during a recent, specified period.
Employed: people aged 15 and 
over who, during a brief reference period 
such as one week or day: (1) have had a 
waged job, working for a wage or salary, 
or have a job but are not working owing 
to a temporary absence, but maintain a 
formal link with their job; (2) have an own-
account job, working independently to 
gain benefits or a family income (includes 
unpaid family members), or who are not 
working on an own-account basis owing 
to a temporary absence.
Economically active population 
(EAP) (or labour force): people aged 15 
and over who meet the requirements for 
the employed or unemployed category 
(that is, the total of all employed and 
unemployed persons). 
Working age population (WAP): 
people aged 15 and over, corresponding to 
the potentially active working population.
Unemployment rate  (open 
unemployment): number of people 
unemployed over the economically 
active population (EAP). This figure does 
not include the discouraged, meaning 
those persons who wish to work but are 
no longer searching for a job and have 
become resigned to it.
Employment rate (gross employment 
rate or employment-to-population ratio, in 
accordance with the definition used for the 
Millennium Development Goals indicators): 
number of people employed divided by the 
working age population (WAP).
Net employment rate: number of 
employed persons divided by the number 
of economically active persons (EAP).
Overall employment rate: number 
of employed persons over the total 
population.
Participation rate: Economically 
active population (EAP) over the working 
age population (WAP).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. Cecchini and A. Uthoff, “Reducción de la pobreza, tendencias demográficas, 
familias y mercado de trabajo en América Latina”, Políticas sociales series, No. 136 (LC/L.2775-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.0X.II.G.110.
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B. The new employment target of the first Millennium 
 Development Goal and its indicators 
In 2008, the United Nations announced a new Millennium target, “to achieve full and productive 
employment and decent work for all, including women and young people”, as part of the first 
Millennium Development Goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Although no quantitative 
levels were established to be reached by a certain date, the new target illustrates the need for 
countries to focus on improving the labour market as the best way of reducing poverty. Since 1990, 
regional trends for three of the four indicators for monitoring the target have been favourable: 
labour productivity and the employment rate have risen and poverty has declined among the 
employed. However, workers’ vulnerability —measured as the proportion of own-account 
and unpaid family workers in total employment— has remained stable. Moreover, additional 
indicators for monitoring the employment target in Latin America, such as the percentage of 
workers covered by social security and labour income trends among the poor and indigent, show 
that the labour market’s contribution to poverty reduction has not been entirely satisfactory.
1. Achievement of full and productive employment and 
 decent work
Latin American citizens consider unemployment to be 
one of the main problems in their respective countries and 
this view has been consistently confirmed in opinion polls 
for more than a decade (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 
2008).15 In addition, in order to overcome absolute 
poverty, it is necessary to create a sufficient number of 
jobs of acceptable quality, since most of Latin American 
households’ resources for meeting the basic needs of their 
members come from labour income (see section A). 
The relevance of employment to poverty reduction 
was recently confirmed at the United Nations in a new 
Millennium target (target 1.B), “to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including 
15
 In 2008, for the first time since 1995, crime emerges as the main 
problem in the region, in 17% of responses to the Latinobarómetro 
poll, with unemployment in second place (15%). As the economic 
situation in the region improved and unemployment declined, crime 
has acquired more importance as the main problem.
women and young people”. The target was proposed in 2006 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following 
discussions at the 2005 World Summit held during the 
sixtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
The employment target came into effect in 2008 and was 
included in the first Millennium Development Goal, “to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”, in order to illustrate 
the close relationship existing between the labour market 
and improvement of the material aspects of people’s well-
being.16 Although this is not a quantitative target with 
levels to be reached by a certain date, the message for the 
region’s countries is clear: efforts should be focused on 
improving the functioning of the labour market in order 
to generate quality employment, as this represents the 
main means of reducing poverty and inequality. Indeed, 
16
 For more details on the redefinition of the targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals, see box I.5 in chapter I.
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the Heads of State and Government, meeting at the Fourth 
Summit of the Americas in November 2005, stated in the 
Mar del Plata Declaration their commitment to decent 
employment in order to tackle poverty.17
The topic of employment was included in the goals set 
out in the Millennium Declaration in September 2000 and 
is covered by target 16 of the Millennium Development 
Goals: “in cooperation with developing countries, develop 
and implement strategies for decent and productive 
work for youth”, which came under Goal 8, “Develop a 
global partnership for development”. The target on youth 
unemployment has now been incorporated in target 1.B, which 
has also required some changes in the indicators.18
The measurement of complex concepts such as full 
and productive employment and decent work (see box II.3),
17
 On that occasion, the Heads of State and Government agreed to 
implement active policies to generate decent work and to create 
the conditions for quality employment (ILO, 2006).
18
 Indicator 45, used to monitor former target 16, “Unemployment rate 
of 15-to-24-year-olds”, is no longer one of the official indicators 
for monitoring the Goals, although the United Nations database 
on indicators for the Millennium Development Goals retains it as a 
“contextual” indicator, together with “Ratio of youth unemployment 
rate to adult unemployment rate”, “Share of youth unemployed 
to total unemployed” and “Share of youth unemployed to youth 
population” (United Nations, Millennium Development Goals 
Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx).
which are part of the new Millennium target, is a 
very challenging task. The official indicators for 
monitoring the new employment target proposed by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Inter-
agency and Expert Group on Millennium Development 
Goal Indicators (IAEG) are four in number and two 
of them focus on the component of income as part of 
decent work:
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio (employment 
rate)
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below 
$ 1 (PPP) per day
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing 
family workers in total employment
Box II.3
THE CONCEPT OF DECENT WORK
The concept of decent work, introduced 
in 1999 by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), reflects the broad 
goal of providing men and women with 
opportunities to obtain “productive work 
in conditions of freedom, equity, security 
and human dignity”.
Although the ethical meaning is the 
one conveyed most strongly by the term 
“decent work”, its various dimensions show 
what this basic human activity should be 
and provide guidance for analysing the 
labour market:
- “opportunities for productive work” 
refers to the need for all persons who want 
work to be able to find work, allowing 
workers and their families to achieve an 
acceptable level of well-being;
- “employment in conditions of 
freedom” underlines the fact that work 
should be freely chosen and not forced 
on individuals; it also means that workers 
have the right to participate in the activities 
of trade union groupings;
- “employment in conditions of equity” 
means that workers need to have fair 
and equitable treatment in work, without 
discrimination and with the ability to 
balance work with family life;
- “employment in conditions of security” 
refers to the need to safeguard the health of 
workers and to provide them with adequate 
pensions and social protection;
- “employment in conditions of human 
dignity” requires that workers be treated with 
respect and be able to participate in decision-
making about working conditions.
In particular, decent work should 
enable people to earn enough to pull 
themselves out of poverty with their families 
on a lasting basis. Decent employment 
is therefore covered by social security 
and guarantees protection under labour 
laws, as well as the possibility of making 
one’s voice heard through freely elected 
workers’ organizations.
This concept was based on the 
conviction that only decent employment 
—and not any type of employment— will 
enable people to avoid or overcome 
poverty. Decent work is thus an alternative 
for a large number of people who are 
working, sometimes for long hours and 
in bad conditions, in low-productivity 
jobs that do not enable them to emerge 
from poverty.
Each of the dimensions of the concept 
of decent work is among the topics that 
have been the subject of recommendations 
and mandates of ILO since its creation nine 
decades ago. What is new is that the idea of 
decent work places the various dimensions 
of work within a single framework. It is 
also necessary to stress that this is a 
universal concept, covering all workers 
—and not only certain groups— which 
represents a departure from the traditional 
role of ILO, which was initially concerned 
with workers in the organized sector, 
with those who were already employed 
or those who were protected by specific 
rules and regulations.
Source: Richard Anker and others, “Measuring decent work with statistical indicators”, Policy Integration Paper, No. 1, Geneva, International Labour Organization (ILO), 
2002; María Estela Lanari, Trabajo decente: significados y alcances del concepto. Indicadores propuestos para su medición, Buenos Aires, Office of the Under-
Secretary for Technical Programming and Labour Studies, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Argentina, 2005; International Labour Organization 
(ILO), “Report of the Director-General: Decent Work” , Eighty-seventh session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 1999; “Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market (KILM), Fifth Edition” [online] http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/download.htm 2007 and A. Sen, Speech at the eighty-seventh 
session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, 15 June 1999.
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Tables II.2, II.4, II.5 and II.6, and the section on the 
Millennium Development Goals in the statistical annex, give 
data for each of the four indicators for monitoring target 
1.B. The data on labour productivity (indicator 1.4) are 
calculated by ILO and reflect the official data contained in 
the United Nations database on the Millennium Development 
Goals, while the data for the other three indicators were 
calculated by ECLAC on the basis of household surveys. 
For indicator 1.6, therefore, the calculation used not the 
“one dollar a day” line but the indigence lines of each 
country based on the method of the cost of the basket of 
basic foodstuffs of the population of the countries of the 
region used by the Commission.
It should also be noted that two of the four official 
indicators used for monitoring the employment target 
—employment rate and percentage of vulnerable 
workers— may be disaggregated by sex and by age group, 
showing the different results in each case.
Results and trends for each indicator are discussed 
below and some additional indicators are suggested 
that may help to clarify the picture regarding full and 
productive employment and decent work in Latin America. 
As shown in figure II.7, since 1990 the regional trend 
for three of the four indicators used for monitoring the 
target has been positive: labour productivity and the 
employment rate have risen and poverty has declined 
among the employed. However, workers’ vulnerability 
—measured as the proportion of own-account and 
unpaid family workers in total employment— has 
remained stable.
Figure II.7
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS IN INDICATORS USED FOR MONITORING THE NEW EMPLOYMENT TARGET OF THE FIRST  
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL, 1990-1992, 1990 AND 2006
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant 
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2. Labour productivity
Table II.2
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GROWTH RATE OF GDP PER PERSON EMPLOYED
(MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATOR 1.4) 
(Percentages)
Country 1992-2002 2003-2006 1992-2006
Argentina 0.1 4.6 1.3
Bolivia -0.3 1.0 0.0
Brazil 0.2 2.0 0.7
Chile 3.8 4.9 4.1
Colombia -0.8 1.3 -0.3
Costa Rica 1.4 2.1 1.5
Dominican Rep. 3.3 1.9 3.0
Ecuador -1.6 0.9 -1.0
El Salvador 1.5 0.9 1.4
Guatemala 1.6 0.6 1.3
Honduras -1.2 -2.5 -1.6
Mexico 0.1 1.9 0.6
Nicaragua -1.4 -0.1 -1.1
Panama 0.2 3.8 1.1
Paraguay -2.2 -1.0 -1.9
Peru 0.3 3.8 1.2
Uruguay -0.4 5.4 1.1
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -2.2 2.8 -0.9
Latin America a 0.1 1.9 0.6
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/.
a
 Simple average.
Productive employment is one of the elements that make 
up the concept of decent work (see box II.3), and is a 
fundamental factor in poverty reduction. The first indicator 
for monitoring the new employment target of the first 
Millennium Development Goal is therefore GDP growth rate 
per person employed, which can be used to assess whether 
a country’s economic conditions are able to generate and 
sustain opportunities for decent work with fair and equitable 
wages. Countries that succeed in increasing productivity can 
expect to see less poverty, and this correlation will be even 
closer in countries with more equitable income distribution, 
where the impact of increased production should reach low-
income groups much more quickly (ILO, 2007a). 
In Latin America, however, low labour productivity 
growth since the early 1990s failed to spur reduction of 
extreme poverty. Between 1992 and 2006, value added 
per job grew at an annual average rate of 0.6% for the 
18 countries of Latin America. This average conceals 
widely differing situations, ranging from the success 
story of Chile —with annual growth of 4.1%— to 
Paraguay, where productivity declined by an annual 
average of 1.9%. It is also noteworthy that, while prior 
to 2002 productivity hardly increased at all, during the 
period 2003-2006 it climbed at an annual rate of 1.9% 
(see table II.2).
The data on the various regions of the world show 
that in 1996 the productivity of Latin America and the 
Caribbean —corresponding to GDP per person employed 
of about 17,500 dollars in purchasing power parity 
(PPP)— was above the world average and that there 
was a wide gap compared with other poorer regions. Ten 
years later, because of the low rate of labour productivity 
growth, the region —with GDP per person employed 
of 18,900 dollars PPP— was below the world average 
(19,800 dollars PPP) and Eastern Asia —the developing 
region most successful in reducing extreme poverty— is 
catching up (see table II.3 and figure II.8). 
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Table II.3 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND ANNUAL GDP GROWTH RATE PER PERSON EMPLOYED, 1996-2006
(In 2000 constant PPP dollars and percentages)
Region
Labour productivity 
(GDP per person 
employed)
Compound average annual growth rate of GDP per person employed
1996 2006 1996 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996-2006
Eastern Asia 6 347 12 591 7.1 6.6 7.8 7.5 9.0 8.5 7.1
Central and South-Eastern Europe 
(excluding European Union) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States 11 787 18 121 4.0 7.5 5.7 5.8 6.0 5.8 4.4
Southern Asia 5 418 7 998 2.3 4.9 6.7 5.9 6.2 5.8 4.0
World 15 824 19 834 2.5 2.2 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.3 2.3
Developed economies and European Union 52 876 62 952 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.8
South-Eastern Asia and Pacific 8 068 9 419 2.3 3.9 4.0 2.3 3.9 3.5 1.6
Northern Africa 12 967 14 751 -0.6 1.5 -0.1 0.9 3.2 3.2 1.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 490 5 062 0.4 1.3 2.8 2.7 2.6 3.2 1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 652 18 908 1.4 -0.6 3.1 2.8 3.6 2.9 0.7
Middle East 22 130 21 910 -0.5 1.3 2.8 2.7 2.6 3.2 -0.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), “Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 
Fifth Edition” [online] http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/download.htm. 
Figure II.8 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), “Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 
Fifth Edition” [online] http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/download.htm.
In this connection, ECLAC (2007c) has identified 
certain factors connected with the structure of the 
workforce that may explain the different rates of growth 
of value added per person employed between Asia and 
Latin America. In the case of Asia, the greater importance 
of the manufacturing sector explains productivity gains. 
In addition, a middle class has emerged with sufficient 
purchasing power to boost the national services market, 
which also increased its labour productivity. In contrast, 
in Latin America there was a premature reduction in the 
manufacturing sector’s share of total value added (ECLAC, 
2008e) and, starting in the early 1990s, many of the new 
jobs were created in the sector of trade and services,19 
where many of the jobs are of low quality, since they are 
informal and own-account jobs.
19
 In the 1990s, 27% of new jobs were created in the trade sector and 
43% in the services sector, broken down into : financial services, 
13%; social services, 19%; personal services, 5%; and domestic 
service, 6% (ECLAC, 2004b).
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3. Employment rate
The link between increased productivity and poverty 
reduction is even stronger when the productivity gain goes 
hand in hand with job creation.20 The second indicator 
for monitoring target 1.B is therefore the employment 
rate (or employment-to-population ratio), defined as the 
proportion of the working-age population that is employed. 
This measures both labour-market participation and the 
economy’s capacity to absorb the workforce. A high ratio 
means that a large proportion of a country’s working-age 
population is employed, while a low ratio means that 
many of them are not directly involved in market-related 
activities, either because they are unemployed or because 
they are completely outside the workforce. 
In countries which have high unemployment rates or 
where job-seekers, in many cases, become discouraged 
and give up the search, it is desirable for the employment
20
 Indeed, there could be a situation in which GDP per person employed 
(the indicator used to measure productivity) increases while its 
denominator (number of employed in a country) decreases.
rate to rise. However, very high employment rates could 
reflect situations in which low-quality jobs are found in 
abundance, as is the case in the poorer countries. In terms 
of absolute values, there is thus no “correct” value for the 
employment-to-population ratio; for example, no clear 
correlation is found between a country’s per capita GDP and 
its employment rate. In addition, an upward movement of 
this indicator is not necessarily positive as regards poverty 
reduction. In any case, the employment rate in Latin America 
climbed between 1990 and 2006, primarily because more 
women entered labour markets and found work.
As can be seen in table II.4, employment rates are 
consistently higher for men than for women and for the average 
active population than for young people. However, since 1990 
employment rates have decreased for men and increased for 
women, as more women enter the labour market.
Table II.4
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT RATE (MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATOR 1.5),




(aged 15 and above)
Women 
(aged 15 and above)
Men 
(aged 15 and above)
Young people of both sexes
(15-29 years old)
Around: Around: Around: Around:
1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006
Argentina a 52.5 49.0 57.0 35.8 38.4 45.2 71.4 61.2 71.1 53.4 40.8 49.5
Bolivia b 53.5 61.5 63.4 42.4 52.7 54.2 66.2 71.8 73.9 42.0 47.7 50.8
Brazil 61.1 60.8 63.2 42.6 47.7 51.6 81.0 74.9 75.8 62.6 56.8 59.6
Chile 47.7 50.1 53.1 29.4 35.1 39.2 67.9 66.3 68.3 41.9 38.3 40.8
Colombia 58.6 56.2 57.5 38.8 43.0 43.8 80.9 71.1 73.0 53.1 48.2 48.7
Costa Rica 54.7 55.9 57.1 30.7 38.0 39.7 79.2 74.9 75.6 54.5 49.8 50.9
Dominican Rep. 52.9 53.3 54.1 31.0 35.4 37.0 76.0 71.5 71.6 46.3 43.7 44.7
Ecuador c 57.1 60.6 62.7 39.2 45.8 48.7 76.6 75.9 77.6 46.4 49.1 52.0
El Salvador 55.8 56.1 55.5 39.4 42.2 42.4 75.1 72.6 70.8 49.1 49.8 49.1
Guatemala 56.5 66.5 61.2 27.5 46.8 41.0 88.4 88.1 83.. 53.7 63.9 56.4
Honduras 56.1 57.8 58.1 30.6 35.9 38.2 83.9 82.0 80,4 50.8 52.5 51.5
Mexico 52.1 59.2 62.2 28.8 41.9 47.2 77.3 78.4 79.3 47.2 51.8 54.2
Nicaragua 49.6 58.3 60.4 32.7 40.2 41.5 67.9 77.6 80.7 42.7 52.3 54.7
Panama 48.1 54.1 58.8 29.6 36.7 42.8 67.2 71.6 75.3 39.8 44.2 49.7
Paraguay d 61.4 59.9 64.3 46.4 50.4 54.9 79.0 71.7 75.4 56.7 52.8 55.1
Peru 67.9 64.5 66.2 56.7 54.8 57.2 79.9 74.6 75.7 60.1 55.4 58.6
Uruguay c 52.6 50.2 52.4 38.9 39.6 42.6 69.2 62.4 64.0 52.3 45.1 47.8
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 51.6 58.0 59.5 32.3 44.4 45.0 71.3 71.6 74.1 41.6 47.5 47.9
Latin America e 57.4 59.0 61.4 38.1 44.7 48.2 78.3 74.6 75.8 54.3 52.6 54.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Greater Buenos Aires.
b




 Asunción and Central Department.
e
 Weighted average.
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a matter for concern, since it is due to the fact that they 
remain longer in the education system, and the increase 
in employment among young women is explained by 
the fact that their participation rates were still low (see 
section II.C).
Among young people, the percentage of persons 
employed increased very slightly between 1990 and 
2006, as a result of two contrasting trends: fewer men 
employed and higher employment rates for young 
women. The decrease for young men is not necessarily 
4. Poor and indigent workers
The proportion of employed people living on less than 
US$ 1 (PPP) per day reflects a key element of the lack of 
decent work worldwide. If workers do not even generate 
enough income to pull themselves and their families 
out of extreme poverty, their jobs can hardly be called 
“decent” (ILO, 2007a). It should be noted, however, that 
being a poor or indigent worker does not necessarily 
mean having a low labour income, since a worker with a 
good labour income may also fall below the poverty or 
indigence line if there are a large number of dependants 
in the household (IDB, 2007).
The indicator used for monitoring the new employment 
target worldwide is calculated by ILO as the weighted 
average of: (i) the product of the incidence of extreme 
poverty (measured by the World Bank using the line of 
US$ 1 (PPP) per day) and the population aged 15 years 
and above, and (ii) the product of the incidence of extreme 
poverty and the workforce aged 15 and over.21 In Latin 
America and the Caribbean the percentage of workers 
living on less than one dollar per day calculated using 
this methodology declined by more than three percentage 
points, from 11.6% in 1997 to 8.0% in 2007. In contrast, 
Eastern Asia —where in 1997 18.8% of workers were 
indigent— succeeded in decreasing the proportion of 
employed people earning less than US$ 1 per day by 
about 10 percentage points, so that today this region has a 
percentage of extremely poor workers (8.7%) similar to that 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2008f).
Following the traditional method used in the Social 
panorama of Latin America, in order to measure indigence
21
 This method of calculation is an approximation, made by averaging 
estimates of (i) an upper limit and (ii) a lower limit of the actual 
percentage of extremely poor employed people. The estimate of 
the lower limit is based on the assumption that all poor persons 
aged 15 years and over who are part of the economically active
and poverty —instead of using the lines of one or two 
dollars per day—lines obtained for each individual country 
are used, and table II.5 gives data on the incidence of 
indigence and poverty among employed people using 
ECLAC country lines.22 It can thus be shown that the 
existing operation of the labour market in the region 
still does not enable broad segments of workers to lift 
themselves out of poverty. In Latin America, between 
7% (Chile) and 63% (Honduras) of the employed live in 
conditions of poverty and between 1% (Chile) and 40% 
(Honduras) in conditions of indigence.
Since 1990, however, the regional trend has been 
positive, with a decrease in the percentage of working 
poor from 39.7% to 29.5% in 2006 and a reduction in the 
percentage of working indigents from 17.5% to 11.4%. 
Reflecting the regional trend, in most countries the percentage 
of working poor declined over the period 1990-2006; 
the most striking declines were in Chile (18 percentage 
points) and in Brazil and Mexico (14 percentage points 
each). The exceptions were Argentina and Uruguay, where 
there was a slight increase in poverty among employed 
people, and Bolivia and Paraguay, where poverty among 
employed people increased by about four percentage points 
(see figure II.9).
The figures on working poor and working indigents 
show that the situation is more serious in rural than in 
urban areas. However, in all countries with available data, 
poverty declined among rural employed people since 
1990, while in the urban areas of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Uruguay it increased (see figure II.10).
  population are employed (United Nations, Millennium Development 
Goals Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/).
22
 Unlike the methodology used by ILO to calculate the official 
indicator, in this case working indigence and working poverty are 
calculated directly using microdata from household surveys.
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Figure II.9 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY 
AMONG EMPLOYED PEOPLE, NATIONAL TOTAL,























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a




 Asunción and Central Department.
d
 Eight main cities and El Alto.
Figure II.10 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY 
AMONG EMPLOYED PEOPLE, URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 
AROUND 1990 AND 2006















































































Urban areas 2006 Rural areas 2006
Rural areas 1990 Urban areas 1990
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Greater Buenos Aires.
b
 Asunción and Central Department.
c Eight main cities and El Alto.
5. Vulnerable workers
The proportion of own-account and unpaid family 
workers within the total employed population can be 
a useful means of identifying persons in a vulnerable 
employment situation, as workers in these categories are 
less likely to have access to social protection. The link 
with poverty exists because vulnerable workers have no 
social protection system or safety net to protect them 
when labour demand is slack, and they are often unable 
to save enough money to see themselves through such 
situations (ILO, 2007a).23
The percentage of vulnerable workers in Latin 
America climbed from 33.0% in 1990 to 33.7% in 
2006 (the largest increase, to 35.0%, occurred between 
1990 and 2002 but there was a subsequent decline). 
Vulnerable forms of employment increased among both 
men and women. In most Latin American countries (the 
exceptions are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Panama and 
Uruguay), the percentage of own-account and unpaid 
family workers is higher among women than among 
men (see table II.6).
23
 The statistical appendix to this edition of Social Panorama of Latin 
America shows in greater detail the various occupational categories, 
distinguishing between own-account workers with professional or 
technical skills and unskilled workers.
From the viewpoint of gender equity, a fundamental 
cause of working women’s vulnerability is the fact that 
they have no income of their own. This is true not only 
for unpaid women workers in family businesses —a 
phenomenon included in indicator 1.7 for monitoring the 
employment target of the first Millennium Development 
Goal— but above all for the vast number of women who 
work at home without pay, looking after children and the 
elderly and performing domestic chores. Around 2005, 
between 40% (urban areas) and 53% (rural areas) of 
women aged 15 and above had no income of their own 
(ECLAC, 2007d).
The data provided in the statistical annex (see tables 
19 and 20) show that the national average for vulnerable 
workers conceals vast geographical differences. In rural 
areas of Latin American countries —where own-account 
and unpaid family workers generally represent over 
50% of the employed— this phenomenon is much more 
widespread than in urban areas, where the percentage of 
vulnerable workers is about 30%.
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Table II.6
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): OWN-ACCOUNT AND UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS (MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATOR 1.7), 
NATIONAL TOTAL, AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006 
(Percentage of total employment)
Country
Both sexes Women Men Young people(aged15-29)
Around: Around: Around: Around:
1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006
Argentina a 25.6 22.3 19.3 27.0 16.1 16.7 24.8 26.8 21.3 15.9 15.0 10.3
Bolivia b 43.7 46.0 43.0 54.1 57.7 56.1 36.0 36.1 32.1 34.2 36.1 33.9
Brazil 28.9 32.7 31.0 30.0 31.9 30.5 28.3 33.2 31.4 22.0 24.4 22.3
Chile 24.5 21.1 21.3 20.7 19.4 20.9 26.3 22.0 21.5 17.2 13.3 11.8
Colombia 44.6 44.9 44.1 35.2 44.6 43.8 49.7 45.2 44.3 36.8 36.6 35.5
Costa Rica 24.3 23.6 21.4 20.4 24.5 21.4 25.8 23.1 21.4 17.0 15.7 13.0
Dominican Rep. 41.7 43.5 42.6 32.2 30.0 29.0 45.8 50.3 49.8 34.9 35.6 35.1
Ecuador c 35.6 34.2 40.6 40.5 40.1 50.9 32.9 30.6 33.9 27.8 23.9 31.9
El Salvador 36.2 37.3 35.3 45.8 45.5 45.0 30.2 31.6 28.6 25.5 29.4 25.8
Guatemala 48.0 45.3 47.2 47.1 56.8 56.5 48.3 38.5 42.2 42.5 40.0 41.2
Honduras 49.6 49.3 48.9 50.4 49.2 50.3 49.3 49.3 48.1 41.6 39.6 37.6
Mexico 29.4 29.6 28.2 30.8 35.8 35.9 28.8 26.0 23.0 21.7 21.3 19.0
Nicaragua 46.5 42.2 44.9 44.8 48.4 49.4 47.4 38.7 42.4 39.8 37.4 38.6
Panama 33.8 34.7 31.6 15.9 26.0 28.5 41.9 33.5 36.4 33.4 31.6 28.0
Paraguay d 22.9 26.8 28.8 30.8 30.9 33.2 17.4 23.3 25.1 12.1 16.4 17.4
Peru 52.4 53.6 56.3 62.5 63.1 64.9 44.6 46.4 49.5 44.5 44.9 49.7
Uruguay c 20.1 25.8 24.3 21.8 20.8 20.5 18.9 29.5 27.2 12.9 19.5 16.8
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 25.7 39.3 37.0 22.1 42.2 37.6 27.4 37.5 36.6 19.2 33.9 29.5
Latin America 33.0 35.0 33.7 34.1 37.0 35.9 32.5 33.6 32.1 25.7 27.2 25.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Greater Buenos Aires.
b
 Eight main cities and El Alto.
c
 Urban areas. 
d
 Asunción and Central Department.
6.  Monitoring of the employment target in Latin America: 
 additional indicators and methodology of analysis 
 of the employment-poverty relationship
Although the four official indicators for monitoring the 
new Millennium target identify important elements of the 
concept of decent work, in Latin America other indicators 
can be added to enhance the analysis of the prerequisites 
for decent work, such as:
percentage of workers in low-productivity • 
sectors;24
24
 This indicator, which refers to informal work, differs from the indicator 
on vulnerable workers. Although both include unpaid family workers 
and own-account workers, in the calculation of the informality
percentage of workers covered by social security, • 
and
ratio between women’s and men’s wages.• 
These additional indicators reveal persistent features 
of Latin American labour markets, such as informality, low 
levels of social protection and wage inequalities between 
men and women. As far as trends between 1990 and 2006
 rate own-account workers with professional or technical skills are 
excluded. In addition, the percentage of workers in low-productivity 
sectors includes domestic work and workers in micro-enterprises.
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are concerned, the situation improved slightly, since the 
national average of workers in low-productivity sectors 
dropped from 55.1% to 52.3%, and women’s wages 
rose from 76.0% to 78.1% of men’s wages. Of the eight 
countries for which data for social security coverage 
can be compared among the employed between 1990 
and 2006, six (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador (urban areas) and Nicaragua suffered a decrease 
in coverage and only two (Chile and México) experienced 
slight increases (see table II.13).
These indicators have been used for some time in 
ECLAC analyses and, together with others, have been 
used by countries in the region in the national reports on 
the Millennium Development Goals or as an instrument 
for monitoring their social and labour policies for 
achieving decent work.25 In 2003, an additional Goal was 
proposed at the national level in Argentina —before the 
United Nations adopted the new employment target— on 
promotion of decent work, which includes the target 
of increasing social protection coverage (Argentina, 
Office of the President, 2003). In Brazil, where in 
2006 the Government adopted a National Decent Work 
Agenda with strong emphasis on the creation of better 
jobs with equal opportunities and conditions, the ratio 
between the hourly wage of employed women and that 
of employed men was incorporated (Brazil, Office of 
the President, 2007). In Chile, wage disparities between 
men and women are monitored (Chile, Government of, 
2008). And in Peru dignified work is a priority of social 
policy and improvement of income and permanent 
employment are pillars of the “CRECER” national 
strategy (IAS, 2008).
The methodology described in Social Panorama of 
Latin America, 2007 (see box I.6 of section I.C) may 
be useful for monitoring the employment target in the 
region. This methodology shows that the way in which 
growth is reflected in changes affecting the monetary 
resources available to members of poor households 
depends on the quantity and quality of the jobs created 
and on the increase in wage income, as well as in non-
wage income and in the resources which the State may 
transfer to households through social programmes.26
25
 ECLAC/UNDP/ILO (2009); in the case of Brazil, these bodies 
recently proposed a series of 28 indicators for monitoring conditions 
of decent work. In addition, important indicators which link the 
topic of employment with social cohesion have been proposed by 
ECLAC/EUROsocial (2007d). 
26
 Consideration is also given to other components of household 
monetary income that are not directly dependent on the rate of GDP 
growth, such as remittances received by households from abroad and 
revenue from unearned income, retirement plans and pensions.
This quantifies the relative importance of the three main 
factors associated with increase in the per capita income 
of households, of which the first two are directly related 
to Millennium target 1.B: ratio of employed persons 
to total number of household members (or “overall 
employment rate”),27 labour income per employed person 
(a measurement that approximates labour productivity) 
and income from other non-labour sources of income.28 
This analysis can also take into account demographic 
changes and changes in patterns of behaviour of persons 
and families, which also have a major influence on the 
amount of resources available to households. These 
changes influence household size, the number of members 
of working age and the number of members actually 
participating in the labour market. 
In the most recent edition of Social Panorama, this 
methodology was used to analyse how these factors affected 
poverty (including indigence) reduction between 1990 and 
2005. The same method is being used on this occasion, 
this time applied to changes in indigence, using data for 
the period 1990-2006.
The results summarized in table II.7 show that, 
throughout the period 1990-2006, the main factors 
contributing to the increase in the per capita income 
of households living in indigence were the ratio of 
employed people to total household members and non-
labour income.29 Since 1990, labour income per person 
employed, which is related to productivity, increased in 
indigent households only in Chile, Brazil and urban areas 
of Ecuador, and declined or remained constant in the other 
countries. This is explained by the poor performance of 
the labour market in the period 1990-2002, during which 
average remuneration of wage earners and independent 
(own-account) workers in indigent households declined in 
almost all countries except Brazil or at best was maintained 
(León, 2008). 
27
 The overall employment rate is different from the employment rate 
(or “gross employment rate”) because the number of employed people 
is divided by the total population and not only by the working-age 
population (see box II.2).
28
 The per capita income (Y/N) of households living below 
the indigence line is analysed using the following formula: 














, in which O/N is the overall employment rate, YL/O 
is labour income per person employed and YNL/N is per capita non-
labour income. In order to analyse per capita income trends over time 
—for example, between 1990 and 2006— the following formula is used: 











































































































(see ECLAC, 2008a; Cecchini and Uthoff, 2008).
29
 The changes in these two factors, and in labour income per person 
employed, refer to the deciles that were below the indigence line 
at the beginning of the period.
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Table II.7
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN THE OVERALL EMPLOYMENT RATE, LABOUR INCOME PER EMPLOYED PERSON 
(PRODUCTIVITY) AND NON-LABOUR INCOME IN DECILES THAT INCLUDE INDIGENT HOUSEHOLDS, AROUND 1990-2006











Chile 12.9 + + + 3.2
Brazil 23.3 + + + + + 9.0
Ecuador c 26.0 + + + + 12.8
Mexico 18.6 + + - + 8.7
Panama 19.2 + = / +- + 11.7
Guatemala 43.4 + + - + + 31.5
Costa Rica 9.8 = / +- = / +- + 7.2
Colombia 25.8 = / +- = / +- + 20.2
Dominican Republic 14.8 + - - - 22.0
El Salvador 21.6 + - - + + 19.0
Bolivia c 22.8 + + - = / +- 18.5
Honduras 60.6 + + - - + + 49.2
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 14.6 + + = / +- - 9.9
Paraguay d 12.7 = / +- - + 15.2
Uruguay c 3.4 = / +- - + 4.2
Argentina d 5.2 + - - + 6.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
Key:
++ Significant progress + Progress = / +- No change / progress and setback
- Setback - - Significant setback
a
 Countries are shown in order of the annual reduction in indigence, estimated on the basis of the following formula: ARI = ((FP-IP) / IP) *100)/y, where ARI = annual reduction in 
indigence, FP = final percentage of indigence, IP = initial percentage of indigence and y = number of years in the period.
b
 These percentages may not correspond to those appearing in chapter I, owing to a different treatment of domestic service. For Guatemala, adjustments were made in the way 
the data were processed in order to compensate for the lack of measurements that included the population under the age of 10 in 1989. In addition, because of issues related to 




 Metropolitan area. 
With few exceptions, the overall employment rate 
helped to increase the per capita income of indigent 
households. However, the increase in this rate cannot be 
seen solely as the result of a growing capacity to create 
quality jobs in the economies of the region. The increase 
in the number of employed persons per household member 
among the distribution deciles consisting of indigent 
persons was also due to factors connected with demographic 
transition and to changes in individuals’ behaviour and 
in average family size. The decline in the overall fertility 
rate, the change in the population age structure and the 
trend towards smaller families reduced the number of 
members (the rate denominator) of households with 
low per capita income. In addition, the change in the 
population age structure (see chapter IV) increased the 
number of people of working age in households, and the 
entry of more women into the labour market increased 
the average number of employed persons per household 
(the rate numerator). 
It is therefore vital to improve the quality of integration 
in the labour market of broad sectors of the workforce, 
particularly the poorest. This means guaranteeing adequate 
wages, stable contracts, safe working conditions (as 
regards work-related accidents and illness), access to 
health systems and affiliation and contribution to social 
security schemes. The achievement of full and productive 
employment and decent work in the countries of Latin 
America is crucial in order to reduce poverty and income 
inequality, which are profoundly rooted in the functioning 
of the labour market.
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C. Employment situation of young people 
 and women 
Young people and women are openly discriminated against in the labour market, although 
there was a gradual improvement between 2002 and 2006 in various indicators relating to their 
integration into the labour market. As regards the Millennium target of full employment and 
decent work for young people and women, there has been scant progress and actual setbacks 
in some regards. Their unemployment rates dropped between 2002 and 2006, but are still 
higher than they were in the early 1990s. Young people, and especially young women, are 
entering low-productivity sectors and taking up low-quality jobs (mostly as independent 
workers), indicating that Latin American labour markets are structurally unable to create 
wage work. The quality of employment continues to decline, with a proliferation of hiring 
practices considered unorthodox, and the decline continues in the percentage of employed 
people affiliated with social security and health schemes.
Young people and women are groups that are specially 
vulnerable to difficulties in finding a place in the labour 
market, as well as to various forms of discrimination 
within that market, resulting in their accepting low-quality, 
low-income jobs.
Although the situation of women was mentioned in 
the third Millennium Development Goal, and although the 
eighth Goal already took into account youth unemployment, 
employment and the functioning of the labour market, 
these aspects were not very prominent in the system of 
development targets defined at the Millennium Summit in 
September 2000. The recommendation made at the 2005 
World Summit to explicitly include an employment target 
in the first Millennium Development Goal gave greater 
prominence to this aspect and it has thus been recognized 
that employment is one of the main mechanisms for 
achieving well-being and for overcoming poverty and related 
problems. In addition, the emphasis on the importance 
of monitoring employment indicators, especially among 
young people and women, is an acknowledgement of 
the relevance of both groups as regards their economic 
and productive contribution to our societies and of their 
disadvantageous position in regard to employment.
Employment issues of concern to young people and 
women share common features but are also different. Both 
groups are affected by higher unemployment rates and the 
need to accept low-quality jobs and lower wages, to mention 
the most striking features. However, some of the characteristics 
of their employment, as well as trends over time, are different. 
The root causes of the problems of incorporation and retention 
in the labour market are also different.
Youth is a transition marking the beginning of a 
person’s involvement in productive activity. The difficulties 
facing young people in the labour market are thus often 
temporary in nature, since the problems affecting youth 
as such disappear or change when the person moves on to 
become part of the adult world. On the other hand, women 
face various barriers to entry into the labour market; when 
they do succeed in entering it, they are discriminated against 
compared with their male counterparts. And womanhood 
does not disappear with age.
The following pages briefly analyse the situation 
of young people and women as regards entry into and 
characteristics of integration into the labour market, in 
the light of the target and the indicators recently proposed 
under the first Millennium Development Goal.
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1. Youth and female employment
Youth and employment. It is now increasingly clear 
that, at least in our region, young people represent a 
development opportunity. For this reason, 2008 was 
declared Ibero-American Youth Year and the central theme 
of the Eighteenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of 
State and Government was youth and development.
This is not a purely rhetorical recognition, but is based 
on the fact that today’s young people are the ones in the 
best position to tackle in a positive manner the important 
social and productive changes resulting from the process 
of globalization and the introduction of new technologies 
in various world spheres (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004). In Latin 
America, young people currently represent a launching 
pad for development, not only for the reason given above 
but also because of the actual features of demographic 
transition in the region. With some country differences, 
we are today enjoying a demographic dividend or bonus, 
consisting of a temporary window of low levels of 
dependency. In other words, people of productive age 
outnumber people of potentially inactive ages (children 
and older persons) who therefore represent an economic 
burden on the family and the State (see chapter IV). 
Already in 1995, the United Nations explicitly 
acknowledged the importance of young people and of 
improving the various situations affecting them and that 
idea was embodied in the World Programme of Action for 
Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond. This plan indicates the 
measures to be adopted in various areas such as education, 
employment, hunger and poverty, health, environment, 
drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, leisure-time activities, 
girls and young women, as well as the full and effective 
participation of youth in the life of society and in decision-
making (United Nations, 1995).
Education and employment are priority areas, since 
they lay the foundation for improvement in other areas. 
Education develops the skills of children and young 
people, preparing them for an ever-changing world. 
However, this development must have as a corollary the 
existence of opportunities to use the skills, mainly —but 
not exclusively— in the world of work. It is through 
participation in work that one can unleash creative and 
innovative potential, live a full life, participate in the 
countless areas of social life, achieve material and symbolic 
well-being, be a responsible member of society and thus 
sever the chains of poverty replication that today afflict 
our societies (ECLAC/OIJ, 2008).
Women and work. The recent report Millennium 
Development Goals 2006: a Look at Gender Equality 
and Empowerment of Women in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC, 2007d) estimates that poverty in the 
region would be more than 10 percentage points higher 
without women’s wage labour. Despite the importance of 
women’s wage labour in family economies, employment 
is one of the areas in which there are still the widest 
gender gaps, reflected in lower remuneration, low returns 
on education and predominance of informal and low-
productivity work (ECLAC, 2007d). In this sense, the 
inclusion of the employment target in the Millennium 
Development Goals represents a significant step forward. 
It is thus recognized that the creation of quality jobs and 
equality between men and women are central goals of the 
development agenda and, at the same time, a prerequisite 
for the attainment of the other Goals (ECLAC, 2007a).
The Millennium Development Goals originated in a 
series of earlier international mandates and commitments 
concerning human rights and development (United Nations, 
2005). The most significant were the adoption in 1979 by 
the United Nations General Assembly of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the holding of the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994. The 
ICPD marked the transition from a strictly demographic 
approach to a new vision of development and of women’s 
rights. Together with the world conferences on women held 
since 1975, and in particular the Fourth World Conference 
on Women (Beijing, 1995), these are the most striking 
events in the process of building gender-sensitive public 
policies. At the latter conference, agreement was reached 
on an agenda in which the link between public policies, 
the rights-based approach and gender equality appears 
most prominently and 12 critical areas of concern were 
defined, including: women and poverty; education and 
training of women; women and the economy; and human 
rights of women (Milosavljevic, 2007).
For a long time, women were considered as a 
workforce that was “secondary”30 and more costly to 
recruit, which justified labour practices that today, in the 
light of the above-mentioned international instruments, 
30
 The theories of labour market segmentation and sexual dualism 
(Piore and Berger, 1980; Piore and Doeringer, 1985; ILO, 1979) 
noted the existence of a labour market with primary and secondary 
segments. Thus, the workforce in “secondary” occupations would 
be composed of groups whose social identity and roles are defined 
outside the labour market, such as women, adolescents, apprentices, 
interns and temporary migrants, who enter and leave the workforce 
frequently (Piore and Berger, 1980).
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are considered to be openly discriminatory. Although 
neo-classical theories recognized the existence of gender 
gaps, these were mainly attributed to alleged lower female 
productivity, women’s professional preferences and non-
wage costs of recruitment. The theory of human capital 
already clearly recognized discriminations in the labour 
market, resulting from cultural conditioning related to 
the traditional assignment of family caregiver roles to 
women (Becker, 1971; Becker, 1985).
More recent studies also note that, in the context of 
the various family and cultural transformations in western 
societies, women have acquired growing importance in the 
labour market and as contributors to the family income. 
This has led to the recognition that, for a significant number 
of women, work cannot be considered as a secondary and 
optional activity (Geldstein and Delpino, 1994; Abramo 
and Todazo, 1998; Abramo, 2004). It must therefore 
be recognized that monitoring the situation of female 
employment not only reveals the position of women in 
the labour market but also reflects the recognition by our 
societies of their rights and of their crucial importance 
both in the home and for overall economic growth.
2. Participation of young people and women in the world of work
The entry of young people into the labour market is usually 
described as having unstable features because it is sensitive 
not only to seasonal factors but also to movements in the 
business cycle. For example, in periods of slowdown or 
economic crisis, young people go in search of work in 
order to supplement the income of their households, even 
if this is detrimental to their participation in the education 
system. This behaviour, which also used to be attributed to 
women, was allegedly part of what during the 1960s and 
1970s was called “survival strategies” for dealing with 
marked deteriorations in the well-being of families. These 
strategies included taking children and young people out 
of school and mobilizing them —together with the other 
household members— in informal economic activities, 
often of a family nature.
At the end of the cyclical downturn, those still of an 
age to do so would leave the labour market and re-enter 
the education system, thus resuming their main role of 
students. By this reasoning, young people and women 
are seen as belonging to the so-called “secondary” 
workforce, which fits into a segment of the labour market 
characterized by greater instability, precarious working 
conditions, low wages and low status. 
The information analysed in this chapter gives some 
idea of the degree of stability of labour market participation 
by young people between 15 and 29 years of age and by 
women, comparing the behaviour of different age cohorts. 
It should also be noted that the general trends described 
below are not found in all countries.
Firstly, it is noteworthy that, as was to be expected, 
the average employment rate among young people is much 
lower (54.7%) than that of adults between 30 and 64 years 
of age (72.3%). However, between 1990 and 2006, the 
employment rate among young people increased slightly, 
since in the earlier period it involved 54.3% of young people 
of both sexes, whereas the percentage of adult employed 
persons grew by almost seven percentage points.
There are various reasons for this moderate increase. 
Firstly, the rate of participation of young people grew steadily 
between 1990 and 2006 and the trend remained constant as 
of 2002, except for young people between 15 and 19 years 
of age, whose participation in the workforce declined in 
the two comparative periods considered, as shown in figure 
II.11 a). This seems to be due mainly to the expansion of 
education systems, their greater retention rates for younger 
students and the return of those still of an age to attend 
secondary school (ECLAC, 2008a). Nevertheless, the youth 
employment rate continued to increase in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia (eight main cities and El 
Alto), Ecuador (urban areas), Mexico and Nicaragua. In the 
first and last of these countries, there was a considerable 
increase in participation around 2002 and then a marked 
drop, but to levels still higher than those of 1990.
As can be seen from figure II.11 b), the increase 
in youth participation in the labour market combines 
two trends: a slight decrease (3.3 percentage points) in 
the participation of young men and a strong increase 
(9.7 percentage points) in the participation of young women, 
mainly after age 20, when they leave the education system. 
The latter situation reflects the general trend towards a 
gradual rise in the participation of women in the labour 
market, which between 1990 and 2006 increased from 
40.7% to 53.2% throughout the region. This trend was 
particularly marked in Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Guatemala and Mexico but insignificant 
or negative in El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay.
However, participation in the labour market does not 
always mean immediate job placement. Unemployment rates 
for young people tend to be high and increase considerably 
in times of crisis, coinciding with their mobilization in 
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the labour market in order to supplement family income. 
This is partly because of the job losses that are common 
in periods of recession but also because of discrimination 
in the hiring of young people —even more in the case of 
young women— because they have less work experience 
and spend less time in jobs. The latter reason reflects the 
fact that they may work for a while and then resume their 
studies, seek better jobs or jobs better suited to their skill 
levels, or start a family.
Figure II.11
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PARTICIPATION RATES
BY AGE GROUPS AND SEX, NATIONAL TOTAL,
AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006 a
(Percentages)
(a) Participation rate by age groups, 1990, 2002 y 2006
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries.
a 
 Weighted average of countries at the national level. The figures for Argentina 
correspond to Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to eight main cities and El Alto, 
for Ecuador and Uruguay to urban areas and for Paraguay to Asunción and 
Central Department.
There are major disparities between levels of youth 
unemployment and levels of adult unemployment and in 
crisis periods these disparities tend not to increase (and 
even slightly decrease) because young people leave the 
workforce and because most of the jobs lost were filled by 
adults (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004). This is not the case for female 
unemployment, which tends to increase more than male 
unemployment in periods of contraction of economic activity 
and to decrease more slowly in periods of recovery.
Despite the large increase in youth unemployment 
between 1990 and 2002, from 8.6% to 14.4%, the doubling 
of the rate of adult unemployment (persons from 30 to 
64 years of age) in the same period meant that the gap 
between the former and the latter decreased, from a 
youth/adult unemployment ratio of 2.9 to 2.4. When 
overall unemployment dropped around 2006, the rate 
of youth unemployment was 2.9%, which was 2.9 times 
higher than adult unemployment, and this disparity was 
the same as that found in the early 1990s. The highest 
unemployment rates are among the younger people 
(15 to 19 years of age) and are four times those of the 
adult population (see figure II.12 a)).
Figure II.12
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
BY AGE GROUP, NATIONAL TOTAL, AROUND 1990, 2002
AND 2006 a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Lastin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Weighted average of countries at the national level. The unemployment rates reported 
on the basis of household surveys in Colombia, Panama and the Dominican Republic 
included hidden unemployment. The figures for Argentina correspond to Greater 
Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to eight main cities and El Alto, for Uruguay to urban areas 
and for Paraguay to Asunción and Central Department.
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On the other hand, unemployment does not affect all 
young people equally. As reported in a recent study by 
ECLAC and the Ibero-American Youth Organization (OIJ) 
on the current situation of young people (ECLAC/OIJ 
2008), it is precisely the poorest young people who are 
most affected by unemployment: around 2005, the average 
rate of unemployment among young people between 
15 and 29 years of age belonging to the poorest per capita 
income quintile was slightly over 24%, a percentage 
which decreases gradually to reach 6.6% among young 
people in the richest quintile.
When youth unemployment rates are compared on 
the basis of educational level, unemployment is found 
to affect mainly those with more education, particularly 
those who have completed secondary education. 
According to various ECLAC studies, this is mainly due 
to the phenomenon of educational devaluation, since full 
secondary education was generalized in the last decade 
and no longer allows rapid access to the labour market 
in good conditions or guarantees escape from poverty 
(ECLAC/OIJ, 2008; ECLAC, 2004b; ECLAC, 2000b). 
Young people with university diplomas are also affected 
proportionately more, although this is mainly due to their 
greater willingness to hold out for jobs of appropriate 
quality suited to their skills (ECLAC, 2002).
One of the most striking disparities between young 
people as regards unemployment levels is undoubtedly 
gender disparity. Gender criteria still play a very big role 
in staff selection. This affects women throughout the 
entire cycle of productive life (in 2006, the overall female 
unemployment rate was 56% higher than the male rate) 
but to a greater degree when they are young. The high 
rates of youth unemployment are largely explained by 
the even higher levels of unemployment among young 
women. On average, the difference in female and male 
unemployment levels is around 3.4 percentage points, 
but this doubles at the beginning of active life. This 
gap is narrowing slightly and is significantly smaller 
for persons aged 40 and above, coinciding with the 
phase of lower fertility. Upwards of age 55, female 
unemployment levels are lower than male levels, since 
as of the fifth decade of life their rate of withdrawal 
from the workforce increases more rapidly (see figures 
II.11 b) y II.12 b)). 
In the absence of reasons connected with qualifications 
and work experience, one plausible explanation for the 
greater unemployment among women is that firms tend 
not to recruit women of child-bearing age both because 
of the higher turnover (frequent departures from the 
workforce) and because of the labour costs associated with 
child-bearing which, depending on national legislation, 
include maternity entitlements and resulting temporary 
replacements, paid leave to care for sick children and 
funding of day-care centres.
3. The position of young people and women in the labour market
Young people enter the market in lower-quality jobs than 
adults, as do women compared to men; most enter in 
low-productivity sectors, in low-paying jobs in precarious 
working conditions, often without health-care benefits or 
social security. One explanation for this situation is that 
the jobs are temporary in nature. In the case of young 
people, it is also noted that they start in low-productivity 
jobs because they are less qualified, and their pay reflects 
their lack of experience.
Public policies often try to ensure that young people 
remain longer in the education system, to upgrade work training 
systems, to give credit for work skills among those with 
more experience, and to encourage youth entrepreneurship, 
in order to take advantage of young people’s innovative 
skills and to encourage independent work and creation of 
businesses. In the case of women, the growing pressure to 
achieve gender parity and equity has spurred development 
of public plans and programmes focused on monitoring 
this type of inequality in national markets and sometimes on 
introducing gender quotas in government employment.
The incorporation in the first Millennium Development 
Goal of target 1.B on decent employment and the use 
of the percentage of own-account workers and unpaid 
workers as a monitoring indicator implicitly recognize 
that at least a large part of independent or own-account 
work is associated with inadequate working conditions and 
protection. It is also found that this type of employment 
may be related to inadequacies in the functioning of 
the labour market, principally as regards the creation of 
wage employment. This highlights a structural vision 
of the problems of the position of young people and 
particularly of young women in the labour market, since 
these difficulties would be attributed not so much to the 
unstable nature of the labour participation of both groups 
but to shortcomings in production systems related to their 
structural heterogeneity (Infante, 2008).
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Women and young people employed on their 
own account
The proportion of own-account workers among young 
people has remained stable at around one in four employed 
young people, with a slight increase around 2002. The 
same trend is observed in the adult population, with a 
smaller increase in the period of economic crisis and a 
subsequent decrease to levels somewhat below those of 1990. 
However, among women the proportion of independent 
workers increased slightly from 34.1% to 35.9%, even 
during the post-2002 recovery (see table II.8).
Table II.8
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOUR FORCE INTEGRATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE DISAGGREGATED  
BY SEX AND SHOWING NATIONAL TOTAL, AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006 a
(Percentages and 2000 dollars)
1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006 1990 2002 2006
Vulnerable workers b Employed persons covered by social security c Labour earnings of employed persons
15 to 29 years 25.7 27.2 25.4 48.1 44.5 45.5 181 206 220
30 to 64 years 36.5 37.3 35.7 55.8 52.5 53.5 345 395 412
Men aged 15 and above 32.5 33.7 32.1 51.7 48.5 49.8 323 379 400
Women aged 15 and above 34.1 37.0 35.9 52.1 49.3 49.5 186 238 257
Total 33.0 35.0 33.7 51.8 48.8 49.6 276 323 341
Employed persons in low-
productivity sector d
Wage earners covered by 
social security e Wage earners
15 to 29 years 49.2 50.3 46.6 61.3 52.3 53.2 197 224 242
30 to 64 years 54.0 51.9 49.8 73.9 66.1 67.3 341 397 422
Men aged 15 and above 51.3 50.4 47.3 65.1 59.9 61.8 296 355 382
Women aged 15 and above 57.7 57.4 55.5 74.2 61.4 61.7 225 278 300
Total 53.5 53.2 50.7 67.9 60.4 61.6 273 324 349
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a 
 Weighted average of countries. The figures for Argentina correspond to Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to eight main cities and El Alto, for Ecuador and Uruguay to urban areas, 
and for Paraguay to Asunción and the Central Department.
b 
 Includes own-account workers and non-wage workers.
c 





 Includes nine countries with comparable information for the three periods: Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires), Bolivia (eight main cities and El Alto), Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua.
Although own-account employment has tended to 
remain stable over time, at the regional level this type of 
labour insertion involves 72 million workers, which is 
60% more than in the early 1990s. The increase among 
young people between 15 and 29 years of age was slower, 
reaching one quarter of total employed persons of all ages 
in 2006, or just over 18 million young people. Among 
women, the number of workers practically doubled between 
1990 and 2006 (currently amounting to almost 32 million) 
and in the same period 57% of new own-account workers 
were women. This shows that the barriers to entry into 
the wage employment market affect women to a greater 
extent, as they steadily increase their participation in the 
workforce.
The low-productivity sectors
Although there is no direct information on productivity 
in the different occupational groups, the indicator on 
the proportion of employed persons engaged in low-
productivity activities gives an indirect indication of the 
degree of structural heterogeneity of Latin American 
economies and of the different rates of development of 
their productive sectors.
Despite the slight tendency towards an increase in 
own-account employment and non-wage workers, the 
level of employment in low-productivity sectors decreased 
slightly between 1990 and 2006, for both men and women, 
and for employed adults. Around 2006, half of Latin 
American workers were employed in low-productivity 
sectors (51%), representing almost 67 million employed 
persons (see table II.8).
Social protection
There is a significant labour deterioration as regards 
social protection, in particular with respect to the decrease 
in the percentage of employed persons and wage earners 
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affiliated with various social security schemes. Informal 
hiring arrangements and use of unorthodox methods of 
hiring, in this case without including health and social 
security benefits, have become more common in countries 
of the region. In 2006, only 61.6% of the group of wage 
earners in nine countries had some form of coverage under 
such protection systems, compared with 67.9% in 1990. 
Young people were most affected by this deterioration in 
hiring conditions: between 1990 and 2006, the proportion 
of wage-earners between 15 and 29 years of age covered 
by social security decreased from 61.3% to 53.2%. Women 
were most affected, despite their greater need for this type 
of benefit, especially health benefits. Currently men and 
women have practically the same levels of protection, 
because there is more likelihood of voluntary affiliation 
among independent workers, which to some extent has 
prevented further deterioration in women’s access to 
social protection.
Labour income
There have been some improvements in labour 
income in the region. Between 1990 and 2006, the 
labour income of employed persons aged 15 and above 
increased on average by about 23.6%; in the case of 
wage earners, the increase was greater, about 27.9%. 
These improvements helped young people somewhat, 
since they increased their labour income by 21.4 %, 
compared with 19.4% for adults. Women’s income grew 
more than men’s, especially among female non-wage 
workers (whose labour income increased by 38% at 
the regional level).
This resulted in a slight lessening of the large wage 
and income disparities between young people and adults 
and, somewhat more significantly, between men and 
women. In any case, large gender gaps still exist between 
wage earners, with average differences of 21%, which 
increase with age, as does the wage gap; among non-wage 
workers these gaps are even greater (44% according to 
the parity index shown in figure II.12 b)), and are widest 
when workers become adult.
In 1990, the labour income of young people was 
about 53% of adult labour income and 58% of the 
income of wage earners; in 2006, the former percentage 
increased to 58% and the latter remained constant. It 
is noteworthy that income gaps are very wide when 
young people start work: between 15 and 19 years of 
age, they earn wages that are about 32% of adult wages 
because they are inexperienced and unskilled; between 
the ages of 25 and 29, these gaps are still significant 
and wages are still 26% below the adult wage. It is 
often noted that earning differences, especially wage 
differences, reflect the importance of experience. While 
it is argued that the starting wage explains the wage 
differences between young people and adults, the large 
differences found when young people and adults with 
mid-level and high-level skills are compared (disparities 
sometimes exceeding 60%) would indicate the existence 
of discriminatory, not to say abusive, practices applied 
to the former (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004).
Figure II.13
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): LABOUR INCOME BY AGE 
GROUP, SEX AND OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY,
NATIONAL TOTAL, AROUND 2006 a
(In 2000 dollars and wage parity index)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries.
a
 Weighted average for the countries at the national level. The figures for Argentina 
correspond to Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia to eight main cities, for Ecuador and 
Uruguay to urban areas and for Paraguay to Asunción and Central Department.
Furthermore, in relative terms women enjoy a better 
position as wage earners than as independent workers 
or entrepreneurs, judging by their income levels and the 
fact that they suffer fewer disparities throughout their life 
cycle compared with men. They also suffer progressively 
from discrimination in their earnings, and this is especially 
obvious in the case of independent workers.
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4. Summary of trends in the employment of young people 
 and women
The labour situation of young people and women 
improved gradually between 2002 and 2006, despite 
the fact that they were openly discriminated against in 
the labour market. Among young people, there were 
average increases in labour participation as a result of 
the growing entry of women into the labour market, 
which offset the slight decrease in the participation 
of men with the expansion of access to secondary 
education. Improvements also occurred in levels of youth 
unemployment, which declined but to levels considerably 
higher than those existing in the early 1990s (12.9% 
compared with 8.6% in 1990).
Among women, the minor improvements were also 
concentrated in gradual reduction of unemployment 
levels since 2002, which fell from 11% to 9.4% in 2006, 
both figures being higher than the 1990 levels (6.5%). In 
addition, there was some improvement in labour income, 
but not in social protection. Most women had to enter 
low-productivity sectors, working on their own account, 
as wage earners in micro-enterprises or in domestic 
service. From the viewpoint of the new target on decent 
work in the first Millennium Development Goal, these 
achievements were clearly insufficient, because in general 
terms the quality of jobs deteriorated and deficiencies 
persist in the creation of productive jobs.
Nevertheless, there was a distinct improvement 
compared with the more critical situation in 2002, reflecting 
the fact that several years of growth have now been 
accumulated by the region. This has made it possible to 
some extent to regain the employment levels of the early 
1990s, absorbing greater female participation. However, 
hiring considered unorthodox has proliferated and the 
proportion of employed persons affiliated with social 
security and health schemes is still declining.
Table II.9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RATE OF PARTICIPATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EARNING, 
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1990 55.8 38.3 75.7 6.0 6.4 5.7 52.5 35.8 71.4 69.0 70.2 68.3
2002 60.5 47.8 75.1 19.0 19.5 18.5 49.0 38.4 61.2 72.2 78.5 67.7
2006 63.7 52.2 77.5 10.5 13.4 8.2 57.0 45.2 71.1 76.9 81.0 73.8
Argentina a 2002 57.9 45.6 72.2 17.9 18.0 17.8 47.6 37.4 59.4 72.1 79.3 66.9




1989 59.1 46.7 73.2 9.4 9.1 9.5 53.5 42.4 66.2 54.1 45.1 60.7
2002 65.9 57.3 76.0 6.7 8.0 5.5 61.5 52.7 71.8 49.5 40.0 57.6
2004 67.7 58.7 78.0 6.4 7.7 5.2 63.4 54.2 73.9 52.1 41.6 60.9
Bolivia 2002 72.1 61.6 83.3 4.4 5.8 3.2 68.9 58.1 80.6 33.0 26.3 38.2
2004 73.1 63.8 83.3 4.2 5.0 3.6 70.0 60.7 80.3 37.4 27.8 45.4
Brazil 1990 63.5 44.1 84.3 3.8 3.5 3.9 61.1 42.6 81.0 60.9 54.1 64.8
2001 67.0 54.1 81.0 9.3 11.9 7.5 60.8 47.7 74.9 63.0 65.6 61.2
2006 69.0 58,0 81.0 8.4 11.0 6.4 63.2 51.6 75.8 64.4 66.7 62.8
Chile 1990 52.0 32.5 73.6 8.3 9.6 7.7 47.7 29.4 67.9 73.0 77.9 70.6
2000 55.9 39.8 73.4 10.4 11.7 9.6 50.1 35.1 66.3 74.7 78.1 72.8
2006 57.3 43.3 72.6 7.3 9.4 6.0 53.1 39.2 68.3 75.7 76.9 74.9
Colombia b 1991 63.2 43.8 84.9 7.2 11.4 4.8 58.6 38.8 80.9 48.6 57.5 43.8
2002 66.7 53.6 81.5 15.7 19.8 12.7 56.2 43.0 71.1 50.0 52.5 48.3
2005 65.2 51.9 80.2 11.8 15.7 9.0 57.5 43.8 73.. 50.6 53.1 48.8


















Women Men Both 
sexes
Women Men Both 
sexes
Women Men Both 
sexes
Women Men
Costa Rica 1990 57.3 32.5 82.5 4.5 5.8 4.0 54.7 30.7 79,2 70.3 77.7 67.4
2002 59.8 41.2 79.3 6.4 7.9 5.6 55.9 38.0 74.9 68.5 70.9 67.2
2006 60.7 43.5 79.0 5.9 8.7 4.3 57.1 39.7 75.6 70.8 73.9 69.1
Dominican
Rep. b
1997 63.1 43.3 83.9 16.2 28.4 9.5 52.9 31.0 76.0 54.7 66.5 49.6
2002 63.5 48.1 79.3 16.1 26.4 9.8 53.3 35.4 71.5 53.4 68.0 46.0
2006 64.6 50.4 79.1 16.2 26.5 9.5 54.1 37.0 71.6 53.6 68.1 45.9
Ecuador a 1990 60.8 43.2 80.0 6.1 9.2 4.2 57.1 39.2 76.6 59.3 56.7 60.7
2002 66.7 53.2 80.6 9.1 13.9 5.8 60.6 45.8 75.9 58.8 55.4 60.9
2006 67.9 54.7 82.0 7.7 11.0 5.3 62.7 48.7 77.6 60.2 55.1 63.7
El Salvador 1995 60.1 41.8 81.8 7.2 5.6 8.1 55.8 39.4 75.1 57,0 51.2 60.6
2001 60.3 44.5 79.1 7.0 5.3 8.2 56.1 42.2 72.6 58.0 51.6 62.4
2004 59.6 44.1 77.5 6.8 3.9 8.7 55.5 42.4 70.8 60.3 52.2 65.9
Guatemala 1989 57.7 28.4 89.9 2.1 3.3 1.7 56.5 27.5 88.4 50.4 51.7 49.9
2002 68.8 48.9 90.7 3.4 4.2 2.9 66.5 46.8 88.1 47.3 38.9 52.1
2004 63.3 42.7 86.1 3.3 3.9 3.0 61.2 41.0 83.5 48.0 40.8 51.8
Honduras 1990 58.6 32.3 87.2 4.3 5.3 3.8 56.1 30.6 83.9 50.1 49.1 50.5
2002 60.1 37.7 85.0 3.9 4.7 3.6 57.8 35.9 82.0 47.8 48.4 47.5
2006 60.0 39.9 82.6 3.2 4.3 2.6 58.1 38.2 80.4 48.3 47.5 48.8
Mexico 1989 53.5 29.6 79.3 2.6 2.7 2.6 52.1 28.8 77.3 67.6 67.8 67.5
2002 61.0 42.8 81.2 2.9 2.1 3.4 59.2 41.9 78.4 66.4 62.5 68.7
2006 64.3 48.5 82.4 3.3 2.8 3.7 62.2 47.2 79.3 67.3 60.9 71.6
Nicaragua 1993 55.6 36.2 76.6 10.8 9.9 11.3 49.6 32.7 67.9 52.9 54.8 52.0
2001 65.5 46.1 86.2 11.0 12.7 10.1 58.3 40.2 77.6 52.3 48.8 54.3
2005 63.0 43.6 84.0 4.2 4.7 3.9 60.4 41.5 80.7 50.4 47.6 51.9
Panama b 1991 57.3 38.2 77.1 16.1 22.5 12.8 48.1 29.6 67.2 63.0 82.4 54.2
2002 62.6 45.1 80.1 13.5 18.5 10.6 54.1 36.7 71.6 62.4 72.4 57.3





1990 65.5 49.7 84.2 6.3 6.5 6.2 61.4 46.4 79.0 68.1 66.8 68.9
2000 67.7 57.3 80.6 11.5 12.1 11.0 59.9 50.4 71.7 65.7 64.3 67.0
2005 69.9 60.5 81.1 8.0 9.2 7,. 64.3 54.9 75.4 64,1 63.1 65.0
Paraguay 2000 69.2 53.5 85.3 7.6 8.9 6,. 63.9 48.7 79.6 45.8 45.. 46.1
2005 70.7 56.3 85.4 5.8 7.2 4.8 66.6 52.3 81.3 47.7 49,0 46.8
Peru 1997 74.3 64.1 85.3 8.6 11.5 6.3 67.9 56.7 79.9 41.9 35.1 47.1
2001 67.9 57.9 78.3 5.0 5.3 4.7 64.5 54.8 74.6 41.3 34.5 46.5
2003 69.7 60.4 79.5 5.0 5.3 4.8 66.2 57.2 75.7 38.4 32.7 42.9
Uruguay a 1990 57.7 43.8 74.7 8.9 11.1 7.4 52.6 38.9 69.2 74.4 76.6 73.0
2002 60.3 50.2 72.1 16.9 21.1 13.4 50.2 39.6 62.4 70.0 76.0 65.5
2005 59.6 50.3 70.7 12.1 15.3 9.5 52.4 42.6 64.0 71.2 75.9 67.4
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of)
1990 57.4 35.2 79.4 9.6 8.3 10.2 51.9 32.3 71.3 68.1 79.3 63.1
2002 69.2 54.7 83.7 16.2 18.8 14.4 58.0 44.4 71.6 55.2 55.4 55.1
2006 65.6 50.6 80.7 9.3 11.1 8.2 59.5 45.0 74.1 58.5 60.5 57.3
Latin 
America c
1990 60.6 40.7 82.2 5.3 6.5 4.7 57.4 38.1 78.3 60.1 57.5 61.4
2002 64.9 50.3 80.7 9.0 11.0 7.6 59.0 44.7 74.6 60.4 60.5 60.4
2006 66.3 53.2 80.7 7.4 9.4 6.0 61.4 48.2 75.8 61.7 61.3 62.0




 Unemployment rates include hidden unemployment.
c 
 Regional weighted averages were obtained for Argentina using data for Greater Buenos Aires, for Bolivia using data for eight major cities and for Paraguay using data for Asunción 
and Central Department.
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Table II.10
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERSONS EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS, NATIONAL TOTAL AND URBAN AREAS,
BOTH SEXES, WOMEN AND MEN, AROUND 1990, 2002 AND 2006
(Percentages)
Country Year
National total Urban areas
Both sexes Women Men Both sexes Women Men
Argentina (Greater
Buenos Aires)
1990 … … … 44.2 47.8 42.1
2002 … … … 42.1 39.9 43.7
 2006 … … … 39.7 42.8 37.5
Argentina 2002 … … … 42.3 39.5 44.3
 2006 … … … 40.8 43.3 39.1
Bolivia (eight major cities 
plus El Alto)
1989 … … … 61.0 73.0 52.2
2002 … … … 64.1 75.5 54.5
 2004 … … … 68.5 76.9 61.5
Bolivia 2002 76.5 83.4 71.2 65.2 75.5 56.9
 2004 77.4 84.6 71.4 69.9 77.9 63.4
Brazil 1990 59.9 63.1 58.1 53.4 58.3 50.4
 2001 50.0 56.3 45.6 45.6 51.1 41.6
 2006 46.8 53.3 42.0 41.9 47.9 37.2
Chile 1990 42.2 48.5 39.2 38.9 47.6 34.1
 2000 33.8 39.8 30.4 31.8 39.1 27.1
 2006 32.2 38.6 28.2 30.6 38.2 25.6
Costa Rica 1990 45.8 44.7 46.2 36.6 39.8 34.9
 2002 46.8 49.6 45.3 40.2 45.1 37.0
 2006 44.4 48.2 42.3 39.5 43.9 36.6
Dominican Rep. 1997 55.7 50.9 57.8 49.6 48.2 50.4
 2002 54.7 48.5 57.8 46.2 43.6 47.8
 2006 55.8 51.1 58.4 49.5 46.8 51.2
Ecuador 1990 … … … 53.7 60.4 50.0
 2002 … … … 55.8 62.9 51.3
 2006 65.3 71.12 61.5 57.0 62.7 53.1
El Salvador 1995 56.8 63.4 52.6 50.6 60.4 42.5
 2001 61.5 66.5 58.0 53.5 61.4 46.5
 2004 60.0 66.0 55.7 54.3 62.2 47.3
Guatemala 1989 67.2 70.7 66.0 58.9 67.1 53.9
 2002 68.3 75.8 63.9 55.2 64.0 48.6
 2004 68.4 73.7 65.6 58.6 66.7 52.8
Honduras 1990 70.8 72.2 70.2 56.8 66.3 50.4
 2002 73.7 69.4 75.8 62.0 63.0 61.2
 2006 67.7 64.8 69.3 52.7 55.0 50.9
Mexico 1989 39.9 46.3 37.3 33.2 38.4 30.6
 2002 56.5 60.1 54.4 47.0 50.9 44.5
 2006 55.1 60.4 51.4 45.4 50.6 41.6
Nicaragua 1993 58.5 56.4 59.6 48.9 54.0 45.0
 2001 65.7 68.2 64.3 58.0 64.1 53.5
 2005 66.6 68.4 65.6 57.4 63.3 52.8
Panama 1991 53.2 44.2 57.3 40.6 39.8 41.2
 2002 51.4 47.2 53.5 38.2 39.0 37.6
 2007 48.6 49.1 48.4 36.3 39.2 34.3
Paraguay (Asunción
and Central Department)
1990 59.2 70.2 51.6 59.2 70.2 51.6
2000 52.4 61.7 44.4 52.4 61.7 44.4
 2005 54.8 61.9 48.8 54.8 61.9 48.8
Paraguay 2000 72.3 76.1 70.0 59.5 66.7 53.8
 2005 71.7 73.9 70.3 60.1 65.8 55.5
Peru 1997 69.8 77.1 64.2 60.3 69.0 53.5
 2001 72.0 79.4 66.4 63.0 71.6 56.3
 2003 73.1 80.1 67.5 63.6 71.4 57.4
Uruguay 1990 … … … 39.3 45.9 34.7
 2002 … … … 42.1 45.6 39.5
 2005 … … … 41.5 45.4 38.3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. Of) 1990 47.9 47.0 48.3 44.7 45.4 44.4
2002 55.9 56.0 55.8 … … …
 2006 51.0 49.0 52.2 … … …
Latin America a 1990 55.1 60.1 52.5 48.5 54.5 45.0
 2002 54.4 59.4 51.7 47.2 52.6 43.5
 2006 52.3 57.4 48.6 44.9 50.7 40.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Weighted average of countries which have information for the periods considered.
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Table II.11 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF WAGE EARNERS WITH FORMAL CONTRACTS, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2006 a
(Percentages)
 Year Total wage earners
Wage earners in 
medium- and high-
productivity sectors








2002 85.0 (97.0) 86.8 (96.9) 80.5 (97.3) 82.9 (95.5) 86.8 (98.2)
2006 81.8 (87.1) 91.6 (89.7) 57.2 (76.5) 70.1 (86.6) 91.5 (87.4)
Argentina b 2002 83.5 (94.1) 85.5 (93.4) 78.2 (96.1) 81.4 (92.2) 85.3 (95.7)
2006 82.0 (84.6) 91.9 (87.3) 57.4 (73.8) 70.4 (84.6) 91.5 (84.5)
Bolivia (eight major 
cities plus El Alto)
2002 39.5 (48.3) 56.3 (51.0) 9.4 (18.6) 38.9 (53.5) 39.9 (45.2)
2004 33.9 (47.2) 57.0 (50.2) 5.9 (12.2) 36.0 (54.0) 32.7 (43.0)
Bolivia 2002 38.2 (49.3) 54.8 (52.1) 8.8 (18.1) 39.3 (55.8) 37.5 (45.3)
2004 33.1 (49.0) 55.9 (52.0) 5.7 (13.4) 35.6 (56.2) 31.7 (44.5)
Brazil 1990 68.4 (33.7) … (33.7) … … 68.3 … 68.5 …
 2001 53.3 (39.3) 61.6 (34.6) 32.0 (62.4) 47.5 … 57.9 …
 2006 55.5 (40.6) 63.7 (36.4) 32.4 (63.9) 49.3 … 60.8 …
Chile 1990 83.4 (36.5) 87.4 (31.2) 70.1 (58.4) 81.5 … 84.5 …
2000 76.2 (84.1) 82.5 (83.4) 49.8 (88.8) 73.6 (86.1) 78.0 (82.8)
2006 77.4 (77.5) 83.9 (76.5) 45.4 (86.9) 72.5 (79.4) 80.7 (76.3)
Dominican Rep. 2002 41.1 (42.3) 48.3 (42.3) 8.6 (41.8) 38.7 … 43.0 …
 2006 37.5 (82.5) 46.5 (82.7) 4.8 (74.6) 34.7 (80.6) 39.9 (84.0)
Ecuador 2002 51.8 (47.8) 67.0 (46.0) 19.0 (61.5) 54.0 (45.0) 50.6 (49.5)
 2006 47.9 (47.5) 67.3 (45.5) 11.0 (70.6) 50.8 (44.4) 46.3 (49.4)
El Salvador 2001 29.9 … 41.1 … 2.9 … 31.2 … 29.1 …
2004 25.5 … 35.1 … 1.8 … 25.3 … 25.7 …
Guatemala 2002 41.0 (86.2) 54.3 (86.7) 9.4 (79.6) 43.5 (84.1) 39.4 (87.7)
 2004 39.1 (86.2) 54.2 (86.4) 9.2 (83.8) 42.2 (84.5) 37.3 (87.2)
Honduras 2006 59.8 (92.0) 76.2 (92.2) 9.5 (88.9) 65.5 (92.5) 55.7 (91.6)
Mexico 1989 67.6 (80.9) 66.4 (79.8) 74.1 (86.7) 71.0 (83.2) 66.0 (79.8)
 2002 62.1 (79.8) 80.5 (80.9) 21.5 (71.5) 63.3 (79.3) 61.3 (80.2)
 2006 62.2 (74.1) 78.1 (76.1) 25.4 (60.0) 62.7 (76.9) 61.8 (72.3)
Panama 2002 82.6 (81.2) 93.9 (81.7) 39.2 (76.3) 79.3 (83.1) 85.1 (79.8)
2007 83.1 (76.2) 94.1 (76.8) 35.8 (69.9) 79.3 (79.8) 86.0 (73.7)
Paraguay (Asunción) 2005 49.0 (61.0) 72.9 (63.0) 10.6 (38.7) 47.3 (61.1) 50.4 (60.9)
Paraguay 2005 44.4 (60.9) 70.6 (64.0) 9.9 (31.9) 43.2 (64.0) 45.4 (58.5)
Latin America c 1990 69.1 (46.9) 88.3 (44.8) 15.9 (80.0) 71.0 (83.2) 66.0 (79.8)
2002 57.5 (59.0) 68.3 (57.1) 30.2 (69.8) 65.6 (81.0) 64.1 (80.9)
2006 58.9 (57.0) 69.2 (55.6) 29.5 (65.4) 61.9 (77.2) 63.7 (74.4)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a
 Urban wage earners aged 15 years and over who declared labour income (not including unpaid workers). The percentage in parentheses is for wage earners with a formal 
permanent contract.
b
 In this country, the type of employment by criteria of duration is used as an approximation of the existence of a contract.
c
 Weighted average of the countries which have information for the periods considered.
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Table II.12 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCOME AND WAGES OF EMPLOYED PERSONS WITH DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS,





Sector of activity of employed persons Employed people
who Wage earnersLow productivity Medium and high productivity
Both 
sexes









1990 458 359 514 339 239 404 552 469 594 … … 476 394 524
2002 696 490 844 582 395 704 779 554 952 … … 515 420 594
 2006 919 697 1087 821 520 1080 984 829 1091 … … 742 598 861
Argentina 2002 614 439 741 534 356 649 672 493 814 … … 461 377 535
2006 890 665 1055 783 506 1010 963 787 1084 … … 710 574 821
Bolivia (eight major 
cities plus El Alto)
1989 247 171 302 216 158 275 295 205 332 279 234 217 151 253
2002 186 128 235 122 95 153 301 230 334 313 149 229 176 260
 2004 163 119 199 109 83 136 279 236 300 301 128 191 160 209
Bolivia 2002 173 122 215 118 91 147 277 218 304 285 142 212 169 238
2004 157 113 192 110 81 138 266 228 286 285 124 184 155 201
Brazil 1990 302 200 365 290 165 378 317 248 352 386 161 285 236 310
 2001 312 234 368 203 134 264 403 339 442 419 190 291 238 333
 2006 318 245 374 189 134 244 411 347 451 421 187 299 250 341
Chile 1990 364 253 425 301 196 383 403 304 447 388 307 300 227 344
2000 553 385 659 390 245 522 629 475 710 626 412 454 358 518
2006 555 428 639 437 287 586 607 516 657 611 438 471 389 526
Colombia 1991 231 178 266 240 149 313 224 203 237 … … 222 190 246
 2002 221 185 249 192 140 240 255 249 259 … … 262 243 279
 2005 243 201 276 227 159 290 260 258 262 … … 283 261 302
Costa Rica 1990 395 308 443 274 161 345 464 405 495 444 263 414 340 459
2002 492 403 550 319 226 393 608 549 642 580 311 520 444 571
2006 495 410 551 293 200 367 626 573 658 603 273 539 480 581
Dominican Rep. 1997 398 325 439 365 250 427 430 394 451 … … 352 329 368
 2002 398 308 455 348 241 409 441 360 497 … … 330 291 362
 2006 410 288 487 443 277 538 377 297 432 317 463 251 216 281
Ecuador 1990 127 90 148 91 61 112 169 136 183 176 98 144 109 162
 2002 153 112 179 116 83 140 201 161 220 231 117 149 127 162
 2006 162 126 185 117 86 142 220 194 234 242 122 166 152 173
El Salvador 1995 246 180 301 177 120 244 317 271 343 344 193 252 216 277
2001 265 221 305 183 152 220 359 330 378 390 185 286 270 297
2004 232 201 259 181 151 216 293 283 299 320 180 252 238 262
Guatemala 1989 260 197 298 226 151 283 308 291 316 … … 224 198 239
 2002 274 182 344 192 131 254 375 274 429 350 241 265 219 293
Honduras 1990 231 161 279 166 97 227 318 287 332 … … 252 214 273
2002 182 151 205 150 114 179 232 214 246 … … 212 191 226
2006 182 157 201 109 83 132 263 249 273 296 127 221 212 227
Mexico 1989 510 320 602 678 331 887 427 313 476 497 528 403 319 443
 2002 554 381 664 458 256 604 639 510 711 596 282 482 396 534
 2006 549 388 666 401 257 529 672 522 764 642 334 501 414 558
Nicaragua 1993 191 161 214 157 138 175 223 188 245 227 171 178 151 196
2001 179 138 208 119 101 134 262 205 294 280 146 167 146 179
Panama 1991 436 376 480 339 240 409 503 466 531 … … 375 306 442
 2002 465 402 507 255 169 314 595 551 623 562 271 504 445 549
 2007 487 397 552 411 244 546 531 495 555 524 433 440 400 472
Paraguay (Asunción and
Central Department)
1990 303 205 370 290 192 383 321 237 357 … … 215 159 253
2000 300 244 349 205 152 270 404 392 411 452 250 297 259 329
2005 250 175 314 155 114 199 366 275 424 367 216 241 208 269
Paraguay 2000 272 212 320 185 136 233 401 366 422 446 230 272 240 297
 2005 224 162 275 149 108 188 338 265 385 361 190 223 191 249
Peru 1997 208 145 258 146 103 191 303 239 336 … … 244 203 269
2001 187 142 223 133 108 159 279 227 306 358 148 219 183 243
2003 202 138 253 127 98 156 333 237 384 423 147 254 192 295
Uruguay 1990 548 306 714 581 203 922 527 392 603 … … 419 313 495
2002 483 395 548 283 222 334 629 541 688 636 223 497 411 570
2005 417 341 477 240 184 294 542 471 592 562 188 423 363 478
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of) b
1990 872 644 989 887 573 1051  860 703 939 … … 718 611 784
2002 539 449 596 492 355 578 599 568 618 570 290 461 462 461
2006 646 553 704 568 412 658 728 688 754 746 591 614 597 625
Latin America c 1990 363 242 436 345 193 455 380 299 421 405 261 333 273 365
2002 377 276 447 280 178 365 467 388 514 472 208 350 291 392
2006 397 300 470 283 188 370 493 416 542 479 218 378 318 425
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a




 Weighted average of the countries which have information for the periods considered. The figures for low- and high-productivity sectors do not include Colombia, which does not 
distinguish between firms of different sizes.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)132
Table II.13

















Argentina d 1990 e … 94.6 … 88.9 89.8 92.3 96.0
2002 f … 55.8 … 68.4 22.8 52.2 58.9 
2006 f … 60.0 … 68.8 22.3 55.0 64.1
Bolivia 1989 g … 28.5 … 56.0 11.4 27.6 29.2
 2002 15.1 21.9 5.7 42.7 7.2 15.7 14.7
 2004 15.6 20.2 9.0 44.4 6.0 16.6 14.8
Brazil 1990 53.3 62.8 20.0 97.7 29.0 51.0 54.5
2001 46.7 53.4 16.5 78.0 34.2 45.9 47.2
2006 49.5 56.0 20.5 78.7 35.1 48.3 50.4
Chile 1990 65.9 69.6 46.9 86.2 59.0 64.5 66.6
 2000 63.5 66.1 45.0 80.4 52.8 61.8 64.5
 2006 66.7 68.1 55.7 82.6 51.6 62.9 69.0
Costa Rica 1990 69.3 72.9 66.2 88.7 50.9 64.4 71.2
2002 64.4 67.4 59.6 87.2 43.0 59.0 67.3
2006 65.2 67.1 62.0 86.4 39.7 58.8 68.8
Dominican Rep. 2006 58.4 61.6 49.5 70.2 8.5 59.3 63.6
Ecuador 1990 … 37.5 … 67.8 17.6 35.8 38.4
 2002 … 32.1 … 57.5 13.0 31.4 32.6
 2006 28.7 33.1 20.4 59.6 14.9 30.4 27.6
El Salvador 1995 25.3 35.3 10.0 68.1 6.5 25.2 25.4
2001 29.3 39.1 12.5 77.3 9.0 30.0 28.9
2004 28.9 37.2 13.8 75.8 8.2 28.4 29.2
Guatemala 2002 17.1 30.2 8.2 63.4 9.9 15.9 17.8
 2004 17.7 27.1 7.9 61.2 7.5 16.3 18.4
Honduras 2006 19.8 32.6 7.4 65.6 5.7 25.8 16.6
Mexico 1989 50.4 56.4 39.4 61.9 67.6 58.9 47.0
 2002 d 54.8 64.5 31.2 81.7 25.5 59.2 52.5
 2006 52.1 61.3 29.1 78.1 23.4 54.6 50.6
Nicaragua 1993 25.3 35.7 11.2 58.7 14.5 30.0 22.8
2001 17.6 24.3 7.2 53.2 7.2 21.1 15.6
2005 17.4 25.7 5.7 58.6 3.2 22.0 14.8
Panama 2002 53.4 66.8 29.4 88.3 37.0 63.4 48.3
 2007 47.8 60.2 24.3 85.3 27.6 49.9 46.5
Paraguay 2000 13.0 19.7 4.7 45.9 4.0 13.6 12.7
2005 14.1 20.0 6.0 46.5 4.4 15.3 13.4
Peru 2001 12.9 18.8 2.7 44.0 4.1 10.1 15.0
 2003 13.7 20.1 3.4 46.2 4.7 9.8 16.8
Uruguay 2002 … 63.0 … 84.9 44.3 63.1 63.0
 2005 … 61.1 … 82.7 40.5 60.7 61.5
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) d h 2002 61.5 … … 75.6 19.8 67.1 58.0
2006 60.9 … … 68.6 16.1 65.0 58.2
Latin America i 2002 37.4 44.5 21.3 67.6 21.8 41.1 40.3
 2006 37.4 44.1 23.9 68.4 19.6 40.8 41.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household surveys in the respective countries.
a 
 The variables used to define the contribution to social security of employed persons aged 15 and above who declare labour income (not including unpaid workers) vary depending 
on the surveys in each country: contribution to or affiliation with a pension and/or health scheme (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay), a national social security scheme (Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama) and entitlement to social benefits (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela). The totals for women and men refer to the national or urban total, depending on the characteristics of each country’s survey.
b 
 The formal sector includes wage earners in the public sector and in firms with more than five employees, professional and technical staff working on their own account, and 
owners of firms with five or more employees.
c 
 The informal wage earners’ sector includes wage earners in firms with less than five employees and in domestic service.
d 
 The rate corresponds to various social benefits of wage earners (vacations, allowances, bonuses, pension contributions and other statutory entitlements), excluding own-account 
workers, unpaid family members and owners of firms.
e 








 Simple average of countries which have information around 2002 and 2006. 
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Table II.14 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYED PERSONS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES, NATIONAL TOTAL,





Sector of activity of employed persons









cities and El Alto)
1989 28.5 27.6 29.2 56.0 64.5 52.6  10.9 14.0 7.8
2002 22.4 22.6 22.2 43.3 50.2 40.1  10.7 13.6 7.2
 2004 20.0 21.7 18.7 44.8 55.3 39.5  8.7 11.6 5.6
Bolivia 2002 15.1 15.7 14.7 40.6 50.5 36.1 7.3 8.8 6.0
2004 15.6 16.6 14.8 42.0 54.9 36.3 7.9 9.6 6.1
Brazil 1990 53.3 51.0 54.5 96.3 96.7 96.1  24.4 24.3 24.5
 2001 46.7 45.9 47.2 74.2 79.7 71.2  19.1 19.7 18.6
 2006 49.5 48.3 50.4 75.6 79.8 73.1  20.0 20.8 19.2
Chile 1990 65.9 64.5 66.6 84.1 84.3 84.0 40.8 43.1 39.5
2000 63.5 61.8 64.5 78.7 77.9 79.1 33.8 37.5 31.1
2006 66.7 62.9 69.0 82.0 80.3 82.9 34.0 34.8 33.2
Costa Rica 1990 69.3 64.4 71.2 86.9 87.7 86.6  48.4 35.8 53.2
 2002 64.4 59.0 67.3 85.9 88.0 84.9  40.0 29.5 46.1
 2006 65.2 58.8 68.8 85.5 85.8 85.4  39.8 29.7 46.2
Dominican Rep. 2006 31.3 38.0 27.7 68.6 74.8 64.8  1.7 2.7 1.3
Ecuador 1990 37.5 35.8 38.4 67.8 72.8 65.6 11.3 11.6 11.2
2002 32.1 31.4 32.6 57.5 65.0 54.0 11.9 11.5 12.3
2006 33.1 35.5 31.5 59.6 67.8 55.2 13.0 16.3 10.5
El Salvador 1995 25.3 25.2 25.4 56.1 65.8 51.4  2.0 1.8 2.1
 2001 29.3 30.0 28.9 70.3 82.5 63.5  3.7 3.5 3.9
 2004 28.9 28.4 29.2 67.3 78.4 61.4  3.2 2.7 3.6
Guatemala 2002 17.1 15.9 17.8 51.0 60.8 47.1 1.4 1.6 1.3
2004 17.7 16.3 18.4 52.5 59.5 49.7 1.6 0.9 2.0
Honduras 2006 19.8 25.8 16.6 57.8 69.6 50.6  1.7 2.1 1.5
Mexico 1989 50.4 58.9 47.0 57.6 67.8 54.1 39.5 48.6 35.0
2002 54.8 59.2 52.5 76.1 82.0 73.0 18.1 20.0 17.0
2006 52.1 54.6 50.6 73.6 77.7 71.3 17.1 18.7 16.2
Nicaragua 1993 25.3 30.0 22.8 50.1 55.3 47.2  7.7 10.5 6.3
 2001 17.6 21.1 15.6 46.8 60.8 39,9  2.3 2.6 2.1
 2005 17.4 22.0 14.8 50.4 67.6 41.6  0.8 0.8 0.8
Panama 2002 53.4 63.4 48.3 86.1 91.8 82.8 22.4 31.6 18.2
2007 47.8 49.9 46.5 83.2 87.4 80.0 10.4 11.1 9.9
Paraguay 2000 24.6 21.8 27.1 49.0 54.7 45.6  2.5 1.4 3.9
 2005 22.6 21.3 23.8 46.6 52.1 43.1  2.9 2.3 3.5
Peru 2001 12.9 10.1 15.0 39.4 43.3 37.6 2.6 1.5 3.6
2003 13.7 9.8 16.8 41.9 42.4 41,7 3.3 1.7 4.9
Uruguay 2002 63.0 63.1 63.0 84.9 86.3 84.0 33.0 35.5 30.8
2005 61.1 60.7 61.5 82.7 84.3 81.6 30.7 32.3 29.2
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2002 61.5 67.1 58.0 75.6 80.4 72.5  19.8 26.9 15.5
2006 35.7 39.3 33.4 68.6 72.2 66.2  4.1 5.2 3.5
Latin America b 1990 51.8 52.1 51.7 79.9 85.5 77.4 27.2 28.3 26.5
2002 48.8 49.3 48.5 74.1 79.6 71.2 18.4 19.4 17.7
2006 49.6 49.5 49.8 74.6 78.8 72.2 18.6 19.6 17.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a 
 Employed persons aged 15 and over who declare labour income (not including unpaid workers).
b 
 Weighted average of the countries which have information for the periods considered.
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Table II.15
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): WAGE EARNERS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES, NATIONAL TOTAL,





Sector of activity of wage earners











1990 94.6 92.3 96.0 96.3 96.1 96.3  89.8 84.5 94.6
2002 56.9 54.4 58.9 69.2 68.0 70.1  25.1 21.5 28.3
 2006 59.8 54.1 64.6 74.5 74.1 74.7  23.1 18.7 29.0
Argentinab 2002 55.8 52.2 58.9 68.4 66.0 70.4 22.8 19.1 26.4
2006 60.0 55.0 64.1 75.2 74.7 75.6 22.3 19.0 26.3
Bolivia (eight main
Cities and El Alto)
1989 42.7 42.9 42.6 59.8 67.3 56.6  11.4 13.0 10.2
2002 31.7 32.5 31.2 45.7 51.6 42.9  6.5 8.6 4.6
 2004 28.4 33.3 25.5 46.9 56.6 41.8  5.9 8.5 4.2
Bolivia 2002 29.8 34.1 27.5 43.4 52.5 39.1 6.7 9.3 4.9
2004 26.7 32.7 23.6 44.8 56.3 39.3 5.1 7.4 3.9
Brazil 1990 70.9 78.5 67.4 97.8 99.1 97.1  23.1 39.0 16.1
 2001 64.7 63.8 65.2 76.2 82.8 72.5  33.5 34.0 32.8
 2006 67.3 65.8 68.4 78.5 83.4 75.5  34.4 34.8 33.7
Chile 1990 78.7 75.0 80.6 86.1 86.3 86.0 56.9 55.7 58.0
2000 77.0 73.6 79.1 83.5 84.0 83.3 51.9 50.9 53.4
2006 79.8 75.4 82.6 85.8 85.6 85.9 52.0 48.6 57.3
Costa Rica 1990 78.2 76.0 79.3 88.2 89.1 87.8  50.0 46.7 52.0
 2002 75.8 74.2 76.7 88.5 90.5 87.5  43.0 40.6 44.8
 2006 75.3 71.8 77.5 88.0 88.6 87.6  40.1 37.5 42.4
Dominican Rep. 2006 58.4 55.8 60.4 73.7 78.7 70.5  7.7 6.4 9.7
Ecuador 1990 56.1 56.9 55.6 70.3 74.8 68.3 17.6 20.7 15.4
2002 45.0 47.5 43.6 59.8 66.9 56.3 13.0 14.9 11.6
2006 45.6 52.2 41.7 61.7 70.2 57.0 14.9 21.7 10.4
El Salvador 1995 43.2 48.4 40.4 58.2 67.0 53.7  4.0 5.2 3.2
 2001 48.3 55.9 44.0 72.3 83.6 65.8  6.0 7.1 5.3
 2004 46.2 53.0 42.4 69.0 79.7 63.2  5.3 6.1 4.9
Guatemala 2002 35.8 40.8 33.7 54.2 63.5 50.5 5.1 7.4 4.0
2004 36.4 39.8 34.9 56.0 63.6 52.9 4.9 3.5 5.6
Honduras 2006 39.3 52.8 32.3 60.0 71.7 52.6  3.1 5.3 2.3
Mexico 1989 59.2 65.2 56.8 58.4 68.2 55.0 64.1 54.3 72.9
2002 54.8 59.2 52.5 76.1 82.0 73.0 18.1 20.0 17.0
2006 52.6 55.3 51.1 73.8 78.0 71.4 17.1 18.9 16.1
Nicaragua 1993 42.1 47.5 39.1 58.1 73.0 51.3  12.0 12.3 11.9
 2001 32.5 41.7 28.0 49.6 65.2 42.0  5.5 5.4 5.5
 2005 34.0 45.7 28.0 52.8 70.3 43.8  2.2 2.6 1.9
Panama 2002 73.2 75.6 71.6 87.7 92.5 84.8 30.2 33.9 27.2
2007 69.8 69.4 69.4 85.1 90.6 83.5 21.5 22.4 22.8
Paraguay (Asunción
and Central Department)
2000 36.9 33.6 39.7 55.2 62.4 51.0  4.8 2.8 8.0
2005 34.8 33.2 36.1 53.1 58.2 49.7  5.5 4.1 7.2
Peru 2001 27.1 26.9 27.1 41.9 45.7 40.1 3.4 3.2 3.6
2003 29.9 26.6 31.9 45.3 45.0 45.4 3.9 2.6 5.0
Uruguay 2002 76.6 73.2 79.4 90.4 93.3 88.5 44.3 43.1 46.2
2005 73.7 71.1 76.0 88.1 90.7 86.2 40.5 40.4 40.6
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2002 61.5 67.1 58.0 75.6 80.4 72.5  19.8 26.9 15.5
2006 60,9 65.0 58.2 73.1 76.1 71.1  16.1 20.5 13.6
Latin Americac 1990 68.1 74.0 65.3 82.0 87.8 79.5 32.5 43.8 26.3
2002 60.6 61.8 59.9 75.5 81.3 72.3 26.3 29.0 23.7
2006 61.9 62.2 61.6 76.7 81.2 74.0 26.2 29.0 23.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a 
 Wage earners aged 15 and over who declare labour income (not including unpaid workers).
b 
 The rate corresponds to various social benefits of wage earners (vacations, allowances, bonuses, pension contributions and other statutory entitlements).
c 
 Weighted average of the countries which have information for the periods considered.
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Chapter III
The demographic dividend: an opportunity 
to improve coverage and progression rates 
in secondary education
A. Introduction
The pace of demographic change has quickened in the last 
few years in Latin America, and the most recent data suggest 
that even the countries furthest behind in this regard have 
entered the moderate stage of the demographic transition.1 
Consequently, all the countries of the region are witnessing 
huge changes in the age structure of their populations 
that consist, in most cases, of a significant decrease in 
the weight of the child population and an increase in the 
weight of the adult and elderly population. 
These changes in the age structure mark the onset 
of a period in which the proportion of people in the 
potentially productive age bracket grows steadily relative 
to the number of people of potentially inactive ages and 
in which dependency ratios therefore decline to minimum 
levels before rising again as a result of the increase in 
the proportion of older persons. This period, which is 
known as the demographic “dividend” or “bonus” or 
the “demographic window of opportunity”, creates a 
situation that is particularly conducive for development 
as it increases the possibility of saving and investing 
in economic growth. Nearly all the countries of Latin 
America currently find themselves in this favourable period 
1
 A classification of the countries of Latin America according to the stage 
of demographic transition they have reached, as determined by their 
fertility and life-expectancy rates, is presented in the next section.
of transition. Owing to the unevenness of demographic 
change, however, this window of opportunity is beginning 
to close for some countries whereas in others it has just 
begun to open up. 
In most countries, the demographic changes under 
way have had a positive impact on the education sector. 
The primary education segment has benefited directly 
from the relative and absolute decline of the younger 
population.2 In conjunction with the efforts countries have 
made to meet the education targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals, this demographic change has 
resulted in most of the region’s countries being close 
to attaining universal coverage for primary education,3 
although important challenges remain both in terms of 
progression and quality.4
In the coming decades, not only will demand for 
primary education continue to decline, but so will 
demand for secondary education, relatively at first, but 
2
 The number of primary-school students in the region will fall from 67.8 
million in 2000 to 63.2 million in 2015 (Wolf and Gurria, 2005). 
3
 According to UNESCO statistics, only Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay had net primary-education enrolment rates 
of less than 90% in 2000-2004 (see UNESCO, 2007). 
4
 In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the proportion of children 
that have completed the final grade of primary school is barely over 
60%, and in Nicaragua, practically half the children in the country 
do not finish primary school.
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subsequently in absolute terms. During this period, 
governments will have the opportunity to pursue ambitious 
goals for increasing coverage and quality in secondary 
education as a strategy for taking better advantage of the 
demographic dividend. 
As ECLAC has stated on numerous occasions, as 
soon as the region has recorded major advances in terms 
of primary-education coverage, efforts to increase the 
coverage and quality of secondary education will need to 
be stepped up. Only through a quality secondary education 
will young people be able to access more productive 
jobs and obtain incomes that will keep them above the 
poverty line (ECLAC, 1998). This is the way to obtain 
significant improvements in terms of equity and social 
cohesion and to avoid the pitfalls of the intergenerational 
reproduction of poverty.
The demographic dividend opens up an opportunity 
for moving towards universal coverage for secondary 
education in conjunction with on-time progression. If 
the education system and spending on education as a 
percentage of GDP expand at historical rates, spending per 
student will rise and the ratio of students to infrastructure 
and teachers will drop.
In addition to generating more opportunities for the 
young people of today, investing in education and health 
and in the creation of productive jobs during the period 
corresponding to the demographic dividend constitutes a 
unique opportunity to prepare for the future. This is because 
the fruits of such investments are essential for achieving the 
savings and productive leaps forward needed for dealing 
with the exponential increase in costs which will accompany 
society’s inexorable ageing.5 Production capacities need 
to be improved to increase formal employment and social 
security contributions, enhance the conditions of the active 
population and prepare for when the opportunity posed 
by the demographic dividend runs out. 
This document examines how the changes in the 
age structure of the population associated with the 
demographic transition under way in Latin America 
can help to significantly expand secondary-education 
coverage and to raise spending per student to the levels 
seen in developed countries.
The first part of this chapter presents a general 
overview of the region’s demographic context together 
with past and future trends in the secondary-school-age 
population. A summary is given of the main demographic 
trends observed in Latin America since 1950 and the 
medium- and long-term trends expected in the future. In 
addition to examining the demographic transition in the 
5
 A recent simulation performed by Lee and Mason (2008) shows 
that the rise in productivity generated by better education will be 
enough to cover the additional costs of an ageing population. 
region as a whole, the unevenness of the changes across 
the region is taken into account by applying ECLAC 
typology that classifies countries according to different 
stages of the transition. The effects of the transition on 
the age structure of the population are measured using 
dependency ratios, which serve as a means of assessing 
the relationship between the demographic context and 
other aspects of socio-economic development. The values 
of these ratios are used to determine the demographic 
dividend in each of the region’s countries. It should be 
noted that these dividends vary considerably in terms of 
duration. 
The end of the first part focuses more on the implications 
of the demographic trends for the education sector, presents 
the general trends in the secondary-school-age population 
and analyses the evolution of that population throughout 
the demographic dividend period. 
The second part of the chapter examines the efforts 
that governments must make on the economic front to 
achieve the coverage and quality targets set for secondary 
education and the role that demography plays in the 
process.
First, a comparative analysis of enrolment rates, 
spending per student and total spending on education as 
a percentage of GDP is performed using data for around 
2005 obtained from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 14 
Latin American countries and for 17 countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), which are used as the comparison group. 
Then the financial costs of attaining the following 
three goals in secondary education are calculated for 
each country and Latin America as a whole around 2005: 
(i) 75% net enrolment for secondary education, as agreed 
by the countries of Latin America at the 1998 Summit of 
the Americas; (ii) universal secondary school coverage;6 
and (iii) OECD levels of net secondary school enrolment 
and spending per student.7 
Finally, the population projections made by the 
Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC are used to 
predict the impact of the changes in the age structure of the 
population on countries’ capacity to reach three different 
targets for secondary education during the demographic 
dividend period. 
6
 The target of universal secondary education, the usefulness and 
feasibility of which is still debatable, has not yet been adopted by 
the countries of Latin America and is considered in this document 
for the purpose of analysing the repercussions of demographic 
changes on more ambitious coverage targets.
7
 Although coverage in OECD is on average less than universal, this 
combined target of high coverage and high spending per student is 
more demanding in terms of resources.
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B. The secondary-school-age population and 
 the demographic context
Latin America us currently going through a stage of profound demographic change, which is 
referred to as the demographic transition. During this period, particularly favourable conditions 
for development arise, inasmuch as the proportion of people in the potentially productive 
age bracket grows steadily relative to the number of people of potentially inactive ages. This 
stage is known as the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend” in reference to the 
opportunities that it offers for boosting per capita GDP and thus raising the population’s living 
standards. The duration and intensity of the demographic dividend varies across the region, 
but in all the countries of Latin America in the coming decades, not only will demand for 
primary education continue to decline, but so will demand for secondary education, relatively 
at first, but subsequently in absolute terms, which opens up the possibility of taking advantage 
of the dividend by investing in education. In addition to generating more opportunities for 
young people, the demographic dividend constitutes a unique opportunity to prepare for the 
challenges that the ageing of society will pose.
1. Demographic transition, changes in the dependency ratio 
 and the demographic dividend
(a) Demographic transition
Like other developing regions, Latin America is 
going through a stage of profound demographic changes 
known as the demographic transition. This is a relatively 
long process that starts with high mortality and fertility 
rates and ends with much lower ones. Population growth 
is slight at both ends of the process, but tends to increase 
as the process unfolds and mortality rates decline and 
then decrease again when fertility rates come down. In 
Latin America, the fact that the onsets of the decline of 
the mortality and fertility rates did not coincide produced 
a relatively short period of rapid population growth in the 
middle of the twentieth century that substantially altered 
the age structure of the population.8
During the initial stage of demographic transition 
—during which mortality, especially among children, falls, 
but fertility remains high— the region’s population remained
8
 Although at the regional level and in the more populated countries, 
international migration does not have a large impact on the age 
structure of the population, its effect in smaller countries and countries 
with high migration rates, such as Nicaragua and Uruguay, can be 
significant. Given its generally selective nature migration alters not 
only the size, but also the age structure, the gender composition 
and other socio-economic and demographic features of both origin 
and destination populations. 
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very young and even became somewhat younger as a result 
of the growing proportion of children.9 Beginning in the 
mid-1960s, the continuing fall in fertility and a sustained 
rise in life expectancy led to the start of a gradual ageing 
of the population as the larger generations progressed 
through the life cycle.10
Table III.1 summarizes the demographic changes 
that have occurred and are projected to occur in Latin 
America. Since 1950, the average number of children 
per Latin American woman has dropped from 5.9 to 2.4, 
the number of children who die before their first birthday 
has dropped from 128 to 22 per 1,000 births, the average 
life expectancy of the population has risen from 52 to 73
9
 Between 1950 and 1965, infant mortality in Latin America fell from 
an average of 128 to 92 deaths of children aged under one year 
per 1,000 births, while the overall fertility rate remained at close 
to six children per woman. In the same period, the proportion of 
children under 15 in the total population rose from 40% to 43%.
10
 The largest generations are those born during the initial period of 
demographic transition when infant mortality falls and fertility 
rates remain high.
years, and average annual population growth has fallen 
from 2.8% to 1.3%. In the same period, the proportion of 
children under 15 has dropped from 40% to 30%, while the 
population of people aged 60 or more has risen from 6% to 
9%. In 2050, life expectancy is projected to be 80 years, as 
infant mortality falls to 8 deaths per 1,000 births, average 
annual population growth shrinks to 0.2%, and the average 
number of children drops to 1.9 (below the replacement 
rate).11 According to these projected changes, in 2050, the 
proportion of children under 15 will have almost halved (from 
30% to 18%) and the proportion of elderly will have almost 
tripled (from 9% to 24%), and by the middle of this century, 
one in four Latin Americans will be an older person.
11
 The replacement rate is considered to be 2.1 children per woman.
Table III.1
LATIN AMERICA: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE INDICATORS, 1950-2050
Indicators 1950-1955 1975-1980 2005-2010 2025-2030 2045-2050
Global fertility rate (children per woman) 5.9 4.5 2.4 2.0 1.9
Life expectancy at birth (in years) 51.8 63.4 73.4 77.1 79.6
Infant mortality rate (per 1 000 births) 127.7 69.7 21.7 12.0 7.9
Annual population growth rate (percentages) 2.8 2.3 1.3 0.7 0.2
Age structure (percentages) 1950 1975 2005 2025 2050
0 to 14 years 40 41 30 23 18
15 to 59 years 54 52 61 62 58
60 years or more 6 6 9 14 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
Regional averages, however, conceal major differences 
at the country level in terms of the pace and intensity of 
demographic change. With a view to analysing this variation 
and obtaining a comprehensive view of the changes under 
way in the region, ECLAC (2008) classified the countries 
of Latin America into four different stages of demographic 
transition according to life expectancy and fertility rates: 
very advanced, advanced, full and moderate. 
Only Cuba is in the very advanced stage of transition. 
The total fertility rate reached replacement level much 
earlier in Cuba than in the rest of the region (between the 
late 1970s and early 1980s).
The countries in the advanced stage of transition 
fall into three subgroups. The first consists of Argentina 
and Uruguay, whose fertility and mortality rates both 
declined early on (in the first half of the twentieth century) 
and were already posting fertility rates of about three 
children per woman from 1950 onward. A second case 
apart is Chile, which despite having a fertility rate similar 
to that of Cuba in the period 1950-1955, has not seen 
fertility decline as sharply as in Cuba since then. Chile 
is nonetheless the second country in the region where 
fertility has fallen below replacement level. All three 
countries (Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) have population 
growth rates of less than 1%. The third subgroup within 
advanced transition countries is constituted by Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico. Although these 
countries still had quite high total fertility rates in the 
mid-1960s, they moved rapidly through the fertility 
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transition and those rates had fallen by half (or even 
more) by the late 1980s to early 1990s. The natural 
growth rate of the population in this subgroup is between 
1.3% and 1.4%.12
Two groups of countries are in the full transition 
stage. On the one hand, there are those where fertility 
had already declined considerably by the early 1980s 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama and Peru). On the other, 
there are those where the most significant drops in fertility 
were recorded more recently (Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Paraguay). Fertility rates in both of these groups have 
now levelled out at the regional average rate, although the 
natural population growth rates vary within them, ranging 
from 1.5% in Peru to 2.3% in Honduras.
The countries in the moderate transition stage are 
Bolivia, Guatemala and Haiti. Fertility has dropped in all 
three countries but remains far above the regional average. 
The decline has been particularly slow in Guatemala, 
which now has the highest fertility rate in the region 
(4.2 children per woman) as well as the highest rate of 
population growth (2.8%). Haiti and Bolivia, meanwhile, 
have the highest levels of mortality in the region, with 
life expectancy levels (60 and 66 years, respectively) well 
below the regional average (73 years). 
Despite the differences in the region, in general, Latin 
America can be said to have undergone a rapid process of 
demographic transition compared with that experienced 
by industrialized countries (ECLAC/CELADE/IDB, 
1996). Whereas the demographic transition lasted over 
a century in developed countries, similar changes are 
occurring much faster in Latin America, mainly because 
the means of controlling fertility and reducing mortality 
were already available. In a period of approximately 
30 years, between 1960 and 1990, Latin America went 
from having some of the world’s highest fertility levels 
to levels below the international average. In other words, 
changes in the age structure of the population, especially 
ageing, are occurring faster in Latin America than they 
did in the industrialized countries, which points to the 
need to develop situation-specific measures to tackle the 
challenges and take advantage of the opportunities raised 
by the demographic changes.13
12
 The natural growth rate does not take migration flows into account. 
In several countries of Latin America, the total growth rate is below 
the natural one due to large negative migratory flows.
13
 The population generally keeps ageing in the industrialized countries 
owing to very low fertility rates and the increase in longevity. In 
2050, for example, 42% of the population of Japan is expected to 
be 60 years old or older. 
(b) Changes in the dependency ratio
Since people’s economic behaviour depends on their 
stage in the life cycle, changes in the age structure tend 
to have a major impact on economic development. A 
high proportion of dependent persons (children and older 
persons) in the population usually constrains economic 
growth as a significant portion of resources have to be 
allocated to attending to their needs. In contrast, having 
a large proportion of working-age people can boost 
economic growth, as incomes tend to increase and the 
accumulation of capital tends to accelerate thanks to the 
lower level of spending on dependent persons. 
In this regard, by relating the numbers of people in 
potentially inactive age groups (under 15 years and over 
59 years) to the population in potentially active age groups 
(15-59 years), the dependency ratio constitutes a valuable 
indicator of the potential effects of demographic changes 
on socio-economic development.14 
The dependency ratio in Latin America increased 
between 1950 and the 1960s owing to a relative increase 
in the child population. Then it began to decline steadily 
with the drop in fertility rates. This decline is expected to 
continue until around 2020 when the growing proportion of 
older persons will cause the dependency ratio to increase 
again. Although in general Latin American countries 
coincide with this model, in terms of form, there are huge 
variations from one country to another in terms of time 
(see table III.2). This is clearly shown by a comparison 
of the situation of three countries in different stages of 
demographic transition (Cuba, in the very advanced 
stage; Mexico, in the advanced stage; and Guatemala, 
in the moderate stage). 
In Cuba, the period in which the dependency ratio 
declines is much shorter than in the other countries, 
and, after stabilizing at relatively low levels for a long 
period of time, it is expected to rise again much faster 
than the other countries. In Mexico, the dependency ratio
14
 To calculate the dependency ratio, many studies consider the 
economically active population to be those aged between 15 and 64. 
In any case, it is important to be aware of the limitations of stating 
dependency ratios in terms of age ranges. First, in most populations 
people do not automatically cease to be economically active at the 
age of 60. Second, not everyone aged 15 to 59 is economically active, 
especially among the female population (and despite the increasing 
participation of women in the labour market). Similarly, as training 
for entering work becomes longer, a growing number of adolescents 
and young adults spend longer in education and outside the labour 
market (thereby extending the period of dependence far beyond the 
age of 15). These observations suggest that trends in dependency 
ratios considered in this section offer only an indication of the 
economic impact of changes in age structure of the population.
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was extremely high at the beginning of the period due to the 
high porportion of children and then started a steep downward 
trend that is expected to last until the middle of the 2020s. In 
Guatemala, the decline of the dependency ratio has been far 
more gradual because fertility rates have remained relatively 
high. The dependency ratio in this country is projected to 
continue to decline until the middle of this century. The child 
dependency ratio (the number of children to the number of 
working-age persons) is projected to converge among the 
Latin American countries, while the elderly dependency ratio 
(the number of older persons to the number of working-age 
persons) is projected to diverge. 
Table III.2
LATIN AMERICA: ASPECTS OF DEPENDENCY RATIO TRENDS a
Countries
Reduction period of dependency ratio  
Period for which dependency ratio 
remains below two dependents per 





















Latin America 97 1965 60 2019 54 38 2001 2041 40
Argentina 78 1989 63 2032 43 19 2007 2039 32
Bolivia 95 1974 57 2041 67 40 2019 2062 43
Brazil 97 1964 58 2007 43 41 1995 2040 45
Chile 92 1966 54 2011 45 41 1983 2026 43
Colombia 109 1965 56 2017 52 49 1998 2042 44
Costa Rica 115 1965 53 2014 49 54 1999 2041 42
Cuba 91 1974 53 1991 17 42 1983 2024 41
Dominican Republic 114 1965 63 2027 62 44 2010 2048 38
Ecuador 105 1965 61 2025 60 43 2008 2048 40
El Salvador 104 1968 57 2028 60 45 2011 2052 41
Guatemala 103 1988 55 2050 62 46 2029 2069 40
Haiti 92 1970 57 2039 69 38 2018 2060 42
Honduras 111 1972 56 2040 68 50 2019 2059 40
Mexico 110 1966 57 2022 56 48 2002 2036 34
Nicaragua 114 1965 59 2035 70 48 2013 2052 39
Panama 102 1968 61 2020 52 40 1999 2036 37
Paraguay 113 1962 58 2038 76 48 2015 2055 40
Peru 99 1967 59 2017 50 41 2005 2049 44
Uruguay b 74 1989 67 2016 27 9 - -
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 104 1966 61 2020 54 41  2002 2048 46
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
a
 Number of people aged less than 15 years and aged 60 or over per 100 persons aged 15 to 59. years.
b
 After peaking, the dependency ratio in Uruguay will remain at or above two dependants per three working-age persons.
Figure III.1 shows how the dependency ratio will 
evolve over the next few decades in selected Latin American 
countries in different stages of the demographic transition. 
The year 2008 is taken as the base year (equal to 100) 
against which projections up to 2050 are compared. The 
figure shows a clear downward trend in the dependency 
ratio in the countries furthest behind in the transition 
process, such as Bolivia and Guatemala, and a strong 
upward trend in the case of the countries that are in the later 
stages of transition, such as Chile and Cuba. In countries 
such as Brazil and Mexico, which are in the intermediate 
stages of demographic transition, the dependency ratio 
is growing in line with the average for Latin America, in 
other words, far more slowly than in the countries in the 
later stages of transition.15 A comparison of the extreme 
cases of Cuba and Guatemala provides a clear picture 
of the diversity of demographic situations in the region: 
in Cuba, the dependency ratio is expected to practically 
double by 2050, while in Guatemala, it is expected to be 
nearly halved.
15
 Brazil and Mexico are classified in a less advanced subgroup than 
Chile within the advanced stage of demographic transition due to 
the significantly higher overall fertility rates they had at the start 
of the transition process in comparison with Chile.
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Figure III.1
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FUTURE TRENDS  
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Bolivia Guatemala Latin America
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
a
 Number of persons aged under 15 and 60 or over per 100 persons aged between 
15 and 59 years. 
(c) The demographic dividend
During demographic transition, there is a period 
when the dependency ratio drops substantially as the 
weight of the potentially productive age group grows and 
the relative weight of the potentially inactive age group 
diminishes. In that period, the situation is particularly 
favourable for development as the possibilities for savings 
and investment in economic growth increase, while the 
pressure on primary-education spending eases. Various 
terms have been coined to describe this period, including 
“demographic dividend”, “demographic bonus” or 
“demographic window of opportunity”, which refers to 
the possibility of increasing rates of economic growth per 
capita and hence the levels of well-being of the population 
during this period.
The benefits associated with this period do not 
accrue automatically. They are subject to the adoption 
of macroeconomic policies that encourage productive 
investment, increase employment opportunities and promote 
a stable social and economic environment conducive to 
sustained development (Bloom, Canning y Sevilla, 2003; 
Adioetomo et al., 2005; Wong and Carvalho, 2006). In 
particular, they require major investments in human 
capital, above all in the education of young people, to 
increase their productivity. 
The recent history of countries in South-East Asia 
shows that the combination of a large pool of young workers 
with highly developed job skills and a relatively small 
contingent of dependent older people creates a situation 
that is highly favourable for economic growth. The increase 
in productivity seen in these countries stems largely from 
the considerable investments made in educating young 
people during the period of the demographic dividend 
(UNFPA, 1998; Mason, 2002).
There is no exact measurement of the beginning and 
end points of the demographic dividend, and its definition 
in terms of the dependency ratio tends to vary. In this study, 
the period corresponding to the demographic dividend has 
been subdivided into three phases. In the first of these 
phases, the dependency ratio declines but is still fairly 
high (above two thirds, in other words, two dependents for 
every three persons in economically active age groups). 
In the second, the dependency ratio falls below two thirds 
and continues to decrease. In the third and final phase, the 
dependency ratio begins to rise as the proportion of older 
people increases, but is still below two thirds. 
While the countries of the region show little difference 
as regards the onset of the demographic dividend (in 
nearly every country, the dependency ratio began to 
come down towards the middle of the 1960s), the extent 
and duration of its different phases vary significantly 
(see figure III.2). Generally speaking, the countries 
which are most ahead in the demographic transition 
have a shorter dividend period left than countries that 
are further behind in the process. In Chile and Cuba, 
for example, the dividend is expected to end some time 
in the first quarter of this century. In Brazil and Costa 
Rica, it will last until the beginning of the 2040s, while 
in Ecuador and Peru it is expected to end around 2050. 
In seven countries, the dividend should last beyond the 
middle of the century (to 2062 in Bolivia and 2069 in 
Guatemala, for example). 
Figure III.2
LATIN AMERICA: DURATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND a





















Dividend 1 Dividend 2 Dividend 3
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
a
 Dividend 1: period in which the dependency ratio declines but is above two thirds; 
Dividend 2: period in which the dependency ratio falls below two thirds and continues 
to decrease; Dividend 3: period in which the dependency ratio rises, but is still below 
two thirds. 
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On average, the Latin American population is currently 
in the second —and most favourable— stage of demographic 
dividend, in which the dependency ratio tends to be relatively 
low and is still falling. This stage started at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century and is expected to last until the end 
of the next decade when the third stage will start and last 
until the beginning of the 2040s. Only two countries are in 
the third phase of the demographic dividend: Cuba since 
the beginning of the 1990s, and Brazil since 2007. Chile is 
expected to enter this final phase very shortly (2011), and eight 
other countries are already in the second phase: Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru. The eight remaining 
countries are still in the first phase (see figure III.2).16 
(d) Taking advantage of the opportunity the dividend 
offers for preparing for the future 
All countries in Latin America are currently in 
a period that is particularly conducive to economic 
development thanks in part to the demographic dividend. 
In some countries, this period has already reached, or is 
about to reach, the final phase, while in others it is just 
beginning and should last for the next five or six decades. 
The advantage of having a favourable ratio between the 
working-age population and the dependent age people 
will disappear, sooner for some countries than for others, 
as the proportion of elderly people will steadily increase.
16
 Uruguay is not included in the figure since it is not going through a 
demographic dividend period. While the dependency ratio in Latin 
America on average dropped 38% between its maximum and minimum 
level, the decline in the case of Uruguay was only 9%. Also, after 
attaining a maximum value significantly lower than the regional 
average, Uruguay’s dependency ratio remains for the whole period 
above two dependents per three persons in the potentially-active 
age group (see table III.2). The heavy migration of members of the 
active age group could be one of the factors behind this situation.
After the demographic dividend, there will be a period 
of rapid population ageing that will pose new challenges to 
society and require the implementation of public policies 
and programmes in various areas, including the provision 
of long-term health care and the financing of pensions 
for a progressively ageing population.
Population ageing will take place in all countries 
of Latin America and will invert the dependency ratio 
as the number of older dependents steadily increases in 
relation to the number of young people and working-age 
adults. If this phase is reached in unfavourable economic 
conditions, with no economic growth or accumulated 
savings, the burden placed by the dependent elderly 
population on the active population will require huge 
transfers of resources from the latter to the former, which 
might not only create intergenerational conflict, but 
also generate solvency problems that could jeopardize 
the financing of key systems, such as health and social 
security. 
Taking advantage of the demographic dividend by 
investing in education and creating productive jobs not 
only generates more opportunities for the young people 
of today. Such investments are essential for achieving the 
savings and productive conditions needed for dealing with 
the exponential increase in costs which will accompany 
society’s inexorable ageing. The demographic dividend 
therefore represents a unique opportunity to prepare for 
the future. 
2. Secondary education and the demographic dividend
Trends for the younger population and for the secondary-
school age group in particular are directly linked to an 
important part of the demographic dividend that arises 
from changes in the proportional size of the different 
age groups in the population. The secondary-school age 
population generally increases considerably during the 
initial phase of the dividend, which leads to a series of 
demands on public policy, especially in terms of providing 
quality secondary education and creating enough jobs to 
make good use of a growing supply of increasingly well-
educated and well-trained workers. 
As countries move through the period of the dividend, 
the secondary-school age group stabilizes and then begins 
to decrease, which provides a unique opportunity to extend 
coverage and improve the quality of schooling provided 
at the secondary level while demand for public spending 
from the older population is still relatively low.
The analysis presented below describes the general 
trends for the secondary-school age population and how they 
change according to the different phases of the dividend.
(a) General trends in the secondary-school age 
population
The weight and volume of the secondary-school 
age group in the population of Latin American countries 
vary according to the stage of demographic transition 
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reached. The relative size of this group usually shrinks 
at the beginning of the transition period when the 
number of children increases sharply. It later increases 
owing to the incorporation of cohorts born during 
low-fertility periods and then shrinks again as a result 
of the constant ageing of the population. In absolute 
terms, the volume of secondary-school age children 
usually increases steadily during the first stages of the 
transition up to a point of inflection after which the 
generations joining this group are smaller and smaller 
in comparison with previous years as a result of the 
decline in fertility rates. 
The current secondary-school-age population (those 
aged between 12 and 17) in Latin America is 64 million, 
three times as large as in 1950.17 The size of this group is 
expected to remain fairly stable over the next decade and 
a half and then decrease gradually. Projections place the 
secondary-school-age population at 57 million in 2050, 
which represents an approximate 10% drop from present 
levels (see table III.3). In relative terms, the proportion of 
people of secondary-school age in the population has fallen 
from 12.7% in 1950 to 11.3% today after reaching 14% 
in 1975. By 2050, this age group is expected to account 
for no more than 7.5% of the population.
17
 The age range for secondary education varies slightly from one 
country to another in Latin America (see table III.3). For illustrative 
purposes, this study considers as the regional average the most 
common range (12-17 years). 
Table III.3
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME, RELATIVE PARTICIPATION AND PAST AND FUTURE VARIATION OF THE SECONDARY-SCHOOL-AGE 
POPULATION, 1950-2050
Countries Age group












1950 1975 2008 2025 2050  1950 1975 2008 2025 2050
Latin America 12-17 20 474 44 096 64 059 64 159 56 904 12.7 14.0 11.3 9.5 7.5 3.1 -11
Argentina 12-17 1 877 2 777 4 140 4 111 3 632 10.9 10.7 10.4 9.0 7.2 2.2 -12
Bolivia 12-17 355 638 1 335 1 531 1 414 13.1 13.4 13.3 11.5 8.4 3.8 6
Brazil 11-17 8 428 18 386 23 585 24 785 21 761 15.6 17.0 12.1 10.8 8.5 2.8 -8
Chile 12-17 710 1 512 1 754 1 506 1 369 11.7 14.5 10.5 7.9 6.8 2.5 -22
Colombia 11-16 1 638 3 941 5 478 5 014 4 531 13.0 15.6 11.7 9.0 7.3 3.3 -17
Costa Rica 12-16 94 273 430 402 358 9.7 13.3 9.5 7.2 5.8 4.6 -17
Cuba 12-17 739 1 208 921 647 535 12.5 12.8 8.2 5.8 5.4 1.2 -42
Dominican Rep. 12-17 341 784 1 199 1 253 1 114 14.4 15.2 12.3 10.7 8.3 3.5 -7
Ecuador 12-17 418 953 1 674 1 693 1 552 12.3 13.8 12.1 9.9 7.7 4.0 -7
El Salvador 13-18 254 567 877 952 914 13.0 13.8 12.1 10.4 8.2 3.5 4
Guatemala 13-17 352 690 1 597 2 174 2 225 11.2 11.1 11.7 10.9 8.0 4.5 39
Haiti 12-18 486 816 1 548 1 700 1 707 15.1 15.9 15.9 13.5 10.6 3.2 10
Honduras 13-18 188 427 1 027 1 134 1 029 12.7 13.7 14.0 11.6 8.3 5.5 0
Mexico 12-17 3 562 8 605 12 616 11 235 9 180 12.8 14.2 11.7 9.1 7.0 3.5 -27
Nicaragua 13-17 147 343 673 640 541 11.4 12.3 11.9 9.4 6.8 4.6 -20
Panama 12-17 103 239 375 408 386 12.0 13.9 11.0 9.7 7.8 3.6 3
Paraguay 12-17 204 411 817 881 843 13.9 14.7 13.1 10.9 8.4 4.0 3
Peru 12-16 847 1 787 2 903 2 764 2 488 11.1 11.8 10.3 8.2 6.4 3.4 -14
Uruguay 12-17 240 301 320 289 262 10.7 10.6 9.6 8.1 7.0 1.3 -18
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 12-16 534 1 583 2 729 2 911 2 657 10.5 12.4 9.8 8.3 6.5 5.1 -3
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
Given the unevenness of demographic change in 
Latin America, its effects on the secondary-school-age 
population also tend to vary considerably from one country 
to another in the region. With notable variations and some 
exceptions, the secondary-school-age population has 
increased significantly in the last few decades in most of 
the region’s countries. In some, such as Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile, this population group has doubled or almost 
tripled since the middle of the last century (see table III.3). 
In others, such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Mexico, the increase has been between three- and four-fold. 
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In Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua, it has expanded 
by a factor of four-to-five, and in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Honduras, the secondary-school-age 
population is more than five times larger than it was in 
1950. By contrast, this population segment has increased 
by only 20% in Cuba and 30% in Uruguay. In Cuba, the 
number of secondary-school-age children has varied 
significantly over the period in question, however: having 
risen sharply in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s before 
declining after then.
Figures III.3 and III.4 show the future trends for the 
secondary-school-age population in absolute and relative 
terms, using a group of countries in different stages of 
demographic transition as an example. Both figures use 
2008 as the base year for projections for the following 
years up to 2050. A clear distinction emerges between the 
countries at the opposite ends of demographic transition: in 
Bolivia and Guatemala, the countries furthest behind in the 
process, the secondary-school-age population will continue 
to increase for several decades, and the relative weight of 
this population segment will decrease more slowly than the 
regional average; while in Chile and Cuba, the countries 
in the most advanced stage of transition, the secondary-
school-age population will continue its downward trend, 
and its relative weight will shrink faster than the regional 
average. Among the countries in the intermediate stages of 
transition, the declines both in absolute and relative terms 
of the secondary-school-age population will be steeper in 
Mexico than in Brazil. 
Figure III.3
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FUTURE TRENDS IN 
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Cuba Chile Brazil Mexico
Bolivia Guatemala Latin America
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
a
 The age range for secondary education varies slightly across the region. The range 
12 to 17 years was used as the average for Latin America. 
Figure III.4
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FUTURE TRENDS 
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Cuba Chile Brazil Mexico
Bolivia Guatemala Latin America
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
a 
 The age range for secondary education varies slightly across the region. The range 
12 to 17 years was used as the average for Latin America. 
(b) Evolution of the secondary-school-age population 
over the course of the demographic dividend 
As noted earlier, this study considers three distinct 
phases in the demographic dividend. In the first phase 
(dividend 1), the dependency ratio is high but falling; in 
the second (dividend 2), the dependency ratio reaches 
more favourable levels and continues to fall, and in the 
third (dividend 3), the dependency ratio begins to rise 
again but remains at favourable levels.
Figure III.5, which presents the regional average 
as well as the situation in countries in different stages 
of demographic transition, shows that although the 
duration and magnitude of the demographic dividend 
vary greatly from one Latin American country to another, 
trends for the secondary-school age group through 
the various phases of the demographic dividend tend 
to follow a similar pattern in all the countries. In all 
three countries shown  —Chile, the one furthest ahead 
in the demographic transition; Brazil, at an intermediate 
stage; and Bolivia, which is the furthest behind in the 
transition— the secondary-school age group increases 
notably in the initial phase of the dividend, while its 
relative weight in the population remains relatively 
stable, increasing slightly at first before starting to 
gradually decrease.
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Figure III.5
DEPENDENCY RATIO, SIZE AND RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE SECONDARY-SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION IN THE VARIOUS
PHASES OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND
(1950=100)




























































































































































Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007
a 
 The age range for secondary education varies slightly across the region. The range 12 to 17 years was used as the average for Latin America. Dividend 1: period in which the 
dependency ratio declines but is above two thirds; Dividend 2: period in which the dependency ratio falls below two thirds and continues to decrease; Dividend 3: period in which 
the dependency ratio rises, but is still below two thirds. 
During the second and most favourable phase of the 
dividend, the relative weight of the secondary-school age 
group falls significantly, while the absolute weight remains 
more or less stable, with a slight tendency to decrease 
towards the end.18 In the third phase, when the dependency 
ratio rises again but the proportion of elderly people is 
still low, the secondary-school age group decreases both 
in relative and absolute terms. 
Although the downward trend in the secondary-
school-age population tends to continue beyond the period
18
 In Chile, the relative weight oscillates signficantly, probably owing 
to past demographic events. 
of the dividend in all countries, by this point the situation 
will be less propitious for investment in education because 
the process of population ageing will have increased 
demand for public spending in other areas, such as health 
care and pensions.
The next sections of this chapter examine the effort 
that the countries of Latin America will need to make 
from an economic perspective to attain the coverage 
targets set for secondary education as well as the role 
that demographics play in this process. 
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C. The impact of demographic changes on 
 secondary education
In most of the region’s countries, the demographic changes under way are already having a 
positive impact on education. Throughout the demographic dividend period, sizeable savings 
will be generated by the decline of the dependency ratio of the primary- and secondary-school 
age population. These savings will be sufficient to cover the cost of providing universal 
coverage for secondary education and will make a considerable contribution towards achieving 
more ambitious targets in terms of spending per student. These dividends are realized not in 
the present but in the course of the demographic transition until the end of each country’s 
demographic dividend period. Therefore, countries must find ways to finance the resources 
needed today based on these future dividends.
1. Education targets and current coverage rates in Latin America
At the second Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago 
in 1998, the countries of the region committed themselves 
to attaining two fundamental targets by 2010:19 
(i) Ensuring, by the year 2010, universal access to quality 
primary education for all children and access to quality 
secondary education for at least 75 percent of young 
people, with increasing percentages of young people 
who complete secondary education; and
(ii) Providing the general population with opportunities 
for life-long learning. 
According to the assessment performed by UNESCO 
in 2007, access to primary education is almost a universal 
phenomenon in all the countries of the region, with 
Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Panama being the most 
recent countries to achieve this target (UNESCO, 2007). 
Despite the undeniable progress made in this regard, 
several countries in Latin America still have to make 
additional efforts to achieve universal primary-education 
coverage. This is the case of Colombia, the Dominican
19
 Plan of Action signed by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the Second Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago 
in 1998 (UNESCO, 2007).
Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay, whose net primary-
school enrolment rates are still below 90%.
Although net enrolment rates provide an indication of 
access to primary education, and in part to the education 
system as a whole, they do not reflect how students 
progress within, and complete, the respective education 
cycle. Primary-school enrolment may be high, but grade 
repetition, high dropout rates and low completion rates 
continue to be a problem. The percentage of children 
who repeat a grade at primary school is below 10% in 
the region as whole, but 13% in Guatemala and 20% in 
Brazil. The lowest completion rates for primary school 
are recorded in Ecuador (72.6%), El Salvador (66.4%), 
Guatemala (62.6%), Honduras (61.7%) and Nicaragua 
(50.2%) (UNESCO, 2007). 
Under these circumstances, large numbers of children 
will not reach secondary school at the appropriate age, 
which, in turn, undermines efforts to improve net enrolment 
rates in secondary education. Providing universal access 
to primary education is only the first step. Considerable 
efforts are still required to ensure that children progress 
within, and complete, the primary school cycle. Only 
then will secondary-school coverage and completion 
rates significantly increase in the region. 
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Two aspects of the second target (life-long learning 
opportunities for all) need to be addressed: eliminating 
adult illiteracy so that people can keep learning; and 
improving pre-school education given its proven importance 
in ensuring that children perform better throughout the 
various education cycles and beyond. 
As regards secondary education, of the countries 
for which information is available, only Argentina and 
Brazil have attained the 75% net enrolment target, while 
Bolivia and Peru are close to doing so. Secondary-school 
enrolment in Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua is below 60%.20 
Although there is less data on secondary-school completion 
rates, with the exception of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile 
and Peru, only up to half of the young people enrolled 
in secondary school in the region complete the cycle.21 
A comparison of the percentage of the population aged 
between 20 and 24 years that has completed secondary 
school shows that Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
are the furthest behind in this respect as three quarters 
or more of this population group in these countries have 
not completed secondary school. 
In the cases of both primary and secondary education, 
the countries whose systems lag most behind are also the 
least advanced in the demographic transition process. 
These are countries with younger populations which face 
greater potential demands at the levels of primary and 
secondary education and which have had to cope with 
serious constraints associated with their demographic 
situations. Despite this, and as was explained at the 
beginning of this chapter, these countries have only 
recently entered into the first phase of the demographic 
dividend period. Accordingly, from this point on, they 
will be able to take full advantage of the opportunity to 
improve their education systems. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the benefits to be 
derived from the demographic dividend do not accrue 
automatically, and governments will have to make
20
 There is no information on net enrolment in Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba 
and Uruguay, which have possibly already reached the target.
21
 No information is available on the current completion rate for 
secondary education in 10 of the region’s countries. 
considerable efforts to provide the resources needed to 
obtain them. The state of the education system in some of 
the countries that have already gone through a large part of 
their demographic dividend periods attest to the fact that 
achievements in education are not always proportional to 
improvements in demographic conditions. Demographic 
changes open up opportunities but, as several studies 
show, they are not the most determinant factor in bringing 
about improvements in the education system (UNESCO, 
2007; IDB, 2000).22 
While there are targets that remain to be attained at the 
primary level, the countries should seek to achieve those 
relating to the secondary level as soon as possible. From 
a demographic perspective, the fact that the secondary-
school age group has greatly increased in numbers means 
that its many needs, among which education is of vital 
importance, must be analysed and attended to. From 
an economic and social perspective, quality secondary 
education is needed to ensure that young people have 
access to higher-productivity jobs and thus to incomes 
that will enable them to remain above the poverty line. 
According to ECLAC (2000d), in order to have some 
chance of obtaining an intermediate or high level of 
income, people need to have at least 12 years of schooling 
behind them. Deficient education systems condemn young 
people to unemployment or informal and low-income 
jobs and perpetuate the intergenerational transmission 
of poverty.23 
The scenario analysis presented below considers only 
quantitative targets, in other words, minimum goals. The 
importance of the progress that still needs to be made in 
terms of the quality and equality throughout education 
cycle should not be overlooked, however; governments 
will need to invest as much, if not more, in improving 
the quality and equality of the education system as they 
do in expanding education coverage, which will reduce 
the possibilities of transferring the primary education 
dividend to the secondary education sector. 
22
 The UNESCO report (2007) cites the case of Belize and Guatemala: 
11% of the population in both countries is aged between 15 and 
19; coverage rates are 72% and 34%, respectively. A study carried 
out by Behrman, Duryea and Szekely referred to in the IDB report 
(2000) notes that demographic factors had only a marginal influence 
on the educational progress made in the 1980s in Latin America.
23
 It should be noted that higher levels of education among young 
people can lead to rising employment and huge expectations and 
this can lead to increasing unemployment. Education policies 
need to be implemented together with measures to guarantee the 
absorption of demand for more skilled jobs.
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2. Countries’ efforts to improve education
Public investment in education, as a percentage of GDP, 
constitutes an important measure of the efforts being made 
to improve education. This indicator varies considerably 
across the region, from 1.8% in the Dominican Republic 
to 6.4% of GDP in Bolivia in 2005. The countries that, 
in addition to Bolivia, are making the largest efforts in 
this regard are Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Paraguay, which are all investing over 4% of GDP in 
education. At the other end of the spectrum, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay, are making the 
smallest investments in education, as measured by this 
indicator, inasmuch as they allocate less than 3% of GDP 
to education (UNESCO, 2007). 
The countries in which public investment in education 
as a percentage of GDP has grown since 2000 are Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and 
Paraguay. Investment in education has remained practically 
stagnant in Cuba and Uruguay and has fallen in Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, most steeply in the case 
of Ecuador. 
A comparison of investment in education (as a 
percentage of GDP) with the progress made in education 
coverage shows that the achievements reached in the 
coverage and completion of education cycles are not 
proportionate to the amount invested in education. In 
Colombia, for example, investment levels similar to those 
of Mexico (again as a percentage of GDP) have resulted 
in far less coverage at both primary- and secondary-
education levels than in Mexico. As far as secondary 
school completion is concerned, however, the opposite 
occurs: 60% of the population aged between 20 and 24 
have completed secondary school in Colombia compared 
with 40% in Mexico. This implies that the same level 
of spending on education as a percentage of GDP can 
achieve highly different results according to institutional 
factors and other factors affecting the effectiveness of 
the education system, such as the grade-repetition and 
dropout rate. 
Spending per student is a more subtle measure of 
education policy efforts and reflects the resources available 
per enrolled student. This spending is determined by, 
among other elements, the costs of teachers and other 
staff, infrastructure costs and class sizes, three factors 
that are closely linked to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the education system.
In 2005, public spending per secondary-school student 
as a percentage of per capita GDP varied considerably 
across the region, from 3.7% in Guatemala to 18.4% in 
Colombia (UNESCO, 2007). There seems to be no direct 
relationship between this spending and the progress made 
either: Argentina and Mexico, for example, which spend 
similar amounts per student in terms of percentages of per 
capita GDP, have achieved very different results in terms 
of secondary-school coverage and completion rates.
3. The impact of demographic change on public investment 
 in secondary education
(a) Trends in dependency ratios in  
secondary education
As shown in the first section of this chapter, the weight 
of the secondary-school-age population increases slightly 
during the first phase of the demographic dividend and 
then declines gradually. In the second phase, the weight 
of this group falls sharply and in the third, it diminishes 
both in relative and absolute terms. 
The secondary-education dependency ratio can be 
understood as a measure of the potential burden that the 
secondary-school-age population (as defined by each 
country) places on the potentially active population (people 
aged between 20 and 64 years) 24 and is measured as the 
ratio between the two. Although this dependency ratio 
will decrease in all the countries during the demographic 
dividend period, the magnitude of this decline will depend 
on the stage of demographic transition reached, the pace of 
demographic change and the period in which the demographic 
dividend occurs in each country. The percentage drop in 
24
 This age group is used to include the population most likely to 
participate in the production process and to exclude those who are 
still in the education system or retired.
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the dependency ratio between the present moment and 
the moment at which the dividend is projected to end25 
provides an approximation of the benefit or dividend that 
each country can derive for its secondary education sector 
from the demographic change process, in other words, an 
estimate of the secondary-education dividend.26 
Table III.4 shows the total decrease of the dependency 
ratio in each country. On average, the dependency ratio 
will fall approximately 35% between now and the end of 
the demographic dividend period. The countries furthest 
behind in the demographic transition process, such as 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, will record
25
 The duration of the demographic dividend period is determined by 
the definition given in the first section of this chapter, in other words, 
when the dependency ratio exceeds two thirds (see table III.2). 
26
 The functioning of this dividend may be related to the reduction 
of the number of household dependents which makes it possible 
to increase household spending per child.
a much larger drop (of about 50%) since their dividend 
period is just starting and they will experience a total 
reduction of the dependency ratio. Some countries in 
an intermediate transition stage will witness a decline 
of about 40% (Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico) and 
those at more advanced stages will undergo a decrease 
of up to 30% (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay).27 Some 
countries in the intermediate transition stage, such as 
Mexico and Panama, will experience smaller reductions 
owing, probably, to the fact that their demographic trends 
to date imply that their demographic transition will be 
faster in the future.
27
 As shown in the first section of this chapter, Argentina and Uruguay 
fall into the most advanced subgroup of countries in the advanced 
stage of demographic transition, while Chile is in the second 
subgroup, and Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico in the third.
Table III.4
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE SECONDARY-EDUCATION DEPENDENCY RATIO FROM 2005 TO THE END
OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND PERIOD
Countries
Secondary-education dependency ratio
Year in which the demographic
dividend endsIn 2005 In the year in which the demographic dividend ends Percentage change
Latin America 0.214 0.138 -35.4 2040
Argentina 0.194 0.133 -31.3 2039
Brazil 0.222 0.155 -30.0 2040
Chile 0.190 0.131 -30.7 2026
Colombia 0.220 0.131 -40.2 2042
Costa Rica 0.182 0.103 -43.5 2041
Cuba 0.142 0.093 -34.7 2024
El Salvador 0.239 0.142 -40.3 2048
Guatemala 0.278 0.132 -52.6 2050
Mexico 0.222 0.128 -42.2 2036
Nicaragua 0.258 0.115 -55.4 2050
Panama 0.208 0.151 -27.1 2036
Paraguay 0.278 0.141 -49.4 2050
Peru 0.203 0.109 -46.5 2049
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007.
(b) Demography and secondary education coverage: 
overcoming demographic constraints
The demographic transition process and its influence 
on the secondary-education dependency ratio are in 
full force in all the countries of Latin America. The 
issue now is to what extent these changes are being 
converted into gains in terms of education coverage. As 
the secondary-education dependency ratio decreases, 
coverage can be expected to increase. The first question 
is whether the expected increases in coverage are actually 
happening. Figure III.6 shows the relationship between 
education coverage, measured as the net enrolment 
rate, and the secondary-education dependency ratio, 
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which reflects the demographic situation that affects 
secondary education.28 The countries of OECD, which 
are representative of countries in very advanced stages 
of demographic transition, are included in the figure 
for reference.
As the OECD countries are at much later stages 
of demographic transition, their secondary-education 
dependency ratios are much lower than those of any Latin 
American country (except Cuba). Despite the differences in 
dependency ratios, the differences in secondary-education 
coverage are smaller in relative terms, in other words, 
there is a weak relationship between secondary-education 
coverage and the demographic situation (correlation of 
+0.12). Moreover the relationship tends to be a positive 
one, which, to some extent, suggests that progress in 
education coverage in the developed countries depends 
less on demographics than on factors related to spending 
and education policy. 
In Latin America, on the other hand, there is an inverse 
relationship between the coverage rates and dependency 
ratios for secondary education (a correlation of -0.65) 
which seems to indicate that the drop in the relative 
demand in the education sector has helped the countries 
in the more advanced stages of demographic transition, 
such as Argentina and Cuba, to increase education 
coverage, while higher dependency ratios are hampering 
coverage expansion efforts in countries further behind 
in the transition process, such as Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay.29 
In short, the difference between what is occurring in 
the developed countries and in Latin America as regards 
expanding secondary-education coverage is that policy 
decisions largely determine progress in the developed 
countries, while demographic constraints still influence 
the situation in Latin America. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between these two 
variables and the results obtained by some Latin American 
countries suggest that demographic constraints are 
not so large as to be impossible to overcome with the 
implementation of appropriate policies. Two sets of 
countries in figure III.6 show this to be the case: Brazil 
and Colombia on the one hand, and Bolivia, Guatemala 
and Paraguay, on the other. The dependency ratio (in other 
words, the demographic restrictions) in each set is very 
similar, but the progress made in education is not.
28
 The net enrolment rate in secondary education is not a totally accurate 
measure because it is affected by those who have fallen behind in 
the education system: children that fall into the secondary-school 
age group but are registered in primary school. 
29
 This cannot be interpreted as a causal relationship because social 
and economic factors, as well as factors associated with the 
institutional educational arrangements beyond the scope of this 
analysis, are involved.
Figure III.6
NET ENROLMENT RATES AND DEPENDENCY RATIOS IN 














































Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
a 
 The secondary-education dependency ratio is the ratio between the secondary-school-
age population and the potentially productive population (people aged between 20 
and 64).
Brazil and Colombia, for example, are both countries 
in the intermediate stage of demographic transition, which, 
despite having similar dependency ratios of about 23%, have 
achieved very different coverage rates (78% in Brazil and 
54% in Colombia). Bolivia, Guatemala and Paraguay are the 
countries furthest behind in demographic transition in the 
region and therefore all have very high dependency ratios (of 
about 30%). Despite these demographic restrictions, Bolivia 
has made notable progress and achieved a net secondary-
education coverage of 74% that is far higher than coverage 
in Guatemala (less than 40%) and Paraguay (56%).
Although bringing about improvements in secondary 
education in Latin America depends more on demographic 
constraints than it does in developed countries, some 
countries in the region are overcoming these restrictions 
and achieving high coverage rates. This shows that when 
all of society is behind the effort, the educational level of 
the population can be improved. 
(c) Social investment in secondary education
One way to gauge the effort a society is making to 
improve education is to measure education spending as a 
percentage of GDP (in other words, the proportion of the 
country’s economic resources that is invested in education). 
The most notable case in Latin America is Bolivia, which 
has significantly boosted education spending as a percentage 
of GDP. Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico 
and Paraguay have also made efforts in this regard in 
recent years. The question is to what extent this increased 
spending translates into significant improvements in terms 
of coverage. Figure III.7 presents education spending as 
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a percentage of GDP for the countries of Latin America 
and, as a point of comparison, the education spending 
levels of the OECD countries.
Figure III.7







































Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
The levels of average spending on secondary 
education in Latin America and in the OECD countries 
are very different: 1.6% and 2.4% of GDP, respectively.30 
Several Latin American countries, however, are spending 
similar proportions of GDP on secondary education as 
OECD countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
30
 A substantial portion of education spending goes towards paying 
wages. In 2005, for example, wages represented 76% of education 
costs of public institutions worldwide both for primary and secondary 
education (UNESCO Data Centre [online] www.uis.unesco.org). 
In developed countries, other factors obviously also determine the 
general state of the education system.
and Nicaragua), which is highly noteworthy because, as 
figure III.9 shows, all the OECD countries have far higher 
secondary-education coverage rates. With the exception of 
Cuba, no country in Latin America has attained the levels 
of coverage found in OECD. This suggests that, with the 
same effort relative to the size of their economies, the OECD 
countries achieve better results as far as expanding coverage 
is concerned than some Latin American countries. 
The question is: why? What factors lie behind the 
differences in coverage achieved through similar levels 
of spending (when measured as a proportion of GDP)? 
Part of the difference must stem from demography given 
that dependency ratios are lower in the OECD countries. 
There must be other and possibly more influential factors, 
however, related to the institutional and organizational 
structure of the education system (number of students 
and teachers per class), as well as to dropout and grade 
repetition rates, teacher training processes, and individual 
and social characteristics, that can make access to education 
expensive and affect a country’s results in education. 
An attempt to gauge the efforts that the countries of 
Latin America will need to make to attain several different 
coverage targets for secondary education is presented in 
the next section. The various factors and, in particular, 
the demographic effects involved are taken into account 
using a methodology that breaks down spending into its 
various components.
Box III. 1
BREAKDOWN OF SPENDING ON SECONDARY EDUCATION
The effort made to finance secondary 
education can be measured by observing 
the size of spending on secondary 
education in relation to the size of the 
economy. The equation below presents 
the measure of spending on secondary 
education as a percentage of GDP as 
the product obtained by multiplying four 
factors.
 ( ) ( )
   Number of students  E
   Gross enrolment rate  B




























The first factor, the secondary-
education dependency ratio, measures 
the impact of the age structure of the 
population on spending. This is defined 
as the proportion of people officially of 
secondary-school age (generally those 
aged between 12 and 17 years) divided 
by the working-age population (those aged 
between 20 and 64 years). The decline of 
this demographic dependency ratio over 
time considerably loosens the constraints 
on education funding. 
The second and third factors are 
associated with enrolment rates: the 
proportion of students attending school in 
relation to the population “at risk” (those 
officially of secondary-school age). For 
both theoretical and empirical reasons 
discussed below, gross enrolment is 
considered to be the product of two 
factors: the net enrolment rate and the 
ratio between gross enrolment and net 
enrolment. The gross enrolment rate is the 
number of students enrolled in secondary 
school divided by the population “at risk”. 
The net enrolment rate is the number of 
students enrolled in secondary school 
that are within the standard age range for 
enrolment, divided by the population “at 
risk”. The net enrolment rate is usually used 
to measure progress in education coverage, 
with 100% representing universal access 
to secondary education. The coefficient 
between gross and net enrolment reflects 
the extent to which students outside 
the standard age range are enrolled in 
secondary education. This coefficient is 
higher than one and reflects the effects 
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of grade repetition in secondary school, 
as well as delays in entering secondary 
school, which often occur when the 
primary education system undergoes a 
rapid expansion. 
The fourth factor is a measure 
of average spending per student that 
reflects teachers’ wages, administrative 
expenses and the number of students 
per class. The measure of spending 
per student is normalized by the level 
of labour productivity recorded in each 
economy (GDP per working-age adult). 
In other words, average spending per 
student in relation to GDP per working-
age adult was used as the measure. In 
Latin America, one year’s spending on 
secondary education is approximately 10% 
of GDP per working-age adult, compared 
with about 17% in the OECD countries. 
OECD countries thus spend 70% more 
resources per student than the countries of 
Latin America do. It should be pointed out 
that these figures refer only to spending 
levels and do not take into account the 
effectiveness of that spending. 
Breaking down secondary-education 
spending as a percentage of GDP into 
these four factors makes it possible 
to analyse the role that demographic 
differences among countries, as far as 
the accounting of educational spending 
is concerned, play in the different 
economies. This exercise also makes 
it possible to examine the hypothetical 
impact that changes in these factors 
could have on general costs. This 
study, for example, analyses how the 
changes in age structure that occur in 
the demographic transition process can 
facilitate the pursuit of universal coverage 
for secondary education.
Box III.1 (concluded)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Countries of Latin America were paired up with 
OECD countries that spend the same proportion of GDP 
on secondary education (Colombia with the United 
States, Argentina with Spain, and Nicaragua with Japan). 
Nicaragua spends a slightly higher percentage of GDP on 
secondary education than Japan, which means it invests 
proportionally more of the economic resources its society 
generates than does of Japan.31
An analysis of the first pair of countries (see table 
III.5) shows that the demographic dependency ratio of 
Colombia is significantly higher than that of the United 
States, but gross enrolment and spending per student are 
much higher in the United States. These two countries 
therefore make the same effort in terms of spending as a 
proportion of GDP but achieve very different results as 
far as coverage is concerned. In other words, the United 
States uses its low dependency ratio to step up both 
spending per student and coverage. 
The same occurs in the case of Argentina and Spain 
(see table III.6). The dependency ratio of Argentina is 
twice that of Spain, and although Argentina is making the 
same effort in terms of investing in education, Spain is 
taking advantage of its lower dependency ratio to spend 
50% more per student and achieve 40% more coverage 
than Argentina.
In the final pair of countries examined (see table 
III.7), it is interesting to note that Nicaragua is making 
a slightly larger effort than Japan in terms of education 
spending as a percentage of GDP, but Japan is investing 
the demographic dividend in spending-per-student 
levels that are 72% higher than in Nicaragua with 50% 
more coverage. 
31
 Logically, in absolute terms, both spending and price levels 
are much higher in Japan than in Nicaragua, hence the use of a 
relative measure.
Table III.5 
COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES: BREAKDOWN
OF SPENDING
Colombia United States United States/Colombia
Spending/GDP 
(percentages) 2.1 2.1 1.02
Dependency ratio 
(percentages) 0.22 0.15 0.68
Gross enrolment 
(percentages) 82 94 1.14
Spending per student 
(percentages of GDP) 12 15 1.32
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Table III.6
ARGENTINA AND SPAIN: BREAKDOWN OF SPENDING
Argentina Spain Spain/Argentina
Spending/GDP 
(percentages) 1.7 1.8 1.01
Dependency ratio 
(percentages) 0.20 0.09 0.48
Gross enrolment 
(percentages) 86 118 1.38
Spending per student 
(percentages of GDP) 10 16 1.52
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Table III.7
NICARAGUA AND JAPAN: BREAKDOWN OF SPENDING
Nicaragua Japan Japan/Nicaragua
Spending/GDP 
(percentages) 1.7 1.6 0.95
Dependency ratio 
(percentages) 0.26 0.10 0.36
Gross enrolment 
(percentages) 66 102 1.53
Spending per student 
(percentages of GDP) 10 17 1.72
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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These differences in secondary-education coverage 
show that demographics constitute an important restriction 
in the countries of Latin America for making progress in 
this regard. It is also apparent that some countries can 
overcome this constraint by making spending-related 
efforts. Figures III.6 and III.7 show that Guatemala and 
Paraguay have similar demographic situations (dependency 
ratios of 28%), but that Paraguay has been making a 
larger effort to invest in education (by spending 1.5% of 
GDP on education compared with 1.2% in Guatemala) 
and has achieved more coverage (66% compared with 
53% in Guatemala). Another example is provided by the 
comparison of Chile and Costa Rica, which also have 
similar demographic situations. In this case, Chile is the 
country that is achieving greater coverage by spending a 
larger proportion of GDP on education. 
Figure III.8 shows the difference between the 
demographic situation and other education-spending-
related factors in all the countries of Latin America 
and the OECD countries for which this information is 
available. Using a logarithmic scale, spending per potential 
student (the product of gross enrolment and spending per 
student) is cross-measured with the dependency ratio. 
The sloping lines on the figure represent the levels of 
spending on secondary education as a percentage of GDP 
(iso-spending lines). 
There are clear differences between the situation in 
Latin America and the situation in OECD countries. The 
countries of Latin America are generally characterized 
by low levels of spending per potential student and high 
dependency ratios, while the OECD countries have high 
spending-per-potential-student levels and low dependency 
ratios. With the exception of Cuba, all the countries of Latin 
America currently spend between 1% and 2% of GDP on 
secondary education, while OECD countries spend between 
2% and 3% of their GDP on secondary education. 
The demographic situation is clearly an important 
factor in the differences observed between developed 
countries and Latin America as regard secondary-education 
coverage as this study has shown. The OECD countries 
seem to have taken advantage of their lower demographic 
dependency ratios to intensify spending on secondary 
education. Figure III.8 supports this notion. Moving from 
right to left represents the decline in the dependency ratios 
that Latin America could experience as the demographic 
transition process lowers those ratios to current OECD 
levels. The figure clearly shows, however, that even when 
that point has been reached, Latin America will not attain 
the same levels of secondary-education coverage as the 
OECD countries unless it steps up spending to between 
3% and 4% of GDP. In other words, the demographic 
situation can be a constraint, but it is also an opportunity, 
and under no circumstances is it an excuse for not making 
the significant investments needed in education.
Figure III.8
SECONDARY-EDUCATION DEPENDENCY RATIO, SPENDING PER 



















































Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008
a
 Spending per potential student refers to spending per person of secondary-school 
age. The secondary-education dependency ratio is the coefficient between the 
secondary-school age population and the potentially productive population (people 
aged between 20 and 64 years).
4. More ambitious education targets
Given the current economic, social and demographic 
conditions in Latin America, the countries of the region 
should focus their efforts on achieving significant 
advances in secondary education since the demographic 
dividend offers an opportunity for governments to adopt 
increasingly ambitious targets for that level of education. 
The analysis presented below examines the possibility 
of attaining alternative goals in secondary education 
under different scenarios. It should be noted that these 
exercises are merely intended to provide some indication 
of the size of the effort required and should not be taken 
as recipes for action. 
The first possible goal considered is the coverage 
target of 75% for secondary education by 2010 adopted 
by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean at the 
second Summit of the Americas (UNESCO, 2007). The 
second possible goal is universal coverage for secondary 
education, which in many studies is considered essential 
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for attaining development goals.32 The third possible goal 
pursues, to some extent, progress in both the coverage and 
quality of the education system and consists of achieving 
current OECD standards for secondary education, in other 
words, 93% coverage and spending per secondary-school 
student equivalent to 17% of GDP. 
The feasibility of attaining certain goals for secondary 
education depends on the cost of reaching those goals. 
Data on three factors are needed to calculate these costs: 
the gross enrolment rate, the costs of education per 
student and the secondary-education dependency ratio. 
Given that the scenarios are framed in terms of net rates, 
an additional component that relates gross rates to net 
rates is required. The difference between gross and net 
rates of coverage provides a measurement of out-of-age 
enrolment that has occurred either because of grade 
repetition or for other reasons. A larger difference means 
that more students in the country are enrolled in courses 
that do not correspond to their age group.
Figure III.9 shows that in general there is a certain 
relationship between gross and net enrolment which suggests 
that, as coverage increases, the education system improves 
and out-of-age enrolment diminishes. The situation varies 
considerably, however, and even in the most developed 
countries there are high levels of out-of-age enrolment, 
which is one of the factors that raise education costs. For 
the purpose of projecting education costs in the analyses 
presented in this section, the average out-of-age enrolment 
rate of the OECD countries (16%) is used. 
Figure III.9




















































Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
32
 The Universal Basic and Secondary Education Project of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences suggests the target of universal 
coverage for secondary education. The target proposed by ECLAC 
for the population aged between 20 and 24 to have an average of 12 
years of education is equivalent to universal secondary education. 
(a) The target set by the Summit of the Americas 
The analysis here consists of attempting to determine 
the spending required to attain the goal set by the Summit 
of the Americas (75% coverage) starting from the situation 
in each country in around 2005. Figure III.10 shows 
that Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Peru are close 
to reaching this target at a minimum additional cost (in 
relative GDP terms). Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua 
will have to make a greater effort. It is interesting to note 
that Colombia, despite being at a more advanced stage of 
the demographic transition process, will have to make as 
much of an effort as Nicaragua. The five countries that 
have already reached the target, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Cuba and Uruguay, are not included in the figure. In order 
to reach the Summit of the Americas target as of 2005, the 
region should have spent between an additional US$ 1.5 
and 3.1 billion in current dollars, which is equivalent 
to an additional 0.1% of the region’s total GDP. This is 
therefore a perfectly feasible goal.
Figure III.10
ADDITIONAL EFFORT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE NET 
ENROLMENT TARGET OF 75% SET BY THE SUMMIT OF
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Out-of-age enrolment rate remains unchanged
Out-of-age enrolment rate falls
Source: Calculations by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay have already reached the target.
Two types of cost calculations are given to take into 
account the impact of out-of-age enrolment, which is one 
of the factors that significantly raises education costs but 
tends to diminish as coverage increases. The higher cost 
calculation assumes no changes in the percentage of out-of-
age enrolment, and the lower cost calculation assumes that 
this percentage will fall to the 16% average of the OECD 
countries. In Nicaragua, for example, the difference between 
the two is large due to the high percentage of students 
enrolled in courses outside their age group (about 55%). 
In Brazil, out-of-age enrolment is 35% and will have to be 
halved if the country is to attain the OECD level. This will 
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obviously require modifications to the education system. 
Like policies to reduce out-of-age enrolment from primary 
school onward, these cannot be introduced overnight.
(b) Universal coverage 
Figure III.11 shows that attaining universal coverage 
for secondary education implies greater costs but can 
feasibly be achieved by most of the countries by increasing 
spending on education by up to one half a percentage point 
of GDP. Although Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua will 
need to make a large effort to reach this target, the costs of 
doing so will diminish substantially to approximately one 
percentage point of GDP if out-of-age enrolment is reduced. 
Achieving universal coverage today would mean increasing 
spending by between US$ 8.8 billion and US$ 17.3 billion 
in current dollars on improving secondary education in 
the region, in other words an addition half a percentage 
point of GDP.33
Figure III.11
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE TARGET 
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Out-of-age enrolment rate remains unchanged
Out-of-age enrolment rate falls
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
(c) The OECD standard
This section aims to justify the pursuit of a more 
ambitious target for the region and to present the 
feasibility of doing so. Net coverage and cost per student 
are shown in figure III.12, which is divided into four 
33
 This estimate is very similar to that of Binder (2006), who calculated 
the additional cost of achieving the target of universal secondary 
education for Latin America in around 2000 to be between US$ 4.1 
billion and US$ 10.7 billion (in constant 2002 dollars), depending 
on grade repetition rates. Converting these figures to current dollars 
and adjusting the goal from 90% coverage to 100%, the estimated 
costs would be between US$ 6.2 billion and US$ 16.3 billion, 
which is fairly close to the projections presented here (between 
US$ 8.8 billion and US$ 17.3 billion).
quadrants according to the average of both factors. The 
countries fall into one of two categories: the developed 
countries have a high coverage rate and high costs per 
student and are all in quadrant I; while the countries of 
Latin America are in quadrant III. Net enrolment rates 
vary considerably within the region but spending levels 
are similar. 
Figure III.12
SPENDING PER STUDENT AND NET ENROLMENT a












































Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
a
 Spending per student refers to spending per enrolled student in relation to average 
GDP per working-age adult. 
Attaining the target of 75% net coverage for 
secondary education set at the Summit of the Americas 
or universal (100%) coverage would mean the countries 
making a horizontal shift into quadrant IV, in which no 
country currently stands, probably because this is not 
very feasible. To move towards the level of the developed 
countries, Latin America needs to invest not only in greater 
coverage but also in increasing spending per student, in 
other words, to move into quadrant I. A more realistic 
scenario for the changes needed in the region involves 
boosting both coverage and spending per student. The 
third target examined in this section is therefore to reach 
the average levels of coverage and spending recorded 
for OECD countries, in other words, 93% coverage and 
spending per student equivalent to 17% of GDP per 
working-age adult. 
This target contemplates less-than-universal coverage 
but also requires an effort to bring spending per student 
up to the average OECD level. Figure III.13 shows 
that all countries, except Cuba, need to significantly 
increase spending on education as a percentage of GDP.34 
34
 Cuba reports an exceptionally high level of spending per student in 
terms of per capita GDP, owing at least in part to the way in which 
teachers’ wages and/or GDP are valued in that country. 
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Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay need to make the 
largest efforts in this regard: Guatemala and Nicaragua 
need to raise spending by over four percentage points 
of GDP, and Paraguay by more than 3.5 percentage 
points of GDP. 
Figure III.13
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT NEEDED TO ATTAIN THE AVERAGE 
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Out-of-age enrolment rate remains unchanged 
Out-of-age enrolment rate falls
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC
This would mean that the region’s total spending 
level would have to be far more than doubled, with 
added expenditure of from US$ 56 billion to US$ 66 
billion at current prices (4% of GDP). It may seem 
surprising that Latin America would have to spend 4% 
of its GDP on secondary education to achieve OECD 
levels of coverage and of spending per student given 
that OECD countries currently spend about 2.6% of 
their GDP on education. The explanation lies in the 
favourable demographic structure existing in the OECD 
countries. As the demographic transition under way in 
Latin America moves ahead, the proportional burden of 
education spending will decrease, and this decrease is 
the effect of the demographic dividend.
(d) The impact of the demographic dividend
As shown above, upgrading the education systems in 
the region to meet the targets set for secondary education 
will represent major costs for the countries of Latin 
America, but these costs could fall as the dependency 
ratio declines in the years ahead. Countries can not, 
however, just wait until the dependency ratio falls and 
costs of achieving these education goals decreases as a 
result of inertia. For several reasons, efforts need to be 
made today, through loans or taxation, to ensure that 
the expected future dividend materializes. First, waiting 
for effects of the demographic dividend will only make 
it possible to reach these goals in the long run. Second, 
if several generations are allowed to continue suffering 
from shortfalls in the secondary-education system, the 
necessary increases in productivity and savings, and hence 
the leap forward in development, will be much harder to 
attain. Third, the period in which the younger generations 
can produce the savings needed to address the growing 
demands of the older adult population is growing shorter 
by the day.
The percentage drop in the dependency ratio for 
secondary education represents the size of the sector’s 
demographic dividend. This drop ranges from 25% to 
55% in Latin America. Given that the dependency ratio 
is a factor in education spending as a percentage of GDP, 
this means that education spending will experience a 
reduction of the same proportions. 
The case of Paraguay is analysed below to assess 
the contribution of the demographic dividend to the 
achievement of different education targets. Figure III.14 
shows two costs projections for the secondary education 
system.35 The dotted line represents the projected level 
of spending per student needed to uphold the current 
education system as the age structure of the population 
varies over time. This shows that costs are projected to 
fall by almost 50% over the period under consideration. 
The second projection (the unbroken line) supposes a 
system of universal coverage in which Paraguay would 
spend 2.4% of GDP (instead of the 1.5% it spends at 
present) and would maintain that level of spending 
regardless of the changes in the demographic situation. 
In this case, the costs also fall 50% over the period in 
question. The difference between the two projections 
(the area between the two curves in the figure) shows 
the additional spending that Paraguay will have to carry 
out in order to achieve and maintain universal coverage. 
The challenge for the country is to find a means to cover 
this increase in spending.
Figure III.15 presents the same information but with 
a third line that shows spending as a percentage of GDP 
if it remains at the same level as today even though the 
demographic situation changes. This implies a first-level 
effort that involves reinvesting the whole secondary 
education dividend in the system. This reinvestment of the 
dividend would cover a large portion of the additional costs 
required and, from 2032 onward (where the lines cross), 
there would be sufficient funds to cover the additional 
costs of providing universal coverage.
35
 These projections suppose that GDP will grow at the same pace as 
the working-age population (using the Cobb-Douglas function). They 
do not take into account the impact of improvements in education 
on economic growth. 
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Figure III.14








2004 2014 2024 2034 2044
Cost of universal coverage Cost of current coverage
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
Figure III.15
PARAGUAY: RESOURCES MAINTAINING CURRENT SPENDING  








2004 2014 2024 2034 2044
Cost of universal coverage
Cost of current coverage
Resources maintaining current spending on secondary education
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
As most countries have already attained coverage 
close to 100% in the case of primary education, they 
could also invest the primary-education dividend (derived 
from the decrease in the dependency ratio in the primary 
cycle) in improving the secondary education system.36 
This possibility is shown in figure III.16 which presents 
another projection of spending needs based on the use of 
both the primary- and the secondary-education dividends 
to improve the secondary education system. 
In this case, Paraguay would have sufficient funds to 
achieve the universal coverage target as of 2015, the point at 
which the demand curve (universal coverage) intersects with 
the resources curve (the investment of the two dividends). 
36
 The dependency ratio for primary education is the ratio between the 
population at the age to attend the primary cycle and the potentially 
productive population (aged between 20 and 64).
To reach this point, Paraguay would have to reinvest all the 
balance of the secondary-education dividend obtained so far 
and all of the primary-education dividend. From 2015 onward, 
the total education dividend would not only be sufficient to 
finance completely the maintenance of universal coverage, 
it would also generate savings (area B) that could be used to 
improve the quality of education or invest in other sectors, 
such as the financing of the pension system. 
Figure III.16










2004 2014 2024 2034 2044
Cost of universal coverage
Resources investing the primary-education dividend
Resources maintaining current spending on secondary education
A B
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
To strengthen the argument, the exercise was repeated 
using the data for Colombia, which is at a more advanced 
stage of demographic transition than Paraguay, has a higher 
level of coverage for secondary education and is therefore 
closer to attaining universal coverage. In the case of Colombia, 
investing the secondary-education dividend alone would mean 
reaching the universal coverage target in 2019. Investing the 
primary-as well as the secondary-education dividend would 
mean attaining the target in 2013 (see figure III.17).
The cases of Colombia and Paraguay are further compared 
with regard to the more ambitious target of attaining OECD 
levels of coverage and spending per student. Figure III.18 
shows that if Paraguay maintains its spending on secondary 
education at current levels, there is no possibility of the 
country reaching the OECD target during the period under 
consideration. If it uses the entire secondary-education dividend 
and the entire primary-education dividend, however, Paraguay 
would attain the target in 2047 and would have accumulated 
70% of the necessary additional resources in 2030. In other 
words, although the demographic dividend is not enough to 
cover all the additional costs in the short term, it can make 
a considerable contribution towards doing so. In the case of 
Colombia, if all the primary- and the secondary-education 
dividend are reinvested in secondary education, the target 
will be reached in 2026 (see figure III.19).
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Figure III.17










2006 2016 2026 2036
Cost of universal coverage
Resources investing the primary-education dividend
Resources maintaining current spending on secondary education
A B
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
Figure III.18
PARAGUAY: RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ATTAIN OECD LEVEL OF 









2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049
Cost of OECD system
Resources investing primary education dividend
Resources at current level of spending on secondary education
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
Figure III.19
COLOMBIA: RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ATTAIN OECD LEVEL OF 








2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041
Cost of OECD system
Resources investing primary education dividend
Resources at current level of spending on secondary education
A B
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the demographic 
dividend can help countries in Latin America significantly 
to reach more ambitious goals in secondary education. 
One way to appreciate the magnitude of the costs involved 
and the resources the education dividend will generate in 
the decades ahead is to calculate their discounted present 
value today (the sum of future values discounted by the 
projected interest rate). Figure III.20 shows that for Latin 
America as a whole, the present value of the education 
dividend represents 0.8% of the present value of regional 
GDP and ranges between 0.3% and 1.7% across the region. 
Moreover, in all the countries of the region, the dividend is 
sufficient to cover the cost of achieving universal secondary 
education and would make a significant contribution 
towards attaining the average OECD level of coverage 
and spending-per-student.
Figure III.20
DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUE OF THE PRIMARY- AND 
SECONDARY-EDUCATION DIVIDEND AND THE COST OF 
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Dividend Cost of attaining universal coverage
Cost of attaining OECD level of coverage and spending
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2007, and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 2008.
However, the resources freed up by the demographic 
dividend are not available to the countries at present, 
but as they are generated over the course of the whole 
demographic dividend period. As is apparent in figures 
III.16 and III.17, although there are sufficient resources 
in the period as a whole to guarantee universal coverage 
(by 2013 in Colombia and 2015 in Paraguay), there is a 
shortage of recourses at first (area A in the figures) that 
is then followed by a surplus (area B). 
This raises the possibility of redistributing resources 
over time by borrowing to finance today’s investments and 
then using the proceeds of the demographic dividend to 
repay that loan later on.
Although the demographic dividend will generate 
savings in the future, the countries should not wait for it 
to take effect and miss the opportunity for one or more 
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generations to improve their level of education and 
consequently their possibilities of obtaining productive 
jobs as a means of remaining above the poverty line. 
Moreover, generations of people living close to or below 
the poverty line could hamper the materialization of the 
dividend generated by the demographic changes. 
Having a poorly educated population undermines 
countries’ possibilities of competing in today’s globalized 
economy and makes them less prepared to respond to the 
pension and other demands of an ageing population, which 
will undoubtedly hinder their development.
It has already been shown that some secondary-
education targets can be reached with relatively little 
effort, that the savings generated by the dividend 
represent an opportunity for setting more ambitious goals 
and that the best course of action as far as furthering 
development is concerned is to try to attain these goals 
as soon as possible.
 Conclusions
Under present demographic conditions, most of the region’s 
countries are very close to reaching the 75% target set for 
secondary education coverage by the Summit of the Americas. 
The additional cost of reaching this target for the region 
as a whole is estimated at between US$ 1.5 billion and 
US$ 3 billion at current prices. Although attaining universal 
secondary education would require a greater effort, this goal 
is still feasible for the region at an additional cost of between 
US$ 8.8 billion and US$ 17.3 billion. Achieving the third 
target suggested in this chapter, which would mean bringing 
coverage and spending per student up to OECD levels, will be 
far more difficult for the countries of Latin America as they 
still face demographic constraints. The additional costs in this 
case would be between US$ 56 billion and US$ 66 billion 
in current dollars, which means that spending on secondary 
education would have to be raised to 4% of regional GDP, 
far above the average spending level (2.6% of GDP) of the 
developed countries, because high demographic dependency 
ratios still exist in the region. 
The demographic context in Latin America is changing, 
however, and although the situation varies from country 
to country, in general they are going through a favourable 
demographic dividend period brought about by the huge 
changes under way in the age structure of their populations. 
These changes result from the demographic transition process, 
which is largely characterized by a significant reduction 
in the weight of the child population and an increase in 
the proportion of working-age people. For the region as a 
whole, the demographic dividend, as defined in this study, 
will last until the beginning of the 2040s.37 From then on, 
the proportion of older people will increase rapidly and the 
ageing of the population will intensify (ECLAC, 2008g).
As a result of these changes, the secondary-school-age 
population at first increases and then trends downwards. 
In relative terms, in Latin America, the weight of this age 
37
 The definition of the demographic dividend period is given in the 
first part of this chapter.
group has already dropped from 14% in 1974 to 11.3% 
today, and is projected to continue falling gradually to 7.5% 
in 2050. This decline represents a significant reduction in 
the dependency ratio between the secondary school-age 
population and the working-age population. 
The reduction in the dependency ratios of the 
primary- and secondary school-age population over 
the course of the demographic dividend period will 
produce a sizeable dividend. Calculated as a discounted 
present value, this dividend currently represents as much 
as 1.7% of the countries’ GDP and averages 0.8% of 
regional GDP. This dividend, which is sufficient to cover 
the cost of attaining the target of universal secondary 
education, could significantly contribute towards all the 
countries of Latin America achieving more ambitious 
goals, such as OECD levels of coverage and spending 
in secondary education.
In other words, to make greater progress in secondary 
education, the countries of the region should reinvest 
the whole secondary-education dividend as well as the 
primary-education dividend in the secondary education 
system. Given that these dividends are realized not in the 
present but in the course of the demographic transition 
and up to the end of the demographic dividend period, 
each country will need to find a way to finance now the 
resources they may be able to save in the future. 
Countries need to start financing the upgrading of 
the education system today. If they wait for the education 
dividend to come into effect, improvements will only be 
obtained in the distant future, and countries will miss the 
opportunity for one or more generations to improve their 
level of education and, consequently, their possibilities 
of obtaining productive jobs and generating the savings 
needed to address the demands that will be generated by 
the forthcoming ageing of the population. In short, failing 
to improve the education of the next generations now will 
undermine the country’s possibilities of harvesting the benefits 
derived from the demographic transition process. 
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Chapter IV
A social agenda: youth and family  
violence in Latin America with  
an inclusive approach
A. Introduction
In recent decades, the issue of youth violence in Latin America has become increasingly 
prominent in public debate, on government agendas and in international forums and conferences. 
Violence has increased in most of the region in recent years, and young people are clearly 
overrepresented in terms of the incidence and the severity of the phenomenon, both as victims 
and as perpetrators. In many countries of Latin America, young people are committing violent 
crimes, and dying as a result of such crimes, at earlier and earlier ages. Against this background, 
policies to address the root causes of escalating youth violence are urgently needed. 
Youth violence entails very high social, ethical, human 
and economic costs to society. The effects of violence 
may include direct costs, such as the destruction of 
property and the loss of human lives, and indirect costs 
in the form of resources allocated to criminal justice and 
incarceration, as well as high health expenditures. In a 
more general sense, the rise in violence and insecurity 
undermines social cohesion and breeds public distrust 
with respect to the effectiveness of the rule of law as a 
means of ensuring people’s safety. 
In response to growing concern among representatives 
of international organizations, governments and civil 
society over the rise in youth violence in Latin America, 
in 2008 ECLAC conducted a series of assessments of the 
situation and of the youth-related policies and programmes 
implemented by Latin American governments and 
institutions. The outcome document was presented at the 
eighteenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, held in El Salvador in October 2008, which 
focused on youth and development.
As in previous years, this chapter is based on information 
provided by the ministries responsible for the issues examined 
(in this case ministries of public safety). This information 
was supplemented with data from other agencies also 
working on the implementation of policies aimed at reducing 
and eradicating youth violence. An effort has been made 
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to synthesize the views of national authorities concerning 
specific realities and problems of violence affecting young 
people and to examine the institutional and programmatic 
orientations being applied in this area. Responses to the 
ECLAC survey were received from the following countries: 
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.1
The chapter is divided into four sections: the first is an 
assessment of the various forms of youth violence, which 
examines the contexts in which youth violence occurs 
from the dual perspective of victims and victimizers. It 
also presents the views of government authorities with
1
 The response received from Cuba indicated that the questionnaire did 
not apply to the situation and the issues of concern in that country 
and that incidents of youth violence remain isolated phenomena.
respect to the problems arising from youth violence in their 
countries. The second section outlines the major policies, 
programmes and approaches being applied to preventing 
youth violence, focusing in particular on legislative reforms 
and changes. The following section provides more detailed 
information on existing programmes, summarizes the main 
lessons learned from them and offers recommendations 
for the future. Lastly, the section on the international 
agenda outlines the social commitments made during the 
seventeenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, held in Chile in 2007, the theme of which 
was “Social cohesion and social policy to achieve more 
inclusive Ibero-American societies”.
B. Assessment of youth violence
Violence perpetrated by and inflicted upon young people takes many forms, including self-
directed, interpersonal and collective violence. Such violence is fuelled, in turn, by various forms 
of symbolic and social exclusion during youth, such as inequality of opportunity, lack of access 
to employment, institutional disaffiliation, the gap between symbolic consumption and material 
consumption, territorial segregation, lack of opportunities for social and political participation 
and growth in informal employment. Although it is very difficult to measure the various forms 
of violence, violent deaths among young people are a clear indicator and one that is comparable 
across countries. The figures show that violence is an increasingly frequent cause of death among 
Latin American youth, and they also show a strong gender bias: homicide, road traffic accident 
and suicide rates among young men more than double those among young women.
1. Contexts, types and magnitude of youth violence
Violence is fuelled by exclusion and segregation. Many 
Latin American young people face situations of exclusion 
in many areas, including the economic, social, political 
and cultural spheres. Although many countries have 
become more economically prosperous, much of the 
youth population continues to live in poverty, and high 
levels of inequality persist. 
In this context, many young people lack the skills needed 
to participate in the knowledge and information society, 
and their quest for greater autonomy is thwarted by barriers 
to access to high-quality jobs that would enable them too 
enjoy material autonomy. As a result of the weakening of 
both formal and informal mechanisms of social protection 
(labour markets, families and communities, among others), 
young people today are more vulnerable than in the past. 
Increased symbolic consumption and educational capital 
generate expectations of social mobility that are frustrated 
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by barriers that prevent access to productive assets or to 
a first job. Despite greater democratic freedom, young 
people exhibit apathy and lack of interest in becoming 
involved in the political system, in a context of mistrust 
of public institutions. The generation gap grows wider 
because young people are continually recreating their 
identity and developing ways of seeing the world that 
are shaped by connectivity and risk, further distancing 
themselves from the adult world. All this translates into 
various forms of discrimination against young people and 
into the stigmatization of youth (ECLAC/OIJ, 2008).
Researchers and analysts agree that the violent behaviour 
by young people is the result of structural processes associated 
with the persistence of poverty and unemployment. Several 
studies have pointed out that the frustrations felt by young 
men as a result of unemployment often give rise to illness, 
increased violence among youth gangs, interpersonal conflict 
and domestic violence. Among women, unemployment leads 
to greater economic dependence on men, which in turn can 
lead to increased violence against women (Moser and van 
Bronkhorst, 1999). The social exclusion that unemployed 
young people experience every day, in a context of mass 
consumption, accounts for a structural dimension to violence 
that affects young people in the economic sphere. Indeed, 
there appears to be some consensus that what young people 
receive as structural violence they return as social violence 
(De Roux, 1993).
In this context, many young people know that they 
have little chance of getting into a prestigious occupation 
or profession and less still of earning a good salary. Their 
lack of attachment to institutions increases their feeling of 
being “outsiders” (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). The 
inequality they experience begins to smack of injustice. 
Gaps created by unemployment and educational levels 
breed discontent, which is compounded by the greater 
risk of death from violence (OMS, 2003; Rubio, 2005, 
Rodríguez, 2005; Kliksberg, 2007a; Muñoz González, 
2002). Hence, physical violence cannot be analysed without 
considering the violence inherent in the mechanisms that 
transmit social exclusion (Kliksberg, 2007b).
In another context, violence is expressed at the symbolic 
level through various forms of language and cultural 
representations that society imposes on individuals and 
groups through their cognitive processes of apprehending 
reality. Symbolic violence is a “gentle violence, imperceptible 
and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part 
through the purely symbolic channels of communication and 
cognition (...) of recognition or even feeling” (Bourdieu, 2001). 
This category includes the “naturalized” forms of gender 
violence implicit in the dominance of men over women. 
The effectiveness of this dominance lies in the ideological 
acceptance by both the dominators and the dominated, which 
stems from the enormous importance of beliefs and feelings 
in the production and reproduction of male superiority as a 
central aspect of the established order.
Another symbolic form of violence is media content 
that portrays stereotypical or discriminatory images of some 
groups of youths —images in which many young people do 
not recognize themselves. Audiovisual productions that convey 
sensationalized and exaggerated depictions of violence are an 
insidious form of violence that contribute to its tolerance and 
legitimacy, and to the stigma attached to youth, with violence 
thus becoming part of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
According to a model that integrates health and 
violence, adopted by some international agencies (Pan 
American Health Organization, Inter-American Development 
Bank, World Health Organization, World Bank), particular 
forms of youth violence can be distinguished according to 
how they relate to problems of a structural, institutional 
(community), interpersonal (relational) or individual 
(psychobiological, ethical or moral) nature. Hence the 
varied contextual origins and modes of expression of 
violence, depending on whether young people are the 
victims or the perpetrators (see diagram IV.1).
Diagram IV.1


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Heath Organization (WHO), World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva, 2002.
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2.  Impact of violence on mortality and morbidity among young people
The World Health Organization considers violence to be a 
public health problem, defining it as: “The intentional use 
of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting 
in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or 
deprivation” (WHO, 2002, p. 5). This definition associates 
intentionality with the commission of the act itself, 
irrespective of the outcome it produces. This definition 
excludes unintentional incidents such as most road traffic 
injuries and burns.
Violence takes many forms, which need to be clearly 
defined. Box IV.1 summarizes the various forms of violence 




Violence that a person inflicts on 
himself or herself. Includes suicidal 
behaviour and self-abuse.
Interpersonal violence
Violence inflicted by another individual 
or by a small group of individuals. Includes 
family and intimate partner violence 
and violence perpetrated in community 
contexts by individuals who may or may 
not know each other.
Collective violence
Violence inflicted by larger groups 
such as States, organized political groups, 
militia groups and terrorist organizations. 




Any act of gender-based violence that 
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering 
to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or in private life. 
Violence against women encompasses:
Physical, sexual and psychological 
violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of 
female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital 
rape, female genital mutilation and 
other traditional practices harmful to 
women, violence perpetrated by family 
members other than the spouse and 
violence related to exploitation.
Physical, sexual and psychological 
violence occurring within the 
general community, including rape, 
sexual abuse, sexual harassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational 
institutions and elsewhere, trafficking 
in women and girls and forced 
prostitution.
Physical, sexual and psychological 
violence perpetrated or condoned 
by the State, wherever it occurs.
Violence against children
All forms of physical and/or emotional ill-
treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment or commercial or other exploitation, 
resulting in actual or potential harm to the 
child’s health, survival, development or 
dignity in the context of a relationship of 
responsibility, trust or power.
Source:  World Health Organization (WHO), World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva, 2002; United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women (A/RES/48/104), New York, February 1994; World Health Organization (WHO), Report of the consultation on child abuse prevention (WHO/HSC/
PVI/99.1), Geneva, 1999.
In order to understand young people’s exposure to 
the various forms of violence it is necessary to distinguish 
levels of risk in various population groups. Studies reveal 
gender, age and ethnic biases in youth violence. However, 
there are major impediments that hinder comparative 
analysis of rates of violence among youth, including 
lack of information, insufficient disaggregation of the 
information that does exist and the fact that the available 
data cover different periods and have been collected from 
numerous sources. Most countries in the world lack 
adequate information on the number of deaths caused by 
violence, and in any case deaths account for only a small 
proportion of the problem. The fact that the data come from 
a variety of sources —including law enforcement, judicial 
and health agencies— makes it difficult to standardize the 
information in order to assess the situation. Moreover, the 
data are not collected on a regular basis and suffer from 
significant underreporting. 
The crude death rate from homicide per 100,000 
population is one of the most reliable statistics. Nevertheless, 
even these figures must be interpreted with caution 
because they are highly sensitive to the methods used to 
collect the data (Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando, 2005). 
Homicide is undoubtedly the severest form of violence, 
but there are other serious forms of violence that often 
go unreported. 
According to information for 16 Latin American 
countries, external causes are the leading cause of death 
among young people (141 per 100,000 population). The 
leading cause among males is homicide (68 per 100,000 
population), followed by road traffic accidents (30 per 
100,000) and suicide (10 per 100,000). Among females 
the figures are significantly lower: the death rate from 
external causes is 19 per 100,000, with road traffic accidents 
accounting for 6 deaths per 100,000, homicide for 5 per 
100,000 and suicide for 3 per 100,000.
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Homicide death rates vary considerably from region 
to region in the world. WHO data indicate that the 
highest rates occur in Latin America, where homicide 
is the leading external cause of death. Homicide rates 
among males exceed critical levels in several countries, 
including El Salvador (176), Colombia (159), the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (112) and Brazil (97) 
(see table IV.1).
Table IV.1
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): RATE OF MORTALITY DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES AMONG  
PERSONS FROM 15 TO 29 YEARS OF AGE, BY SEX a
(Per 100,000 population) 
Country
Males Females
Total Homicides Suicides Road traffic 
accidents Total Homicides Suicides
Road traffic 
accidents
Argentina (2004) 81 17 19 16 17 2 5 5
Brazil (2004) 173 97 8 39 20 7 2 8
Chile (2004) 72 15 22 20 14 1 5 5
Colombia (2004) 228 159 12 26 28 13 5 6
Costa Rica (2004) 66 13 14 24 13 3 2 5
Cuba (2005) 55 14 10 16 17 4 5 6
Dominican Republic (2004) 99 17 3 30 15 2 1 5
Ecuador (2005) 131 55 16 32 25 4 9 6
El Salvador (2005) 242 176 16 32 34 18 8 5
Mexico (2005) 94 23 11 33 17 3 3 7
Nicaragua (2005) 68 23 15 13 13 2 6 2
Panama (2004) 90 36 12 26 16 2 5 6
Paraguay (2004) 96 43 9 19 26 3 5 6
Peru (2000) 45 3 2 10 14 1 1 3
Uruguay (2004) 73 11 23 17 19 3 6 6
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) (2004) 271 112 9 37 28 6 3 11
Latin America Total (16 countries) 141 68 10 30 19 5 3 6
Source: Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Health Statistics from the Americas, 2006, Washington, D.C., 2007; Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC; and Population Division of the United Nations.
a
 Codes V01-Y98 in the International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision.
Although rates of mortality from external causes 
in Chile, Costa Rica and Cuba are closer to European 
averages, they differ considerably with respect to the 
principal component, which for these three Latin American 
countries consists of homicide and suicide and for the 
European countries of road traffic accidents. Male suicide 
rates are particularly high in the countries of the Southern 
Cone (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), as are road traffic 
accident rates in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, 
where the figures are similar to those in Europe, but 
homicide rates are also high. In the year 2000, suicide 
was the third leading cause of death among young people 
aged 10 to 19 in Latin America and the eighth leading 
cause among adults aged 20 to 59 throughout the Americas 
(PAHO, 2006).
It is important to highlight some gender differences 
with respect to deaths from external causes. According 
to statistics from the early 2000s, three out of every four 
homicide victims worldwide were male and homicide 
death rates for males were more than three times those for 
females (WHO, 2002). Recent data corroborate this larger 
proportion of male youth homicides and their rising trend 
in recent years.
The gender biases in youth violence figures are evident. 
The number of young males deaths from external causes 
is eight times higher than that of young females in the 
16 Latin American countries studied. However, there are 
less visible and less reported forms of violence that are 
very difficult to measure and that affect women in general 
and young women in particular (sees box IV.2).
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)168
Box IV.2
METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN MEASURING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
Sources of information for measuring 
violence, and especially gender-based 
violence, suffer from a number of 
deficiencies, as the reliability of the 
statistics is affected by underreporting 
of some crimes, especially crimes of 
sexual and family violence (Arriagada and 
Godoy, 2000). Some violent behaviours 
are viewed as “normal” in accordance 
with some deeply ingrained cultural 
standards, both because they are 
perceived as falling within the private 
sphere and because of the reactions of 
shame, fear or disgrace associated with 
acknowledging the abuse (INEGI, 2006). 
The task of producing a full, up-to-date 
assessment of the prevalence, causes 
and repercussions of violence against 
women in Latin America has not yet been 
accomplished, and consequently there is 
no baseline for monitoring and evaluating 
the impact of relevant policies, laws and 
programmes (ECLAC, 2007e).
Analysis of the murders of women in 
Ciudad Juárez in Mexico is representative 
of these problems: the exact number 
of victims is a matter of dispute among 
various sources, owing to the lack of official 
records. According to data from the NGO 
“8 de marzo”, between January 1993 and 
November 2003 the number of women 
murdered was 271, but according to Amnesty 
International the figure was 370 (with 137 of 
those cases also involving sexual violence), 
while the Chihuahua Women’s Institute 
(ICHIMU) puts it at 321. Mexico’s National 
Commission for Human Rights recorded 
236 murders and 40 disappearances of 
women during the period 1993-2002, while 
the Chihuahua state prosecutor for follow-
up on the murders of women in Ciudad 
Juárez indicates that 379 women were 
killed from 1993 to 2005 (Tavera, 2008). In 
the face of this conflicting information, it is 
recognized that statistics must be collected 
and compiled in order to determine the 
magnitude and the characteristics of the 
phenomenon. It is also acknowledged 
that criminal statistics constitute a basic 
tool for tackling the problem of violence 
against woman, especially femicide; that 
the formulation of high-quality policies 
requires reliable information that will make 
it possible to effectively assess problems; 
and that accurate, timely and documented 
information is a civil right. Accordingly, the 
development of a statistics and records 
system on femicide in Mexico is being 
advocated. It has also been suggested that 
the administrative format of records should 
be improved and that a gender perspective 
should be applied in the conceptualization 
of the crime of homicide.
Source: Irma Arriagada and Lorena Godoy, “Prevention or repression? The false dilemma of citizen security”, CEPAL Review, No. 70 (LC/G.2095-P/I), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), April 2000; Ligia Tavera Fenollosa, “Estadísticas sobre violencia de género. Una mirada 
crítica desde el feminicidio”, Políticas sociales y género, Gisela Zaremberg (coord.), Mexico City, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), vol. 2, 
2008; National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI), “Hombres y mujeres en México”, 2006 and 2007 [online] www.inegi.mx; ECLAC, No 
more! The right of women to live a life free of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/L.2808), Santiago, Chile, 2007.
3. National authorities’ perceptions of youth violence issues and 
 societal dynamics
The authorities consulted indicate that the primary violence-
related problems faced by young people are linked to organized 
youth violence (crime, gangs, street violence or carrying of 
weapons), which has become prevalent in some urban areas 
in several countries of the region. The situation of gangs 
(known as pandillas in most Latin American countries, but 
called maras in Central America and quadrilhas in Brazil), 
the increase in crime in the Southern Cone countries and 
in violence in the Andean countries are clear indicators of 
the need for targeted interventions aimed at specific groups 
of young people. Of particular concern is the relationship 
between youth gangs and drug use, drug trafficking and human 
trafficking. The authorities also highlight the seriousness of 
family violence, both between intimate partners and between 
generations. While reporting of gender-based violence has 
increased, there is still a severe lack of protection for children 
and young people who suffer abuse. Self- or other-directed 
violent behaviours associated with alcohol and drug use are 
also significant problems.
Patterns of violent behaviour change over the course 
of a person’s lifetime. The period of adolescence and 
young adulthood is a time when violence is often given 
heightened expression. Because youth is a transitional 
stage, factors related to the construction of identity that 
may motivate the development of violent behaviours must 
be considered, as must factors of a social and individual 
nature that may explain such behaviours (Vanderschueren 
and Lunecke, 2004). Any preventive measures envisaged 
must be flexible and tailored to the characteristics of young 
people and their environment. Understanding when and 
under what conditions violent behaviour typically occurs as 
a person develops can be helpful in planning interventions 
and policies for prevention that target the most critical age 
groups (WHO, 2002).
According to the ECLAC survey on policies and 
programmes to address youth violence, national authorities’ 
primary concerns relate to social exclusion and social inequality 
(Argentina, Brazil), which are expressed in organized 
youth violence and which translate into crime, gangs, street 
violence and the carrying of weapons (Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Peru). Secondly, the authorities’ surveyed expressed concern 
about domestic violence, both between intimate partners 
and between generations (Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Mexico) and, thirdly, about self- or other-
directed violent behaviours associated with alcohol and drug 
use (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru) (see table IV.2).
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Table IV.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS OF YOUNG PEOPLE
Countries
Youth violence problems
First in importance Second in importance Third in importance
Argentina Social exclusion and lack 
of expectations
Lack of individual and social 
aspirations, drug addiction
Lack of standards and 
models, unemployment
Brazil Social inequalities, difficulties in 
accessing education and work 
Discrimination and physical and 
symbolic victimization through 
police violence, violent deaths
Recurrent conflicts related to 
drug abuse and trafficking
Chile Crime School violence Intimate partner violence
Colombia Armed conflict, theft Drug trafficking and crime
Homicide
Youth gangs and culture 
Extortion 
Costa Rica Rebellious behaviour Lack of parental authority Environment in which young people live
Dominican Republic Narcotic drug and alcohol 
use at early ages
Participation in drug micro-
trafficking and related activities
Social violence and aggression 
generally linked to the foregoing
Ecuador Abuse within the family Intergenerational violence Suicide
El Salvador Gangs Crime Family violence and abuse
Guatemala Gangs (extortion, violence) Drug and alcohol addiction Homicide, foeticide, child sexual abuse 
Mexico Family violence Street violence Intimate partner violence
Peru Crime, gangs Drug and alcohol abuse, family violence Lack of adequate education and training
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of)
Robbery Illegal carrying of weapons Drug possession
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of government responses to the ECLAC survey on policies and programmes for tackling 
youth violence, 2008.
4.  Organized youth violence
Youth violence is primarily an urban phenomenon. An 
estimated 78% of Latin American young people live in 
cities (ECLAC, 2005) and suffer the repercussions of 
problems associated with urban concentration, which 
national authorities see as the principal problem affecting 
youth. In some countries these problems are related 
to social exclusion (Argentina); theft and other forms 
of crime (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, 
Colombia, El Salvador); gangs and street violence (El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru); drug trafficking 
(Colombia); homicide (Colombia) and illegal possession 
of weapons (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). The scale 
of these problems may be considerable. In the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, for example, the offences committed 
most frequently by children and adolescents aged 10 to 
17 in 2007 were theft, illegal carrying of weapons and 
possession of drugs.2 
The findings of international studies indicate that the 
vast majority of those responsible for violence against 
2
 Statistics provided by the Scientific, Penal and Crime Research 
Corps (CICPC) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
young people in urban settings are of the same age and 
sex as their victims. In most cases, the perpetrators are 
males acting in groups (UNICEF, 2006). In large cities, 
such violent relations among young people occur as 
a consequence of the formation of local groups in the 
context of situations of marginalization and disruptive 
behaviours. In general these are criminal groups structured 
as gangs, which develop their own subcultures and fight 
among themselves for territorial control of neighbourhoods 
or districts.
Gangs may be informal groups of youths that defend 
a territory and possess an informal leadership structure or 
they may be organizations with their own internal survival 
and operational dynamics (including assigned roles and 
rules). Often juvenile gangs provide an alternative setting 
for the socialization of excluded children and youth, 
whose sense of belonging is based on participation in 
group activities ranging from sharing of leisure time to 
commission of crimes. In some cities, large groups of 
youths commit a variety of crimes in their immediate 
environment (hotel hold-ups and robberies) but also 
engage in acts of intimidation and coercion.
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Empirical studies conducted in the late 1980s had 
already revealed the proliferation of violent gangs of 
adolescents and young people in cities such as Guayaquil 
and Mexico City (Rodríguez, 1996). In Brazil, various 
studies have found that the majority of youths involved 
in murders, either as victims or as perpetrators, are 
impoverished black or mulatto males between 15 and 
17 years of age. They tend to reside in peripheral areas 
and favelas (slums) surrounding urban centres and are 
generally not enrolled in school (Willadino Braga, 2003) 
This confirms the hypothesis widely held in the literature 
that institutional disaffiliation increases the exposure of 
young people (those who do not work or attend school) 
to acts of violence, both as victims and as perpetrators.
The socio-economic exclusion and institutional 
disaffiliation of many Brazilian adolescents and young people 
living in favelas occurs in tandem with a high prevalence 
of drug trafficking, which comes to be seen as a “way out”, 
a means of participating in extended networks and gaining 
a share of power and greater access to consumer goods. 
The favela residents involved in drug gangs are usually 
young people between 15 and 30 years of age who are 
looking to earn money. Members of drug gangs control the 
favelas and protect the places where drugs are sold. Young 
gang members defend such places from attacks by other 
gangs (quadrilhas) and raids by the police, which puts 
them in the lowest, and the most dangerous, echelons of 
the drug trade. Other favelados (slum-dwellers) recognize 
that these young people are the poorest participants in the 
drug trade. Within their peer group, however, they are seen 
as brave and they acquire a certain degree of social status. 
Youth crime thus becomes a violent means of adapting 
to economic and social conditions of exclusion and an 
attempt to participate in social consumption patterns 
(Sperberg and Happe, 2000).
The 1990s saw explosive growth of gangs (maras) in 
Central America. The Central American maras have been 
strongly influenced by the culture and style of gangs in the 
United States (see box IV.3). In El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mexico, maras have flourished in social contexts 
shaped by deep-seated problems such as unemployment, 
exploitation of child labour, urban and civil violence and 
the deportation and return of many young people who had 
migrated north during the years of civil war. Some maras 
have subsequently become part of transnational organized 
crime networks, especially drug trafficking networks. In El 
Salvador, the gang movement became firmly entrenched 
during the peace process of recent years, with the return of 
young people who had been refugees or exiles (for economic 
or political reasons) in the United States —especially in 
Los Angeles— and who came home to resume their lives 
in a completely changed context (Rodríguez, 1996).
Box IV.3
THE MARAS OF CENTRAL AMERICA: A LONG-STANDING PHENOMENON
Youth gangs have existed in Central 
America at least since the 1960s, but their 
characteristics changed considerably during 
the 1990s. Youth gangs emerged in the 
Central American immigrant community 
in Los Angeles in the 1980s. The two 
dominant groups were the Mara Salvatrucha, 
or MS, and the 18th Street Gang (Barrio 
18). The origin of the maras is complex 
and is the result of an amalgamation of 
several processes, including the disruption 
of traditional agricultural relations and 
indigenous forms of relationship; the 
violent eviction of indigenous groups; the 
destruction of urban habitats as a result of 
official, military and paramilitary violence in 
cities; lack of jobs, which led to international 
migration; changes in family structure, 
including tens of thousands of war orphans 
and family fragmentation resulting from the 
migration of parents and siblings.
When the Central American young 
people who had migrated to the United 
States in the 1980s began returning to their 
home countries in the next decade —often 
as a result of United States deportation 
policies— and the influence of United 
States subcultures grew in Central America, 
youth gangs in the region began to adopt 
the style and the names of Los Angeles 
gangs. Although links were established 
between gangs, two phenomena should be 
highlighted: the growth of ethnic gangs in 
Central American immigrant communities 
in the United States and the fact that youth 
gangs in Central America “reinvented” 
themselves.
The term mara first began to be 
used in El Salvador in the 1980s to refer 
to gangs, but also to groups of friends. 
Although maras may include girls and 
women, they are essentially a male social 
phenomenon, which may begin at an early 
age (some members join gangs as young 
children) and extend through youth and 
early adulthood. Maras are subdivided 
into “cliques”, whose members feel a 
sense of belonging to the larger gang. In 
general, mara or gang members come from 
economically disadvantaged areas and 
from poor and marginal urban contexts, or 
else they are migrants who have returned 
from the United States. Most of them have 
dropped out of school, have low-paying jobs 
and live in an environment characterized 
by ineffective or non-existent services, 
overcrowding and low social capital.
Over the years, many of these 
gangs, or maras, have become vertical 
organizations involved in drug trafficking, 
human trafficking and urban crime. 
According to the Washington Office on 
Latin America (WOLA, 2006), there are 
70,000 to 100,000 gang members in Central 
America, which poses a serious threat to 
public order in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua and also in 
south-eastern Mexico and some parts 
of the United States.
Source: E. Falkenburger and Geoff Thale, “Maras centroamericanas en maras y pandillas juveniles: dos mundos diferentes”, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No. 
81, March-April 2008; World Health Organization (WHO), World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva, 2002; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 
“Pandillas juveniles en Centroamérica: cuestiones relativas a los derechos humanos, la labor policial efectiva y la prevención”, 2006; Dina Krauskopf, “Pandillas 
juveniles y gobernabilidad democrática”, document presented at the seminar Youth gangs and democratic governance in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Madrid, 16-17 April 2007.
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The Governments of Honduras and El Salvador have 
responded to gangs with tough repressive strategies and 
laws making gang membership a crime. These measures 
have forced the gangs to operate clandestinely and, as a 
result, they have become more organized. Gang cohesion 
in prison environments has also increased. Generally 
speaking, such hard-line strategies have failed to stem 
the rising tide of violence or reduce the number of 
homicides in the affected countries (WOLA, 2006).
5.  Drug trafficking, drug use and crime
The consumption and distribution of psychoactive or 
psychotropic drugs is a central concern for the authorities 
of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Peru, 
while in other countries, such as the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, it is considered a relatively minor problem.
In the cities of the region where there are nerve 
centres for the drug trade, alienated young people play 
a major role in various areas of the criminal economy, 
including the production, circulation and consumption 
of drugs (Kaplan, 1997). Social exclusion leads children 
and youth to become involved in the drug distribution 
network, where they are exposed to dangerous and unsafe 
conditions.
According to one report, the 7,000 children and youths 
under 18 years of age who work in the drug trade and 
belong to the oldest criminal faction in Rio de Janeiro, 
Commando Vermelho (CV), receive as payment 20% of the 
drugs they sell in drug dens (bocas de fumo) in the tourist 
capital of Brazil (IBISS, 2006). A study conducted by the 
organization Observatório de Favelas in Rio de Janeiro 
noted the high turnover of young people working in the 
drug trade and the downward trend in the age range of 
consumers (13 to 19 years). It also noted the high degree of 
instability in the lives of these young people. High school 
dropout and drug use rates, coupled with lack of access 
to public spaces outside their communities, severely limit 
their sociocultural environment. Clashes with the police 
were the cause of 60.4% of deaths in the course of the 
study. The young people interviewed reported witnessing 
122 deaths and 205 beatings during the first five months 
of the study (Observatório de Favelas, 2006).
In peak periods of crime, the number of victims has 
climbed to epidemic levels. From January to early September 
2008, clashes between drug gangs claimed 3,200 lives in 
Mexico. At the same time, there was a downward trend 
in the average age of the victims. In 1986, the average 
age of people killed in the city of Medellín was 35-45; 
by 1987 it had dropped to 25-35 and by one year later 
to 20-25. In 1989, 70% of the people killed in that city 
were between 14 and 20 years of age.3 
3
 Report of the chief administrative officer to the Medellín City 
Council (1989), quoted in Salazar (1993).
6.  Family and gender-based violence
Violence against women, as defined in the 1993 Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women (United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 48/104), is “any 
act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely 
to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion 
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring 
in public or in private life”. Gender-based violence is 
usually perpetrated by adult men, is rooted in the macho 
culture and tends to be justified on the basis of theories 
that attribute it to something in the physical realm of the 
aggressor (psychopathology), to affective ties (crimes 
of passion) or to social factors (poverty or low levels of 
education). While this form of violence —which may 
involve forced sexual relations within marriage, date rape 
and rape in other contexts, sexual abuse and harassment, 
and forced prostitution— occurs in all cultures, social 
strata and ethnic groups, it is often not reported owing 
to the ineffectiveness of existing laws on the matter and 
to stigmatization of victims.
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As a mechanism of male domination, gender-based 
violence often takes place in the context of intimate 
partner relationships. Studies on violence against women 
conducted by the World Bank have highlighted some 
common features of violence in such relationships (Heise, 
Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999):
The vast majority of the perpetrators are men, and • 
women are at greatest risk with men they know.
Physical violence is almost always accompanied • 
by psychological abuse and, in many cases, by 
sexual abuse.
The majority of women who are physically abused • 
by their partners will be subject to multiple acts of 
violence over time.
Violence against women transcends boundaries of • 
socio-economic class, religion and ethnicity.
Men who abuse their partners generally exhibit • 
strong controlling behaviour.
While in some countries the authorities viewed domestic 
or family violence as the main problem affecting young 
people, whether as victims or as perpetrators (Ecuador and 
Mexico), in others it is considered a problem of relatively 
little importance (Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico 
and Peru). Government perceptions of the magnitude of 
this phenomenon coincide with the findings of studies 
of changes in Latin American family structure, which 
have revealed that the increase in family violence in 
several countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic and Honduras) observed in 2006 affected mostly 
women (ECLAC, 2007e).4 Violence in intimate partner 
relationships between young people has also shown 
a gradual rising trend, which was cited as a source of 
concern by authorities in Chile and Mexico. 
Although the various forms of domestic violence are 
generally manifested in social settings related to home 
and family, they reflect disparities and inequalities that 
are condoned in the public domain. WHO estimates 
for 2002 indicate that between 10% and 36% of Latin 
American women had been subjected to physical or 
sexual violence, and that between 70% and 80% of 
victims of sexual violence were girls. In almost half of 
those cases, the aggressors lived with their victims and 
in three quarters of the cases they were family members 
of the girls or boys who suffered abuse (WHO, 2003). 
Around one in three women in Latin America has been 
the victim of physical, psychological or sexual violence 
by family members; among adolescent girls aged 15 to 
19, rates of emotional abuse are significantly higher (see 
table IV.3). A United Nations report (ECLAC, 2007e) 
draws attention to the social tolerance that exists for 
violence against girls and young women, especially in 
the private sphere, which is linked to crime, corruption, 
sexual exploitation, forced prostitution, harassment and 
sexual violence, above all in domestic service.
4
 The following figures illustrate the magnitude of this problem in 
Colombia in recent years: of all the cases of child abuse reported 
to the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), complaints of 
physical abuse totalled 3,261 in 2003, 13,685 in 2004 and 20,211 in 
2005 —an increase of 52% over the period. Reports of psychological 
abuse totalled 2,496 in 2003, 2,994 in 2004 and 4,090 in 2005, a 
64% increase between 2003 and 2005. Reports of sexual abuse 
rose from 1,451 in 2003 to 2,182 in 2004 and 3,301 in 2005, an 
increase of 127% over the three-year period.
Table IV.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (6 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGES OF ALL WOMEN AND YOUNG WOMEN REPORTING  
HAVING BEEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY FAMILY MEMBERS, 2000-2005
Country
Physical violence Intimate partner sexual violence Emotional violence
All women Women aged 15-19 All women 
Women aged 
15-19 All women 
Women aged 
15-19 
Bolivia, 2003 52.3 43.9 15.2 11.1 53.8 48.7
Colombia, 2005 39.0 37.6 11.5 7.5 65.7 68.0
Dominican Republic, 2002 21.7 19.1 6.4 5.3 67.5 79.3
Ecuador, 2004 31.0 … 12.0 … 41.0 …
Mexico, 2003 9.3 … 7.8 … 38.4 …
Peru, 2004 42.3 27.3 9.8 4.5 68.2 75.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), No more! The right of women to live a life free of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LC/L.2808), Santiago, Chile, 2007. 
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2008 173
Manifestations of gender violence in the domestic 
sphere are associated with patterns of inequality in power 
relations within families and couples. A comparative 
study of domestic violence in nine developing countries 
found that women who shared the majority of household 
decisions with their husbands or partners were less likely 
to be abused (irrespective of household income level). The 
same report noted that women whose mothers had been 
abused by their fathers were twice as likely to be victims 
of domestic violence (Kishor and Johnson, 2004).5 
All the women interviewed in the course of studies 
conducted in 16 communities in 10 countries in the 
framework of a set of PAHO projects to address gender-
based violence said that they had suffered violence as 
a means of control used by their partners to reinforce 
unequal power relations within the family (Velzeboer 
and others, 2003). These studies also revealed that few 
health care providers have received specialized training 
in dealing with women living in situations of violence 
and none had protocols or standards for care. The police 
and legal services were often the first places women 
turned to for help. However, police stations were found 
to be the institutions that were least supportive, and law 
enforcement officials were found to be unaware of laws 
to protect victims. With regard to the role of schools, 
teachers felt ill-equipped to meet the needs of affected 
students and their families. At the community level, 
community members belonging to unions, cooperatives 
or businesses where women were able to exercise 
leadership also lacked information about how to detect 
and respond to the problem.
Violence against women is a major public health 
problem and is associated with a higher risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases (PAHO, 2007)6. According to a 
comparative study, there is a clear relationship between 
abuse of women and deterioration of their health and that 
of their children. For example, in almost all the countries 
5
 This report was based on data from Demographic and Health Surveys 
conducted in nine developing countries: Cambodia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, India, Nicaragua, Peru and 
the Zambia. These surveys, most of them carried out after 1998, 
collected a large body of demographic and health data on women 
15 to 49 years of age (Kishor and Johnson, 2004).
6
 According to the report Health in the America 2007, after sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Caribbean is the subregion in the world most affected by 
HIV/AIDS. An estimated 1.2% of the Caribbean population —about 
a quarter of a million people— were living with HIV/AIDS in 2006. 
Half of the people infected are women, and young women are 2.5 
times more likely to be infected than young men. Nearly three-quarters 
of those infected live in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but HIV 
prevalence is high throughout the subregion: 1%-2% in Barbados, 
the Dominican Republic and Jamaica; 2%-4% in the Bahamas, Haiti 
and Trinidad and Tobago. From 1981 to 2005, more than 1.7 million 
AIDS cases were officially reported in the Americas, 38,000 of them 
in persons younger than 15 years of age (PAHO, 2007). 
studied, women who had been abused by their partners 
had higher numbers of unwanted births and stillbirths 
(between 33% and 72%) than those who never experienced 
such violence. There is evidence of a correlation between 
violence and pathological conditions such as low birth 
weight, premature birth and miscarriage. It was also found 
that women who had been the victims of violence were 
more likely to have sexually transmitted infections than 
their peers who had not suffered abuse, but were less 
likely to receive antenatal care during the first trimester 
of pregnancy, and their children aged 12 to 35 months 
were less likely to be fully vaccinated. Children of abused 
women were also more likely to die before reaching 
5 years of age (Kishor and Johnson, 2004).7 
Family violence usually occurs first in childhood. 
A global study on violence against children, which 
highlighted the living conditions of children in Latin 
America, found that each year more than 6 million 
children in countries of the region suffer severe abuse 
and over 80,000 die as a result of domestic violence. 
Sexual abuse is the least reported form of child abuse. 
The perpetrators are usually male and in 8 out of 10 cases 
are parents or relatives. According to a United Nations 
report on violence against children, in Costa Rica 32% 
of women and 13% of men interviewed reported having 
been sexually abused during childhood; in Nicaragua the 
figures were 26% and 20%, respectively, and in Chile, 
75.3% of children surveyed said they had suffered some 
type of violence inflicted by their parents.8 More than 
half suffer physical violence and one in four, severe 
physical violence (UNICEF, 2006).
While the limited availability of data makes it 
difficult to undertake a comparative analysis in the 
region, domestic violence is known to be a problem of 
considerable magnitude in some countries. For example, 
in Uruguay an average of 36 women a year die as a result 
of such violence, and women who have experienced 
domestic violence are five times more likely to attempt 
suicide and are at increased risk for sexually transmitted 
diseases and maternal mortality. According to data from 
the National Observatory on Violence and Crime of the 
Ministry of the Interior of Uruguay, in 2005 there were 
6,802 domestic violence complaints. Those reports include 
men and women of all ages (MSP, 2006).
7
 This report was based on data from Demographic and Health Surveys 
conducted in nine developing countries: Cambodia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, India, Nicaragua, Peru and 
the Zambia. These surveys, most of them carried out after 1998, 
collected a large body of demographic and health data on women 
15 to 49 years of age (Kishor and Johnson, 2004).
8
 It should be noted that these data are not comparable because the 
various surveys applied different criteria and some used a broader 
definition of “violence” than others.
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C.  National policies on youth
Various approaches to preventing youth violence have been tried in Latin America. They include 
the risk approach, the public safety approach, the conflict theory approach and the rights approach. 
Through different lines of action aimed at reducing youth violence, these prevention models 
seek to reinforce protective factors and enhance the strengths of adolescents and young people. 
A wide variety of initiatives have been launched in the various countries. National programmes 
are based on a number of different paradigms for addressing youth-related issues, policies are 
based on different laws, the agencies and levels of government responsible for implementing 
youth-related initiatives differ and there are also differences in the types of activities carried 
out by the public agencies involved in youth-related work in each country. Two points appear 
to be crucial with regard to policies aimed at youth: the need for an integrated approach on 
the part of government institutions and the need for policies that will support and facilitate 
coordination of the efforts of governmental and non-governmental institutions.
1.  Policy approaches to youth violence in Latin America
One peculiarity of national youth policies is that different 
age criteria are applied in each country. The differences 
in the age range defined as “youth” reveal at least two 
trends. First, the period defined as “youth” is starting at 
younger ages (in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Mexico) and extending to older ages (in Chile, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay), which may mean 
that the definition of youth is expanding with respect 
not only to age but also to the way in which youth are 
viewed in society (OIJ, 2001). The second trend is the 
age overlap between “adolescents” and “young people” 
in the definitions of youth.
This situation affects not only the basis no which 
youth policies are formulated, but also the scope and 
nature of countries’ programmes for these age groups. 
On the one hand, although in the discourse on the subject 
youth is deemed to encompass adolescence, in practice 
crucial periods of the youth experience are excluded. 
Moreover, young people between 18 and 29 years of age 
have acquired the status of citizens, since at 18 people are 
tried as adults in courts of law and can exercise their right 
to vote (Krauskopf, 2000). The gap between the social 
and legal realities creates a dual status for young people. 
While programmes for adolescents do contribute to the 
development of young people, they do not fully cover the 
youth period (Krauskopf and Mora, 2000).
Another feature of youth policies is the relative lack 
of explicit approaches for this population group. National 
policies envisage specific programmes (for example, 
targeting the poor) as well as general ones, but few are 
oriented specifically towards young people. Moreover, 
as noted above, in some cases there are no clear criteria 
to indicate whether young people should be included in 
the minor or the adult population. Consequently, a cross-
sectional approach is applied by the various sectoral agencies 
that deal with youth-related issues within their respective 
spheres of action (e.g., education, health, employment). 
While policies may include actions aimed at young people, 
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they generally have a sectoral bias —i.e. they are designed 
from the standpoint of the sector, not that of the individuals 
at whom the policies are aimed (Balardini, 2003).
National youth policies in the region are based on 
four perspectives regarding the characteristics of youth 
(Krauskopf, 2000): youth as a preparatory period (in 
which youth is defined in terms of crises), youth as a 
problem phase (which limits the scope to issues such as 
crime, drugs, violence and school dropout), young people 
as citizens (a perspective that prioritizes the full rights of 
young people to participate in youth-related policies and 
programmes) and youth as strategic agents of development 
(a view aimed at building human and social capital, 
including skills and abilities to enable youths to further 
their own development and become productive members 
of society). The latter two approaches view young people 
as social actors (see table IV.4). 
From each of these approaches emerge various options 
with respect to the design of policies and the nature of 
programmes aimed at youth. From the perspective of 
controlling or eliminating violence, all include objectives 
aimed at preventing criminal behaviour.
Table IV.4
PARADIGMS OF THE YOUTH PHASE IN POLICY AND PROGRAMME APPROACHES
Paradigm of the 
youth phase Policies Programme features Programme types Objectives
– Transition to adulthood
– Preparatory stage
– Geared towards 
preparing youth 
for adulthood
– Extension of access 
to education
– Healthy, recreation-







– Leisure programmes: 
sports, recreational 
and cultural
– Integration of youth
– Fostering the protective 
factors of adolescence
– Crime deterrence during 
the “pre-criminal” stage
– Violence prevention
– Risk and wrongdoing
– Problem phase 
for society
– Compensatory
– Sectoral (predominantly 
justice and health)
– Targeted





– Targeted to working-









– Social control of 
organized youth groups
– Violence prevention
– Youth as citizens
– Stage of social 
development
– Incorporated into 
public policies
– Intersectoral
– Involvement of youth 
as persons with specific 





– National poverty 
reduction policies









– Youth as strategic 
agents of development
– Stage of training 
and contribution 
to production
– Incorporated into 
public policies
– Intersectoral
– Geared towards 
involving young people 
as human capital and 
developing social capital
– Equity and intersectoral 
institutional collaboration
– Action to address 
exclusion
– Youth participation in 
development strategies
– Emergency employment 
programmes
– Training programmes 






Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of D. Krauskopf, “La construcción de las políticas de juventud en Centroamérica”, 
Políticas públicas de juventud en América Latina: políticas nacionales, Oscar Dávila (comp.), Viña del Mar, CIDPA Ediciones, 2003.
Two main approaches to preventing youth violence 
have been put in place: one focusing on reducing risk 
factors and the other on reinforcing the protective 
factors and strengths of adolescents. These approaches 
to prevention have given rise to various lines of action 
aimed at reducing youth violence.
With respect to interventions to reduce violence-related 
risk factors, two types of initiatives have been implemented 
with a view to, on the one hand, expanding and improving 
the education system and, on the other, promoting sound 
use of leisure time among young people. In both cases it is 
assumed that young people have a certain amount of time 
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to prepare for adulthood (Rodríguez, 1995 and 1996). The 
assumption behind these interventions is that recreation can 
prevent crime and encourage the adoption of constructive 
social behaviours among young people. They aim to reduce 
the negative effects of lack of parental supervision outside 
school hours, which leads many children and young people 
to socialize with violent peers.
Another area of intervention is oriented towards 
social control of organized youth groups. The objective 
of programmes implemented under this approach has 
been to control the linkage of youth movements with 
other non-youth social movements which had adopted 
—either at the same time or at different times in history— a 
position of open defiance of the political system. This 
model, which took a punitive or situational prevention 
approach, was adopted by ministries of the interior and 
institutions devoted to the advancement of youth. The 
strategy consisted of isolating student movements and 
“confining” them within universities, preventing them 
from forging ties with other protest movements involving 
working-class urban youth (Rodríguez, 1995). Prison 
policies might be associated with this model. 
In a similar vein, in recent years “heavy-handed” 
policies have been advocated as a means of dealing 
with the problems of youth violence, whether or not it is 
associated with drug trafficking, gangs or crime. Some 
examples of this approach include lowering the age of 
criminal responsibility in many countries of the region, 
police crackdowns on youth groups, injunctions against 
such groups and the enactment of repressive anti-youth 
laws that expand police powers, such as the anti-tattooing 
law in Honduras and the “heavy-handed” (mano dura) and, 
later, “super-heavy-handed” (súper mano dura) laws in El 
Salvador. Such harsh responses to violence have failed to 
control the problem and have created serious dilemmas with 
regard to human rights and the rule of law, in addition to 
contributing to prison overcrowding (WOLA, 2006).
A third model is linked to the poverty elimination 
strategies undertaken by democratic governments in the 
1980s. These initiatives served to quell the demands 
of young people who were marginalized and excluded 
from education, serving as a compensatory measure 
for the negative social effects of structural adjustment 
programmes. Poverty reduction programmes were based 
on the direct transfer of resources to impoverished groups 
through food, job creation and health care programmes 
organized through social emergency funds. Although these 
programmes were not classified as youth programmes, 
youth were beneficiaries of almost all of them, especially 
the job creation programmes. While they did not contain 
explicit violence prevention objectives, they did serve 
indirectly as a preventive or containment mechanism.
Since the 1990s a new model for youth policies has 
become widespread. This model focuses on incorporating 
excluded young people into the labour market. In this 
context, large numbers of young people have taken 
advantage of the opportunities created by emergency 
employment programmes. Although these programmes 
do not explicitly target young people, they began to 
be implemented in various countries with a marked 
age bias, following the model of the successful “Chile 
Joven” (“Young Chile”) programme, a vocational training 
programme for young people launched in Chile in 1990. 
The experience was repeated in other countries, including 
Argentina, Bolivia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, 
Peru, and Uruguay, with financial support from the 
Inter-American Development Bank. These programmes 
prioritized national development needs, providing rapid 
training through innovative methods. By focusing their 
objectives on human capital formation and treating youth 
as contributors to development, these programmes ushered 
in a new youth policy approach, helping to de-link action 
in this area from compensatory social policies and focus 
employment programmes on the youth population.
In general, programmes that address the issue of 
violence focus on some dimension of behaviour, such as 
criminal behaviour, school dropout or adolescent pregnancy. 
Although international instruments have promoted a 
holistic approach to national plans, activities related 
to youth violence still tend to be subdivided by type of 
violence (political, territorial, and domestic and organized 
crime, among others). Projects structured in this way lack 
mutually reinforcing interrelated approaches (Moser, 1999). 
The lack of a conceptual framework comprising various 
disciplines (public health, criminology, sociology and 
psychology, among others) is one of the biggest obstacles 
to achieving a holistic approach to violence.
Responses to the ECLAC survey conducted on policies 
and programmes for the control and prevention of youth 
violence point to the coexistence of various competing 
approaches relating to the role and the needs of young 
people. This points up the importance of a holistic approach 
in policies aimed at young people.
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D.  Recent legislative changes in national  
 legal frameworks
The responses of national authorities to the ECLAC survey reveal four major areas of reform in 
national legal frameworks: general laws on youth, reforms of child and adolescent protection 
codes, new legislation on family violence and gender equality, and laws concerning the legal 
responsibility of adolescents and youth. It is important for these legislative reforms to be 
followed by monitoring and evaluation of the results of the changes introduced. The Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child have contributed to the reform of domestic legislation.
1. Progress in the development of youth-related institutions  
 and legislation 
Given the multiple dimensions of violence, legislation on 
the matter is diverse and addresses the problems of youth 
from different angles. The ECLAC survey of policies 
and programmes for the prevention and control of youth 
violence reveals four major areas of reform in national 
legal frameworks: general laws on youth, reforms of child 
and adolescent protection codes, new legislation on family 
violence and gender equality and laws concerning the 
legal responsibility of adolescents and youth. 
Various countries have adopted laws on youth or 
young people, which serve as a legal framework for 
national youth policies (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, more recently, Honduras and 
Bolivia, where legislation is currently under discussion) 
(ECLAC/OIJ, 2008). The process of creating laws to 
support national youth plans or programmes has varied 
from one country to the next. In Colombia, a document 
published in 1995 by the National Council on Economic 
and Social Policy (CONPES) established the National 
Youth Policy, under which laws, decrees and regulations 
relating to young people were established. The 1998 
National Development Plan included an Education Plan 
for Peace, which called for the implementation of the 
National Youth Policy through the “Builders of a New 
Country” (Constructores de un nuevo país) programme. 
The “Young Colombia” (“Colombia Joven”) national 
youth programme was launched in 2000 and its terms of 
reference have recently been revised.
In 1996 Costa Rica enacted an organic law on the 
National Youth Movement and established an agency with 
the same name to establish policy guidelines within the 
framework of a universal youth policy. In 2002, a general 
law on youth was adopted, laying the foundation for the 
National Youth System. Although this law has undergone 
numerous changes, it has raised the hierarchical standing 
of the agency responsible for the matter, which has evolved 
into the Vice-Ministry for Youth.
In 1999, the President of Nicaragua launched the 
formulation of a national youth policy through the Ministry 
of Social Action. Two years later, a law to promote the 
development of young people was enacted, which led 
to the development and adoption of the National Policy 
for the Comprehensive Development of Youth and the 
creation of a youth secretariat, with responsibility for 
implementing the Plan of Action. This law changed the 
institutions responsible for youth policy and is now regarded 
as vanguard legislation in the region (Dávila, 2003).
In the Dominican Republic, a law on youth was 
enacted in July 2000 with the aim of establishing a legal, 
policy and institutional framework to guide the actions of 
the State and society in general towards the formulation 
and implementation of a set of policies for meeting the 
needs and expectations of young people and promoting 
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their effective participation in decision-making processes. 
The law’s objective is to foster the development of young 
people, without regard to sex, religion, political affiliation, 
race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or nationality.
One of the countries currently discussing a general 
law on youth is Bolivia, where the first national survey 
of youth provided the basis for an assessment of Bolivian 
youth and the formulation of proposed guidelines for 
national youth policies, which in turn led to a proposal to 
amend the Constitution and to the development of draft 
legislation on youth.9
In Peru, a decree establishing the National Youth 
Plan 2006-2011 was approved in 2006. The Plan is 
underpinned by the law on the National Youth Council, 
adopted in 2002. This legislation was designed to establish 
the legal and institutional framework for the actions of 
the State and society with regard to youth policy and to 
create favourable conditions for democratic participation 
and representation of young people.
Another area of reform relates to the amendment of 
legal codes relating to children and adolescents. There 
are very few specific references to youth in the national 
constitutions of Latin American countries and those that do 
exist generally relate to adolescents and young people under 
18 years of age. These provisions are focused on protecting 
the family and seeking resources to ensure, among other 
things, the right to life, food, health, education, physical 
integrity and leisure time for children and adolescents. The 
influence of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the efforts to incorporate its provisions into domestic law 
are positive developments (ECLAC/OIJ, 2007).
In Bolivia, the only explicit reference to youth is 
contained in a decree on the rights and duties of young people. 
The Dominican Republic has laws relating specifically to 
young people, including legislation creating a national youth 
agency and establishing a National Students Day. In Cuba, 
programmes for youth began to be offered with the Cuban 
revolution. The Constitution of 1976 ushered in a legal reform 
aimed at eliminating legislative fragmentation, and currently 
there are laws dealing specifically with the youth population. 
In Chile, there are no domestic laws or regulations relating 
specifically to youth, with the exception of the law creating 
the National Institute for Youth (OIJ, 2001).
Thus, the legal provisions relating to youth in the various 
countries relate mainly to safeguarding the rights of minor 
children and adolescents (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Uruguay). With the exception of laws relating to the 
age of criminal responsibility, there is no explicit reference 
to young people, who are subsumed within laws relating 
9
 See [online] http://www.oij.org/notas/notas_1.htm.
to children and adolescents (ECLAC/OIJ, 2007). In the 
Dominican Republic, legislation governing the system for 
protecting and upholding the fundamental rights of boys, girls 
and adolescents was adopted in 2003 (Law 136-03).
According to the survey conducted by ECLAC in 
2008, recent legislative changes relating to children include 
amendment of the chapter on juvenile criminal responsibility in 
the Child and Adolescent Code in Colombia and modification 
(in 2007) of the provisions relating to malicious gangs in the 
Child and Adolescent Code in Peru and prohibition (in 2006) 
of work and activities that are dangerous or harmful to the 
physical or mental health of adolescents. Brazil’s response to 
the survey cited decree No. 6,490 of 2008, which established 
the implementing regulations for articles 80-D and 80-E of 
Law No. 11530, which created the National Programme for 
Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI).
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the organic 
law for the protection of children and adolescents forms 
the basis for the activities of the Autonomous Institute of 
the National Council for the Rights of Boys, Girls and 
Adolescents (IACNDNNA), formerly the National Council 
for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CNDNA). In 
1999, children and adolescents were recognized under the 
Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as 
persons possessing full legal rights and entitled to State 
protection. A year later the Organic Law for the Protection 
of Children and Adolescents (LOPNA) came into force. 
In December 2007, the latest reform of that law, which 
establishes the legal provisions relating to the criminal justice 
system and criminal responsibility for adolescents, stipulated 
changes aimed at accelerating litigation processes through 
the combined use of oral, written and recorded statements 
and promoting mediation and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution with a view to avoiding litigation. In 
addition, in 2006 a law was enacted to protect children 
and adolescents with respect to Internet chat rooms, video 
games and other multimedia programmes.
In addition, some countries have implemented reforms 
aimed at strengthening organizations and forums for youth 
participation, such as youth councils (Colombia, Peru). This 
reflects a gradual recognition of young people as persons 
with rights and as agents of development and an effort to 
help organize the relationships that they may establish with 
other segments of society. Another type of citizenship-
related legislation in force at present has to do with the 
establishment of voting rights. In most Latin American 
countries, the minimum voting age is 18 years, while in 
Cuba and Nicaragua 16-year-olds have the right to vote.10 
With regard to political participation of youth, there are no 
uniform constitutional provisions among countries.
10
 The constitutions in force at the turn of the century set the age of 
majority at 21 years and conferred political rights at 25 years of age.
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A final area of legislative change concerns the 
treatment of gender-related issues and violence in 
labour laws. One example is sexual harassment, which 
is addressed explicitly under the laws of Costa Rica, El 
Salvador (in the criminal code) and Uruguay. In Argentina, 
the laws currently in force cover only public-sector 
employment and contain implicit stipulations relating 
to “psychological or other coercion”. The laws of other 
countries use terms such as “severe abusive treatment 
by the employer” (Ecuador) or allude to “respect for 
workers where their privacy, private life or dignity might 
be affected” (Chile). The lack of awareness of these 
issues —which tend to affect young women starting out 
in their working lives— is reflected in a lack of adequate 
legislation on sexual harassment in most countries of the 
region (Pautassi, Faur and Gherardi, 2005).
Another focus of recent legislation is promoting the 
incorporation of women into the labour market, whether 
through business development, access to property (Colombia) 
or employment (Colombia, Dominican Republic). Only 
in Bolivia have regulations concerning paid work in the 
home recently been put in place (ECLAC, 2007a).
Matters relating to the development of a culture of 
peace or to healthy lifestyles are not reflected in national 
constitutions, although in some countries they are 
addressed implicitly. Only in Ecuador —in the context 
of the drafting of a new Constitution— has a culture of 
peace been advocated as a right. At the same time, the 
recent incorporation of considerations relating to quality 
of life in constitutional law represents a step forward in 
the legislative sphere, although this is a general right, 
not a specific right of adolescents and young people. It 
should be noted that there is a great void in Latin American 
constitutions with respect to the “right to a future” —i.e., 
the set of conditions required for the advancement of 
young people, adolescents and children.
2.  National legal frameworks in the area of family violence
Legislation on family violence —in force in all countries 
of the region— is one of the most well-established areas 
of law in Latin America. In some cases, national plans 
to combat violence, with emphasis on violence in the 
home, are complemented by legislative measures that 
promote gender equality in the public (especially labour) 
sphere and in the private domain (gender relations within 
the household).
Most of the laws and policies in Latin America use 
the term “family violence” to refer mainly to violence 
perpetrated against women by their intimate partners. 
While PAHO used that term in its early works on the 
subject, it later began using the terms “gender-based 
violence” or “violence against women” to refer to the 
broader range of violent acts experienced by women and 
girls, perpetrated both by their partners and by family 
members and individuals outside the family.
Prior to the existence of international sanctions 
against gender-based violence, women’s organizations 
in various countries of the region had formed national 
coalitions to propose and lobby for relevant legislation, 
obtained funding to train police and judges and provided 
counselling and services to affected women. Thanks to 
the women’s movement, the seriousness of the problem of 
violence against women has been increasingly recognized 
since the 1970s, and the issue has been discussed at the 
international level at the World Conferences on Women 
held in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi 
(1985) and Beijing (1996) (Velzeboer, 2003). Those 
events helped to put in place instruments that expanded 
protection against this problem for women.
One such instrument is the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 
and its Optional Protocol of 1999, ratified by 14 Latin 
American countries (the exceptions being Chile, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua). This convention led to the 
inclusion in national legal systems of important rights for 
women arising from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which have been further elaborated as general 
recommendations by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women. The Optional Protocol 
establishes the Committee’s competence to receive, consider 
and investigate complaints of any form of discrimination 
against women. The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women led to the 
elimination of the notion of “marital authority” (potestad 
marital) from legal regimes, doing away with the rules 
relating to the head of household, which gave the man the 
right to make decisions concerning the family, including 
choosing where to establish the conjugal domicile, granting 
the wife permission to work and limiting her freedom of 
movement. As a result of this change, a husband’s right to 
discipline his wife and to do as he wished with her body 
without her consent was also abolished, giving rise to laws 
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on family violence. Another key element of the Convention 
relates to equality of rights with regard to access to family 
planning services, in particular in relation to decisions 
concerning the number of children desired and maternity 
protection. This, in turn, facilitated the development of 
public policies aimed at reducing maternal mortality.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 also 
had a notable impact on family relations, particularly with 
regard to protecting the rights of girls who were being forced 
into marital relationships at a young age in some countries. 
As the social and legal status of young people is generally 
equated with that of the population under 18 years of age, 
it is necessary also to look at legal instruments relating to 
children and adolescents, which include national child and 
adolescent codes, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment (International Labour Organization Convention 
C138) and the Convention concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour (ILO Convention C182). The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child is the international instrument that has 
had the greatest impact in terms of recognition of the rights 
of young people; however, it refers explicitly to adolescents 
and young people between 15 and 18 years of age. There is 
no international instrument providing protection specifically 
for the youth population aged 19 to 24 (Bernales, 2001).
Countries fall into three categories with respect to the 
Convention: some have ratified it, but still have old legislation 
concerning children in force; others have begun processes 
of reform aimed at ensuring full protection of the rights 
of children, but still partially retain legislative approaches 
that predate the Convention; and a third group of States 
have substantially amended their laws in accordance with 
the Convention and are engaged in complex processes 
of institutional transformation under new policies and 
programmes (ECLAC, 1998). While most countries have 
ratified the ILO conventions on child labour, there are 
inconsistencies with respect to international standards 
concerning the minimum working age, as well as major 
differences between and within countries.11
In summary, most Latin American countries have 
adopted a regulatory framework on family violence or 
legal provisions on gender equality. Most of them were 
introduced in the 1990s; more recently, a law on women’s 
right to a life free from violence (2007) was adopted in 
Mexico and the “Maria Da Penha” law against violence 
(2006) was enacted in Brazil.
11
 The minimum working age is 18 in Bolivia and Colombia, 17 in 
Cuba, 16 in Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic, 15 in Uruguay 
and 14 in Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama. Peru 
has established different minimum ages for workers in agriculture 
(15 years), mining and industry (16 years) and industrial fishing 
(17 years) (ECLAC, 2004a).
In the 1990s, a number of countries adopted anti-
violence legislation, including the law on protection 
against family violence (1994) in Argentina, the law on 
family or domestic violence (1995) in Bolivia, the law 
on violence against women and the family (1998) in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the family violence 
act (1994) in Chile, the domestic violence act (1996) in 
Colombia, the law on violence against women and the 
family (1995) in Ecuador, the family violence act (1996) 
in El Salvador, the law on prevention, punishment and 
eradication of family violence (1996) in Guatemala, the 
domestic violence act (1997) in Honduras, the law on 
family violence prevention and assistance for victims 
for the Federal District and 22 states (1996) in Mexico, 
the domestic violence act (2000) in Paraguay and the law 
establishing the State and societal policy against domestic 
violence (1993) in Peru.
Some countries have no specific national legislation 
on the subject. In the case of Nicaragua, Law 230 
introduced amendments and additions to the Criminal 
Code (1996), while in Panama Law 27 (1995) criminalized 
domestic violence and child abuse, provided for the 
establishment of specialized agencies to provide care 
for victims of these crimes, introduced reforms and 
added articles to the Criminal and Judicial Code and 
instituted other measures.
In all these laws there are differences with regard 
to the acts that constitute family violence, the penalties 
for perpetrators and the measures of prevention and 
immediate protection available to victims, depending on 
the balance between preventive and punitive measures 
(see table 3 in annex).
Regarding definitions of acts of violence, while some 
countries make clear distinctions among the various types 
of violence, including physical, psychological, sexual 
and economic or property-related violence (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Uruguay), others do not (Argentina, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay) or they exclude the economic/
property dimension (Bolivia, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru). In 
Chile, the law defines and punishes acts of physical and 
psychological violence committed in domestic settings, 
but does not include sexual assault in the home and does 
not protect non-minor children or siblings (whose cases 
come under the criminal code).
In terms of whether such cases should be dealt with 
under civil or criminal law, current legislation includes 
measures that emphasize prevention, punishment or both, 
depending on the country. Costa Rica has a law establishing 
protective measures for victims of domestic violence and 
giving oversight responsibilities to the Ministry of Women. 
Bolivia’s legislation establishes preventive measures and 
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amends a criminal law that allowed impunity for perpetrators. 
It also establishes statutory rape, rape and sexual abuse 
as public order offences. In Chile, the legislation is both 
punitive and preventive and grants powers to civil courts, 
the Chilean national police force (Carabineros de Chile) 
and the national investigatory police force (Policía de 
Investigaciones), but also provides for treatment and 
community services. Although this is a civil law, cases of 
serious physical violence come under the criminal code. 
Uruguay’s domestic violence act provides for both a 
preventive approach to the problem and a criminal response 
(prosecution in order to prevent further violence).
With regard to the specific limitations of these laws 
in national contexts, it should be noted that protection 
measures in Costa Rica are considered inadequate, as 
only 20% of requests for interim measures of protection 
are resolved in favour of the petitioner. In Bolivia, 
limitations include a shortage of human and financial 
resources, lack of uniform procedures and lack of training 
and strengthening of the capacity of health personnel to 
ensure enforcement of the law.
Indeed, few laws exist to enable health personnel to 
pursue legal action when needed. Uruguay is an exception, 
as it has adopted the international instruments and models 
of intervention proposed by PAHO to address violence, 
which give responsibility to health personnel, without 
requiring them to report all cases of which they may 
become aware. In 2004 four special courts on domestic 
violence were established in Montevideo, in addition to 
the traditional district courts and public defenders’ offices, 
which are responsible for emergency cases. In Uruguay, 
the domestic violence act provides for the creation of 
the National Advisory Council on Combating Domestic 
Violence, which is tasked with drafting the National Plan 
to Combat Domestic Violence and grants jurisdiction to 
family courts to intervene in cases in which no criminal 
offence has been committed.
Other legislative changes identified in the ECLAC 
survey responses reveal a variety of actions. In the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela reforms in legal procedures and 
family law have been introduced with regard to parental 
authority, custody and the right to family life, replacing former 
provisions regarding parental visitation rights (organic law 
on protection of the family, fatherhood and motherhood, 
26 July 2007). In Mexico, federal law was amended with 
a view to preventing and eliminating discrimination.
3.  Criminal law relative to adolescents and young people 
As a result of increases in the proportion of arrests among 
youth in several countries, there have been calls to lower 
the age of legal responsibility, with proponents pointing 
to the legal impediments that hinder the prosecution and 
punishment of individuals under 18 years of age. In some 
cases, in keeping with the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, provisions have been included to protect children 
under 18 and avoid their being subject to the same penalties 
as adults. The age of criminal responsibility is 12 in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico; 13 in the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay; 14 in Chile, 
Colombia, Panama, Paraguay and Peru; 16 in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Cuba; and 18 in Brazil.12
12
 In El Salvador, cases involving young people aged 12 to 16 are 
handled through an antisocial behaviour system, while cases involving 
those aged 16 to 18 come under the criminal justice system. In 
Cuba, minors are subject to the same procedure as adults, but the 
criminal code provides the option of reducing sentencing limits 
based on two age brackets. In cases involving defendants aged 
16 to 18, sentences can be reduced to half and for defendants aged
Lowering the age of criminal responsibility has created 
problems in terms of overcrowding of prisons and lack of 
appropriate detention facilities or institutions to facilitate 
the reintegration of young offenders into society. It has 
been found that, where the State fails to address the social 
exclusion of young people, repressive or heavy-handed 
policies have led to a strengthening of gang organization 
and to the transformation of youth gangs into complex 
criminal organizations, and have also exacerbated the 
crisis in prisons (Aguilar, 2007). Such measures may 
expose young people to situations of violence (riots, 
revolts, etc.), which will only encourage more criminal 
behaviour in the long term.
 18 to 20 they can be reduced by one third. Executive Order 64/82 
establishes a system for treating children under 16 years of age with 
behavioural disorders. Bolivia has a “social responsibility” system 
for young people aged 12 to 16, while those aged 16 to 21 are tried 
in the general justice system, but are afforded special protections 
under the applicable legislation.
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2008 183
Paradoxically, although there is consensus on the 
limitations of the prison system, the debate surrounding 
this issue is taking place in legal contexts that have 
conflicting legal instruments, such as the doctrine of 
“irregular situation” and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, in which children are viewed as persons 
with rights. While under the former, young people are 
considered abandoned or delinquent persons who should 
be institutionalized (i.e., imprisoned), the latter seeks to 
provide “comprehensive protection” for young people 
(García Méndez, 1994). Several countries that have signed 
the Convention continue to apply traditional approaches 
based on the doctrine of irregular situation and support 
lowering the age of criminal responsibility.
Recent changes in juvenile criminal justice law include 
criminal code reforms concerning penalties and security 
measures, rehabilitation, treatment without incarceration and 
community service, and crimes against the free development 
of personality in Mexico, and amendments, in 2006, to the 
law for the treatment of juvenile offenders in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. In recent years, laws have been enacted 
in the latter country on computer crime (2001), organized 
crime (2005), social responsibility in radio and television 
(2004) and drug abuse and illicit trafficking (2005). Reforms 
on juvenile violence in El Salvador include the anti-maras 
act, the law to combat criminal activities of illicit groups and 
associations, and the juvenile criminal justice law, adopted 
in June 2006, formerly known as the juvenile offender act.
E.  Policies and programmes for the prevention  
 and reduction of youth violence
The policies and programmes undertaken in Latin America to prevent and reduce youth violence 
are diverse in nature; some have been oriented towards public safety and peaceful coexistence, 
while others have focused on the elimination of domestic and family violence against women, 
recreation, school-based interventions and educational rehabilitation for offenders, job training 
or adolescent and youth health. The results of the ECLAC survey show that only in some 
countries are programmes against youth violence part of national youth systems; in others 
they are carried out in the framework of specialized and sectoral initiatives.
1.  Content of programmes on youth violence
In the array of programmes for youth, several areas of 
intervention for the prevention and control of youth 
violence can be distinguished: safety and peaceful 
coexistence; domestic and family violence or violence 
against women, recreation, intervention in schools and 
educational rehabilitation for offenders, job training and 
adolescent and youth health. While these strategies are 
beginning to be based on multi-sectoral planning, there is 
still a tendency to address youth violence as a cross-cutting 
element of broader policies, including national public 
safety strategies and plans for the protection of children 
and adolescents, strengthening of the family and gender 
equality, as well as national violence deterrence plans.
The results of the ECLAC survey show that programmes 
against youth violence are part of national youth systems 
only in some countries. This is the case with the lines of 
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action proposed under Peru’s Youth Policy 2005-2015, 
Brazil’s National Youth Inclusion Programme (ProJovem), 
Colombia’s Presidential “Young Colombia” (Colombia 
Joven) Programme and Mexico’s National Youth Policy 
and National Youth Programme (PROJUVENTUD).
In other countries, programmes to prevent youth 
violence are carried out within specialized areas of action. 
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, youth violence 
prevention activities are implemented under national 
plans for the protection of children and adolescents 
(2001-2007), a national plan against sexual abuse and 
commercial sexual exploitation (2005), border crime 
prevention plans and plans for the protection of families 
in the Colombian-Venezuelan border area. In Chile, youth 
violence prevention activities are undertaken mainly 
under the National Public Safety Policy (2004) and in El 
Salvador, in the framework of the National Youth Policy 
and Public Safety Policy. Peru has implemented plans to 
prevent violence with support from PAHO and the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), together with 
training programmes for officials responsible for youth 
development activities. 
At the sectoral level, several programmes have drawn 
on successful experiences in the areas of adolescent 
health, prevention of risk behaviours, awareness-raising 
and promotion of healthy lifestyles. The participation of 
specialized non-governmental organizations has been 
crucial to the implementation of these programmes, both 
because of their methodological contributions and because 
they have provided the initial impetus for initiatives that 
were later replicated in the public sphere (as in the case 
of the Adolescent Guidance Centre (CORA) in Mexico, 
which is considered a paradigmatic example of such an 
initiative). The “Open your Eyes” Programme in Colombia 
and the healthy schools and communities programmes 
carried out through the Ministry of Health in Peru are 
other examples. This group of prevention programmes 
also includes drug abuse programmes (Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Peru).
Plans for training and employment as a means 
of preventing violence include apprenticeship, job 
training and microenterprise development programmes. 
Apprenticeship programmes include technical training 
programmes designed to meet the needs of the productive 
apparatus. Evaluations of some of these programmes 
have criticized their educational bias (targeting of young 
people who had completed basic education) and lack of 
business management training, technical assistance and 
credit support (Rodríguez, 1995).
Another area on which youth violence prevention 
programmes have focused is youth participation. In this 
context, volunteer programmes have been developed, 
building on volunteer initiatives already under way in 
local environments, including Christian youth groups, 
the Scout Movement and Catholic youth ministry groups. 
Their focus has been on training youth community and 
outreach workers, an area in which Christian youth groups 
have accumulated considerable experience.
2.  Public safety and peaceful coexistence programmes
Measures implemented in the area of public safety have 
included intervention models promoting reparation 
and accountability, within the framework of strategies 
for ensuring public safety and encouraging youths and 
adolescents to accept responsibility for their crimes, 
coupled with judicial structures for victim assistance 
and community–police partnerships at the local level. 
Government action has encompassed a wide range of 
pre-and post-crime interventions, utilizing family- and 
community-based intervention approaches, as well as 
measures aimed at youth in conflict with the law (see 
table 4 in the annex).
The family is the focus of intervention for various 
programmes aimed either at strengthening the family 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Peru) or at putting 
in place support structures for victims of violence. In 
Ecuador, for example, special police units have been 
established to serve women, families and children, under 
the coordination of the Ministry of the Interior. In the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela a school and community 
ombudsman programme was in effect from 2002 to 2006. 
Noteworthy among the initiatives incorporating prevention 
models with community-based approaches are those 
programmes that link the work of the local police with 
various sectors of the community. One example is the 
National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship 
(PRONASCI) in Brazil, which combines public safety and 
social activities. Other examples include the Peruvian Youth 
Patrols Programme and Friends of the Police Youth Club, 
similar to neighbourhood watch and community-based 
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school policing associations. Another type of programme 
involves the creation of specialized bodies within the 
national police to deal with child and youth issues. In 1978, 
Colombia created a special juvenile police force, made up 
largely of women. Colombia has also established a child 
and adolescent police corps, formerly known Policía de 
Protección Juvenil (Juvenile Protection Police) and currently 
called Policía Cívica Juvenil (Juvenile Civic Police). In 
the Dominican Republic, the Democratic Security Plan 
includes a neighbourhood security programme for excluded 
communities that provides scholarships, banking services 
(small unsecured loans for small initiatives), recreation, 
and vocational and job training. Steps have also been taken 
to regulate the distribution and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, protect victims of violence and control access 
to weapons.
The use of community-based approaches to address 
the problem of violence has led to the creation of 
programmes aimed at fostering the social integration of 
at-risk youth. Such programmes are based on recreation 
and the promotion of opportunities for youth participation 
and representation, as well as increasing job opportunities 
for young people. Brazil has launched the Protection 
Programme for Children and Adolescents under Death 
Threats (PPCAAM), which ensures their safety and 
protection by removing them from the place of risk, placing 
them in a safe environment and ensuring their access to 
health care, education, sports, cultural opportunities and, 
where appropriate, to market-oriented job training courses. 
Other programmes of this type in Latin America include 
a programme to promote a culture of peace, human rights 
and youth violence prevention and a youth advancement 
programme, implemented in accordance with the specific 
lines of action of the educational policy in Peru, and 
programmes to promote peaceful neighbourhoods and 
opportunities for dialogue on diversity in Ecuador. 
A variety of recreation-oriented interventions 
have been implemented, ranging from the celebration 
of Children’s Day in Colombia to sports development 
projects in countries such as Chile (football/soccer 
schools), Costa Rica (construction of football/soccer 
fields) and Brazil (programme offering access to sports, 
nutritional supplements, academic support and sports 
equipment). In Costa Rica, sports development projects 
are offered by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports 
and the Ministry of Justice, which provide training to 
team fan groups with a view to discouraging violence 
during football/soccer matches.
The area of promoting youth and adolescent 
accountability for crime includes a whole range of measures 
targeting young offenders, including rehabilitation, school 
reintegration and early intervention. One example is the 
programme “Chats about Juvenile Criminal Law” in Costa 
Rica, a national programme implemented in 2001 under 
the coordination of the Ministry of Public Safety. Peru 
has programmes for early intervention and counselling for 
at-risk adolescents and youth, crime reparation measures 
and social reintegration of young offenders, administered 
by the Ministry of Justice. 
Some countries have attempted to combine punitive 
and situational prevention approaches in addressing youth 
violence. In Chile, for example, the National Public Safety 
Strategy includes community public safety plans, which 
are implemented in collaboration with municipalities 
through annual projects to prevent violence in educational 
institutions and psychosocial prevention initiatives targeting 
at-risk children and adolescents. The public safety plans, 
launched in 2005, are limited to urban areas and involve 
the implementation of projects of the Municipal Support 
Fund (FAGM), which during the 2006-2007 financial year 
benefited 15,067 young men and women in 57 communities. 
The amount available for projects was 908,329,557 pesos 
(approximately US$ 1,481,000 in 2000) per year. Another 
line of action of the National Public Safety Strategy is a 
comprehensive programme for children and adolescents 
carried out with funds from the 24-Hour Integrated 
Security Programme of the National Police of Chile. 
The programme was implemented in three urban regions, 
with a budget of 512,000,000 pesos (US$ 773 million in 
2000), provided by the Ministry of the Interior and the 
National Children’s Service. It is aimed at children and 
adolescents included in the 24-hour programme (who have 
come into contact with a police unit for matters relating 
to infringement of rights or violations of the law but are 
considered not criminally responsible).
Another country that has combined strong punitive 
measures with measures aimed at promoting peaceful 
coexistence and a culture of peace is El Salvador, where 
various national plans are being implemented, including 
the “Heavy-Handed” (Mano Dura) plan (introduced in 
July 2003) and the “Super- Heavy-Handed” (Súper Mano 
Dura) plan (introduced in June 2004 and renewed in 
January 2006), designed to control youth gangs. In the 
area of prevention, El Salvador has also launched (in 
January 2007) the National Plan for Social Prevention and 
Peace, which targets at-risk communities in 13 districts 
(municipios) in the western part of the country, and the 
“Friendly Hand” (Mano Amiga) and “Outstretched Hand” 
(Mano Extendida) plans (in June 2004). In the same 
vein, the Government has implemented a programme for 
the social prevention of youth violence and crime in El 
Salvador and a programme for the social prevention of 
youth violence and crime specifically targeting the western 
part of the country, the situation appraisals for which were 
based on risk maps, municipal data, community records 
and school assessments. With regard to the monitoring 
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and evaluation systems in use, impact indicators for 
specific components of work were developed and surveys 
of victimization and perceptions of insecurity were 
conducted, in addition to the normal periodic updating 
of the table of indicators of violence and crime of the 
Central American Observatory against Violence (OCAVI) 
and the implementation of municipal observatories. The 
aforementioned programmes for youth violence and crime 
prevention also included school-based components aimed 
at encouraging recreational sports and art as tools for 
steering young people away from violence.
In the area of public safety and peaceful coexistence, 
Colombia is one of the countries that developed the most 
programmes and incorporated the issue of violence to 
the greatest extent into its national youth policy. In the 
framework of the new Constitution of 1991, which marked a 
significant step forward with regard to decentralization and 
democratization, the first national strategy against violence 
was formulated and was revised in 1993. Both national plans 
recognize that there are diverse manifestations of violence, 
which call for specific differentiated policies. To address 
the problem of violence, an institutional framework was 
established which covers the national, regional and local 
levels and is diversified by sector (families, schools, youth, 
women). This framework is designed with both a preventive 
approach (education, employment, participation) and a 
coercive one (police, army, justice). In addition, there has 
been open debate and an effort to raise public awareness 
of the issue in the media, political parties and community 
organizations. A number of institutions have been created 
in recent years, including presidential advisory councils, 
urban mediation centres, community-based mediation and 
dispute resolution centres, special grievance committees, 
youth houses, “centres of love” in Buenaventura, grass-
roots organizations, family police units, security councils, 
peace commissions, human rights offices and citizens’ 
groups, which have joined the traditional police, justice 
and municipal government agencies.
Noteworthy initiatives at the local level include the 
Development, Security, and Peace (DESEPAZ) Programme 
in Cali and the Strategic Security Plan for the Medellín 
metropolitan area. The DESEPAZ Programme includes 
five priority projects: research on the epidemiology of 
violence; strengthening of law and order through the 
establishment of a security council and improvement of 
police forces; education for peace and coexistence through 
the media, support for the school system and the family 
structure; opening up of opportunities for participation at 
the local level through community government councils, 
community safety councils, local administrative boards 
and intersectoral committees; education for community 
participation and peaceful coexistence and promotion of 
social development in critical and at-risk sectors. The 
Colombian case is remarkable for the strong institutional 
system underpinning the Plan, the dynamic linkage with 
the national youth agency and the diversity of the strategies 
and programmes aimed at providing a comprehensive 
solution to the problems of youth at various levels.
3.  Violence prevention in the educational sphere
In the area of education, several countries have mounted 
major efforts to prevent violence in schools, although 
schools are now having to contend with new problems 
such as cyber-bullying. In most cases, prevention 
programmes are provided for under education policies 
and are carried out with the support or coordination of 
the local police force or other agencies (justice, social 
development, health, etc.).
In Chile, the specific policy for young people calls for 
the implementation of comprehensive preventive schools 
and of the “Safer Chile” programme, which includes a 
line of action focusing on schools and another line of 
action aimed at preventing child and youth violence. 
Comprehensive preventive schools were established in 
2007 in 60 communities, with funding totalling 1 billion 
pesos (approximately US$ 1,511,000 in 2000). This 
initiative targeted students aged 12 to 14 with behavioural 
problems in secondary schools with a high-risk student 
population. The project to prevent violence in schools, 
which began in 2005, benefited 26,512 young people and 
members of the educational community in the country’s 
31 urban districts (comunas) during fiscal year 2006-2007. 
The budget for the project totalled 372,866,136 pesos 
(approximately US$ 608,000 in 2000). It focused on the 
educational community in municipal and private-subsidized 
institutions, selected on the basis of an assessment of 
public safety in the community in question. It is proposed 
to extend the project to the second level of primary school 
and to the first and second levels of secondary school 
starting in 2008.
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There have also been initiatives to prevent school 
dropout. Chile has launched school reintegration programmes 
nationwide, with funding of 426 billion pesos (about 
US$ 695,000,000 in 2000), mainly from the Ministry of 
Education, but also with support from the Ministry of 
the Interior. The target population for these initiatives 
are youths under 18 years of age who have left school 
or at risk of doing so. The Ministry of Education and the 
National Drug Control Council (CONACE) (under the 
Ministry of the Interior) are responsible for coordinating 
these programmes. Costa Rica has implemented the “New 
Opportunities” programme, a conditional cash transfer 
programme coordinated by the Ministry of Education 
and aimed at preventing school dropout.
Another example of educational initiatives for the 
prevention of youth violence is the Colombian “Seeds of 
Knowledge” (Semillas de conocimiento) programme, which 
includes education projects aimed at preventing crime and 
wrongdoing among children and adolescents. The lines 
of action of this programme are: student social service, 
workshops to strengthen values for parents and children, 
police training and creative use of vacation time. Also in 
Colombia, the “Playing” (Jugueteando) programme uses 
recreation for girls and boys, adolescents, parents and children 
to disseminate information on their fundamental rights.
A recent advance in violence prevention through 
education is the integration of approaches emphasizing 
a culture of peace, citizenship, peaceful coexistence and 
healthy school environments, which are being applied 
in various educational institutions in the region. The 
experience of the “Making Room” (Abrindo Espaços) 
programme, now called “Open School” (Escola Aberta), 
implemented by UNESCO in Brazil, revealed that the 
greatest impact of violence at the community level is that 
it creates school environments that are incompatible with 
teaching and learning. This programme was implemented 
at the national level (in 14 state capitals of Brazil) and was 
based on a 2002 study of violence in schools. That study 
mapped the types of violence occurring on school premises 
and identified situations that can trigger it (disciplinary 
measures, aggressive acts between students and teachers, 
graffiti, physical damage to the school, unclear rules of 
organization, lack of material and human resources, low 
teacher and staff salaries and lack of dialogue with the 
community, among others). The programme’s objectives 
are to promote interaction among schools, families and 
communities (creating mechanisms of negotiation with 
regard to the internal rules and regulations of the school); 
to implement positive measures in terms of public safety; 
to produce educational materials to sensitize families and 
teachers; and to provide access to cultural activities at the 
local level in existing school facilities.
The programme opened schools at weekends (Saturdays 
or Sundays or both), giving young people access to 
computer laboratories, sports facilities, libraries and other 
facilities. An assessment carried out by UNESCO in the 
State of Rio de Janeiro, presented in the report School 
of Peace, clearly revealed the power of schools to foster 
tolerance and mutual respect. A recent evaluation of the 
experiences of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco (2000) 
shows a decrease in robbery, fights, petty theft, vandalism, 
graffiti, sexual assault, drug trafficking and use, personal 
humiliation, carrying of firearms, gangs in schools, poor 
student behaviour and alcohol consumption on school 
premises, among other accomplishments (Morales, 
2007). In addition to the Open School programme, the 
National Youth Policy created “Literate Brazil”, a literacy 
programme targeting the population over 15 years of age; 
a programme to upgrade and expand secondary education 
(PROMED); a programme to facilitate access to professional 
education (PROEJA); a national textbook programme for 
secondary schools (PNLEM); and the “University for All” 
programme (PROUNI), which provides full and partial 
scholarships for low-income students.
4.  National plans against domestic violence
After the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in 
Beijing in 1995, a number of Governments in Latin America 
and the Caribbean drew up plans for the coordination of 
actions to put a stop to domestic violence, utilizing as a 
basis the various international instruments relating to the 
protection of women’s rights, in particular the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Convention of Belém do Pará. The 
various initiatives undertaken in this area have helped to 
ensure the inclusion of the issue on public agendas, the 
development of communication strategies, the promotion 
of laws, the provision of technical assistance to health 
services and the implementation of sectoral and cross-
sectoral action.
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In several countries, national plans against domestic 
violence have been framed within gender equity policies 
based on the Beijing Platform for Action (Chile, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay). These plans call for comprehensive 
action on all areas of the Platform, which distinguish 
them from the plans formulated in other countries, such 
as Bolivia and Brazil (García and others, 2000).
In most cases, the institutional actors responsible for 
the national response to domestic violence are ministries 
of the family, ministries of justice, agencies for the 
protection of women and health institutions. In Bolivia, the 
major actors in the National Plan for the Prevention and 
Eradication of Violence against Women are ministries and 
vice-ministries. In Chile, the National Plan on Prevention 
of Violence within the Family is overseen by the National 
Women’s Service (SERNAM), working in coordination with 
various ministries, the women’s movement, international 
cooperation agencies and municipal victim assistance 
centres and programmes. In Costa Rica, the entity that 
has overall responsibility for the National Plan to Address 
and Prevent Intra-Family Violence (PLANOVI) is the 
National Centre for the Development of Women and the 
Family (now known as the National Institute of Women), 
with support from various government institutions that 
are part of the plan, including municipal women’s offices, 
community networks, civil society organizations that 
participated in the design of the plan and international 
cooperation agencies.
In Brazil, the institutional actors responsible for the 
National Programme to Prevent and Combat Domestic 
Violence are the National Council on Women’s Rights 
(CNDM), the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice 
(responsible for shelters for victims of violence). The 
plan includes four strategic lines of action: coordination 
of inter-ministerial action (health, education and culture), 
legislative changes, strengthening the legal and law 
enforcement system for dealing with violence against 
women and public awareness-raising campaigns (García 
and others, 2000). The Protection Programme for Children 
and Adolescents under Death Threats (PPCAAM) provides 
for the removal of children from their families and their 
placement in safer communities.
In Uruguay, implementation of the National Plan 
against Domestic Violence launched in late 2004 is the 
responsibility of the National Institute for Women of 
the Ministry of Social Development and the staff of the 
Gender Violence Area of the National Women’s Health 
and Gender Programme, among other agencies. The plan 
is rights-based and follows the approach advocated by 
PAHO/WHO. It established a model of care for domestic 
violence based on cross-cutting approaches (gender equity, 
participation, partnerships) and national coalitions of 
political actors for the development of legislation and 
public policy. At the sectoral level, it includes community-
based strategies to strengthen networks, campaigns and 
self-help groups (MSP, 2006).
In Mexico, the national youth policy encompasses 
the National Network to Counter Violence against Young 
Women and Men and the National Programme for Youth 
(PROJUVENTUD), a medium-term programme to address 
gender and equity issues. Strategies implemented to date 
include training at the regional and national levels in 
gender equity, awareness and information campaigns on 
intimate partner violence among young people, training 
and distribution of “Paths to Equity” (Caminos hacia la 
equidad) educational materials and the national “Women 
as Seen through the Eyes of Youth” (Las mujeres desde 
los ojos de la juventud) video competition.
One of the most important programmes in Colombia 
is “Make Peace” (Haz paz), which is being carried out in 
the framework of the National Policy for Family Peace 
and Coexistence. Through this programme, tools are being 
disseminated to increase and improve service delivery to 
families in conflict and victims of family violence. The 
institutions involved in the formulation and implementation 
of the “Make Peace” programme are the National Planning 
Department, the presidential advisory committees and 
special programmes for women’s equity, the Ministries of 
Social Protection, Education, Communications, Culture, 
Interior and Justice, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute 
(ICBF), National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic 
Sciences, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the National 
Police, the Attorney General’s Office and the Office of 
the Ombudsman. The Presidential Advisory Council for 
Social Policy assumed responsibility for coordinating the 
“Make Peace” programme in 2000, and between 2001 
and 2003 the Colombian Family Welfare Institute also 
gradually became involved.
The process of implementing these national plans has 
been complex. In some cases, the national plan against 
domestic violence has been used to compensate for a lack of 
public policies for gender equity (Bolivia), while in others, 
the lack of a comprehensive plan has given rise to sectoral 
policies and activities (Chile), the effectiveness of which has 
been lessened by lack of coordination and implementation 
problems. In countries that have not developed policies and 
where governmental institutions are weak, the problems 
have multiplied. In cases where the national plan and the 
gender policy have been based on a comprehensive vision 
(Costa Rica), an effort has been made to offset weaknesses 
in the policy by emphasizing continuity of the plan and 
ongoing attention to the issue of violence.
While government efforts to stem domestic violence 
in Latin America have given the problem greater visibility, 
there remain some difficulties in implementing existing 
legal provisions. One major obstacle to implementing 
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programmes aimed at addressing family violence is the 
lack of linkage between the laws enacted and the national 
plans and programmes put in place. In Chile and Costa 
Rica, unlike in other countries, the plans have had greater 
continuity (García and others, 2000).
The programmes implemented in this area encompass 
various forms of public action. While in some countries a 
national policy with a comprehensive approach has been 
applied (e.g., Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay), 
in others specific actions against domestic violence have 
been undertaken by various public institutions, but there 
is no national plan or programme. The latter approach 
is less costly, but the characteristics of demand for such 
services make it inadequate in the long term. A growing 
concern at present is intimate partner violence among 
young couples, the victims of which are mainly young 
women. Chile and Mexico have initiated awareness and 
prevention campaigns to address this form of violence.
In all cases, the provision of services to victims 
of domestic violence has expanded. In Bolivia, such 
services are provided by health care facilities and family 
protection teams, and comprehensive legal services have 
also been developed. In Costa Rica, several national 
ministries provide victim assistance services of various 
types, although municipal governments are playing a 
growing role. In Brazil, the network of shelters for victims 
of domestic violence has received federal funding and 
been strengthened, the Ministry of Health has adopted a 
response protocol and the health and police sectors are 
coordinating their activities. There are differences with 
regard to the approach to victim assistance: in some cases 
(Bolivia and Costa Rica) victim assistance services take 
direct responsibility for providing assistance, while in 
others they focus on prevention and technical assistance 
(Brazil and Chile) (García and others, 2000).
One of the most recent advances is the implementation 
of national programmes, regional campaigns and 
activities targeting various groups, including the 
organized participation of groups of men against violence. 
Evidence of the impact of such initiatives is the growing 
participation of judges and magistrates therein and the 
gradual inclusion of the issue of domestic violence on 
the electoral platforms of presidential candidates of both 
sexes (ECLAC, 2007e).
F.  Coordinating institutions and entities working  
 in the area of youth violence
The government agencies that deal with issues relating to youth vary by country. They include 
ministries, vice-ministries, youth secretariats, under-secretariats, institutes, directorates and 
national youth councils. There are also some government agencies located within non-specialized 
ministerial institutions, whose administrative and political authority is limited by their lack 
of independent legal status. Youth observatories that serve as information clearinghouses 
have been established in only three countries of the region. The main problem with regard to 
financing for policies and programmes to prevent youth violence is lack of continuity in the 
allocation of resources owing to non-inclusion of the relevant activities in public budgets, the 
low priority accorded to the issue of violence and its various manifestations as a public health 
and safety issue and lack of political will to mandate funding for measures to address it. 
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1. Features of the coordinating institutions working in  
 the area of youth violence
In the countries studied, the institutional approach to the 
issue of youth violence has depended on consolidation 
of the agencies responsible for issues relating to youth. 
Progress in that regard has been uneven. In Brazil, for 
example, the National Youth Council, the National Youth 
Secretariat and the National Youth Inclusion Programme 
(ProJovem) were created jointly under the National Youth 
Policy, adopted by law in 2005. In other countries, official 
youth agencies have been created by presidential decree 
—i.e., by the chief executive currently in office, without any 
legislative backing, as a result of which they are vulnerable 
to changes of government (ECLAC, 2000c).
With regard to the level of the government 
agencies that deal specifically with youth, they include 
ministries (Panama), vice-ministries (Bolivia, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Paraguay), youth 
secretariats (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru), 
under-secretariats and institutes (Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay), directorates (Argentina, 
Ecuador), national youth councils (Guatemala) and 
others. Some public agencies are smaller units located 
within a non-specialized ministerial institution and lack 
independent legal status, as a result of which they are 
administratively and politically limited (El Salvador and 
Nicaragua until 2001). Others come under to a high-level 
government agency and enjoy administrative autonomy, 
but work directly with a lead agency, which has primary 
responsibility for youth-related matters, such as the 
ministry responsible for formulating the national youth 
policy (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama) (Dávila, 2003). These agencies may work at the 
national, provincial or local (municipal or departmental) 
levels, depending on their jurisdiction.
In general, the objectives of the national institutions 
that deal with youth include at least four tasks: systematic 
compilation of information about the situation of youth, 
professionalization of technical personnel, design and 
implementation of innovative programmes and development 
of communication skills in order to build consensus among 
leaders and public opinion. While significant progress 
has been made, the institutional structure needs to be 
modified in order to delegate responsibility for leadership 
and for coordination of plans and programmes to national 
youth institutes.
The survey conducted by ECLAC in the region 
reveals that a variety of institutions maintain information 
systems or collect statistics on violence as it affects the 
youth population. In some countries there are violence 
observatories operating in coordination with national 
youth agencies. At the regional level, as part of an effort 
to quantify the magnitude of the problem, since 2004 the 
Pan American Health Organization and the Inter-American 
Coalition for the Prevention of Violence, with technical 
support from the CISALVA Institute at Universidad 
del Valle in Cali, Colombia, have been supporting and 
implementing a project involving municipal violence 
observatories in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama. In 
addition, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
has been working for a decade in the area of violence 
prevention and public safety, with a portfolio that to date 
includes more than US$ 215 million. According to the 
ECLAC survey, information on violence in Honduras comes 
from the Honduras Violence Observatory, a joint initiative 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the National Autonomous University of Honduras. 
In Ecuador, such information is based on data from the 
Youth Observatory and in Uruguay it is supplied by the 
National Observatory on Violence and Crime.
With regard to the dissemination of information to 
support the formulation and implementation of national and 
regional policies for the prevention and control of violence, 
worthy of note is the work being carried out by the Central 
American Observatory against Violence (OCAVI), which 
serves as a virtual information centre for decision-makers, 
operators of prevention systems, academics and members 
of the general public concerned with the phenomenon of 
violence and crime in Central America. OCAVI is part of 
the Safe Central America Plan, an initiative of the Central 
American Integration System (SICA). The observatory is 
located in El Salvador and monitors the issue both at the 
national level and at the regional level in Central America. 
Given the transnational nature of the problem, it also collects 
information from Mexico, the United States and Canada 
and from other countries in Latin America and the world. 
OCAVI studies a wide range of topics related to the problem 
of violence in the region and in the world. The information 
compiled by the observatory includes indicators of violence, 
studies and research, public policies, projects and models 
of prevention, control and rehabilitation.
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In other countries, information on youth violence is 
compiled by national statistics offices. This is the case 
in Argentina, Mexico and Peru. The Integrated System 
of Social Indicators of Ecuador is another example. 
In Guatemala, the institutions that coordinates and 
compile information on youth violence are the National 
Youth Council (CONJUVE) and the police, while in 
Peru this work is done by the Ministry the Interior, the 
national statistics office, the National Youth Secretariat 
and the National Police. In the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, the agency that maintains statistics on 
offences committed by children and adolescents at 
the national level is the Scientific, Penal and Crime 
Research Corps (CICPC).
Table IV.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (14 COUNTRIES): INSTITUTION SERVING AS A CLEARINGHOUSE  
FOR INFORMATION ON YOUTH VIOLENCE
Country Ministry of the Interior
National 
statistics office Youth institute Police
Violence 
observatory Other











Peru X X X X X
Uruguay X
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) X X
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of government responses to the ECLAC survey on policies and programmes for tackling 
youth violence in Latin America, 2008.
a 
 There is no specific institution that compiles and coordinates information on youth violence.
With respect to the management and coordination of 
programmes targeting youth violence, youth agencies and 
the ministries responsible for violence problems work in 
coordination with police forces, NGOs, foundations, schools, 
community associations and other stakeholders.
In Chile, the Ministry of the Interior and several 
NGOs coordinate programmes on youth violence, 
working with municipal governments and local police 
forces. Some programmes, especially those related to 
recreation, job training and education, are coordinated by 
the National Institute for Youth (INJUV). The Institute 
is a mainly technical body responsible for coordinating 
institutional efforts; it comes under the Ministry of 
Planning and Cooperation and has municipal youth 
offices at the local level.13 This entity was established 
13
 Between 1997 and 1999, UNJUV’s implementing functions were 
reduced. Currently, it is responsible for implementing the Youth 
Information System (SIJ) and Interjoven, initiatives aimed at 
intervening in specific strategic areas which reinforce its technical, 
advisory, linking and coordinating role.
in 1991 and was designed to function as a decentralized 
public service, having independent legal status and its 
own financial resources. Its activities are carried out 
through various public agencies. Its youth policies are 
aimed at adolescent students in secondary and higher 
education institutions. INJUV works nationally in a 
coordinated manner through 168 local and municipal 
youth agencies.
In El Salvador, the institutions that coordinate 
youth-related programmes vary, depending on whether 
they are repressive or preventive in nature. The National 
Civil Police are responsible for coordinating the “Heavy-
Handed” (July 2003) and “Super-Heavy-Handed” plans, 
while the National Youth Secretariat oversees the activities 
carried out under the “Friendly Hand” and “Outstretched 
Hand” plans. Responsibility for implementing the 
National Plan for Social Prevention and Peace is shared 
by several ministries (Labour, Education), institutions for 
the protection of women, international agencies such as 
UNDP, mayors and other institutions.
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In Colombia, the institutions engaged in activities to deter 
violence include the Office of the President, the Ministry of 
the Interior and Justice, the Ministry of Social Protection 
and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute.14 15 The latter 
is an agency of the Ministry of Social Protection, with 201 
local centres and service points to serve the population in 
all municipalities of the country. Currently about 10 million 
Colombians are benefiting from its services.
The implementation of programmes related to youth 
violence in Costa Rica is a joint effort involving the Ministry 
of Culture, Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Public Safety, the Ministry of Justice 
and the National Children’s Foundation. Until 2002, the 
entity responsible for youth issues was the National Youth 
Movement (MNJ). That year, the National Council on 
Public Policy for Young Persons was established under the 
leadership of the Vice-Minister for Youth. Other members 
of the Council are the Minister of the Presidency, three 
representatives from the National Youth Advisory Network, 
the Minister for the Status of Women and a representative 
of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. Its work is 
split among MNJ activities relating to youth participation, 
the exercise of rights and coordination of activities in five 
areas: participation, training, research, communication 
and legislation (ECLAC, 2000c).
14
 See [online] www.presidencia.gov.co.
15
 See [online] www.icbf.gov.co.
In Mexico, programmes are coordinated by state 
institutes for youth and the National Polytechnic Institute. 
In Peru, youth violence programmes are coordinated 
jointly by the Ministry the Interior and the National Youth 
Secretariat (SNJ), a division of the Ministry of Education, 
in some cases working with the Ministry of Health and 
the ombudsmen. In Ecuador, a large proportion of youth 
violence programmes are coordinated jointly by government 
ministries and national NGOs.
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the 
Autonomous Institute of the National Council for the 
Rights of Boys, Girls and Adolescents (IACNDNNA) 
—an entity that works with information related to 
violence against girls, boys, and adolescents— is the 
highest authority in the Child and Adolescent Protection 
System. The Foundation “Youth and Change”, established 
in 1994 under the aegis of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sports, has action programmes in the areas 
of social and productive participation, youth leadership, 
comprehensive health care for adolescents, vocational 
training for unemployed youth and prevention of crime, 
adolescent pregnancy, school dropout and low educational 
attainment. The Foundation works with other ministries 
(Health and Social Welfare, Justice) in carrying out 
its activities.
2.  Funding sources and constraints
In the countries surveyed, the programmes aimed at 
preventing and reducing youth violence receive funding 
from the federal government (Brazil) and the Ministry of 
the Interior (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic Venezuela, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Mexico and Peru). Owing to the sectoral nature of some 
programmes, other ministries (Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Peru), NGOs (Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico) and foundations (Ecuador) may 
also contribute funding. 
In El Salvador, the Programme for Social Prevention 
of Youth Violence and Crime has a budget of 16,000,000 
colones (approximately US$ 1,355,000 in 2000), of which 
72% is a contribution from the European Commission 
and the remaining 28% comes from the Government. 
The budget for the Programme for Social Prevention of 
Youth Violence and Crime targeting the western part of the 
country totals 990,555 colones (approximately U$ 83,800 
in 2000), funded by the Office of the President through 
the National Council for Public Safety.
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Table IV.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR PROGRAMMES FOR THE  


















Ecuador X X X X





(Bol. Rep. of) X X
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of government responses to the ECLAC survey on policies and programmes for tackling 
youth violence in Latin America, 2008.
In Peru, the majority of programmes on youth violence 
are funded by the Public Treasury. The resources for 
implementing the various programmes of the National 
Police in this area come from public and private institutions 
(NGOs and regional and local governments, among others), 
as the police force does not have a budget allocated for 
such activities. Consequently, precise data on the amount 
of that funding are not available. In the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, youth violence programmes are funded 
by the General Directorate for the Prevention of Crime 
(Ministry of the Interior) or with combined funding from 
the Ministry of Education, the National Fund for Protection 
of Children and Adolescents and state and municipal funds 
for the protection of children and adolescents. 
As concerns funding for national plans against 
domestic violence, major budgetary constraints have 
been encountered in several countries. In Bolivia, neither 
the National Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of 
Violence nor the law from which it arises provides for 
means to ensure its sustainability. This has resulted in 
a number of funding-related problems, including the 
weakness of the Vice-Ministry, the lack of an equity 
plan and the transfer of resources and services to other 
gender equity areas for which there is no plan but which 
are considered urgent. Funding for the plan has been cut 
since 1997, and it is currently dependent on international 
cooperation resources. In Brazil, the National Programme 
to Prevent and Combat Domestic Violence has been 
hampered by insufficient allocation of budgetary resources 
and complications caused by differences between states 
(García and others, 2000).
In Chile, the majority of funding for the National 
Programme for the Prevention of Family Violence comes 
from the State and is channelled through the National 
Women’s Service (SERNAM) and other ministries. However, 
shortages of financial and human resources limit prevention 
and technical assistance activities. Lack of systems for the 
collection, processing, analysis and production of statistics 
is another major problem. The Ministry of Health and 
municipal governments, which were given responsibility 
for implementing the plan in the original design, did not 
have sufficient resources to do so.
In Costa Rica, financing for the National Plan to 
Address and Prevent Family Violence (PLANOVI) comes 
from the National Institute of Women (INM), which in 
1999 invested 92,826,000 colones (about US$ 334,000 
in 2000). This figure accounts for 14.8% of the Institute’s 
overall budget for that year and 42% of expenditure for 
technical areas. That investment covered all operating and 
building-related expenses. Institutional investment in the 
area of gender-based violence has increased steadily since 
the issue has been on the political agenda (García and 
others, 2000). In Mexico, total funding for the medium-
term programme on gender and equity issues, which 
covers the period 2006-2012, amounts to 700,000 pesos 
per year (US$ 52,200 in 2000).
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Many of the constraints in relation to funding for 
policies and programmes to prevent youth violence 
relate to lack of continuity in the allocation of resources, 
owing to non-inclusion of the relevant activities in the 
public budget (Peru), the low priority accorded to the 
issue of youth violence and the channelling of the bulk 
of funding to interdiction (Colombia). Lack of visibility 
of the problem (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) also 
undermines institutions dealing with youth-related issues, 
reducing their stature and legitimacy in dealing with those 
issues (Ecuador). Violence is not regarded as a public 
health and safety issue in Mexico, and it is therefore not 
a priority for the allocation of resources. Another reason 
for the lack of continuity in funding relates to the lack of 
political will to mandate funding for violence prevention 
measures (Colombia) (see table IV.8).
Table IV.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): MAIN POLICY AND PROGRAMME FUNDING CONSTRAINTS 
Country First in importance Second in importance Third in importance
Argentina No response ... ...
Brazil No response ... ...
Chile Lack of resources Lack of youth participation ...
Colombia Low visibility of the problem Lack of political will to mandate funding Channelling of funds to interdiction 
rather than prevention
Costa Rica Lack of resources Lack of political commitment Lack of institutional coordination
Dominican Republic No response … …
Ecuador Lack of policies on and 
for young people
Weak institutional structure for 
dealing with youth-related issues 
Lack of public awareness of the issue
El Salvador Lack of a national public policy on 
prevention of youth violence
Lack of sustainability of programmes Lack of resources
Guatemala Corruption in public institutions Lack of government participation Lack of policies
Mexico Lack of training among 
human resources
Lack of infrastructure Lack of public awareness of the issue
Peru Bureaucratic red tape Activities not included in 
the public budget
Lack of participation by public 
and civic institutions
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Lack of continuity in funding Lack of monitoring and evaluation Lack of assessment of the problem
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of government responses to the ECLAC survey on policies and programmes for tackling 
youth violence in Latin America, 2008.
The invisibility of the issue of youth violence in 
programmes is closely linked to the lack of comprehensive 
situation assessments at national and regional levels (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela). Youth violence is generally addressed 
through a punitive approach, and budget allocations therefore 
tend to reinforce measures related, for example, to juvenile 
criminal responsibility, personal injury or aggravated theft 
—in other words, focusing on the criminal dimension of 
youth violence. Hence, the problem is not visible from the 
standpoint of its impact on youth themselves, but only from 
the standpoint of punitive action against crime (Colombia). 
Lack of evaluations to determine the effectiveness and the 
return on programmes implemented is another source of 
concern (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).
Lack of budgetary autonomy may lead to an increase 
in bureaucratic red tape (Peru) and corruption in public 
institutions (Guatemala) or lack of adequate budgets 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica) and 
training opportunities for human resources in the area of 
youth violence (Mexico). In countries such as Ecuador 
and El Salvador, the lack of continuity in financing for 
investment in youth violence prevention is attributed to 
the absence of policies on youth and for youth (Ecuador) 
and public policies on prevention.
In several countries funding problems are attributed 
to the breakdown of institutions. Authorities from 
Peru cited the lack of participation by public and civic 
institutions in the proper implementation of programmes, 
while authorities in Mexico noted the lack of an adequate 
structure for programme implementation, one that would 
enable both horizontal and vertical approaches.
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3.  Evaluation of experiences and lessons learned
Evaluations of some of the programmes carried out to 
date and of the experiences gained, point to some progress 
in terms of inter-ministerial coordination and private- 
and public-sector networking, but the weakness of the 
institutions and agencies implementing the programmes 
is an impediment to the dissemination and replication of 
successful experiences. Analysis of these programmes 
reveals at least two gaps that are hindering efforts to 
address youth violence: the implementation of a broad 
spectrum of activities, rather than targeting specific groups 
of youths and the absence or shortage of action focusing 
specifically on children, women and young men living 
in the street. Experts say that policies aimed at reducing 
violence should be specific, coordinated, decentralized, 
participatory and selective. They recommend prevention as 
an essential primary measure, in addition to secondary and 
tertiary measures aimed at ensuring the social reintegration 
of rehabilitated young people.
Evaluations of programmes related to youth violence 
point to some progress in terms of inter-ministerial 
coordination and private- and public-sector networking. 
However, they also indicate that a major problem is the 
small size and low prestige of the agencies responsible for 
their implementation, which reduces the possibilities for 
disseminating and replicating successful experiences.
Policies to reduce youth violence should meet certain 
requirements. They should be targeted in order to provide 
a focused response to the various facets of the problem. 
They should also be coordinated in order to ensure the 
involvement of all relevant stakeholders, decentralized to 
allow for more concerted action by local authorities and 
the community, and participatory, meaning that young 
people themselves are consulted about their perceptions 
and the risks they face. The creation or strengthening of 
comprehensive youth plans applying these approaches is 
being promoted in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Uruguay (Rodríguez, 2005).
Objectives are proposed in the areas of education, 
health and employment, as well as innovations in police 
procedures, legislative reforms and media campaigns. 
Notable in this area is PAHO’s focus on addressing violence 
through an epidemiological approach that combines 
medical and legal aspects of violence with prevention 
and the promotion of a culture of health, based on equity 
and respect for life and the physical and psychosocial 
integrity of individuals. Such approaches should be 
reflected in the changes introduced by governments 
to promote a culture of peaceful coexistence in school 
curricula, together with institutional measures to ensure 
the protection of constitutional and human rights (De 
Roux, 1993; OPS, 1993).
The experience gained in urban violence reduction 
programmes underscores the need to concentrate 
community and institutional efforts at the level of local 
authorities (municipal governments or mayors), as a point 
of convergence between institutions and beneficiaries 
of public services, governments and citizens. At the 
institutional level, the community assets and social 
capital of disadvantaged sectors should be strengthened, 
multisectoral initiatives that enhance the quality of services 
should be promoted and policing and judicial strategies 
should be improved.
Comprehensive plans against youth violence should 
distinguish between principal and complementary goals. 
The principal goals should be prevention of violence, 
early identification and prevention of risk situations, and 
promotion of healthy lifestyles. In the context of public 
policy, such plans should translate into primary prevention 
measures aimed at stopping violence before it happens. 
Violence prevention plans should include strategies to 
support relatively large segments of the population that 
have multiple risk factors and few protective factors 
(Krauskopf, 2007a).
Additional goals include timely intervention to 
address those affected by violence, identifying at-risk 
populations and breaking the intergenerational cycle 
of violence. This calls for secondary prevention efforts 
targeting specific individuals or social groups who have 
been clearly identified as being prone to engage in habitual 
violent or criminal behaviour. Specialized interventions 
are needed in order to neutralize or prevent pre-criminal 
situations among at-risk groups, school dropouts and 
victims of domestic violence, among others.
Tertiary prevention should also be encouraged, targeting 
young people who are involved in gangs and who are in conflict 
with the law, with the aim of changing their lifestyles through 
rehabilitation and treatment alternatives. In order to address 
the problem of youth violence, it must be recognized that 
young people are stakeholders and individuals with rights, 
opinions, experiences and expectations of their own. All of 
this represents a costly process with results that will only be 
seen in the long term in the framework of comprehensive 
programmes. There are currently participatory training 
projects, involving the participation of young people as 
models in peer education for other young people of both 
sexes who find themselves in conflict with law. But after the 
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rehabilitation process is complete, it is necessary to ensure 
the reintegration of young people in an environment that 
encourages their acceptance and discourages stigmatization, 
in order to strengthen their resilience and other positive 
characteristics, rather than characterizing rehabilitated young 
people as drug addicts or criminals.
Lastly, the analysis of existing policies and programmes 
reveals a failure to target specific segments of the youth 
population. Most actions are aimed at youth in general 
and do not address the specific problems of rural youth, 
students or youths who have partially or fully joined the 
working world.
Box IV.4
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMES FOR YOUTH
The ingredients of success in programmes 
for reducing youth violence are: 
-	 Addressing the problem from 
early ages, with a holistic approach that 
includes families, peers and community 
networks.
–	 Resolving specific problems while at 
the same time promoting positive behaviours 
through activities aimed at building individual 
capacities and encouraging participation 
for self-determination.
– Working in networks with other 
programmes and ensuring capacity 
to meet the multiple needs of young 
people.
– Us ing  case  management 
systems —i.e., interdisciplinary groups 
of professionals devoted to meeting the 
needs of youth, incorporating a dimension 
of individualized care.
–	 Adopting community-wide multi-
agency collaborative approaches. 
-	 Fostering private-sector participation, 
including community par ticipation 
in the design and implementation of 
programmes.
-	 Encouraging youth participation 
and empowerment, especially in the early 
phases of programmes, a critical stage 
for establishing dialogue and ensuring 
the sustainability of actions.
-	 Facilitating the replicability and 
sustainability of effective programmes. 
Source:  M. Schneidman, “Targeting at-risk-youth: rationales, approaches to service delivery and monitoring and evaluation issues”, LAC Human and Social Development 
Group Paper, No. 15932, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1996.
G.  Seventeenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads  
 of State and Government: social cohesion and 
 social policies
The seventeenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government was held in Chile 
in 2007. Its central theme was “social cohesion and social policies to achieve more inclusive 
Ibero-American societies”. The Declaration of Santiago, adopted at the Summit, includes 
important commitments by the Governments of Latin America concerning social cohesion, access 
to basic services, gender equity and protection for young people and vulnerable groups.
The seventeenth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of 
State and Government was held from 8 to 10 November 
2007 in Santiago, Chile. The central theme of the 
Summit, which was supported by the Ibero-American 
Secretariat (SEGIB) and ECLAC, was “social cohesion 
and social policies to achieve more inclusive Ibero-
American societies”.
In preparation for the conference, a number of 
ministerial meetings on social and economic issues were 
held between May and October 2007. The issues addressed 
included social security, health, culture, education, 
children and adolescents, economics and finance, public 
administration, the environment, housing and development 
and tourism (see box IV.5).
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Box IV.5
DECLARATION OF SANTIAGO ADOPTED BY THE SEVENTEENTH IBERO-AMERICAN SUMMIT OF HEADS OF
STATE AND GOVERNMENT
Place and date: Santiago, 8-10 November 
2007.
Participants: 22 Heads of State and 
Government of member countries of the 
Ibero-American community.
Organizers: Ibero-American Secretariat 
(SEGIB), Government of Chile.
Preparatory activities: 
Ninth Ibero-American Conference on 
Children and Adolescents, 28-29 May, 
Pucón, Chile.
Ninth Ibero-American Conference of 
Ministers of Public Administration and 
State Reform, 31 May-1 June, Pucón, 
Chile Seventh Ibero-American Forum of 
Ministers of the Environment, 11-13 June, 
San Salvador.
Sixth Ibero-American Conference of 
Ministers Responsible for Social Security, 
5-6 July, Iquique, Chile.
Ninth Ibero-American Conference of 
Ministers of Health, 9-10 July, Iquique, 
Chile.
Seventeenth Ibero-American Conference 
of Ministers of Education, 23-24 July, 
Valparaíso, Chile.
Tenth Ibero-American Conference of 
Ministers of Culture, 26-27 July, Valparaíso, 
Chile.
Eleventh Meeting of Ministers of the 
Presidency and Equivalent Officials, 30-31 
August, Costa Rica.
Seventh Ibero-American Conference 
of Ministers of Tourism, 29 September-2 
October, Buque Aquiles, Chile.
Sixteenth Ibero-American Forum on 
Housing and Urban Development, 8-10 
October, Santiago.
Selection and summary of the principal 
commitments on social issues.
-	 Adopt policies to increase the creation 
of decent, high-quality employment. 
Make decent, high-quality employment, 
social mobility and redistribution common 
objectives of all public policies.
-	 Give priority in the international 
agenda to the promotion of social cohesion 
and the need for more inclusive societies 
in which human rights are respected and 
social protection ensured.
-	 Promote greater development and 
coordination of social policies to overcome 
poverty, ensure universal access to 
social services and improve the quality of 
education, health, housing, security and 
social protection services.
-	 Implement policies to enhance the 
well-being of the most vulnerable groups.
-	 Mainstream gender equality in public 
policies on social cohesion.
-	 Develop programmes, policies 
and legal instruments that reflect the 
commitment of the Ibero-American States 
to youth.
-	 Further the development of social 
protection systems with universal coverage 
through contributory, non-contributory and 
solidarity instruments.
-	 Strengthen the advancement of 
and respect for human rights as an 
essential component of policies for social 
cohesion.
-	 Provide for full protection of the 
human rights of migrants, irrespective 
of their immigration status, in the legal 
framework of each State.
-	 Recognize that addressing the social 
problems of the region will require a wide-
ranging social dialogue, which must take 
place in a climate of understanding, in which 
governments, employers and employees 
work together to forge a social partnership 
that will generate wealth and create decent 
and productive employment.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Technical seminars were also conducted, including 
one on “social cohesion in Ibero-America”, which 
was held in Madrid on 18 and 19 June 2007 and was 
organized by SEGIB with the collaboration of ECLAC 
and with the sponsorship of the Spanish International 
Cooperation Agency for Development (AECID) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
ECLAC/SEGIB seminars on social cohesion were also 
held 30 July 2007 in Mexico City, on 1 August in Bogotá 
and on 3 August in Brasilia. In these seminars, experts 
and representatives of the private sector and government 
discussed a paper entitled “Social Cohesion, Inclusion 
and a Sense of Belonging in Latin America and the 
Caribbean”, prepared by ECLAC with financial support 
from SEGIB and AECID.
Representatives from 22 member countries of the 
Ibero-American community participated in the seventeenth 
Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government 
with a view to exchanging experiences in the design 
and implementation of policies on social cohesion in 
which the various Ibero-American states, the aim being 
to increasing levels of inclusion, justice, protection and 
social assistance and strengthening feelings of solidarity, 
belonging and social identity.
The Declaration of Santiago contains 24 commitments 
made at the seventeenth Summit. The main ones relate to 
economic growth and imbalances in international economic 
and trade relations, employment, social cohesion, poverty 
reduction policies, quality of life of the most vulnerable 
groups, gender equity, youth, social protection, access 
to cultural goods, the Millennium Development Goals, 
human rights of migrants, multiculturalism, tax reforms 
and measures, climate change and natural disasters, 
multilateralism and cooperation (see a selection of these 
commitments in box IV.5)
The participants declared 2008 to be “Ibero-American 
Year against All Forms of Discrimination” and chose the 
venues for future summits on youth and development, to 
be held in El Salvador (2008), Portugal (2009), Argentina 
(2010) and Spain (2012).
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Annual average variations in the period








Argentina 1990 5 832.7 5 690 7.4 1 343.9
1999 7 874.0 7 620 14.3 -1.8 1990-1999 3.4 3.3 0.5 15.0 
2002 6 455.8 6 168 19.7 41.0 2002 -11.7 -13.3 -13.9 -19.5 
2006 8 733.4 8 606 10.2 9.8 2006 7.4 8.6 8.6 12.9 
2007 9 396.8 9 316 8.5 8.5 2007 7.6 8.3 12.0 13.7 
Bolivia 1990 869.9  901 7.3 18.0
1999 995.0 1 016 7.2 3.1 1990-1999 1.5 1.3 2.1 10.2 
2002 991.8 1 038 8.7 2.5 2002 0.2 3.3 3.3 4.7 
2006 1 064.4 1 303 8.0 4.9 2006 2.6 11.1 -8.0 4.5 
2007 1 090.2 1 342 7.7 11.7 2007 2.4 3.0 -2.8 -1.3 
Brazil 1990 3 348.6 3 274 4.3 2 101.3
1999 3 589.1 3 481 7.6 8.9 1990-1999 0.8 0.7 0.2 3.1 
2002 3 727.3 3 619 11.7 12.5 2002 1.2 1.4 -2.1 4.2 
2006 4 021.3 3 973 10.0 3.1 2006 2.3 3.4 3.5 13.1 
2007 4 183.0 4 164 9.3 4.5 2007 4.0 4.8 1.5 6.5 
Chile 1990 3 081.3 2 952 9.2 c 27.3
1999 4 750.6 4 579 10.1 c 2.3 1990-1999 4.9 5.0 4.0 5.5 
2002 5 061.2 4 841 9.8 c 2.8 2002 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.9 
2006 5 889.1 6 484 7.7 2.6 2006 3.3 10.8 1.9 2.5 
2007 6 126.5 6 939 7.1 7.8 2007 4.0 7.0 2.8 1.8 
Colombia 1990 2 062.6 1 977 10.5 32.4
1999 2 229.3 2 192 19.4 9.2 1990-1999 0.9 1.2 2.6 -0.1 
2002 2 290.8 2 260 17.6 7.0 2002 0.9 0.8 3.0 0.7 
2006 2 678.5 2 720 13.0 4.5 2006 5.5 6.3 3.7 2.8 
2007 2 860.1 2 914 11.4 5.7 2007 6.8 7.1 -0.5 0.7 
Costa Rica 1990 3 123.1 3 035 5.4 27.3
1999 4 081.4 3 737 6.2 10.1 1990-1999 3.0 2.3 2.2 1.1 
2002 4 056.3 3 969 6.8 9.7 2002 0.9 2.2 4.1 -0.6 
2006 4 819.8 4 622 6.0 9.4 2006 6.9 6.9 1.6 1.7 
2007 5 085.1 4 722 4.8 10.8 2007 5.5 2.2 1.3 1.3 
Cuba 1990 3 327.9 … … …
1999 2 600.6 2 682 6.3 d -2.9 1990-1999 -2.7 … -9.4 …
2002 2 859.7 2 875 3.3 d 7.3 2002 1.2 1.3 9.3 …
2006 3 890.4 3 970 2.0 5.7 2006 12.0 15.1 11.6 …
2007 4 173.3 4 209 1.9 2.8 2007 7.3 6.0 -0.9 …
Ecuador 1990 1 297.1 1 141 6.1 49.5
1999 1 278.9 1 214 15.1 60.7 1990-1999 -0.2 0.7 3.7 2.1 
2002 1 382.3 1 356 8.6 9.4 2002 2.8 3.9 10.9 0.9 
2006 1 608.1 1 756 8.1 2.9 2006 2.4 7.3 … 3.3 
2007 1 627.6 1 793 7.4 3.3 2007 1.2 2.1 … 3.9
El Salvador 1990 1 638.5 1 704 10.0 19.3
1999 2 089.3 2 296 6.9 -1.0 1990-1999 2.7 3.4 … 0.1 
2002 2 097.8 2 380 6.2 2.8 2002 0.4 -2.1 … -1.8 
2006 2 188.3 2 548 5.7 4.9 2006 2.4 3.7 … -0.7 
2007 2 252.4 2 611 … 4.9 2007 2.9 2.5 … 2.5 
Guatemala 1990 1 289.6 1 268 … 59.6
1999 1 513.9 1 572 … 4.9 1990-1999 1.8 2.4 5.4 -7.4 
2002 1 550.5 1 702 5.4 6.3 2002 1.3 5.3 -0.9 0.3 
2006 1 614.4 1 810 … 5.8 2006 2.7 3.0 -1.1 3.2 
2007 1 664.5 1 858 … 8.7 2007 3.1 2.7 -4.6 -1.6 

















Annual average variations in the period








Haiti 1990 515.7  557 … 26.1
1999 430.9  517 … 9.7 1990-1999 -2.0 -0.8 … -7.3 
2002 408.2  491 … 14.8 2002 -1.8 -2.1 … -8.9 
2006 386.2  501 … 10.2 2006 0.7 0.8 … -12.0 
2007 392.1  513 … 9.3 2007 1.5 2.4 … -7.9 
Honduras 1990 1 061.3 1 028 7.8 36.4
1999 1 113.8 1 228 5.3 10.9 1990-1999 0.5 2.0 … -1.1 
2002 1 180.0 1 217 6.1 8.1 2002 1.7 0.8 … 2.1 
2006 1 363.4 1 470 4.9 5.3 2006 4.2 4.9 … 5.1 
2007 1 420.4 1 510 4.1 8.9 2007 4.2 2.7 … 2.8 
Mexico 1990 5 387.5 5 229 2.7 29.9
1999 6 075.2 5 998 3.7 12.3 1990-1999 1.3 1.5 0.7 -4.1 
2002 6 310.2 6 255 3.9 5.7 2002 -0.1 0.4 1.9 0.7 
2006 6 951.5 7 109 4.6 4.1 2006 3.7 4.2 0.4 0.0 
2007 7 093.7 7 273 4.8 3.8 2007 2.0 2.3 1.0 -0.7 
Nicaragua 1990 681.4  577 7.6 c 13 490.2
1999 753.0  799 10.7 c 7.2 1990-1999 1.1 3.7 3.1 0.8 
2002 777.8  812 11.6 4.0 2002 -0.6 0.7 3.5 3.7 
2006 864.2  904 7.0 10.2 2006 2.5 1.3 1.4 8.8 
2007 884.9  923 6.9 16.2 2007 2.4 2.1 -1.7 2.4 
Panama 1990 2 941.5 3 017 20.0 0.8
1999 3 912.0 3 816 13.6 1.5 1990-1999 3.2 2.6 0.7 1.7 
2002 3 904.5 3 942 16.5 1.9 2002 0.4 2.8 -3.0 -1.2 
2006 4 749.1 4 270 10.4 2.2 2006 6.8 4.7 2.0 3.6 
2007 5 195.9 4 712 7.8 6.4 2007 9.4 10.4 1.0 -1.7 
Paraguay 1990 1 400.1 1 397 6.6 44.0
1999 1 401.7 1 454 9.4 5.4 1990-1999 0.0 0.4 1.3 -1.3 
2002 1 300.2 1 294 14.7 14.6 2002 -2.0 -4.8 -5.0 -0.7 
2006 1 397.9 1 405 8.9 12.5 2006 2.4 4.1 0.6 2.2 
2007 1 466.5 1 498 7.2 6.0 2007 4.9 6.6 2.3 -2.6 
Peru 1990 1 649.4 1 595 8.3 7 646.8
1999 2 047.0 2 043 9.2 3.7 1990-1999 2.4 2.8 0.6 2.3 
2002 2 133.9 2 112 9.4 1.5 2002 3.7 3.6 4.6 -0.2 
2006 2 555.8 2 633 8.5 1.1 2006 6.3 10.2 1.2 6.6 
2007 2 750.8 2 864 8.4 3.9 2007 7.6 8.8 -1.8 -0.3 
Dominican 1990 1 799.0 1 766 … 79.9
Republic 1999 2 604.9 2 747 13.8 d 5.1 1990-1999 4.2 5.0 … 2.6 
2002 2 821.1 2 964 16.1 d 10.5 2002 4.1 4.8 … -0.5 
2006 3 240.3 3 234 16.2 d 5.0 2006 9.0 9.0 … -7.1 
2007 3 464.1 3 465 15.6 d 8.9 2007 6.9 7.1 … 4.8 
Uruguay 1990 4 802.4 4 852 8.5 128.9
1999 6 173.7 6 144 11.3 4.2 1990-1999 2.8 2.7 1.4 -5.3 
2002 5 200.2 5 247 17.0 25.9 2002 -11.0 -10.4 -10.7 -10.1 
2006 6 770.2 6 487 11.4 6.4 2006 6.8 6.8 4.4 16.1 
2007 7 255.1 7 012 9.6 8.5 2007 7.2 8.1 4.7 4.1 
Venezuela 1990 4 828.1 4 522 10.4 d 36.5
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 4 738.4 4 218 15.0 d 20.0 1990-1999 -0.2 -0.8 -3.9 -0.8 
2002 4 380.9 4 102 15.8 d 31.2 2002 -10.5 -10.2 -11.0 -5.4 
2006 5 429.6 6 330 10.0 d 17.0 2006 8.5 13.9 5.1 9.9 



















Annual average variations in the period








Latin 1990 3 516.3 3 335 5.8 1 376.8
America e 1999 3 976.0 3 818 11.0 9.7 1990-1999 1.4 1.5 1.0 2.3 
2002 3 966.4 3 819 11.0 12.2 2002 -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 0.2 
2006 4 526.4 4 525 8.6 5.0 2006 4.3 5.7 2.8 6.8 
2007 4 722.4 4754 8.0 6.4 2007 4.3 5.1 1.6 3.4 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries.
a
 Real per capita gross national income.
b
 Simple average of December-to-December variations for each year.
c




 The aggregate figures for Latin America are obtained from weighted averages for all countries for which data are available in each indicator.
Table A-1 (concluded)
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Table A-2
TOTAL POPULATION OF THE REGION BY COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 1980-2020
(Thousands at mid-year)
Country or territory 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Latin America 
Argentina 28 094 30 305 32 581 34 779 36 784 38 592 40 519 42 403 44 163
Bolivia 5 355 5 964 6 669 7 482 8 428 9 427 10 426 11 411 12 363
Brazil 121 672 136 178 149 690 162 019 174 719 187 601 199 992 211 284 221 450
Chile 11 174 12 102 13 179 14 395 15 398 16 267 17 094 17 865 18 549
Colombia 28 356 31 564 34 875 38 259 41 661 44 907 47 859 50 666 53 298
Costa Rica 2 347 2 697 3 076 3 475 3 925 4 322 4 695 5 022 5 314
Cuba 9 724 10 086 10 605 10 930 11 129 11 242 11 236 11 226 11 212
Ecuador 7 961 9 099 10 272 11 396 12 297 13 211 14 200 15 195 16 189
El Salvador 4 586 4 769 5 110 5 669 6 276 6 874 7 453 8 010 8 585
Guatemala 7 013 7 935 8 908 10 004 11 225 12 700 14 362 16 176 18 055
Haiti 5 691 6 388 7 108 7 836 8 576 9 292 10 085 10 912 11 743
Honduras 3 634 4 236 4 901 5 588 6 231 6 893 7 614 8 353 9 079
Mexico 69 325 76 826 84 002 91 823 99 684 104 159 110 056 115 288 119 808
Nicaragua 3 257 3 715 4 141 4 664 5 106 5 457 5 825 6 192 6 538
Panama 1 949 2 176 2 411 2 670 2 948 3 228 3 497 3 752 3 995
Paraguay 3 198 3 702 4 248 4 799 5 346 5 899 6 451 7 003 7 544
Peru 17 325 19 523 21 762 23 857 25 650 27 254 28 861 30 526 32 181
Dominican Republic 5 935 6 609 7 296 8 014 8 740 9 465 10 169 10 846 11 494
Uruguay 2 914 3 009 3 106 3 218 3 314 3 317 3 363 3 419 3 483
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 15 091 17 317 19 731 22 034 24 296 26 556 28 807 30 988 33 038
Latin America 354 700 394 197 433 668 472 912 511 735 546 664 582 564 616 537 648 080
The Caribbean
Anguilla 7 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Antigua and Barbuda 72 68 62 68 77 83 88 93 97
Netherlands Antilles 174 182 191 191 181 186 199 205 207
Aruba 61 65 64 83 90 103 103 105 106
Bahamas 210 233 255 280 303 323 343 363 381
Barbados 249 260 271 280 286 292 297 300 303
Belize 144 163 186 214 245 276 306 335 363
Dominica 73 72 69 69 68 68 67 67 68
Grenada 89 100 96 98 100 105 105 106 107
Guyana 761 754 731 739 734 739 731 715 700
Turks and Caicos Islands 8 9 12 15 19 24 26 28 29
British Virgin Islands 11 13 17 18 21 22 23 24 26
United States Virgin Islands 98 105 103 107 110 111 111 110 109
Jamaica 2 133 2 297 2 369 2 485 2 589 2 682 2 756 2 819 2 872
Montserrat 12 11 11 10 5 6 6 6 6
Puerto Rico 3 197 3 378 3 528 3 696 3 834 3 947 4 056 4 160 4 252
Saint Kitts and Nevis 43 42 41 43 46 49 52 56 59
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 100 104 109 113 116 119 122 124 125
Saint Lucia 118 127 138 146 153 161 171 180 188
Suriname 356 383 402 416 436 452 465 475 480
Trinidad and Tobago 1 082 1 179 1 224 1 270 1 301 1 324 1 348 1 374 1 393
The Caribbean a 29 855 32 049 34 353 36 577 38 617 40 525 42 300 44 025 45 664
Latin America and the Caribbean b 364 379 404 492 444 271 483 860 523 048 557 979 593 697 627 958 659 562
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Database on Social Statistics and Indicators (BADEINSO) [online]. Information from the Latin American 
and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, population database, 2006 revision, and United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2006 revision; population database, published on CD-ROM.
a
 Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.
b
 Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay.
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Table A-3
ESTIMATED GLOBAL FERTILITY RATES BY COUNTRY AND BY FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1980-2020
(Children per woman)
Country or territory 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Latin America 
Argentina 3.15 3.05 2.90 2.63 2.35 2.25 2.16 2.08
Bolivia 5.30 5.00 4.80 4.32 3.96 3.50 3.09 2.75
Brazil 3.80 3.10 2.60 2.45 2.35 2.25 2.15 2.06
Chile 2.67 2.65 2.55 2.21 2.00 1.94 1.89 1.85
Colombia 3.69 3.17 2.93 2.70 2.47 2.22 2.09 2.00
Costa Rica 3.53 3.37 2.95 2.58 2.28 2.10 1.94 1.85
Cuba 1.85 1.85 1.65 1.61 1.63 1.49 1.54 1.64
Ecuador 4.70 4.00 3.40 3.10 2.82 2.58 2.38 2.22
El Salvador 4.50 3.90 3.52 3.17 2.88 2.68 2.51 2.37
Guatemala 6.10 5.70 5.45 5.00 4.60 4.15 3.71 3.29
Haiti 6.21 5.70 5.15 4.62 4.00 3.54 3.19 2.91
Honduras 6.00 5.37 4.92 4.30 3.72 3.31 2.95 2.66
Mexico 4.25 3.63 3.19 2.67 2.40 2.21 2.04 1.89
Nicaragua 5.85 5.00 4.50 3.60 3.00 2.76 2.55 2.37
Panama 3.52 3.20 2.87 2.79 2.70 2.56 2.41 2.29
Paraguay 5.20 4.77 4.31 3.88 3.48 3.08 2.76 2.51
Peru 4.65 4.10 3.70 3.10 2.70 2.51 2.37 2.25
Dominican Republic 4.00 3.47 3.20 3.05 2.95 2.81 2.66 2.51
Uruguay 2.57 2.53 2.49 2.30 2.20 2.12 2.03 1.96
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 3.96 3.65 3.25 2.94 2.72 2.55 2.39 2.26
Latin America 3.94 3.42 3.03 2.74 2.53 2.37 2.23 2.12
The Caribbean
Netherlands Antilles 2.36 2.30 2.28 2.12 2.06 1.85 1.85 1.85
Aruba 2.36 2.30 2.28 2.21 2.12 2.04 1.97 1.90
Bahamas 3.16 2.62 2.60 2.40 2.11 2.02 1.95 1.88
Barbados 1.92 1.75 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.53 1.58
Belize 5.40 4.70 4.35 3.85 3.35 2.94 2.65 2.41
Grenada 4.23 4.14 3.26 2.81 2.43 2.30 2.20 2.10
Guyana 3.26 2.70 2.55 2.50 2.43 2.33 2.22 2.13
United States Virgin Islands 3.70 3.09 3.09 2.41 2.23 2.15 2.06 1.98
Jamaica 3.55 3.10 2.84 2.67 2.63 2.43 2.30 2.20
Puerto Rico 2.46 2.26 2.18 1.99 1.84 1.83 1.85 1.85
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3.64 3.21 2.82 2.40 2.30 2.20 2.10 2.02
Saint Lucia 4.20 3.65 2.99 2.36 2.24 2.18 2.09 2.01
Suriname 3.70 3.00 2.60 2.80 2.60 2.42 2.29 2.19
Trinidad and Tobago 3.22 2.80 2.10 1.73 1.61 1.64 1.69 1.74
The Caribbean a 3.37 3.09 2.83 2.68 2.56 2.40 2.33 2.27
Latin America and the Caribbean b 3.92 3.41 3.03 2.73 2.53 2.37 2.23 2.12
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Database on Social Statistics and Indicators (BADEINSO) [online]. Information from the Latin American 
and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, 2006 revision. Population Database and United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2006 revision; population database, published on CD-ROM.
a
 Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.
b
 Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay.
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Table A-4
POVERTY AND INDIGENCE LEVELS, 1990-2007
(Percentages)
Country Year
Population below the poverty line a Population below the indigence line
National 
total













Argentina 1990 … … 21.2 … … … … 5.2 … …
1999 … 23.7 19.7 28.5 … … 6.7 4.8 8.8 …
2002 … 45.4 41.5 49.6 … … 20.9 18.6 23.3 …
2006 … 21.0 19.3 22.8 … … 7.2 6.7 7.9 …
Bolivia 1989 … 52.6 … … … … 23.0 … … …
1999 60.6 48.7 45.0 63.9 80.7 36.4 19.8 17.5 29.0 64.7
2002 62.4 52.0 48.0 58.2 79.2 37.1 21.3 18.8 25.0 62.9
2004 63.9 53.8 50.5 60.4 80.6 34.7 20.2 17.3 26.0 58.8
2007 54.0 42.4 40.6 44.9 75.8 31.2 16.2 15.4 17.4 59.0
Brazil 1990 48.0 41.2 … … 70.6 23.4 16.7 … … 46.1
1999 37.5 32.9 … … 55.3 12.9 9.3 … … 27.1
2001 37.5 34.1 … … 55.2 13.2 10.4 … … 28.0
2006 33.3 29.9 … … 50.1 9.0 6.7 … … 20.5
2007 30.0 26.9 … … 45.7 8.5 6.6 … … 18.1
Chile 1990 38.6 38.5 32.1 43.5 38.8 13.0 12.5 9.3 14.9 15.6
1998 21.7 20.7 14.6 25.0 27.5 5.6 5.1 3.3 6.4 8.6
2003 18.7 18.5 12.4 22.7 20.0 4.7 4.4 2.8 5.6 6.2
2006 13.7 13.9 10.4 16.0 12.3 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.7 3.5
Colombia 1991 56.1 52.7 … … 60.7 26.1 20.0 … … 34.3
1999 54.9 50.6 43.1 53.1 61.8 26.8 21.9 19.6 22.7 34.6
2002 51.5 51.4 39.8 54.5 52.0 24.8 24.3 17.1 26.3 26.4
2005 46.8 45.4 33.8 48.6 50.5 20.2 18.2 12.0 19.9 25.6
Costa Rica 1990 26.3 24.9 22.8 27.7 27.3 9.9 6.4 4.9 8.4 12.5
1999 20.3 18.1 17.5 18.7 22.3 7.8 5.4 4.3 6.5 9.8
2002 20.3 17.5 16.8 18.0 24.3 8.2 5.5 5.5 5.6 12.0
2006 19.0 18.0 16.5 23.8 20.4 7.2 5.4 4.8 7.9 9.8
2007 18.6 17.8 16.2 23.9 19.6 5.3 4.2 3.8 5.7 6.8
Ecuador 1990 … 62.1 … … … … 26.2 … … …
1999 … 63.5 … … … … 31.3 … … …
2002 … 49.0 … … … … 19.4 … … …
2006 43.0 39.9 … … 49.0 16.1 12.8 … … 22.5
2007 42.6 38.8 50.0 16.0 12.4 23.0
El Salvador 1995 54.2 45.8 34.7 55.1 64.4 21.7 14.9 8.8 20.1 29.9
1999 49.8 38.7 29.8 48.7 65.1 21.9 13.0 7.7 19.0 34.3
2001 48.9 39.4 32.1 47.7 62.4 22.1 14.3 9.9 19.2 33.3
2004 47.5 41.2 33.2 48.6 56.8 19.0 13.8 8.4 18.8 26.6
Guatemala 1989 69.4 53.6 … … 77.7 42.0 26.4 … … 50.2
1998 61.1 49.1 … … 69.0 31.6 16.0 … … 41.8
2002 60.2 45.3 … … 68.0 30.9 18.1 … … 37.6
2006 54.8 42.0 … … 66.5 29.1 14.8 … … 42.2
Honduras 1990 80.8 70.4 59.9 79.5 88.1 60.9 43.6 31.0 54.5 72.9
1999 79.7 71.7 64.4 78.8 86.3 56.8 42.9 33.7 51.9 68.0
2002 77.3 66.7 56.9 74.4 86.1 54.4 36.5 25.1 45.3 69.5
2006 71.5 59.4 48.7 67.8 81.5 49.3 30.0 19.9 37.9 65.3
2007 68.9 56.9 47.8 64.0 78.8 45.6 26.2 18.0 32.5 61.7
Mexico 1989 47.7 42.1 … … 56.7 18.7 13.1 … … 27.9
1998 46.9 38.9 … … 58.5 18.5 9.7 … … 31.1
2002 39.4 32.2 … … 51.2 12.6 6.9 … … 21.9
2006 31.7 26.8 … … 40.1 8.7 4.4 … … 16.1
Nicaragua 1993 73.6 66.3 58.3 73.0 82.7 48.4 36.8 29.5 43.0 62.8
1998 69.9 64.0 57.0 68.9 77.0 44.6 33.9 25.8 39.5 57.5
2001 69.3 63.8 50.8 72.1 77.0 42.4 33.4 24.5 39.1 55.1
2005 61.9 54.4 48.7 58.1 71.5 31.9 20.8 16.4 23.7 46.1
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Country Year
Population below the poverty line a Population below the indigence line
National 
total













Panama 1991 … 32.7 … … … … 11.5 … … …
1999 … 20.8 … … … … 5.9 … … …
2002 36.9 26.2 … … 54.6 18.6 9.0 … … 34.6
2006 29.9 19.5 … … 47.9 14.3 5.7 … … 29.2
2007 29.0 18.7 … … 46.6 12.0 5.0 … … 24.1
Paraguay 1990 … … 43.2 … … … … 13.1 … …
1999 60.6 49.0 39.5 61.3 73.9 33.9 17.4 9.2 28.0 52.8
2001 61.0 50.1 42.7 59.1 73.6 33.2 18.4 10.4 28.1 50.3
2005 60.5 55.0 48.5 64.3 68.1 32.1 23.2 15.5 34.5 44.2
2007 60.5 55.2 53.1 58.3 68.0 31.6 23.8 22.2 26.3 42.5
Peru 1997 47.6 33.7 … … 72.7 25.1 9.9 … … 52.7
1999 48.6 36.1 … … 72.5 22.4 9.3 … … 47.3
2001 b 54.8 42.0 … … 78.4 24.4 9.9 … … 51.3
2006 b 44.5 31.2 … … 69.3 16.1 4.9 … … 37.1
2007 b 39.3 25.7 64.6 13.7 3.5 32.9
Dominican 2002 47.1 42.4 … … 55.9 20.7 16.5 … … 28.6
Republic 2006 44.5 41.8 … … 49.5 22.0 18.5 … … 28.5
2007 44.5 43.0 … … 47.3 21.0 19.0 … … 24.6
Uruguay 1990 … 17.9 11.3 24.3 … … 3.4 1.8 5.0 …
1999 … 9.4 9.8 9.0 … … 1.8 1.9 1.6 …
2002 … 15.4 15.1 15.8 … … 2.5 2.7 2.2 …
2005 … 18.8 19.7 17.9 … … 4.1 5.8 2.4 …
2007 … 18.1 18.9 17.4 12.6 … 3.1 4.5 1.9 2.4
Venezuela 1990 39.8 38.6 29.2 41.2 46.0 14.4 13.1 8.0 14.5 21.3
(Bol. Rep. of) c 1999 49.4 … … … … 21.7 … … … …
2002 48.6 … … … … 22.2 … … … …
2006 30.2 … … … … 9.9 … … … …
2007 28.5 … … … … 8.5 … … … …
Latin 1990 48.3 41.4 … … 65.4 22.5 15.3 … … 40.4
America d 1999 43.9 37.2 … … 63.7 18.7 12.1 … … 38.2
2002 44.0 38.4 … … 61.8 19.4 13.5 … … 37.8
2006 36.3 31.0 … … 54.0 13.3 8.5 … … 29.2
2007 34.1 28.9 … … 52.1 12.6 8.1 … … 28.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Includes persons below the indigence line or in situations of extreme poverty.
b
 Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. These values are not comparable with those for earlier years, owing to the change in the sample frame of 
the household survey. According to INEI, the new figures contain a relative overestimation in comparison with the previous methodology, of 25% of poverty and 10% of indigence.
c
 From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
d
 Estimate for 18 countries in the region, plus Haiti.
Table A-4 (concluded)
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Table A-5
INDIGENCE AND POVERTY LINES (IL and PL)









IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Argentina 1990 c Sept. A 255 928 511 856 … … 5 791.0 44.2 88.4 … …
1999 Sept. $  72  143 … …  1.0 71.6 143.3 … …
2002 Oct. $  99  198 … …  3.6 27.5 55.0 … …
2006 Second semester $  138  276 … …  3.1 45.1 90.2 … …
Bolivia 1989 Oct. Bs  68  137 … …  2.9 23.8 47.5 … …
1999 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  333  130  228  5.9 28.0 56.1 21.9 38.3
2002 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  334  133  234  7.4 22.6 45.2 18.1 31.6
2004 Nov. 03-Nov. 04 Bs  180  359  144  252  7.9 22.7 45.4 18.2 31.8
2007 Year Bs  232  449  180  307  7.9 29.6 57.2 22.9 39.1
Brazil 1990 Sept. Cr$ 3 109 6 572 2 634 4 967  75.5 41.2 87.0 34.9 65.7
1999 Sept. R$  51  126  43  91  1.9 26.7 66.2 22.7 48.1
2001 Sept. R$  58  142  50  105 2.67 21.7 53.2 18.7 39.2
2006 Sept. R$  85  221  75  172 2.17 39.4 101.7 34.3 79.2
2007 Sept. R$  89  222  78  173 1.90 47.1 116.8 41.0 91.1
Chile 1990 Nov. Ch$ 9 297 18 594 7 164 12 538  327.4 28.4 56.8 21.9 38.3
1998 Nov. Ch$ 18 944 37 889 14 598 25 546  463.3 40.9 81.8 31.5 55.1
2003 Nov. Ch$ 21 856 43 712 16 842 29 473  625.5 34.9 69.9 26.9 47.1
2006 Nov. Ch$ 23 549 47 099 18 146 31 756  527.4 44.6 89.3 34.4 60.2
Colombia 1991 Ago. Col$ 18 093 36 186 14 915 26 102  645.6 28.0 56.1 23.1 40.4
1999 Ago. Col$ 69 838 139 716 57 629 100 851 1 873.7 37.3 74.6 30.8 53.8
2002 Year Col$ 86 616 173 232 71 622 125 339 2 504.2 34.6 69.2 28.6 50.1
2005 Year Col$ 103 138 206 276 85 365 149 389 2 320.8 44.4 88.9 36.8 64.4
Costa Rica 1990 June ¢ 2 639 5 278 2 081 3 642  89.7 29.4 58.9 23.2 40.6
1999 June ¢ 10 708 21 415 8 463 14 811  285.3 37.5 75.1 29.7 51.9
2002 June ¢ 14 045 28 089 11 132 19 481  358.1 39.2 78.4 31.1 54.4
2006 June ¢ 23 562 47 125 18 372 32 148  511.6 46.1 92.1 35.9 62.8
2007 June ¢ 25 865 51 286 20 164 35 032  518.7 49.9 98.9 38.9 67.5
Ecuador 1990 Nov. S/. 18 465 36 930 … …  854.8 21.6 43.2 … …
1999 Oct. S/. 301 716 603 432 … … 15 656.8 19.3 38.5 … …
2002 Nov. US $ 34.6 69.1 … …  1.0 34.6 69.1 … …
2006 Nov. US $ 39.8 79.6 28.1 49.1  1.0 39.8 79.6 28.1 49.1
2007 Nov. US $ 41.5 81.9 29.2 50.6  1.0 41.5 81.9 29.2 50.6
El Salvador 1995 Jan.-Dic. ¢  254  508  158  315  8.8 29.0 58.1 18.0 35.9
1999 Jan.-Dic. ¢  293  586  189  378  8.8 33.5 66.9 21.6 43.2
2001 Jan.-Dic. ¢  305  610  197  394  8.8 34.9 69.7 22.5 45.0
2004 Year ¢  333  666  215  430  8.8 38.1 76.1 24.6 49.2
Guatemala 1989 Apr. Q  64  127  50  88  2.7 23.6 47.1 18.7 32.7
1998 Dic. 97-Dic. 98 Q  260  520  197  344  6.4 40.7 81.5 30.8 54.0
2002 Oct.-Nov. Q  334  669  255  446  7.7 43.6 87.2 33.3 58.2
2006 Mar.-Sept. Q  467  935  362  633  7.6 61.5 123.0 47.6 83.3
Honduras 1990 Ago. L  115  229  81  141  4.3 26.5 52.9 18.6 32.6
1999 Ago. L  561 1 122  395  691  14.3 39.3 78.6 27.7 48.4
2002 Ago. L  689 1 378  485  849  16.6 41.6 83.3 29.3 51.3
2006 Ago. L  869 1 738  612 1 070  18.9 46.0 91.9 32.4 56.6
2007 Ago. L  945 1 872  665 1 155  18.9 50.0 99.1 35.2 61.1
Mexico 1989 Third quarter $ 86 400 172 800 68 810 120 418 2 510.0 34.4 68.8 27.4 48.0
1998 Third quarter MN$  537 1 074  385  674  9.5 56.8 113.6 40.7 71.3
2002 Third quarter MN$  742 1 484  530  928  9.9 75.0 150.1 53.6 93.8
2006 Ago.-Nov. 06 MN$  879 1 758  628 1 099  10.9 80.5 161.0 57.5 100.6
Nicaragua 1993 21 Feb.-12 Jun. C$  167  334  129  225  4.6 36.6 73.3 28.2 49.4
1998 15 Apr.-31 Ago. C$  275  550  212  370  10.4 26.3 52.7 20.3 35.5
2001 30 Apr.-31 Jul. C$  369  739  284  498  13.4 27.6 55.2 21.3 37.2










IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Panama 1991 Ago. B 35.0 70.1 … …  1.0 35.0 70.1 … …
1999 July B 40.7 81.4 … …  1.0 40.7 81.4 … …
2002 July B 40.7 81.4 31.4 55.0  1.0 40.7 81.4 31.4 55.0
2006 July B 43.9 87.8 34.0 59.5  1.0 43.9 87.8 34.0 59.5
2007 July B 47.5 95.0 36.8 64.4  1.0 47.5 95.0 36.8 64.4
Paraguay 1990 d June, July, Ago. G 43 242 86 484 … … 1 207.8 35.8 71.6 … …
1999 July-Dic. G 138 915 277 831 106 608 186 565 3 311.4 42.0 83.9 32.2 56.3
2001 Sep. 00-Ago. 01 G 155 461 310 922 119 404 208 956 3 718.3 41.8 83.6 32.1 56.2
2005 June 05 G 224 499 448 997 172 013 301 023 6 137.9 36.6 73.2 28.0 49.0
2007 Oct.-Dic. G 274 123 524 238 209 976 353 666 4 805.5 57.0 109.1 43.7 73.6
Peru 1997 Fourth quarter N$  103  192  83  128  2.7 42.1 84.3 31.6 55.3
1999 Fourth quarter N$  109  213  89  141  3.5 31.2 61.2 25.5 40.5
2001 Fourth quarter N$  117  230  102  159  3.5 34.0 66.8 29.5 46.0
2003 Fourth quarter N$  120  239  107  167  3.5 34.5 68.9 30.8 48.2
Dominican 2002 Sept. RD$  793 1 569  714 1 285  18.8 42.2 83.5 38.0 68.4
Republic 2006 Sept. RD$ 1 724 3 449 1 552 2 793  33.3 51.8 103.5 46.6 83.9
2007 Sept. RD$ 1 806 3 612 1 625 2 925  33.6 53.8 107.6 48.4 87.2
Uruguay 1990 Second semester NUr$ 41 972 83 944 … … 1 358.0 30.9 61.8 … …
1999 Year $  640 1 280 … …  11.3 56.4 112.9 … …
2002 Year $  793 1 586 … …  21.3 37.3 74.6 … …
2005 Year $ 1 073 2 147 … …  24.5 43.8 87.7 … …
2007 Year $ 1 371 2 650 1 075 1 828  23.5 58.4 112.9 45.8 77.9
Venezuela 1990 Second semester Bs 1 924 3 848 1 503 2 630  49.4 38.9 77.9 30.4 53.2
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 e Second semester Bs 48 737 95 876 … …  626.3 77.8 153.1 … …
2002 e Second semester Bs 80 276 154 813 … … 1 161.0 69.1 133.4 … …
2006 e Second semester Bs 163 503 314 700 … … 2 147.0 76.2 146.6 … …
2007 e Second semester Bs 200 374 376 280 … … 2 147.0 93.3 175.3 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 National currencies:
 Argentina: (A) Austral; ($) Peso      Guatemala: (Q) Quetzal
 Bolivia: (Bs) Boliviano       Honduras: (L) Lempira
 Brazil: (Cr$) Cruzeiro; (R$) Real      Mexico: ($) Peso; (MN$) New Peso
 Chile: (Ch$) Peso       Nicaragua: (C$) Córdoba
 Colombia: (Col$) Peso       Panama: (B/.) Balboa
 Costa Rica: (¢ ) Colón       Paraguay: (G/.) Guaraní
 Dominican Republic: (RD$) Peso      Peru: (N$) Peso
 Ecuador: (S/.) Sucre, 1990-2001. Since 2002, United States dollar (US$).   Uruguay: (Nur$) New Peso; ($) Peso
 El Salvador: (¢ ) Colón       Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of): (Bs) Bolívar
b
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) “rf” series.
c
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Table A-6
LEVEL AND DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME, NATIONWIDE TOTAL, 1990-2007 a
(Percentages)
Country Years Average income b
Share of total income of the: Average per capita  income ratio c
40% poorest 30% following 20% below the 
richest 10% 10% richest D
10/D(1 to 4) Q5/Q1
Argentina d 1999 12.5 15.4 21.5 26.1 37.0 16.4 16.5
2002 8.1 13.4 19.2 25.2 42.1 20.0 21.8
2006 10.8 16.9 23.7 25.4 34.1 13.8 14.9
Bolivia 1997 5.8 9.3 22.1 27.9 40.7 25.9 34.6
1999 5.6 9.3 24.1 29.6 37.2 26.7 48.1
2002 6.1 9.5 21.4 28.3 41.0 30.3 44.2
2004 5.3 12.2 22.7 27.3 37.8 20.6 24.8
2007 6.1 11.2 25.2 28.2 35.5 22.2 31.5
Brazil 1990 9.4 9.6 18.5 28.0 43.9 31.2 35.0
1999 11.3 10.0 17.4 25.4 47.1 32.0 35.6
2001 11.0 10.3 17.4 25.6 46.8 32.2 36.9
2006 10.5 12.2 18.8 25.1 44.0 24.9 27.2
2007 10.8 12.7 19.5 25.7 42.1 22.7 25.9
Chile 1990 9.5 13.2 20.8 25.3 40.7 18.2 18.4
1998 13.7 13.0 20.4 26.6 39.9 19.1 19.7
2003 13.6 13.8 20.8 25.6 40.0 18.8 18.4
2006 14.4 14.6 21.6 26.7 37.2 15.9 15.7
Colombia 1991 6.7 14.1 23.2 25.8 36.9 16.7 18.2
1999 6.7 12.4 21.6 26.0 40.1 22.3 25.6
2002 6.9 12.3 22.4 26.5 38.8 24.1 28.5
2005 7.8 12.2 21.3 25.4 41.0 25.2 27.8
Costa Rica 1990 9.5 16.7 27.4 30.2 25.6 10.1 13.1
1999 11.4 15.3 25.7 29.7 29.4 12.6 15.3
2002 11.7 14.4 25.6 29.7 30.2 13.7 16.9
2006 11.2 14.5 25.7 29.3 30.4 13.4 16.1
2007 11.0 15.0 24.9 28.1 32.0 13.9 14.8
Ecuador d 1990 5.5 17.1 25.4 26.9 30.5 11.4 12.3
1999 5.6 14.1 22.7 26.5 36.6 17.2 18.4
2002 6.7 15.5 24.3 26.1 34.3 15.7 16.8
2006 8.1 15.7 24.1 26.1 34.1 14.8 15.6
2007 8.3 15.4 23.1 26.1 35.5 15.4 15.8
El Salvador 1995 6.2 15.5 24.8 27.0 32.9 14.1 16.9
1997 6.1 15.3 24.5 27.3 33.0 14.3 15.9
1999 6.6 13.8 25.0 29.1 32.1 15.2 19.6
2001 6.7 13.5 24.7 28.7 33.3 16.2 20.3
2004 6.2 15.9 26.0 28.8 29.3 13.3 16.3
Guatemala 1989 6.0 11.8 20.9 26.9 40.5 23.6 27.4
1998 7.1 14.3 21.6 25.0 39.1 20.4 19.8
2002 6.8 14.1 22.4 27.3 36.4 18.6 19.3
2006 7.6 12.8 21.8 25.7 39.8 22.0 23.9
Honduras 1990 4.3 10.2 19.7 27.1 43.1 27.4 30.7
1999 3.9 11.8 22.9 29.0 36.5 22.3 26.5
2002 4.3 11.4 21.7 27.6 39.4 23.6 26.3
2006 4.5 8.8 22.5 29.3 39.3 27.8 40.9
2007 4.7 10.1 23.5 29.5 37.0 23.6 32.5
Mexico 1989 8.6 15.8 22.5 25.1 36.6 17.2 16.9
1998 7.7 15.0 22.7 25.6 36.6 18.4 18.5
2002 8.2 15.7 23.8 27.2 33.2 15.1 15.5
2006 8.7 16.9 24.1 26.1 32.9 14.7 14.8
Nicaragua 1993 5.2 10.4 22.8 28.4 38.4 26.1 37.7
1998 5.6 10.4 22.1 27.0 40.5 25.3 35.1
2001 5.8 12.0 21.7 25.6 40.8 23.6 27.5
2005 6.5 14.3 24.0 26.2 35.5 17.2 18.6
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Country Years Average income b
Share of total income of the: Average per capita  income ratio c
40% poorest 30% following 20% below the 
richest 10% 10% richest D
10/D(1 to 4) Q5/Q1
Panama 1991 d 10.8 14.1 23.9 29.3 32.7 16.8 20.1
1999 d 12.6 15.6 25.2 27.8 31.5 14.0 15.9
2002 9.8 12.2 23.6 28.0 36.3 20.1 25.7
2006 10.3 13.5 25.2 29.1 32.2 16.8 21.8
2007 10.1 14.7 25.4 28.2 31.6 15.6 18.9
Paraguay 1999 6.2 13.2 23.0 27.8 36.2 19.3 22.6
2001 6.2 12.9 23.5 26.3 37.3 20.9 25.6
2005 5.5 14.9 23.9 26.4 34.7 16.0 18.2
2007 5.7 14.3 23.9 25.2 36.6 17.0 19.1
Peru 1997 7.5 13.3 24.6 28.7 33.3 17.9 20.9
1999 7.5 13.3 23.1 27.1 36.5 19.5 21.7
2001 6.2 13.4 24.6 28.5 33.5 17.4 19.3
2003 6.2 14.9 23.6 27.9 33.6 15.6 16.3
Dominican 2002 6.9 12.7 22.7 26.9 37.7 17.8 20.7
Republic 2006 8.1 9.8 20.1 29.0 40.9 24.5 29.1
2007 7.5 11.0 22.0 29.2 37.8 21.3 26.4
Uruguay d 1990 9.9 18.9 23.3 22.5 35.3 11.0 10.5
1999 11.9 21.6 25.5 25.8 27.0 8.8 9.5
2002 9.4 21.7 25.4 25.6 27.3 9.5 10.2
2005 8.1 21.6 25.0 25.7 27.8 9.3 10.0
2007 8.4 21.1 25.1 26.3 27.5 9.6 10.3
Venezuela 1990 8.9 16.7 25.7 28.9 28.7 12.1 13.4
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 7.2 14.5 25.0 29.0 31.4 15.0 18.0
2002 7.1 14.3 25.0 29.5 31.3 14.5 18.1
2006 9.0 17.4 27.0 28.3 27.4 10.5 12.3
2007 8.9 18.4 27.5 28.5 25.7 9.3 10.6
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Households of the whole country ordered by per capita income.
b
 Monthly average household income in multiples of the per capita poverty line.
c
 D(1 to 4) represents the lowest-income 40% of households, and D10 is the highest-income 10% of households.
 The same notation is used in the case of quintiles (Q), which represent groups of 20% of households.
d
 Total, urban areas.
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Table A-7










(ε=1.5)50% of  
average
Argentina c 1999 22.2 0.539 1.194 0.667 0.530
2002 24.3 0.578 1.510 0.724 0.593
2006 21.7 0.519 1.173 0.626 0.522
Bolivia 1997 28.7 0.595 2.024 0.728 0.674
1999 29.5 0.586 2.548 0.658 0.738
2002 28.6 0.614 2.510 0.776 0.738
2004 23.8 0.561 1.559 0.636 0.600
2007 27.2 0.565 2.159 0.611 0.709
Brazil 1990 26.6 0.627 1.938 0.816 0.664
1999 25.9 0.640 1.913 0.914 0.663
2001 26.1 0.639 1.925 0.914 0.665
2006 24.4 0.604 1.646 0.807 0.621
2007 24.7 0.590 1.559 0.744 0.605
Chile
1990 20.4 0.554 1.261 0.644 0.546
1998 21.0 0.560 1.302 0.654 0.553
2003 19.5 0.552 1.203 0.674 0.535
2006 18.5 0.522 1.065 0.568 0.497
Colombia 1991 20.4 0.531 1.157 0.638 0.524
1999 21.8 0.572 1.456 0.734 0.603
2002 22.4 0.569 1.396 0.705 0.580
2005 21.2 0.584 1.460 0.752 0.591
Costa Rica 1990 19.4 0.438 0.833 0.328 0.412
1999 20.7 0.473 0.974 0.395 0.457
2002 21.2 0.488 1.080 0.440 0.491
2006 20.7 0.482 1.031 0.427 0.475
2007 18.9 0.484 0.918 0.466 0.449
Ecuador c 1990 17.4 0.461 0.823 0.403 0.422
1999 18.8 0.526 1.075 0.567 0.498
2002 19.6 0.513 1.031 0.563 0.487
2006 19.3 0.507 0.978 0.609 0.474
2007 19.0 0.520 1.043 0.550 0.488
El Salvador 1995 22.0 0.507 1.192 0.502 0.525
1997 22.9 0.510 1.083 0.512 0.492
1999 24.2 0.518 1.548 0.496 0.601
2001 24.4 0.525 1.559 0.528 0.602
2004 21.3 0.493 1.325 0.449 0.552
Guatemala 1989 22.7 0.582 1.476 0.736 0.590
1998 20.0 0.560 1.182 0.760 0.534
2002 17.9 0.542 1.157 0.583 0.515
2006 24.7 0.585 1.475 0.773 0.590
Honduras 1990 26.1 0.615 1.842 0.817 0.649
1999 25.7 0.564 1.560 0.636 0.603
2002 26.5 0.588 1.607 0.719 0.608
2006 31.9 0.605 2.332 0.736 0.713
2007 30.5 0.580 1.963 0.650 0.661
Mexico 1989 19.7 0.536 1.096 0.680 0.509
1998 22.9 0.539 1.142 0.634 0.515
2002 21.2 0.514 1.045 0.521 0.485
2006 19.5 0.506 0.992 0.527 0.481
Nicaragua 1993 27.4 0.582 1.598 0.671 0.619
1998 26.8 0.583 1.800 0.731 0.654
2001 23.8 0.579 1.599 0.783 0.620











(ε=1.5)50% of  
average
Panama 1991 c 22.0 0.530 1.254 0.543 0.534
1999 c 21.7 0.499 1.088 0.459 0.490
2002 26.6 0.567 1.691 0.616 0.618
2006 26.6 0.540 1.580 0.548 0.597
2007 25.9 0.524 1.334 0.520 0.547
Paraguay 1999 25.7 0.565 1.555 0.668 0.599
2001 26.4 0.570 1.705 0.702 0.631
2005 22.8 0.536 1.318 0.614 0.553
2007 21.9 0.539 1.309 0.701 0.557
Peru 1997 25.6 0.533 1.351 0.567 0.554
1999 23.6 0.545 1.357 0.599 0.560
2001 23.9 0.525 1.219 0.556 0.527
2003 22.8 0.506 1.052 0.503 0.484
Dominican 2002 22.1 0.537 1.247 0.569 0.536
Republic 2006 25.3 0.583 1.597 0.692 0.614
2007 24.2 0.556 1.466 0.599 0.587
Uruguay c 1990 17.4 0.492 0.812 0.699 0.441
1999 19.0 0.440 0.764 0.354 0.393
2002 19.6 0.455 0.802 0.385 0.412
2005 19.9 0.451 0.798 0.383 0.414
2007 19.5 0.457 0.787 0.389 0.403
Venezuela 1990 20.1 0.471 0.930 0.416 0.446
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 21.6 0.498 1.134 0.464 0.507
2002 22.4 0.500 1.122 0.456 0.507
2006 19.3 0.447 0.811 0.359 0.409
2007 18.1 0.427 0.734 0.321 0.381
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Calculated on the basis of per capita income distribution among the entire population of the country.
b
 Includes persons with incomes equal to zero.
c
 Total, urban areas.
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Table A-8
MALE AND FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATES BY AGE GROUP,  
NATIONWIDE TOTAL, 1990-2007
Age group
Country Year Males Females
TOTAL 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




TOTAL 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




Argentina a 1999 74 53 94 97 59 44 36 62 61 27
2002 72 48 93 96 60 46 35 64 67 27
2006 75 54 94 96 64 50 38 67 69 34
Bolivia 1997 82 60 94 99 83 60 46 66 73 56
1999 81 59 94 98 82 62 48 67 75 61
2002 83 64 94 98 85 62 46 72 75 58
2004 83 64 95 98 85 64 48 69 78 64
2007 82 61 94 99 82 62 44 69 77 62
Brazil 1990 84 81 96 95 63 44 47 54 52 22
1999 82 75 95 94 64 54 52 67 66 33
2001 81 73 95 94 63 54 51 67 66 33
2006 81 73 94 94 64 58 55 73 71 36
2007 80 72 94 93 63 58 55 73 71 35
Chile 1990 74 51 94 95 58 33 27 44 42 18
1998 75 46 93 96 64 39 30 54 50 23
2003 73 42 92 96 64 42 30 58 56 27
2006 73 43 92 95 65 43 30 61 59 29
Colombia 1991 85 71 97 98 76 44 40 57 52 25
1999 81 64 97 97 71 50 44 66 63 26
2002 81 67 96 97 70 54 48 69 67 31
2005 80 63 96 97 69 52 44 68 67 32
Costa Rica 1990 83 74 96 96 64 33 35 41 39 12
1999 82 68 96 96 64 39 37 48 49 18
2002 79 63 97 96 63 41 35 54 53 22
2006 79 62 96 96 66 44 37 57 57 24
2007 80 64 96 96 66 45 39 60 56 26
Ecuador a 1990 80 56 95 98 78 43 33 54 56 31
1999 82 64 97 98 76 54 45 65 67 36
2002 81 60 96 98 74 53 40 65 67 41
2006 82 62 96 98 77 55 40 70 70 42
2007 81 57 95 98 78 54 40 66 69 43
El Salvador 1995 82 70 95 96 75 42 32 55 57 29
1999 78 65 93 94 70 44 34 58 59 31
2001 79 67 93 95 70 44 33 59 61 32
2004 77 63 93 95 66 44 32 59 59 30
Guatemala 1989 90 82 98 98 84 28 28 32 32 22
1998 88 79 97 98 84 46 41 49 55 38
2002 91 85 96 98 86 49 45 54 59 39
2006 88 80 97 98 84 47 41 54 57 39
Honduras 1990 87 78 96 97 81 32 26 39 42 25
1999 87 78 98 97 81 44 36 52 57 34
2002 85 75 96 97 80 38 30 46 49 29
2006 83 69 95 97 79 40 31 49 52 32
2007 83 70 95 97 80 40 28 51 52 33
Mexico 1989 79 64 94 94 73 30 26 38 35 21
1998 82 68 94 94 73 41 37 48 48 31
2002 81 65 94 95 75 43 34 51 54 32
2006 82 65 97 97 75 48 38 59 61 37
Nicaragua 1993 77 62 89 91 70 36 24 47 51 26
1998 85 77 95 94 77 43 31 56 56 31
2001 86 79 97 96 77 46 36 55 61 36
2005 84 74 95 95 79 44 32 53 59 34
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Age group
Country Year Males Females
TOTAL 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




TOTAL 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




Panama 1991 a 72 52 95 96 48 48 39 66 65 20
1999 a 77 61 97 96 58 50 42 67 68 26
2002 80 63 97 97 67 45 34 61 61 24
2006 80 62 97 97 67 46 33 61 63 29
2007 79 62 96 97 66 47 34 62 65 30
Paraguay 1999 85 73 96 96 80 48 39 59 60 38
2001 85 76 96 97 77 53 46 64 64 42
2005 85 73 96 98 78 56 45 68 70 46
2007 85 73 96 97 78 55 43 68 70 44
Peru 1997 85 70 97 98 83 64 56 74 76 53
1999 78 61 91 94 76 58 50 68 69 48
2001 79 61 92 95 75 59 47 69 72 48
2003 79 63 91 95 74 60 49 70 76 47
Dominican 2002 79 62 95 97 70 48 42 68 63 23
Republic 2006 79 62 95 96 68 50 43 68 67 26
2007 79 64 95 95 68 50 42 68 66 25
Uruguay a 1990 75 68 98 97 54 44 47 69 64 21
1999 73 67 96 97 50 50 50 74 74 26
2002 72 63 96 96 51 50 47 76 76 28
2005 71 60 95 96 50 50 46 76 77 29
2007 75 63 96 97 57 54 46 77 77 35
Venezuela 1990 79 59 93 96 74 35 23 48 49 20
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 83 66 97 97 74 47 35 60 63 30
2002 84 67 97 97 74 55 42 69 71 37
2006 81 59 96 97 73 51 33 65 69 37
2007 79 57 95 97 72 50 31 64 68 37
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Total, urban areas.
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Table A-9
BREAKDOWN OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2007
(Population aged 15 and over, in percentages)
Wage or salary earners Own-account and 
unpaid family workers




















Argentina d 1990 5.4 69.0 … 69.0 6.9 44.8 11.6 5.7 25.6 23.0
1999 4.6 73.6 11.6 62.0 10.6 32.1 13.9 5.3 21.8 17.3
2002 4.2 73.4 17.6 55.8 12.4 22.9 15.0 5.6 22.4 17.5
2006 3.8 76.7 12.4 64.3 10.9 32.5 13.4 7.5 19.5 15.4
Bolivia 1989 e 2.2 54.0 17.9 36.1 4.3 13.7 12.3 5.8 43.8 41.0
1999 4.2 47.5 10.3 37.2 7.3 15.1 11.8 3.1 48.3 45.9
2002 4.3 47.7 10.4 37.3 4.6 15.5 13.2 3.9 48.0 45.7
2004 4.9 49.3 8.7 40.5 4.7 14.5 16.7 4.6 45.8 44.1
2007 6.9 54.1 12.4 41.8 7.5 15.1 13.9 5.3 39.0 36.7
Brazil f 1990 5.2 72.0 … 72.0 14.3 34.2 17.3 6.2 22.8 21.5
1999 4.7 66.7 13.0 53.7 11.0 25.7 8.4 8.5 28.6 26.5
2001 4.6 68.8 12.7 56.1 11.6 26.8 8.9 8.8 26.6 24.4
2006 5.0 70.3 12.5 57.7 7.1 33.0 9.3 8.4 24.8 21.6
2007 4.2 71.2 12.8 58.4 7.4 33.4 9.3 8.2 24.6 21.4
Chile 1990 2.5 74.8 … 74.8 12.9 45.5 9.4 7.0 22.8 20.9
1998 4.2 76.1 … 76.1 17.1 43.5 9.7 5.8 19.7 15.1
2003 4.1 75.5 11.4 64.1 12.2 38.3 7.1 6.5 20.4 14.9
2006 3.2 76.5 10.5 66.0 11.3 42.4 6.5 5.8 20.4 15.9
Colombia 1991 4.2 66.1 11.6 54.5 4.8 44.2 … 5.6 29.6 27.3
1999 4.3 57.5 8.7 48.8 5.7 37.8 … 5.2 38.2 35.7
2002 5.1 52.8 7.8 45.0 4.1 35.1 … 5.8 42.1 39.3
2005 5.3 54.2 7.5 46.7 4.4 37.2 … 5.1 40.4 37.5
Costa Rica 1990 5.5 74.8 25.0 49.7 6.1 29.5 9.7 4.4 19.7 17.6
1999 8.0 72.8 17.2 55.6 8.9 29.7 11.8 5.1 19.2 17.2
2002 8.1 71.3 17.3 54.0 11.9 27.2 10.9 4.0 20.6 17.8
2006 7.5 72.6 17.2 55.4 12.2 27.9 10.3 5.0 19.9 17.0
2007 7.2 74.8 16.5 58.3 13.6 29.6 10.5 4.6 18.0 15.3
Ecuador 1990 5.0 58.9 17.5 41.4 4.5 21.1 11.3 4.5 36.1 34.5
1999 8.8 59.1 10.7 48.4 7.0 22.5 13.4 5.4 32.1 31.5
2002 6.9 58.4 11.5 46.9 6.4 22.6 13.3 4.5 34.7 32.9
2006 6.5 59.5 9.7 49.8 7.0 23.0 15.7 4.1 34.0 32.2
2007 27.9 60.7 10.0 50.7 8.7 24.0 17.9 0.2 7.2 7.1
El Salvador 1995 6.2 61.7 12.5 49.3 7.2 27.2 10.5 4.4 32.1 31.1
1999 4.6 65.2 12.3 52.9 9.1 25.7 13.8 4.3 30.3 29.2
2001 5.0 62.2 11.3 50.8 7.5 25.6 13.5 4.2 32.8 31.6
2004 4.9 61.4 10.6 50.7 7.7 25.8 13.2 3.9 33.7 32.5
Guatemala 1989 2.8 64.2 14.4 49.8 6.2 22.8 13.8 7.0 33.0 30.9
1998 4.7 59.0 8.2 50.8 7.3 19.5 20.1 3.9 36.4 34.5
2002 6.8 57.1 6.9 50.2 8.4 24.7 13.1 4.0 36.1 34.5
2006 4.7 58.9 7.4 51.5 7.4 25.8 14.2 4.0 24.6 23.0
Honduras 1990 1.5 65.5 14.4 51.1 4.9 26.3 13.2 6.7 33.0 31.7
1999 6.2 60.2 9.7 50.5 7.5 27.0 11.2 4.8 33.6 33.1
2002 4.3 58.8 9.7 49.1 7.2 24.9 12.9 4.0 36.9 34.9
2006 3.9 59.1 10.6 48.5 10.9 24.1 9.9 3.7 37.0 25.2
2007 3.5 59.0 11.0 48.0 11.2 23.5 9.4 3.9 37.6 26.6
Mexico 1989 3.3 76.4 … 76.4 9.0 64.7 … 2.7 20.3 18.9
1998 4.8 72.9 14.2 58.7 6.6 33.1 14.9 4.1 22.4 20.5
2002 4.3 73.0 13.2 59.9 6.3 32.0 17.0 4.6 22.7 20.9
2006 3.9 73.5 … 73.5 13.9 38.8 16.9 3.9 22.6 20.2
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Wage or salary earners Own-account and 
unpaid family workers




















Nicaragua 1993 0.7 60.8 20.3 40.4 6.6 16.0 11.7 6.2 38.5 29.3
1998 3.8 59.8 … 59.8 13.5 25.4 14.5 6.4 36.4 35.1
2001 4.7 58.4 11.9 46.5 4.1 22.3 15.8 4.4 36.9 35.3
2005 5.4 58.4 10.8 47.6 5.7 23.8 14.1 4.1 36.1 35.0
Panama 1991 3.0 78.6 30.1 48.5 9.0 27.0 5.1 7.4 18.4 17.2
1999 3.2 76.7 21.1 55.6 12.1 31.2 6.2 6.1 20.1 18.9
2002 3.4 74.4 20.4 54.0 6.7 32.4 8.1 6.7 22.1 20.6
2006 3.7 73.6 17.8 55.8 8.6 32.3 8.0 6.9 22.7 21.1
2007 3.5 75.6 18.4 57.2 7.1 36.4 7.2 6.5 20.9 19.3
 
Paraguay 1990 g 8.9 68.4 11.9 56.5 4.3 26.0 15.7 10.5 22.7 21.2
1999 6.6 62.2 11.8 50.4 5.1 21.1 14.9 9.2 31.2 29.1
2001 7.6 59.9 11.1 48.8 5.5 19.6 13.3 10.4 32.5 30.1
2005 6.0 61.9 12.7 49.2 4.9 18.0 15.2 11.1 32.0 29.4
2007 6.1 63.0 11.6 51.4 4.8 21.4 15.2 10.0 30.9 28.6
Peru 1997 5.8 53.7 12.3 41.4 3.5 20.8 12.6 4.4 40.5 39.5
1999 5.6 52.9 11.9 41.1 3.1 18.1 14.0 5.8 41.5 40.1
2001 4.8 53.1 12.0 41.1 6.5 15.9 13.4 5.2 42.1 39.6
2003 4.6 51.0 10.7 40.4 6.6 15.8 12.4 5.6 44.4 42.0
Dominican 2002 3.9 61.3 13.8 47.5 8.0 22.8 12.3 4.3 34.8 32.7
Republic 2006 4.5 58.9 13.2 45.6 7.5 26.0 7.2 4.9 36.6 34.2
2007 4.6 59.6 12.7 46.9 8.5 27.1 5.9 5.4 35.8 33.8
Uruguay 1990 5.8 74.2 21.8 52.4 9.7 29.1 6.7 6.9 20.1 19.3
1999 4.0 72.4 16.2 56.1 6.5 31.8 10.4 7.5 23.6 20.6
2002 3.7 70.5 17.3 53.2 5.9 26.4 11.0 9.9 25.8 21.8
2005 3.9 71.7 16.3 55.4 6.2 28.3 13.7 7.2 24.4 20.3
2007 4.5 71.8 15.0 56.8 6.4 29.6 11.7 9.0 23.6 19.6
Venezuela 1990 7.5 70.0 21.4 48.6 5.8 30.1 6.4 6.3 22.4 21.4
(Bol. Rep. of) h 1999 5.1 57.9 14.9 43.0 4.9 24.0 12.1 2.0 36.9 35.3
2002 5.4 54.7 13.8 40.9 3.9 23.2 11.1 2.6 39.9 38.2
2006 4.5 58.3 16.6 41.7 5.3 24.2 10.1 2.1 37.3 35.3
2007 4.1 59.1 17.0 42.1 5.3 25.0 9.8 1.9 36.8 34.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Figures for Argentina (1990, 1994, 1997), Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994, 1998), Mexico (1989, 2004-2006) and Nicaragua (1998) include public-sector wage-earners.
b
 For Colombia and Mexico (1989 and 1994) no data were available for the size of establishments. Non-professional non-technical wage-earners in establishments employing up to 
five persons were included in the column corresponding to establishments with over five workers. Furthermore, in the cases of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia (1999 
and 2002), Chile (1994 and 1996), El Salvador (1995), the Dominican Republic and Uruguay (1990, 2002-2007), establishments with up to four employees were counted.
c
 Includes professional and technical workers.
d
 Greater Buenos Aires.
e
 Eight departmental capitals and El Alto.
f
 No information is available on the size of establishments for 1990. Therefore, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing more than five persons includes 
wage earners who have an employment contract (“carteira”), while the column for establishments employing up to 5 persons includes workers who do not have such contracts. 
g
 Asunción metropolitan area.
h
 From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-10
URBAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET, 1990-2007





Unskilled self-employed workers b
Employers












Argentina d 1990 44.4 3.8 12.0 0.4 11.6 5.7 23.0 6.9 16.0
1999 42.4 3.2 14.8 1.1 13.7 5.8 18.6 5.4 13.0
2002 42.4 2.9 15.2 1.2 14.0 6.0 18.4 6.4 11.8
2006 41.0 2.9 14.5 1.0 13.4 7.4 16.2 5.2 10.9
Bolivia 1989 e 62.8 2.2 13.8 1.6 12.3 5.8 41.0 9.8 30.0
1999 64.2 2.5 12.7 1.0 11.8 3.1 45.9 12.1 31.1
2002 66.7 3.2 14.0 0.7 13.2 3.9 45.7 12.3 29.4
2004 70.9 4.1 18.1 1.4 16.7 4.6 44.1 10.8 28.9
2007 62.5 5.2 15.3 1.4 13.9 5.3 36.7 8.6 24.8
Brazil f 1990 49.3 … 21.6 4.3 17.3 6.2 21.5 3.5 15.8
1999 47.4 2.3 10.1 1.7 8.4 8.5 26.5 5.2 16.4
2001 46.2 2.2 10.8 1.9 8.9 8.8 24.4 4.8 15.4
2006 42.3 2.3 10.1 0.8 9.3 8.4 21.6 5.9 11.7
2007 41.8 2.0 10.2 0.9 9.3 8.2 21.4 6.2 11.8
Chile 1990 38.9 0.8 10.3 0.9 9.4 7.0 20.9 5.7 14.0
1998 34.3 2.6 10.7 1.0 9.7 5.8 15.1 4.1 10.0
2003 31.7 2.4 7.9 0.8 7.1 6.5 14.9 4.8 9.3
2006 30.7 1.7 7.2 0.7 6.5 5.8 15.9 4.8 10.0
Colombia 1991 … … … … … 5.6 27.3 6.4 20.0
1999 … … … … … 5.2 35.7 7.5 26.7
2002 … … … … … 5.8 39.3 8.0 28.2
2005 … … … … … 5.1 37.5 7.6 27.2
Costa Rica 1990 36.9 4.4 10.5 0.8 9.7 4.4 17.6 6.4 10.1
1999 41.6 6.0 13.3 1.4 11.8 5.1 17.2 4.5 11.9
2002 40.3 6.2 12.3 1.4 10.9 4.0 17.8 4.7 12.2
2006 39.8 6.2 11.6 1.3 10.3 5.0 17.0 4.2 11.8
2007 37.7 5.7 12.1 1.6 10.5 4.6 15.3 3.7 10.8
 
Ecuador 1990 54.5 3.6 11.9 0.6 11.3 4.5 34.5 7.8 24.4
1999 58.9 7.0 15.0 1.6 13.4 5.4 31.5 5.6 23.8
2002 56.4 4.8 14.2 0.9 13.3 4.5 32.9 6.9 23.6
2006 57.8 4.9 16.6 1.0 15.7 4.1 32.2 5.1 24.5
2007 57.3 4.3 15.2 1.0 14.2 4.2 33.6 5.5 26.0
 
El Salvador 1995 51.0 4.9 10.7 0.2 10.5 4.4 31.1 8.1 20.2
1999 52.3 4.1 14.6 0.8 13.8 4.3 29.2 6.7 20.0
2001 54.4 4.4 14.2 0.7 13.5 4.2 31.6 6.7 22.8
2004 54.7 4.4 13.9 0.7 13.2 3.9 32.5 6.5 23.9
Guatemala 1989 54.6 2.1 14.6 0.8 13.8 7.0 30.9 7.4 14.9
1998 64.4 3.6 22.4 2.3 20.1 3.9 34.5 8.2 20.7
2002 57.7 5.2 13.9 0.8 13.1 4.0 34.5 8.9 19.8
2006 58.1 4.2 15.3 1.1 14.2 4.0 34.5 7.6 20.0
Honduras 1990 53.3 1.0 13.9 0.7 13.2 6.7 31.7 8.9 18.7
1999 55.2 5.1 12.2 1.0 11.2 4.8 33.1 7.4 22.0
2002 56.7 3.6 14.1 1.1 12.9 4.0 34.9 9.8 20.1
2006 43.3 3.3 11.1 1.2 9.9 3.7 25.2 9.2 11.7
2007 43.9 2.9 10.5 1.1 9.4 3.9 26.6 9.2 13.2
Mexico 1989 … … … … … 2.7 18.9 3.0 12.5
1998 44.0 3.6 15.8 1.0 14.9 4.1 20.5 3.2 16.4
2002 47.1 3.3 18.3 1.3 17.0 4.6 20.9 4.2 16.1
2006 45.7 2.8 18.8 1.9 16.9 3.9 20.2 3.8 15.9
Nicaragua 1993 49.3 0.5 13.3 1.6 11.7 6.2 29.3 7.7 17.5
1998 60.7 3.0 16.2 1.7 14.5 6.4 35.1 4.3 26.4
2001 59.8 3.6 16.5 0.7 15.8 4.4 35.3 5.5 25.7
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Panama 1991 32.3 1.8 5.9 0.8 5.1 7.4 17.2 3.9 11.5
1999 34.2 2.2 7.0 0.8 6.2 6.1 18.9 4.3 13.8
2002 38.4 2.3 8.7 0.7 8.1 6.7 20.6 4.4 15.2
2006 40.1 2.8 9.2 1.3 8.0 6.9 21.1 4.1 16.0
2007 36.5 2.7 7.9 0.8 7.2 6.5 19.3 4.2 14.3
Paraguay 1990 g 55.3 6.8 16.7 1.1 15.7 10.5 21.2 5.2 15.5
1999 59.2 5.0 15.8 0.9 14.9 9.2 29.1 5.2 21.3
2001 61.7 6.4 14.7 1.4 13.3 10.4 30.1 5.3 21.9
2005 61.2 4.6 16.1 0.9 15.2 11.1 29.4 5.7 19.3
2007 60.1 5.3 16.3 1.0 15.2 10.0 28.6 5.6 19.1
Peru 1997 61.9 4.9 13.1 0.5 12.6 4.4 39.5 5.5 29.7
1999 65.0 4.5 14.5 0.5 14.0 5.8 40.1 5.2 31.1
2001 63.3 4.0 14.4 1.0 13.4 5.2 39.6 5.0 28.8
2003 64.6 3.7 13.3 0.9 12.4 5.6 42.0 5.3 29.7
Dominican 2002 54.3 3.2 14.1 1.7 12.3 4.3 32.7 7.4 22.0
Republic 2006 50.0 3.1 7.8 0.6 7.2 4.9 34.2 8.1 22.0
2007 48.9 3.0 6.7 0.8 5.9 5.4 33.8 7.7 21.9
Uruguay 1990 36.8 2.7 7.8 1.1 6.7 6.9 19.3 5.6 13.5
1999 41.5 2.4 11.0 0.6 10.4 7.5 20.6 7.0 12.7
2002 45.7 2.4 11.6 0.6 11.0 9.9 21.8 8.1 12.5
2005 44.3 2.5 14.3 0.6 13.7 7.2 20.3 6.9 12.3
2007 43.8 2.9 12.3 0.6 11.7 9.0 19.6 6.3 11.7
Venezuela 1990 39.1 4.9 6.6 0.2 6.4 6.3 21.4 4.1 15.3
(Bol. Rep. of) h 1999 53.8 3.9 12.5 0.5 12.1 2.0 35.3 6.7 23.7
2002 56.5 4.2 11.5 0.4 11.1 2.6 38.2 6.5 26.4
2006 51.4 3.4 10.6 0.5 10.1 2.1 35.3 6.5 24.0
2007 50.1 3.2 10.3 0.5 9.8 1.9 34.7 6.5 23.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Refers to establishments employing up to five persons. In the cases of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia (1999 and 2002), Chile (1994 and 1996), El Salvador (1995), 
the Dominican Republic and Uruguay (1990, 2002-2007), establishments with up to four employees were counted.
b
 Refers to own-account and unpaid family workers without professional or technical skills.
c
 Includes persons employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing.
d
 Greater Buenos Aires.
e
 Eight departmental capitals and El Alto.
f
 In 1990, wage-earners with no employment contract were included under microenterprises because no information was available on the size of establishments.
g
 Asunción metropolitan area.
h
 From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-11
OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE IN URBAN AREAS, AROUND 1990, 2002, 2006 AND 2007 a
Country Sex
Age groups
Total 15 to 24 years 25 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 and over
1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 
Argentina Total 5.9 19.0 10.5 … 13.0 33.8 26.0 … 4.9 15.4 8.0 … 4.1 18.1 5.9 … 3.8 14.1 7.2 …
Males 5.7 18.5 8.2 … 11.5 31.7 20.0 … 5.0 15.3 5.9 … 3.9 14.8 3.5 … 4.2 16.7 6.8 …
Females 6.4 19.5 13.4 … 15.6 36.3 32.9 … 4.9 15.7 10.6 … 4.3 22.1 8.7 … 3.0 10.3 7.7 …
Bolivia Total 9.4 6.4 … 7.7 17.4 11.2 … 19.2 8.5 7.1 … 8.6 5.1 4.6 … 2.6 6.6 3.3 … 2.5
Males 9.5 5.2 … 6.3 18.2 9.2 … 16.4 7.5 4.8 … 6.2 5.5 3.2 … 2.5 8.5 4.0 … 2.1
Females 9.1 7.9 … 9.4 16.5 13.4 … 23.2 9.9 9.7 … 11.5 4.6 6.1 … 2.8 3.8 2.4 … 3.2
Brazil Total 4.5 10.7 9.5 9.1 8.3 20.5 20.1 18.8 4.4 10.0 9.1 8.9 2.4 6.7 5.6 5.9 1.5 5.2 4.2 4.2
Males 4.8 8.7 7.4 6.9 8.7 17.4 16.2 15.1 4.7 7.3 6.3 6.0 2.8 5.2 3.7 3.9 2.0 5.0 4.0 3.7
Females 3.9 13.4 12.1 11.9 7.7 24.6 24.7 23.5 3.8 13.4 12.4 12.3 1.7 8.7 7.7 8.3 0.6 5.5 4.6 4.7
Chile Total 8.7 10.8 7.6 … 17.9 23.3 18.2 … 8.3 10.9 8.1 … 5.1 8.1 5.4 … 5.3 7.6 4.3 …
Males 8.1 10.2 6.3 … 17.0 22.8 15.8 … 7.4 9.7 6.3 … 4.6 7.4 4.2 … 5.6 7.8 3.8 …
Females 9.7 11.8 9.5 … 19.3 23.9 21.6 … 9.7 12.7 10.7 … 5.8 9.2 7.2 … 4.7 7.2 5.0 …
Colombia Total 9.3 17.2 13.3 … 19.7 32.2 27.5 … 8.3 16.9 13.7 … 4.2 11.5 8.7 … 3.8 10.0 7.1 …
Males 6.7 14.7 11.0 … 15.3 28.8 23.7 … 5.5 13.3 10.4 … 2.8 9.2 6.3 … 3.7 10.2 7.2 …
Females 13.0 20.1 16.0 … 24.8 35.7 31.6 … 11.8 21.0 17.2 … 6.2 14.0 11.2 … 3.9 9.7 6.9 …
Costa Rica Total 5.3 6.8 6.0 4.8 10.5 16.4 15.5 11.8 4.9 5.1 5.1 3.9 2.5 3.7 2.7 2.2 2.9 3.3 2.7 2.3
Males 4.9 6.2 4.5 3.3 9.8 14.7 12.2 9.5 4.1 4.4 3.0 2.0 2.3 3.0 1.4 1.6 3.1 3.4 2.6 1.3
Females 6.2 7.7 8.2 6.8 11.6 19.0 20.2 15.3 6.2 6.0 7.9 6.3 2.8 4.6 4.4 3.0 2.3 3.3 2.8 3.9
Cuba b Total 5.4 2.3 2.0 … … 6.4 3.7 … … 3.4 3.2 … … 1.7 1.9 … … 0.8 0.8 …
Males 3.6 1.9 2.0 … … 6.1 3.9 … … 2.8 3.1 … … 1.3 1.7 … … 0.6 0.9 …
Females 8.5 2.9 2.1 … … 6.8 3.4 … … 4.2 3.3 … … 2.3 2.2 … … 1.1 0.7 …
Ecuador Total 6.1 9.1 7.7 6.1 13.5 17.4 16.3 13.7 6.4 9.2 7.5 5.7 2.7 5.9 4.5 3.8 1.3 5.2 4.4 3.4
Males 4.2 5.8 5.3 4.9 11.2 12.0 12.2 13.2 3.2 4.7 4.3 3.6 1.7 3.1 2.2 2.5 1.3 4.3 3.5 2.7
Females 9.2 13.9 11.0 7.6 17.2 25.5 22.9 14.5 11.3 15.3 11.7 8.5 4.5 9.8 7.2 5.5 1.4 6.7 5.7 4.4
El Salvador Total … 7.0 … … … 13.2 … … … 6.6 … … … 4.7 … … … 4.6 … …
Males … 8.8 … … … 15.2 … … … 8.3 … … … 5.6 … … … 6.2 … …
Females … 5.0 … … … 10.2 … … … 4.7 … … … 3.8 … … … 2.7 … …
Guatemala Total 3.5 6.0 2.7 … 7.1 11.1 5.4 … 2.9 3.8 2.4 … 1.6 3.2 1.4 … 1.2 3.4 1.2 …
Males 3.3 5.2 2.4 … 7.2 8.2 4.5 … 2.6 3.3 2.4 … 1.5 2.7 1.1 … 1.4 5.1 1.3 …
Females 3.8 7.0 3.1 … 7.0 14.6 6.7 … 3.4 4.6 2.3 … 1.8 3.8 1.8 … 0.9 0.9 1.0 …
Honduras Total 6.9 6.0 4.7 3.9 11.2 9.3 7.7 7.6 7.0 6.1 5.1 3.7 4.3 4.1 3.0 2.3 3.7 3.5 2.6 1.8
Males 7.6 6.3 4.3 4.0 11.5 9.4 6.7 7.4 6.6 5.5 4.2 3.6 6.0 4.9 2.9 2.4 5.3 4.5 3.3 2.5
Females 5.9 5.7 5.1 3.7 10.7 9.3 9.0 7.9 7.6 6.9 6.3 4.0 2.0 3.3 3.1 2.2 0.7 2.0 1.5 0.7
Mexico Total 3.3 3.4 3.7 … 8.1 7.2 9.0 … 2.4 3.5 3.3 … 0.7 1.5 1.5 … 0.8 1.8 2.1 …
Males 3.4 3.9 4.3 … 8.4 8.2 10.2 … 2.5 3.9 3.2 … 0.9 1.6 1.7 … 1.0 2.2 3.0 …




Total 15 to 24 years 25 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 and over
1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 1990 2002 2006 2007 
Nicaragua Total … 12.5 … … … 21.5 … … … 10.2 … … … 9.7 … … … 6.3 … …
Males … 13.1 … … … 21.8 … … … 10.7 … … … 9.6 … … … 6.6 … …
Females … 11.7 … … … 20.9 … … … 9.6 … … … 9.8 … … … 5.8 … …
Panama Total 20.0 16.5 10.4 7.8 38.8 34.2 23.4 18.9 21.7 16.8 11.0 8.1 10.4 10.4 7.0 4.8 8.1 7.4 4.7 3.1
Males 17.9 14.0 8.6 6.5 37.0 31.0 19.4 15.9 17.8 12.9 7.9 6.1 8.4 7.1 5.4 3.1 9.1 7.7 5.4 3.4
Females 22.8 19.8 13.0 9.6 41.0 39.1 29.1 23.7 26.5 21.6 15.3 10.7 12.7 14.7 9.2 6.7 6.4 6.8 3.7 2.6
Paraguay c Total 6.3 11.5 8.0 6.7 15.5 21.4 17.4 16.5 4.8 11.8 6.0 5.8 2.3 4.5 4.1 3.2 1.4 6.4 5.2 2.6
Males 6.2 11.0 7.0 5.5 14.7 21.0 16.8 13.8 5.0 9.5 2.3 4.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.2 2.0 8.5 6.9 3.0
Females 6.5 12.1 9.2 8.2 16.5 21.8 18.0 19.9 4.7 14.3 9.9 7.7 1.1 6.2 5.5 4.4 0.0 3.9 3.3 2.0
Peru Total … 7.2 … … … 12.4 … … … 6.4 … … … 4.7 … … … 5.6 … …
Males … 6.8 … … … 12.6 … … … 5.2 … … … 3.9 … … … 6.0 … …
Females … 7.6 … … … 12.2 … … … 7.7 … … … 5.7 … … … 5.0 … …
Dominican Total … 16.8 16.8 15.9 … 30.9 32.2 32.4 … 18.0 17.7 15.4 … 11.3 11.9 11.8 … 7.2 6.5 6.1
Republic Males … 11.1 10.6 10.1 … 22.6 24.1 23.8 … 10.3 10.3 9.5 … 6.6 6.4 5.4 … 5.8 3.4 3.8
Females … 24.4 25.1 23.8 … 42.4 42.6 44.3 … 26.7 26.8 22.9 … 17.3 18.2 19.0 … 9.5 11.9 10.2
Uruguay Total 8.9 16.9 12.1 9.5 24.4 37.9 29.2 25.0 8.2 16.4 12.8 9.0 4.3 12.1 8.2 6.1 3.5 9.6 6.2 4.9
Males 7.3 13.4 9.5 6.9 22.2 32.0 25.1 21.0 6.0 12.7 8.7 5.2 2.5 7.8 5.1 3.0 3.0 7.7 4.8 3.6
Females 11.1 21.1 15.3 12.6 27.5 46.1 34.7 30.6 11.0 20.8 17.5 13.2 6.4 16.8 11.4 9.7 4.4 12.1 7.9 6.5
Venezuela Total 10.2 16.2 9.3 7.5 19.3 28.2 17.0 14.3 11.3 16.3 10.0 7.7 5.9 11.1 6.6 5.2 4.5 9.9 5.6 4.6
(Bol. Rep. of) d Males 11.2 14.4 8.2 7.1 19.9 24.4 14.3 12.7 12.3 13.5 7.8 6.2 6.9 9.9 5.8 5.3 5.5 10.4 6.2 5.3
Females 8.4 18.8 11.1 8.1 18.0 34.5 22.0 17.4 9.6 20.4 13.2 10.0 4.0 12.9 7.7 5.1 1.7 9.0 4.8 3.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 For the exact years of the surveys in each country, see table 5.
b
 National Statistical Office (ONE), Cuba; 1990-1999, total unemployment (urban and rural), 2003-2006, urban unemployment; on the basis of tabulations of data from the National 
Occupation Survey.
c
 Total for urban areas, except that the figure for 1990 relates to the Asunción metropolitan area.
d
 The sample design in the surveys conducted since 1997 does not distinguish between urban and rural areas and the figures therefore refer to the nationwide total.
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Table A-12
AVERAGE INCOME OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2007
(In multiples of the relevant per capita poverty line)
Country Year Total Employers
Wage or salary earners
Own-account  





















Argentina c 1990 6.4 20.6 4.7 … 4.7 9.4 4.5 3.6 2.5 8.0 7.2
1999 6.9 23.8 5.6 6.9 5.3 9.3 5.2 3.6 2.4 8.0 6.6
2002 4.7 20.9 3.5 3.3 3.5 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.7 5.6 4.1
2006 5.9 21.0 4.8 5.7 4.6 7.4 4.9 3.4 1.7 7.4 6.2
Bolivia 1989 d 4.2 16.2 3.7 4.1 3.5 7.7 3.6 2.7 1.6 4.1 3.8
1999 3.4 8.2 4.1 4.7 3.9 7.4 3.8 2.4 1.8 2.3 2.2
2002 3.2 7.3 4.0 5.2 3.7 7.7 4.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.9
2004 2.9 7.6 3.4 5.0 3.1 7.4 3.6 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.6
2007 3.5 7.6 4.0 5.4 3.6 6.4 3.9 2.4 1.9 2.0 1.9
Brazil e 1990 4.7 16.1 4.1 ... 4.1 8.2 3.8 2.6 1.0 3.8 3.4
1999 4.4 14.8 4.1 6.6 3.5 6.9 3.2 2.1 1.4 3.3 2.8
2001 4.3 14.8 4.0 6.7 3.5 6.9 3.1 2.1 1.4 3.3 2.8
2006 4.2 13.9 3.9 6.8 3.3 6.7 3.4 2.2 1.4 2.9 2.2
2007 4.5 14.5 4.3 7.1 3.6 7.1 3.7 2.4 1.6 3.4 2.7
Chile 1990 4.7 24.8 3.8 … 3.8 7.4 3.5 2.4 1.4 5.4 5.0
1998 7.4 34.0 5.6 … 5.6 11.7 4.3 3.0 2.2 8.7 6.5
2003 7.4 36.7 5.7 7.6 5.3 12.4 4.0 2.9 2.4 7.8 5.9
2006 6.6 26.9 5.5 7.7 5.1 11.5 4.1 3.1 2.3 7.5 5.6
Colombia 1991 2.9 7.4 2.7 3.9 2.5 5.3 2.4 ... 1.2 2.4 2.2
1999 3.3 9.5 3.7 6.3 3.2 6.8 2.8 ... 2.1 2.2 1.9
2002 3.0 7.2 3.5 6.3 3.1 6.2 2.9 ... 1.7 1.7 1.5
2005 3.3 8.6 3.9 6.6 3.4 6.8 3.2 ... 1.9 1.9 1.7
Costa Rica 1990 5.2 6.8 5.4 7.3 4.4 9.0 4.3 3.2 1.5 3.7 3.4
1999 6.0 10.4 5.9 8.8 5.1 9.7 4.8 3.6 1.7 4.3 4.0
2002 6.5 10.2 6.8 9.5 6.0 9.7 5.9 3.7 2.0 3.7 3.1
2006 6.1 9.1 6.7 10.3 5.6 8.8 5.6 3.6 2.0 3.0 2.5
2007 5.8 11.3 5.8 8.7 5.0 7.7 4.9 3.2 1.7 3.6 2.9
Ecuador 1990 2.8 4.8 3.2 4.1 2.8 6.0 2.9 2.3 0.8 1.9 1.9
1999 2.9 7.6 2.8 3.8 2.6 4.5 2.9 1.7 0.9 1.8 1.8
2002 3.5 8.7 3.4 4.7 3.1 5.0 3.4 2.1 1.5 2.5 2.4
2006 3.6 8.8 3.8 5.8 3.4 5.6 3.7 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.2
2007 4.1 3.0 5.2 6.8 4.9 7.7 4.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 1995 3.5 9.2 3.5 5.3 3.1 6.9 2.8 2.0 1.0 2.2 2.1
1999 4.2 9.9 4.6 6.9 4.0 8.2 3.7 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.3
2001 3.9 9.2 4.2 6.6 3.7 7.4 3.6 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.2
2004 3.4 7.1 3.7 6.1 3.2 5.3 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.2
Guatemala 1989 3.5 17.7 3.0 4.8 2.5 5.2 2.6 1.7 1.4 3.2 2.9
1998 3.4 15.7 3.1 4.5 2.9 5.2 3.4 2.0 0.6 2.2 2.1
2002 2.9 7.4 3.4 5.6 3.0 5.4 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2
2006 3.4 17.2 2.7 4.6 2.5 4.3 2.7 1.4 1.2 3.8 3.5
Honduras 1990 2.8 16.4 3.1 4.9 2.5 6.5 2.7 1.6 0.8 1.7 1.5
1999 2.0 5.1 2.0 2.9 1.9 3.0 2.1 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.2
2002 2.3 5.1 2.7 4.3 2.4 5.3 2.3 1.4 0.8 1.3 1.2
2006 2.4 4.6 3.0 4.9 2.6 4.6 2.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.9
2007 2.6 5.8 3.2 5.2 2.7 5.0 2.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.1
Mexico 1989 4.4 21.6 3.5 ... 3.5 6.9 3.1 ... 1.4 4.8 4.3
1998 4.1 18.2 3.5 5.3 3.1 6.9 3.1 1.9 1.3 3.0 2.6
2002 4.1 16.1 3.6 5.4 3.2 7.1 3.3 2.1 1.4 3.5 3.2
2006 4.1 15.2 3.7 ... 3.7 6.9 3.5 2.1 1.4 3.4 2.9
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Country Year Total Employers
Wage or salary earners
Own-account  





















Nicaragua 1993 3.5 8.5 3.3 3.4 3.2 6.1 3.1 2.3 2.1 3.6 2.9
1998 3.1 11.0 3.2 … 3.2 6.3 2.6 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.0
2001 3.1 14.2 3.0 4.5 2.7 5.4 3.0 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.8
2005 2.9 9.8 2.9 4.3 2.6 4.6 2.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6
Panama 1991 5.6 14.9 5.8 7.8 4.6 9.8 4.2 2.7 1.3 3.1 2.8
1999 6.2 11.9 6.7 9.0 5.8 11.3 4.9 2.8 2.1 3.6 3.3
2002 6.2 17.8 6.3 8.9 5.3 9.1 5.8 3.1 1.6 4.4 4.1
2006 6.4 17.4 6.2 8.6 5.4 8.1 5.9 3.4 1.8 5.3 4.7
2007 5.9 18.7 5.4 7.6 4.6 7.1 5.0 3.1 1.7 5.9 5.3
Paraguay 1990 f 3.4 10.3 2.4 3.4 2.2 4.1 2.8 1.8 0.8 3.8 3.6
1999 3.2 8.3 3.2 4.8 2.9 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.6 2.1 1.9
2001 3.1 8.6 3.1 5.2 2.7 4.5 3.3 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.5
2005 2.7 8.8 2.7 4.1 2.3 4.2 2.9 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.3
2007 2.6 8.2 2.6 3.5 2.3 4.2 2.8 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.5
Peru 1997 3.3 7.9 3.8 4.0 3.8 7.2 4.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.8
1999 3.2 7.0 3.9 4.5 3.9 9.5 4.4 2.0 2.9 1.8 1.7
2001 2.8 6.7 3.3 3.9 3.2 5.9 3.4 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7
2003 2.7 7.9 3.2 4.1 3.2 5.5 3.3 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.5
Dominican 2002 4.2 15.6 3.9 4.7 3.7 7.0 3.6 2.5 1.3 3.5 3.2
Republic 2006 3.3 8.7 3.2 3.9 3.0 4.9 3.1 1.6 1.4 2.8 2.6
2007 4.7 18.6 2.9 3.3 2.8 4.7 2.8 1.8 1.0 5.9 5.4
Uruguay 1990 4.3 17.9 3.7 4.0 3.5 5.0 3.7 2.4 1.5 3.0 3.0
1999 5.4 14.1 5.3 6.7 4.9 11.2 4.9 3.2 2.1 4.1 3.6
2002 4.3 10.6 4.4 5.8 3.9 7.9 4.3 2.6 2.0 3.1 2.4
2005 3.7 9.7 3.8 5.4 3.3 6.6 3.6 2.0 1.7 2.7 2.0
2007 3.9 10.4 3.9 5.9 3.4 6.6 3.8 2.0 1.6 2.7 2.0
Venezuela 1990 4.5 11.9 3.7 4.0 3.6 6.6 3.6 2.5 2.1 4.5 4.3
(Bol. Rep. of) g 1999 3.5 9.2 3.1 3.7 3.0 6.4 2.9 2.0 1.4 3.4 3.2
2002 3.4 9.9 3.0 4.5 2.4 4.8 2.5 1.7 1.2 3.2 3.1
2006 4.2 9.7 4.0 5.6 3.3 5.4 3.4 2.4 1.7 3.9 3.7
2007 4.1 7.8 4.2 5.7 3.6 5.6 3.7 2.7 1.9 3.4 3.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Figures for Argentina (1990, 1994, 1997), Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994, 1998), Mexico (1989, 2004-2006) and Nicaragua (1998) include public-sector wage-earners. Also, 
figures for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia (1999 and 2002), Chile (1994 and 1996), El Salvador (1995), the Dominican Republic, Uruguay (1990, 2002-2007) 
include —in the case of non-professional and non-technical workers— establishments having up to four employees. In cases where no information was available on the size of 
establishments, no overall figures are provided for persons employed in low-productivity sectors.
b
 Includes professional, technical and own-account workers.
c
 Greater Buenos Aires.
d
 Eight departmental capitals and El Alto.
e
 No information is available on the size of establishments for 1990. Therefore, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing more than five persons includes 
wage earners who have an employment contract (“carteira”), while the column for establishments employing up to 5 persons includes workers who do not have such contracts.
f
 Asunción metropolitan area.
g
 From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
Table A-12 (concluded)
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Table A-13
RATIO OF AVERAGE FEMALE INCOME TO AVERAGE MALE INCOME, BY AGE GROUP, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2007
(Percentages)
Country Year
Disparity in labour income by age group a
Total 15 to 24 years 25 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 to 54 years 55 and over
Argentina b 1990 65 87 77 61 59 52
1999 65 94 76 64 58 54
2002 59 89 73 60 54 43
2006 65 78 76 62 62 52
Bolivia 1989 c 59 71 65 54 54 62
1999 63 72 70 55 68 54
2002 61 80 69 57 53 44
2004 63 70 70 53 62 56
2007 63 75 71 54 67 52
Brazil 1990 56 73 64 54 47 35
1999 65 81 72 63 57 55
2001 66 84 74 64 59 53
2006 68 82 76 67 62 53
2007 68 86 77 67 61 53
Chile 1990 62 84 69 61 57 52
1998 66 90 77 68 59 54
2003 64 90 79 65 55 55
2006 70 88 81 67 64 63
Colombia 1991 69 88 77 64 56 55
1999 75 101 87 69 68 56
2002 78 100 84 74 74 59
2005 76 93 88 73 70 53
Costa Rica 1990 72 86 75 66 60 61
1999 70 87 75 67 64 58
2002 75 86 78 70 68 70
2006 75 91 84 65 75 61
2007 70 88 78 66 64 50
Ecuador 1990 66 80 70 61 60 64
1999 67 99 82 61 51 55
2002 67 83 77 66 55 50
2006 73 105 78 65 70 61
2007 68 90 78 66 61 57
El Salvador 1995 62 76 70 57 50 46
1999 75 84 79 71 67 60
2001 73 87 79 73 62 51
2004 77 80 78 78 76 52
Guatemala
1998 55 88 76 51 34 39
2002 58 80 63 55 42 45
2006 58 91 64 55 55 42
Honduras 1990 59 77 68 51 56 43
1999 65 78 65 68 51 52
2002 76 86 78 70 71 63
2006 81 94 85 77 76 69
2007 81 96 84 75 76 64
Mexico 1989 56 73 64 54 47 48
1998 58 84 74 53 56 40
2002 63 83 67 63 59 43
2006 63 83 69 59 58 54
Nicaragua 1993 77 107 87 62 64 67
1998 65 93 73 60 47 42
2001 69 87 84 72 33 84
2005 71 87 73 80 48 53
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Country Year
Disparity in labour income by age group a
Total 15 to 24 years 25 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 to 54 years 55 and over
Panama 1991 78 73 89 81 68 78
1999 78 98 87 74 73 57
2002 76 88 86 77 67 56
2006 74 82 80 75 72 59
2007 73 87 75 68 76 56
Paraguay 1990 d 55 63 68 52 50 60
1999 72 96 85 67 70 43
2001 68 93 76 62 54 64
2005 61 90 78 67 38 43
2007 71 97 74 61 68 67
Peru 1997 60 84 69 58 49 37
1999 64 105 85 65 45 29
2001 68 94 76 59 59 56
2003 61 97 77 65 39 31
Dominican 2002 72 92 74 70 63 62
Republic 2006 72 82 72 75 67 61
2007 59 77 63 60 46 65
Uruguay 1990 44 63 60 46 37 30
1999 68 81 78 64 65 55
2002 73 91 80 69 70 63
2005 72 88 81 71 69 59
2007 69 83 76 67 67 58
Venezuela 1990 69 84 74 67 60 53
(Bol. Rep. of) 1999 74 94 76 70 66 60
2002 77 87 82 75 71 60
2006 79 86 85 74 75 70
2007 81 91 85 78 74 71
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned.
a
 Refers to the income differential in the total employed population. This differential is calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income, multiplied by 100.
b
 Greater Buenos Aires.
c
 Eight departmental capitals and El Alto.
d
 Asunción metropolitan area.
Table A-13 (concluded)
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Table A-14
INDICATORS OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING, 1990/1991 - 2005/2006 a
Public social spending b
Country Coverage c Per capita (in dollars at 2000 prices) Percentage of GDP Percentage of total public spending d
1990/1991 1995/1996 2000/2001 2005/2006 1990/1991 1995/1996 2000/2001 2005/2006 1990/1991 1995/1996 2000/2001 2005/2006
Argentina e CG 695 828 824 818 11.4 11.3 11.0 9.7 60.3 67.5 61.3 60.4
GG 1 103 1 417 1 516 1 587 18.1 19.3 20.2 18.8 62.7 66.5 63.2 63.5
NFPS 1 179 1 519 1 640 1 712 19.3 20.7 21.8 20.3 62.2 65.5 62.7 63.3
Bolivia f CG 47 71 120 … 5.2 7.4 12.0 … 34.4 26.3 35.4 …
NFPS … 126 162 183 … 13.2 16.3 16.6 … 39.6 42.8 48.4
Brazil g FG 337 415 445 535 10.1 11.5 12.1 13.4 52.3 55.0 59.9 80.5
Consolidated 604 721 776 917 18.1 20.0 21.1 23.0 48.9 55.6 61.6 72.1
Chile CG 380 543 741 719 12.0 12.3 15.0 12.4 61.2 64.9 67.3 66.4
Colombia h NFPS 123 306 236 314 6.6 14.6 11.7 13.9 28.8 43.7 33.2 …
Costa Rica PS 486 570 728 788 15.6 15.9 18.0 16.9 38.9 39.8 40.5 34.8
Cuba CG 864 610 661 1 220 27.6 26.3 23.7 33.2 35.6 44.8 47.0 52.3
Ecuador i CG 98 83 65 101 7.4 6.2 4.9 6.4 42.8 30.4 20.9 28.6
El Salvador CG … 111 209 251 … 5.6 10.0 11.6 … 25.9 38.6 45.8
Guatemala CG 49 63 105 123 3.7 4.5 6.8 7.7 29.9 42.2 47.3 54.2
Honduras CG 80 75 116 152 7.5 6.7 10.0 11.4 40.7 41.1 45.4 52.5
Jamaica CG 243 256 273 … 8.4 8.6 9.5 … 26.8 20.0 17.1 …
Mexico BCG 355 455 618 724 6.5 8.4 9.7 10.6 41.3 53.0 61.3 59.0
Nicaragua BCG 45 45 63 95 6.6 6.7 8.1 11.1 34.0 38.7 38.4 49.2
Panama CG 229 300 371 383 7.5 8.6 9.5 8.3 38.1 44.9 42.5 40.9
NFPS 496 621 680 … 16.2 17.8 17.4 … 40.0 43.4 44.3 …
Paraguay BCG 45 126 107 121 3.2 8.5 8.0 8.7 39.9 45.0 38.3 43.4
Peru BCG 64 134 160 .. 3.9 6.7 7.7 … 33.0 40.3 45.0 …
PS … … 173 210 … … 8.3 8.5 … … 49.7 50.3
Dominican 
Republic h CG 74 142 200 263 4.3 6.8 7.4 8.5 38.4 48.0 45.6 39.1
Trinidad and 
Tobago j CG 303 302 588 888 6.9 6.5 9.1 9.5 40.6 41.8 70.8 76.3
Uruguay k CG-
consolidated 820 1 207 1 322 1 370 16.8 21.0 22.2 20.9 62.3 71.3 66.6 63.1
GG … … 1 405 … … … 23.6 … … … 62.8 …
NFPS … … 1 506 … … … 25.3 … … … 64.4 …
Venezuela
BCG-
approved 441 384 563 653 8.8 7.6 11.6 12.5 32.8 34.6 37.8 42.3
(Bol. Rep. of) l BCG-
executed … … 494 523 … … 10.2 10.5 … … 43.5 40.3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database.
a
 Includes public spending on education, health and nutrition, social security, employment and social welfare, housing, water and sewerage systems.
b
 The figures are simple averages for the relevant bienniums.
c
 NFPS: non-financial public sector; GG: general government; CG: central government; FG: federal government; PS: public sector; BCG: budgetary central government.
d
 In most countries, the figure for total public spending is the official statistic provided by the country; no consideration is given to whether debt servicing is included or excluded.
e
 Includes the spending of the national government, provincial governments and the central government of Buenos Aires, as well as local government.
f
 In Bolivia, in the case of the NFPS, the 2005-2006 figure is the figure for 2005 from the new series published by the country since 2002, and is not comparable to those for previous years.
g
 Estimate of consolidated social spending, which includes federal, state and municipal spending.
h
 Figures under review owing to changes in the GDP series.
i
 The figures of the series are retained; social security spending is under review.
j
 In Trinidad and Tobago, the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) series begins in 2000 and is not comparable with earlier series; the figure under the heading 
2005/2006 relates to 2005.
k
 In Uruguay, the figure for 2005-2006 corresponds to the 2002-2007 series published by the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES); it is not comparable with earlier years.
l
 Relates to the budgetary law. In the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, it includes the modifications made yearly on 31 December. The 2005-2006 figure for the central 
government executed budget corresponds to 2005.
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Table A-15
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
 
Goal 1. 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger      
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than one dollar a day  
Target 1.B:  
Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and 
young people
Indicator 1.1 













Growth rate of 





Level Level  Level Level  Level  Rate Rate Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2007  1990 2007  2006  1992 2006   
Latin America and  
  the Caribbean … … 9.8 6.7 3.1 -3.0 3.5 56.9 60.0
Latin America 22.5 12.8 9.8 6.7 3.1 -3.0 3.4 57.1 60.2
Argentina b 8.2 7.2 c 1.6 2.8 c 3.6 8.9 6.2 53.8 59.8
Bolivia 39.5 31.2 9.7 14.5 1.5 c -1.6 1.3 61.0 69.7
Brazil 23.4 8.5 9.7 3.9 2.5 -10.0 2.8 60.1 61.1
Chile 12.9 3.2 c 4.4 1.1 c 4.1 5.6 3.0 51.2 49.2
Colombia 26.1 20.2 c 9.8 8.3 c 2.9 c -0.1 3.7 53.9 63.1
Costa Rica 9.8 5.3 4.8 2.0 3.9 4.8 4.1 55.1 59.6
Cuba … … … … … … … 54.4 52.8
Ecuador b 26.2 16.0 d 9.2 5.6 d 4.1 -5.5 1.8 55.1 65.5
El Salvador 27.7 19.0 c 9.1 8.1 c 3.4 c 6.7 2.0 58.3 57.0
Guatemala 41.8 29.1 c 18.5 11.3 c 3.7 c 2.7 2.4 57.6 55.2
Haiti … … … … … -13.0 -1.1 59.7 64.6
Honduras 60.6 45.6 31.5 23.9 1.6 -1.9 1.2 57.2 68.6
Mexico 18.8 8.7 5.9 2.4 4.2 -0.3 3.5 57.0 57.2
Nicaragua 51.4 31.9 c 24.3 12.3 c 2.5 c 5.1 1.2 56.2 56.0
Panama b 11.5 12.0 d 7.3 4.3 d 3.9 1.2 5.0 49.6 58.9
Paraguay 35.0 31.6 d 3.6 13.5 d 3.2 -4.7 0.6 61.6 68.5
Peru 25.0 13.7 … 4.3 3.8 c -7.0 4.9 56.4 64.2
Dominican Republic … 21.0 … 8.9 2.5 5.9 7.7 48.5 52.8
Uruguay b 3.4 3.1 0.9 0.7 4.8 c 3.7 5.8 55.4 61.6
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 14.4 8.5 5.0 3.2 4.6 4.5 6.6 54.5 59.6
The Caribbean … … … … … -0.3 3.8 48.4 50.9
Anguilla … … … … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … … … … -1.7 2.8 53.4 51.1
Aruba … … … … … … … … …
Bahamas … … … … … -3.1 2.0 61.1 60.8
Barbados … … … … … -1.2 3.1 56.9 64.5
Belize … … … … … 9.0 0.9 51.8 56.6
Dominica … … … … … … … … …
Grenada … … … … … … … … …
Guadeloupe … … … … … … … 46.7 48.1
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Goal 1. 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger      
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than one dollar a day  
Target 1.B:  
Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and 
young people
Indicator 1.1 













Growth rate of 





Level Level  Level Level  Level  Rate Rate Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2007  1990 2007  2006  1992 2006   
French Guiana … … … … … … … … …
Guyana … … … … … -0.6 3.1 51.7 58.4
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … … … …
Martinique … … … … … … … 46.4 47.0
Montserrat … … … … … … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … … … 37.9 42.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … … … … … … …
Saint Vincent and  
     the Grenadines … … … … … … … … …
Saint Lucia … … … … … … … … …
Suriname … … … … … 4.6 4.2 44.9 42.8
Trinidad and Tobago … … … … … -1.2 9.2 48.1 57.7
Source:  United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 The figures for indicators 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 relate to urban areas.
c
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
d




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
Goal 1. 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.B:  
Achieve full and productive employment and decent work 
for all, including women and young people
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Indicator 1.6 
Proportion of employed 
people living below US$1 
(PPP) per day
Indicator 1.7 
Proportion of own-account 
and contributing family 
workers in total employment 
Indicator 1.8 
Prevalence of underweight 
children under five  
years of age
Indicator 1.9 
Proportion of population 
below minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1992 2004 1990 2005 1981/1993 1995/2006 1990/1992 2001/2003
Latin America and  
  the Caribbean 13.5 10.8 31.7 32.3 10.3 7.2 13 10
Latin America 13.5 10.9 31.7 32.4 10.4 7.2 13 10
Argentina … … 24.5 b 21.4 1.9 5.4 2 2
Bolivia 25.2 b 29.6 b 39.6 61.6 b 13.2 7.5 28 23
Brazil 10.5 b 10.0 b 29.3 28.9 b 7.0 5.7 12 8
Chile 1.6 0.8 b 26.8 b 27.0 b 0.9 0.7 8 4
Colombia 4.3 b 10.5 b 28.3 b 44.3 b 10.1 6.7 17 14
Costa Rica 6.0 2.5 b 24.7 21.1 2.8 5.1 6 4
Cuba … … 3.2 b 2.8 b … 4.0 8 2
Ecuador … 20.6 b 36.1 33.5 16.5 11.6 8 5
El Salvador 28.2 b 27.5 b 34.5 b 35.7 b 16.1 10.3 12 11
Guatemala 17.6 b 18.9 b … 55.0 b 33.2 22.7 16 23
Haiti … 68.6 b … … 26.8 17.3 65 47
Honduras 37.1 18.1 b 48.9 48.9 b 20.6 16.6 23 22
Mexico 20.9 2.5 b 36.6 b 31.2 13.9 7.5 5 5
Nicaragua 65.4 b 65.1 b … 37.8 b 11.9 9.6 30 27
Panama 10.7 b 8.6 b 34.1 b 31.8 7.0 6.8 21 25
Paraguay 24.7 b 17.0 b 22.9 52.0 b 3.7 4.6 18 15
Peru 12.6 b 13.8 b 36.2 35.7 10.7 7.1 42 12
Dominican Republic 2.6 4.2 38.6 b 42.7 10.4 5.3 27 27
Uruguay … … 22.5 b 24.7 7.4 4.5 7 3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 3.7 b 26.9 b 31.8 b 35.3 b 7.7 4.4 11 18
The Caribbean 8.1 1.3 30.7 25.4 9.0 5.9 14 10
Anguilla … … … 7.8 b … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … 14.6 b … 9.5 1.6 … …
Netherlands Antilles … … 8.1 b 6.3 b … … 14 12
Aruba … … … … … … … …
Bahamas … … … … … … 9 7
Barbados … … 11.7 14.0 b 5.9 … … …
Belize … … 25.5 b 23.5 6.2 … 7 5
Dominica … … 22.4 b 25.9 b … 5.9 4 8
Grenada … … … … … 0.1 9 7
Guadeloupe … … … … … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … … … …
Guyana 11.9 b 3.4 b … … 18.3 13.6 21 9
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … … …
British Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
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Goal 1. 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.B:  
Achieve full and productive employment and decent work 
for all, including women and young people
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Indicator 1.6 
Proportion of employed 
people living below $1 
(PPP) per day
Indicator 1.7 
Proportion of own-account 
and contributing family 
workers in total employment 
Indicator 1.8 
Prevalence of underweight 
children under five years 
of age
Indicator 1.9 
Proportion of population 
below minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1992 2004 1990 2005 1981/1993 1995/2006 1990/1992 2001/2003
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
Jamaica 6.8 b 0.7 42.3 b 34.4 7.2 3.6 14 10
Martinique … … … … … … … …
Montserrat … … 12.6 b … … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … 12.1 b 8.5 b … … 13 11
Saint Vincent and  
    the Grenadines … … 20.2 
b
… … 19.5 22 12
Saint Lucia … … 23.5 b 28.7 b 13.8 … 8 5
Suriname … … 15.6 b 16.8 b … 13.3 13 10
Trinidad and Tobago 8.2 … 21.7 15.6 6.7 5.9 13 11
Source:  United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
 
Goal 2. 
Achieve universal primary education
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able  
to complete a full course of primary schooling
Indicator 2.1 
Net enrolment ratio in 
primary education
Indicator 2.2 
Pupils completing primary 
education according to 
the International Standard 
Classification of Education 
(ISCED) 1997
Indicator 2.3 
 Literacy rate of 
15-24 year-olds
Country or territory
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1990 2006 1992 2005 1990 2007
Latin America and the Caribbean 87.5 96.1 … … 92.6 97.1
Latin America 87.5 96.2 83.8 90.9 92.6 97.1
Argentina 93.8 99.1 b 97.1 97.1 98.2 99.1
Bolivia 90.8 96.3 67.1 88.7 b 92.6 98.5
Brazil 85.6 95.6 b 82.2 92.6 91.8 97.8
Chile 87.7 94.1 b 95.5 98.3 b 98.1 99.1
Colombia 68.1 92.0 85.6 91.1 94.9 97.9
Costa Rica 87.3 90.4 b 84.6 92.3 97.4 98.0
Cuba 98.6 99.4 b 96.0 97.3 b 96.2 c 100.0
Ecuador 97.8 99.4 89.8 92.8 95.5 96.5
El Salvador 72.8 95.7 69.0 76.1 b 83.8 95.2
Guatemala 64.0 96.1 52.2 58.3 b 73.4 85.5
Haiti 22.1 … … … 54.8 81.7
Honduras 89.9 97.0 61.7 70.6 b 79.7 90.3
Mexico 100.0 99.4 86.7 93.9 95.2 98.1
Nicaragua 72.2 91.4 60.2 64.5 b 68.2 88.7
Panama 91.5 99.1 89.3 95.0 95.3 96.3
Paraguay 92.8 94.9 b 78.3 89.5 95.6 96.4
Peru 87.8 99.0 85.4 91.6 b 94.5 97.9
Dominican Republic 58.2 79.7 76.3 86.1 87.5 96.0
Uruguay 91.9 100.0 96.2 96.4 98.7 98.7
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 88.1 93.2 88.3 91.5 96.0 98.2 b
The Caribbean 92.0 91.9 … … 95.1 96.5
Anguilla … 95.3 … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … 97.0 b … … 97.5 98.2
Aruba … 99.5 … … … 99.3
Bahamas 89.6 88.4 … … 96.5 …
Barbados 80.1 96.2 … … 99.8 99.8 b
Belize 94.0 99.1 … … 96.0 84.2 b
Dominica … 82.0 … … … …
Grenada … 86.5 b … … … …
Guadeloupe … … … … … 99.8
French Guiana … … … … … …
Guyana 88.9 … … … 99.8 …
Cayman Islands … 83.9 b … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … 80.7 b … … … …
British Virgin Islands 97.3 … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Jamaica 95.7 91.0 b … … 91.2 94.3
Martinique … … … … … 99.7
Montserrat … 99.3 … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … 96.1 97.7 b
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 95.6 b … … … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … 92.5 b … … … …
Saint Lucia 95.1 98.8 … … … …
Suriname 78.4 96.5 … … … 95.2
Trinidad and Tobago 90.9 89.4 b … … 99.6 99.5
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
c
 The information provided is from the 1981 population and housing census.
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Table A-18
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
 Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably 
by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Indicator 3.1 
Ratio of girls to boys in: 
Indicator 3.1.1 
Ratio of women to 
men completing 
primary education 






















Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1992 2005 1990 2007 1990 2006 1990 2008
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 0.98 0.97 1.08 1.05 0.97 1.18 … … 1.06 1.01 37.8 43.4 8 18
Latin America 0.98 0.97 1.08 1.05 0.97 1.17 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.01 37.7 43.4 8 18
Argentina 1.04 0.99 b … 1.11 b … 1.45 b 1.01 1.01 0.81 1.00 37.3 45.0 6 40
Bolivia 0.91 1.00 0.85 0.96 … 0.55 b 0.89 0.96 b 2.88 0.99 35.2 36.5 b 9 17
Brazil 0.94 0.94 b … 1.10 b 1.06 1.30 b 1.05 1.04 0.72 1.02 40.2 46.7 b 5 9
Chile 0.98 0.95 1.08 1.02 … 1.00 1.01 1.01 b 0.80 1.00 36.2 38.5 … 15
Colombia 1.15 0.99 1.13 1.11 1.07 1.09 1.03 1.05 0.78 1.01 39.9 49.1 5 8
Costa Rica 0.99 0.99 1.05 1.06 … 1.26 b 1.00 1.03 0.80 1.01 37.2 40.7 11 37
Cuba 0.93 0.95 b 1.10 0.92 b 1.34 1.70 b … 1.01 b 1.00 1.00 39.6 43.8 b 34 43
Ecuador 0.99 1.00 … 1.02 … … 0.99 1.02 1.28 1.01 37.3 41.8 5 25
El Salvador 1.01 0.96 1.06 1.04 0.71 1.21 0.96 1.05 b 1.17 1.01 32.3 48.6 12 17
Guatemala 0.88 0.93 … 0.92 … 0.82 0.72 0.82 b 1.73 0.94 36.8 38.3 b 7 12
Haiti 0.94 … 0.96 … … … … … 1.05 1.14 … … … 4
Honduras 1.05 0.99 … 1.30 b 0.77 1.41 b 1.06 1.11 b 0.89 1.06 48.1 45.3 b 10 23
Mexico 0.98 0.97 1.01 1.02 0.74 0.93 0.97 0.99 1.38 1.00 35.3 39.3 12 23
Nicaragua 1.06 0.98 1.37 1.14 1.06 1.08 b 1.09 1.21 b 0.97 1.08 … … 15 19
Panama 0.96 0.97 1.07 1.09 … 1.61 1.01 1.00 1.21 1.00 44.3 42.5 8 17
Paraguay 0.97 0.97 b 1.04 1.03 b 0.88 1.13 b 0.96 1.06 1.17 1.00 40.5 43.9 b 6 10
Peru 0.97 1.01 … 1.03 … 1.06 0.90 0.97 b 2.53 0.99 28.9 36.4 6 29
Dominican Republic 1.02 0.95 … 1.20 … 1.59 b 1.09 1.08 0.90 1.02 35.5 39.4 b 8 20
Uruguay 0.99 0.97 … 1.16 … 1.68 1.01 1.02 0.53 1.01 41.9 45.2 6 12
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 1.03 0.98 1.38 1.12 … 1.08 b 1.05 1.05 0.74 1.01 b 35.2 40.9 10 19
The Caribbean 0.99 0.99 1.08 1.07 0.81 2.10 … … 0.61 1.02 45.3 43.5 12 19
Anguilla … 0.99 … 1.02 … 4.86 … … … … … 46.9 b … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … … … … … … … … … 11
Netherlands Antilles … 0.99 b … 1.09 b … 1.43 b … … 0.85 1.00 43.1 48.8 b … …
Aruba … 0.98 … 1.04 … 1.56 … … … 1.00 … 50.1 … …
Bahamas 1.03 1.00 … 1.01 … … … … 0.54 … 49.2 50.0 b 4 12
Barbados 1.00 0.98 … 1.04 1.26 2.46 b … … 1.00 1.00 b 45.5 48.7 b 4 10
Belize 0.98 0.97 1.15 1.06 … 2.43 b … … 0.73 1.01 b 37.4 44.1 b … 3
Dominica … 1.02 … 0.98 … … … … … … … 45.8 b 10 16
Grenada … 0.96 b … 1.03 b … … … … … … … 42.7 b … 27
Guadeloupe … … … … … … … … … 1.00 … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … … … … … … … 41.6 b … …
Guyana 0.98 0.99 b 1.06 0.98 … 2.17 … … 1.00 1.00 b … 39.9 b 37 29
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 Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably 
by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Indicator 3.1 
Ratio of girls to boys in: 
Indicator 3.1.1 
Ratio of women to 
men completing 
primary education 






















Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1992 2005 1990 2007 1990 2006 1990 2008
Cayman Islands … 0.89 b … 0.92 b … 3.01 b … … … … … 48.1 … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … 1.04 b … 0.94 b … 0.44 b … … … … … 40.7 b … …
British Virgin Islands … 0.97 … 1.13 … 2.28 b … … … … … … … …
United States Virgin 
    Islands … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Jamaica 0.99 1.00 b 1.06 1.03 b 0.73 2.29 b … … 0.37 1.08 49.6 47.6 5 13
Martinique … … … … … … … … 0.55 1.00 … 48.1 b … …
Montserrat … 1.00 … 0.98 … … … … … … … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … … … … 0.65 0.99 46.5 40.6 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 1.06 b … 0.98 b … … … … … … … … 7 7
Saint Vincent and  
    the Grenadines 0.99 0.90
 b 1.24 1.24 b … … … … … … … … 10 18
Saint Lucia 0.94 0.94 1.45 1.19 1.38 5.46 … … … … … 46.6 b … 11
Suriname 1.00 1.00 1.15 1.37 … 1.62 b … … … 0.99 39.1 33.1 b 8 26
Trinidad and Tobago 0.99 0.98 b 1.05 1.05 b 0.79 1.28 b … … … 1.00 35.6 42.6 b 17 27
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
Table A-18 (concluded)
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Table A-19






Target 4.A: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 
and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Target 5.A: Reduce by three 
quarters, between 1990 and 2015, 
the maternal mortality ratio
Indicator 4.1 
Under-five mortality rate 
(per 1 000 live births)
Indicator 4.2 
Infant mortality rate











Proportion of births 
attended by skilled 
health personnel
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007 2005 2000 2006
Latin America and 
  the Caribbean … … 41.9 21.4 76 92 126 85.1 85.5
Latin America 55.6 27.8 42.3 21.6 76 92 127 85.0 85.2
Argentina 30.0 16.1 25.8 13.6 93 99 77 99 99 b
Bolivia 113.0 62.1 81.9 46.6 53 64 290 65 67 b
Brazil 59.6 29.5 47.5 24.0 78 99 110 97 b …
Chile 19.3 9.1 16.3 7.3 82 90 16 100 …
Colombia 52.3 26.2 31.1 19.2 82 89 120 86 b 96 b
Costa Rica 18.6 11.1 16.0 10.0 90 89 30 98 …
Cuba 13.2 6.7 b 10.7 5.3 b 94 100 b 30 100 b 100 b
Ecuador 65.3 26.4 49.9 21.5 60 93 110 69 b …
El Salvador 64.1 29.6 47.1 22.0 98 99 170 69 92 b
Guatemala 85.0 39.9 60.4 31.0 68 77 290 41 …
Haiti 133.5 73.0 92.1 49.6 31 54 670 24 b 26
Honduras 66.8 42.4 47.7 28.5 90 92 280 56 67
Mexico 44.3 20.5 36.3 17.1 75 96 60 85 b …
Nicaragua 75.8 26.6 55.7 22.0 82 96 170 67 …
Panama 35.8 24.3 28.3 18.4 73 99 83 90 b 93 b
Paraguay 55.8 38.4 45.0 32.4 69 90 150 86 b 77 b
Peru 85.7 30.2 56.9 22.1 64 80 240 59 b 73 b
Dominican Republic 70.7 33.6 54.6 30.1 96 99 77 b 99 96
Uruguay 25.0 16.2 21.4 13.2 97 95 20 100 b …
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 30.3 24.0 25.0 17.2 61 76 57 94 b 95 b
The Caribbean … 21.8 22.3 14.6 75 89 70 94.3 96.9
Anguilla … … … … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 12.0 b … 11.0 b 89 99 65 b 100 b 100 b
Netherlands Antilles … 17.0 16.7 14.8 … … … … …
Aruba … 20.2 16.9 17.2 … … … 99 b …
Bahamas … 17.2 21.5 14.0 86 85 16 99 b …
Barbados … 11.3 14.6 10.3 87 93 16 98 b 100 b
Belize … 20.3 32.3 16.6 86 95 52 100 b …
Dominica … 15.0 b … 13.0 b 88 98 … 100 b …
Grenada … 41.6 44.1 34.2 85 99 … 100 b 100 b
Guadeloupe … 9.1 15.6 6.9 … … … … …
French Guiana … 15.2 22.5 13.5 … … … … …
Guyana … 58.1 64.6 43.6 73 92 470 90 b 94 b
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … … 88 b 100 b
British Virgin Islands … … … … … 95 b … … 100 b
United States Virgin Islands … 10.1 15.6 8.7 … … … … …
Jamaica … 17.2 21.9 13.7 74 84 26 95 b 97 b
Martinique … 8.1 9.8 6.6 … … … … …
Montserrat … … … … … … … … 100 b
Puerto Rico … 9.1 12.7 7.3 … … 18 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … 18.0 b 99 99 … 99 b 100 b
Saint Vincent and  
  the Grenadines … 28.4 32.3 23.6 96 97 … 100 b 100 b
Saint Lucia … 16.3 18.5 12.0 b 82 94 35 b 100 b 100 b
Suriname … 35.4 34.9 28.1 65 91 72 91 b …
Trinidad and Tobago … 18.2 15.8 12.7 70 93 45 96 b 98
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
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Table A-20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
 
Goal 6. 
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 6.A: Have halted by 
2015 and begun to reverse 
the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the  
incidence of malaria and other major diseases
Indicator 6.1.1 
HIV/AIDS prevalence among 
the population aged 15-49
Indicator 6.8.1 
 Incidence of tuberculosis 
per 100 000 population
Indicator 6.8.2 
 Tuberculosis death rate per 
100 000 population
Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 2001 2007 1990 2006 1990 2006
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.63 0.56 155 68 14 7
Latin America 0.61 0.55 157 69 15 7
Argentina 0.7 0.5 113 49 10 5
Bolivia 0.1 0.2 454 266 42 30
Brazil 0.6 0.6 146 55 14 4
Chile 0.3 0.3 90 16 8 1
Colombia 0.5 0.6 90 59 8 6
Costa Rica 0.6 0.4 34 17 3 1
Cuba 0.1 0.1 4 5 b 0.5 0.2 b
Ecuador 0.3 0.3 315 195 29 26
El Salvador 0.6 0.8 155 64 14 9
Guatemala 1.1 0.8 154 104 14 14
Haiti 5.5 2.2 604 403 56 58
Honduras 1.6 0.7 181 95 17 11
Mexico 0.3 0.3 76 25 7 2
Nicaragua 0.2 0.2 241 74 22 7
Panama 0.7 1.0 110 43 10 4
Paraguay 0.4 0.6 118 100 11 12
Peru 0.4 0.5 618 187 57 16
Dominican Republic 1.8 1.1 214 118 20 15
Uruguay 0.3 0.6 54 31 5 3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.6 0.8 68 52 6 6
The Caribbean 1.73 1.83 34 29 3 4
Anguilla … … 49 40 5 5
Antigua and Barbuda … … 13 9 1 1
Netherlands Antilles … … 18 15 2 2
Aruba … … … … … …
Bahamas 3.0 3.0 84 40 8 8
Barbados 1.5 1.2 27 11 3 2
Belize 2.1 2.1 64 56 6 6
Dominica … … 30 16 3 1
Grenada … … 10 8 1 1
Guadeloupe … … … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … …
Guyana 2.5 2.5 61 215 6 29
Cayman Islands … … … 6 … 1
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … 22 … 2
British Virgin Islands … … 29 20 3 2
United States Virgin Islands … … 26 16 2 2
Jamaica 0.8 1.6 13 8 1 1
Martinique … … … … … …
Montserrat … … 18 15 2 2
Puerto Rico … … 30 6 3 1
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … 21 17 2 2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … 56 47 5 5
Saint Lucia … … 32 22 3 2
Suriname 1.3 2.4 152 96 14 13
Trinidad and Tobago 3.0 1.5 21 10 2 2
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
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Table A-21




Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes  
and reverse the loss of environmental resources, and  
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss
Indicator 7.1.1 























Energy use (kg 
oil equivalent) per 









Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2005 1990 2004 1990 2003 1990 2001 1990 2005 1990 2005
Latin America and the Caribbean 49.2 45.8 2.5 2.6 34 480 8 611 0.07 0.06 169 142 12.9 18.4
Latin America 48.4 44.9 2.4 2.5 33 331 8 521 0.08 0.07 166 140 13.3 18.9
Argentina 12.9 12.1 3.4 3.7 2 138 1 676 … … 161 152 5.0 6.2
Bolivia 57.9 54.2 0.8 0.8 23 27 0.09 0.02 202 156 8.8 19.8
Brazil 61.5 56.5 1.4 1.8 8 539 967 0.05 0.04 138 132 15.7 18.7
Chile 20.4 21.5 2.7 3.9 662 222 0.14 0.18 186 148 13.4 20.8
Colombia 59.1 58.5 1.7 1.2 2 026 557 0.10 0.04 129 108 31.5 31.6
Costa Rica 50.2 46.8 0.9 1.5 342 96 0.16 0.01 105 101 18.9 23.3
Cuba 18.7 25.3 b 3.3 2.3 778 84 b … 0.09 b … 238 c … 4.9 b
Ecuador 49.9 39.2 1.6 2.3 604 133 0.05 0.03 184 119 16.3 53.5
El Salvador 18.1 14.4 0.5 0.9 384 119 0.17 0.16 138 128 0.9 0.9
Guatemala 43.8 36.3 0.6 1.0 357 58 0.30 0.27 148 128 25.9 30.8
Haiti 4.2 3.8 0.1 0.2 0 81 0.11 0.11 108 228 0.1 0.1
Honduras 66.0 41.5 0.5 1.1 0 123 0.25 0.16 181 172 14.6 20.0
Mexico 36.2 33.7 4.9 4.2 12 037 1 604 0.07 0.06 194 150 2.5 8.7
Nicaragua 53.9 42.7 0.6 0.7 87 36 0.22 0.22 192 231 8.1 18.2
Panama 58.8 57.7 1.3 1.8 252 93 0.13 0.13 137 95 18.9 24.6
Paraguay 53.3 46.5 0.5 0.7 171 251 0.27 0.18 165 176 2.9 5.8
Peru 54.8 53.7 1.0 1.2 801 128 0.11 0.07 120 78 4.8 13.3
Dominican Republic 28.4 28.4 1.3 2.1 256 204 0.08 0.06 132 149 11.5 32.6
Uruguay 5.2 8.6 1.3 1.6 531 98 0.10 0.09 104 94 0.3 0.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 59.0 54.1 6.0 6.6 3 343 1 842 … … 386 232 39.8 62.9
The Caribbean 81.7 81.6 5.5 7.9 1 149 91 0.09 0.10 553 461 2.0 5.5
Anguilla 75.0 75.0 … … 214 10 … … … … … 0.1
Antigua and Barbuda 20.5 20.5 4.9 5.1 421 1 … … … … 0.9 0.9
Netherlands Antilles 1.3 1.3 6.3 22.2 … … … … … … … 1.1
Aruba 2.2 2.2 28.9 21.3 … … … … … … … 0.1
Bahamas 51.4 51.4 7.6 6.3 51 13 … … … … 0.4 0.9
Barbados 4.7 4.7 4.0 4.4 21 7 … … … … 0.1 0.1
Belize 72.5 72.5 1.7 2.9 15 10 … … … … 14.9 30.4
Dominica 66.7 61.3 0.9 1.6 … 1 … … … … 3.7 4.5
Grenada 11.8 11.8 1.3 2.1 4 1 0.04 0.05 … … 0.1 0.1
Guadeloupe 49.7 47.3 3.3 4.0 … … … … … … … 3.1
French Guiana 91.8 91.5 6.9 5.4 … … … … … … … 5.4
Guyana 76.7 76.7 1.6 2.0 19 24 0.28 0.29 … … … 2.2
Cayman Islands 46.2 46.2 9.5 7.0 … … … … … … … 92.7
Turks and Caicos Islands 79.1 79.1 … … … … … … … … … …
British Virgin Islands 26.7 26.7 2.9 3.9 … … … … … … … 34.6
United States Virgin Islands 35.3 29.4 … … … … … … … … … 3.0
Jamaica 31.9 31.3 3.4 4.0 424 5 0.03 0.04 383 409 3.6 13.5
Martinique 43.4 43.4 5.7 3.3 … … … … … … … 10.5
Montserrat 40.0 40.0 3.1 11.6 … … … … … … … 10.7
Puerto Rico 45.5 46.0 … … … … … … … … … 2.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis 13.9 13.9 1.6 2.6 6 2 … … … … 9.6 9.6
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 23.1 28.2 0.7 1.7 3 1 … … … … 1.3 1.3
Saint Lucia 27.9 27.9 1.2 2.3 8 2 … … … … 2.2 2.4
Suriname 94.7 94.7 4.5 5.1 40 8 0.08 0.09 … … 2.2 11.5
Trinidad and Tobago 45.8 44.1 13.8 24.7 138 18 … … 706 712 1.7 1.8
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx. The figures for indicators relating to Cuba were supplied directly by the National Statistical Office (ONE).
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
c
 Based on constant GDP in 1997 prices. Corresponds to the year 2007.
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Table A-22




Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access  
to safe drinking water and sanitation
Target 7.D: 
By 2010, to have 
achieved a significant 
improvement in the 




































Slum dwellers in 
urban areas
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2001
Latin America and  
  the Caribbean 84 92 92 97 61 72 68 79 81 86 35 51 35 32
Latin America 84 92 92 97 60 72 68 79 81 86 34 50 36 33
Argentina 94 96 97 98 72 80 81 91 86 92 45 83 31 33
Bolivia 72 86 91 96 49 69 33 43 49 54 14 22 70 61
Brazil 83 91 93 97 55 58 71 77 82 84 37 37 45 37
Chile 90 95 98 98 49 72 84 94 91 97 52 74 4 9
Colombia 92 93 98 99 78 77 82 78 95 85 52 58 26 22
Costa Rica … 98 100 99 … 96 … 96 … 96 97 95 12 13
Cuba … 96 b 84 99 b 78 89 b … 98 b 96 98 b 68 90 b … …
Ecuador 73 95 82 98 61 91 63 84 77 91 45 72 28 26
El Salvador 67 84 87 94 48 68 51 86 70 90 33 80 45 35
Guatemala 79 96 89 99 72 94 58 84 73 90 47 79 66 62
Haiti 47 58 60 70 42 51 24 19 25 29 23 12 85 86
Honduras 84 84 92 95 79 74 50 66 77 78 31 55 24 18
Mexico 82 95 89 98 64 85 58 81 75 91 13 48 23 20
Nicaragua 70 79 91 90 46 63 45 48 64 57 24 34 81 81
Panama 90 92 99 96 79 81 71 74 89 78 51 63 31 31
Paraguay 62 77 81 94 44 52 58 70 72 89 45 42 37 25
Peru 74 84 89 92 41 63 52 72 69 85 15 36 60 68
Dominican Republic 84 95 98 97 66 91 52 79 60 81 43 74 56 38
Uruguay 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 7 7
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) … 83 b … 85 b … 70 b … 68 b … 71 b … 48 b 41 41
The Caribbean 93 94 97 97 89 91 88 89 94 89 78 88 13 10
Anguilla … 60 b … 60 b … … 99 99 b 99 99 … … 40 41
Antigua and Barbuda … 91 95 95 … 89 b … 95 b 98 98 … 94 b 7 7
Netherlands Antilles … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1
Aruba 100 100 100 100 100 100 … … … … … … 2 2
Bahamas … 97 b 98 98 … 86 b 100 100 100 100 100 100 2 2
Barbados 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 99 100 100 1 1
Belize … 91 b 100 100 … 82 b … 47 b … 71 b … 25 b 54 62
Dominica … 97 b 100 100 … 90 b … 84 b … 86 b … 75 b 17 14
Grenada … 95 b 97 97 … 93 b 97 97 96 96 97 97 7 7
Guadeloupe … 98 b 98 98 … 93 b … 64 b … 64 b … 61 b 7 7
French Guiana … 84 b 88 … 71 … 78 … 85 … 57 … 13 13
Guyana … 93 … 98 … 91 … 81 … 85 … 80 5 5
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 2
Turks and Caicos Islands 100 100 100 100 100 100 … 96 b 98 98 … 94 b 2 3
British Virgin Islands 100 100 98 98 b 98 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 3 3
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 2
Jamaica 92 93 98 97 86 88 75 83 86 82 64 84 29 36
Martinique … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 2
Montserrat 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 96 96 96 96 96 11 9
Puerto Rico … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 2
Saint Kitts and Nevis 100 99 99 99 99 99 95 96 96 96 96 96 5 5
Saint Vincent and  
     the Grenadines … … … … … 93
 b
… … … … 96 96 5 5
Saint Lucia 98 98 98 98 98 98 … 89 b … 89 b … 89 b 12 12
Suriname … 92 98 97 … 79 … 82 99 89 … 60 7 7
Trinidad and Tobago 92 94 93 97 89 93 100 92 100 92 100 92 35 32
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx. The figures for indicators relating to Cuba were supplied directly by the National Statistical Office (ONE).
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
 Figures relate to the most recent year for which information was available (as distinct from the year in the heading of the column).
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Table A-23
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
 Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development
Target 8.F:  
In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications
Indicator 8.14 




per 100 population 
Indicator 8.16.1 
Personal computers in 
use per 100 population
Indicator 8.16.2 
Internet users per 
100 population
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
Country or territory 1990 2006 1990 2006 1998 2006 1996 2006
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.2 17.3 0.0 54.3 3.4 12.1 0.3 18.7
Latin America 5.9 17.2 0.0 53.7 3.3 12.1 0.3 18.4
Argentina 9.3 24.2 0.04 80.5 5.5 9.1 b 0.2 20.9
Bolivia 2.7 7.1 0 30.8 0.8 2.4 b 0.2 6.2
Brazil 6.3 20.5 … 52.9 3.0 16.1 b 0.5 22.6
Chile 6.6 20.2 0.11 75.6 6.3 14.8 b 0.7 25.2
Colombia 6.9 17.0 0 64.3 3.2 5.4 0.3 14.5
Costa Rica 10.1 30.2 0 32.8 7.8 23.1 b 0.9 27.6
Cuba 3.2 11.0 b 0.2 b 2.90 b 1.4 4.5 b 0.5 11.7 b
Ecuador 4.8 13.1 0 63.2 1.9 12.7 0.1 11.5
El Salvador 2.4 14.8 0 55.0 … 5.1 b 0.1 10.0
Guatemala 2.1 10.5 … 55.6 0.8 2.1 b 0.0 10.2
Haiti 0.7 1.7 0 13.9 … 0.2 b 0.0 7.5
Honduras 1.7 9.7 0 30.4 0.8 1.9 0.0 4.7
Mexico 6.5 ... 0.08 52.6 3.7 13.9 0.2 19.0
Nicaragua 1.3 4.4 0 32.7 1.9 3.8 b 0.1 2.8
Panama 9.3 14.9 0 66.1 2.7 4.6 b 0.2 15.3
Paraguay 2.7 5.3 0 51.3 1.0 7.5 b 0.0 4.1
Peru 2.6 8.5 … 30.9 3.0 10.0 b 0.3 22.9
Dominican Republic 4.8 9.9 0.04 51.1 … 2.3 b 0.1 15.9
Uruguay 13.6 28.3 0 66.8 9.1 13.9 b 1.9 24.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 7.6 15.5 0.04 69.0 3.9 9.3 b 0.3 14.5
The Caribbean 17.1 23.6 0.2 79.1 6.3 11.8 0.4 31.2
Anguilla … 47.0 0 107.1 b … 20.5 b … 32.3
Antigua and Barbuda 25.2 45.5 0 133.6 … 21.2 2.9 64.2
Netherlands Antilles 24.7 37.2 b 0 90.1 b … … 0.2 0.9 b
Aruba 28.2 38.4 0 104.9 … 9.9 2.7 23.8
Bahamas 27.4 40.2 0.75 77.3 … 12.4 b 1.8 33.6
Barbados 28.1 50.1 b 0 87.8 7.5 14.9 b 0.4 92.5
Belize 9.2 12.5 0 44.1 8.8 15.6 0.9 10.9
Dominica 16.4 29.4 b 0 58.7 … 18.2 b 1.1 37.2
Grenada 17.7 26.7 0.17 44.6 10.8 15.5 b 0.3 21.2
Guadeloupe … … … … 19.1 20.3 b 0.0 19.0 b
French Guiana … … … … 13.2 18.0 b 0.4 22.5 b
Guyana 2.2 14.7 0 37.5 2.4 3.9 b 0.1 23.3
Cayman Islands 46.9 92.9 b 0 74.6 b … … … 45.8
Turks and Caicos Islands … 14.8 b 0 99.6 b … … … …
British Virgin Islands 39.3 55.3 b 0 37.8 b … … … 18.9 b
United States Virgin Islands 45.3 64.0 b 0 71.7 b … 2.7 b … 26.8
Jamaica 4.5 12.9 0 93.7 3.9 6.8 b 0.6 48.8
Martinique … … … … 10.6 20.8 b … 32.8 b
Montserrat 32.7 73.5 0 108.0 … … … 25.0
Puerto Rico 27.9 26.2 0.58 84.8 b … 0.8 b 0.3 25.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis 23.9 59.3 b 0 23.7 b 11.3 26.1 b 2.0 32.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 12.4 19.0 0 73.6 8.9 13.9 b 0.5 29.4
Saint Lucia 12.4 32.6 b 0 65.7 13.3 16.3 b 0.7 61.7
Suriname 9.1 18.0 0 70.8 … 4.5 b 0.2 8.4
Trinidad and Tobago 14.1 24.9 0 68.8 4.7 17.4 0.4 22.0
Source: United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: a Latin America and Caribbean perspective, J.L. Machinea, A. Bárcena and A. León (coords.) (LC/G.2331-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005; United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Default.aspx.
a
 The indicators appear in the order in which they are listed officially; the absence of any indicator is due to lack of information. Figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
For indicators recorded at two different times, the regional and subregional averages take into account only those countries for which information is available at both times.
b
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